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Abstract 
This essay is an exercise in philosophy. It asks, Òwhat are the colors?Ó, and 
ultimately provides a primitivist answer. The essay has four parts. The first is entitled 
ÒStage settingÓ and has two subparts. In 1.1, I provide an explanation of how we should 
understand the question of which this essay is concerned. The goal of 1.2 is to provide an 
adequate taxonomy of views. Part 2 is entitled ÒDispositional viewsÓ and has three 
subparts. In 2.1, I argue against appearance dispositional views. In 2.2, I argue against 
reflectance dispositionalism. Finally in 2.3, I provide a general argument against the 
colors being dispositions. Part 3 is entitled ÒCategorical viewsÓ and has three subparts. In 
3.1, I argue against micro-structuralism. In 3.2, I argue against CohenÕs relationalism. 
Finally in 3.3, I argue for and defend non-relational primitivism. In the last major section 
of this essay I look at whether we should give up on the colors actually being instantiated. 
This section has only one subpart, and in it I reject the argument that the best explanation 
of mass disagreement about the colors is that irrealism is true.  
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Preface 
 
The colors and physics 
This essay is concerned with the question ÒWhat are the colors?Ó When talking with 
those who have not been educated in analytic philosophy (and also sometimes with some 
who have) it is not uncommon for someone to ask, ÒHasnÕt physics already answered that 
question? Are not the colors wavelengths of light?Ó My reply is always that in the 
vernacular the term ÒcolorÓ is used to pick out a property of external objects in addition 
to a property of light, and so the relevant use of ÒcolorÓ in physics should be understood 
as only being a technical term.  
 ÒBut doesnÕt physics tell us that nothing is actually colored?Ó Scientists 
sometimes seem to be under the impression that it has been discovered that nothing is 
actually colored. Their reasoning seems to be that one can explain our experiences as of 
objects being colored without needing to say that things are colored. It is true that one 
can provide a causal explanation for why we have color experiences without needing to 
posit colors. However, just because one can do this does not imply that nothing is 
actually colored. For example, just because one can explain why we perceive macro 
composite objects without needing to posit any macro composite objects does not imply 
that there are no macro composite objects. In the color case just like in the object case, 
what is needed is an argument to the effect that the irrealist hypothesis is preferable to the 
realist hypothesis. The construction of such an argument would be a philosophical 
endeavor not a scientific one. So, physics has not shown that nothing is colored.  
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Moreover, it is impossible to say whether nothing is colored until we know what 
it is that we are saying nothing has. Thus, physics could not have discovered that nothing 
is colored unless physicists already knew the answer to what it is that the colors are. 
Physicists do not know the answer to this question. Their use of ÒcolorÓ is irrelevant. 
Interestingly, if their use of ÒcolorÓ were relevant, physicists should hold that some things 
(i.e. light waves) are actually colored. Regardless, both of my interlocutorÕs questions 
above must be answered in the negative.  
 
The colors and philosophy 
Is the world really the way it appears? A negative answer to this question (or at least 
more negative than not) has had a huge impact on the ontology of color. In the Essay, 
Locke famously says, ÒLet not the Eyes see Light or Colours [É] and all Colours [É], as 
they are such particular ideas, vanish and Cease, and are reduced to their Causes, i.e. 
Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts (2004, II-viii-17). This view that external objects are 
not really colored, or at least not really colored in the way that they are really square, was 
orthodoxy for a long time. However, it is no longer so obvious that such a secondary 
quality view is correct. There has recently been a revolution the result of which being that 
the secondary quality view now has many contenders. There are now myriad realist views 
on color from Byrne and HilbertÕs (2003a) reflectance physicalism to the increasingly 
popular simple view on color supported by Campbell (1997).  
 However, because of this revolution, it is even more obvious than it was before 
that philosophers do not agree on what the colors are. This is unfortunate. For an answer 
to the relevant question would be intrinsically interesting. Anyone who is disposed to ask 
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philosophical questions has at some point wondered about color. The world appears to be 
painted in rich greens, blues, reds, and so on. However, modern science fails to 
adequately say what it is that we are seeing when we see the green of the grass, the blue 
of the sky, and the red of the tomato. Thus, the philosophically minded is left to his own 
devices. This leads him to ask questions such as, Òis the redness really in the tomato like 
its roundness is or is redness just a disposition of the object to create some effect in us?Ó 
As anyone who has been down this path knows such metaphysical questions are 
fascinating, difficult, and demanding of an answer.  
An answer to what the colors are is also instrumentally important, because it 
would shed light on the nature of other properties classically classified as secondary 
qualities (e.g. smells, tastes, and sounds). In fact, I think it is even reasonable that an 
answer to what the colors are could shed some light on the enquiry into what beauty is. 
The reason why an answer to what the colors are would probably shed light onto what 
these other properties are is that the arguments used in the ontology of color are going to 
be relevant, at least to some degree, to the ontology of smells, tastes, sounds, and beauty. 
So, the enquiry into what the colors are is an exercise the merits of which are far 
reaching: An investigation into what the colors are is important to the ontology of 
secondary qualities in general as well as to meta-aesthetics.  
 
The colors and this essay 
This essay is mainly an exercise in philosophy. Philosophers attempt to answer hard 
metaphysical questions mainly by thinking about them. Some are skeptical about whether 
this philosophical method is a good one. There is no special reason to be skeptical. It is 
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undeniable that we know a lot about the world due to scientific investigation. However, 
without thinking about the world we are in there would be no science, and it is only in 
conjunction with a sharp mind that the results of experiments are meaningful. So, 
thinking about the world is a necessary part of any knowledge seeking activity. 
Moreover, the colors are properties of objects of which we are familiar, and thanks to the 
work of Hardin (1988) and Thompson (1995) (amongst others) a great deal about color 
science has been made accessible to the non-scientist. Thus, I believe to be in the position 
to say something interesting about what the colors are.  
This essay has four parts. The first is entitled ÒStage settingÓ and has two 
subparts. In 1.1, I provide an explanation of how we should understand the question of 
which this essay is concerned. The goal of 1.2 is to provide an adequate taxonomy of 
views. Part 2 is entitled ÒDispositional viewsÓ and has three subparts. In 2.1, I argue 
against appearance dispositional views. In 2.2, I argue against reflectance 
dispositionalism. Finally in 2.3, I provide a general argument against the colors being 
dispositions. Part 3 is entitled ÒCategorical viewsÓ and has three subparts. In 3.1, I argue 
against micro-structuralism. In 3.2, I argue against CohenÕs relationalism. Finally in 3.3, I 
argue for and defend non-relational primitivism. In the last major section of this essay I 
look at whether we should give up on the colors actually being instantiated. This section 
has only one subpart, and in it I reject the argument that the best explanation of mass 
disagreement about the colors is that irrealism is true.  
 
       Pendaran Roberts 
       University of Nottingham 
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Part 1: Stage Setting 
 
In part 1, I shall set the stage for my enquiry into what the colors are. In part 1.1, I will 
clarify how one is to understand the question ÒWhat are the colors?Ó In part 1.2, I will 
provide a taxonomy of views on color to guide my enquiry. 
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Part 1.1: Getting Clear On The Question 
Before one can start an enquiry into a subject, one most have some way of understanding 
the question being asked. Moreover, if one does a poor job of understanding the question 
to be investigated, then this is likely to cause problems down the road. So, in this brief, 
opening chapter, I want to spend some time on how we should understand the question 
with which I am concerned, i.e. the question, ÒWhat are the colors?Ó I shall first discuss 
how I think we should understand this question (section 1). Having done this, I will then 
look at how we ought to identify (or pick out) the properties with which I am concerned 
(section 2).  
 
Section 1: Understanding the question 
Philosophers have an intuitive grasp on what is meant by a metaphysical question like the 
one with which I am interested. However, there is seldom much time given to trying to 
get a better explicit grasp on what is being asked. I believe it is worth doing so, however 
briefly, because just how ambiguous the question is can be demonstrated by a humorous 
reply given by a friend: He said, ÒThe colors are (1) Red, (2) Orange, (3) Yellow, (4) 
Green (5) ÉÓ The wittiness of this answer comes from the fact that it is the result of 
purposely misinterpreting the question being asked, but what exactly is the question such 
that this answer is inappropriate?  
There are a lot replies to the question Òwhat are the colors?Ó that take the form 
Òthe colors are identical withÉÓ that are not appropriate answers to this question as I 
understand it. My friendÕs humorous answer above is one such example. There are others. 
For instance, it would be an inappropriate answer to say, ÒThe colors are the properties of 
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which this essay is concerned,Ó or to say, ÒThe colors are the properties that Tom likes.Ó 
There are also a lot of appropriate answers to my question (see part 1.2). For instance, 
saying, ÒThe colors are dispositions to reflect certain proportions of incident lightÓ is an 
appropriate answer, and so is saying, ÒThe colors are primitive properties that we 
experience objects as having when having visual experiences.Ó  
  In order to get clear on what separates the above latter two replies from the former 
two it is important to distinguish between a reply to ÒWhat are the colors?Ó that merely 
tells us something(s) about them (a reply that only gives identifying conditions), and a 
reply that does more than this by telling us what the colors are (and includes no 
superfluous information) (a reply that gives identity conditions).
1
 Identity conditions tell 
us what the entities are that are the colors. Identifying conditions, on the other hand, 
merely tell us a way to identify (or pick out) the entities that are the colors by telling us 
certain properties that the entities that are the colors have or by telling us that a certain 
phrase, for example, Òthe properties that Tom likes,Ó picks out the entities that are the 
colors. In order to understand this difference in types of replies to Òwhat are the colors?Ó 
let us look at the analogous question, Òwhat is beauty?Ó One could say that beauty is the 
property that a tropical sunset has, or that it is the property I long for. On the other hand, 
one could say that beauty is the disposition to cause pleasing aesthetic experiences in 
normal humans, or that beauty is a primitive property we experience when looking at 
beautiful things. These latter two answers give identity conditions, but the former two 
merely give identifying conditions. That is, the latter replies tell us what the entities are 
                                                
1
 This distinction (or something a lot like it) has been made by Evans (1985), McDowell (1985), Wiggins 
(1987), and more recently emphasized by Watkins (2002). 
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that are the colors, and the former replies merely tell us a way to identify the entities that 
are the colors.  
We are now in a position to understand the question ÒWhat are the colors?Ó The 
question is asking after the identity conditions for the colors. So, only replies that give 
identity conditions are appropriate answers to my question. Hence, it is neither 
appropriate to answer the question by saying, ÒThe colors are the properties of which this 
essay is concernedÓ nor by saying, ÒThe colors are the properties that Tom likes.Ó This is 
because neither of these answers is capable of giving us identity conditions for the colors; 
they only provide identifying conditions. Contrary to this, saying, ÒThe colors are 
dispositions to reflect certain proportions of incident lightÓ provides us with identity 
conditions and so does saying, ÒThe colors are primitive properties that we experience 
objects as having when having visual experiences.Ó  
 
Section 2: Identifying conditions 
I have clarified that my question is asking after the identity conditions for the colors, but 
in order to even begin to answer my question we need some way of better identifying the 
properties with which I am concerned. Why is the phrase Òthe colorsÓ insufficient for 
identifying the properties with which I am interested? The reason is that the meaning of 
Òthe colorsÓ is ambiguous. Physicists, for example, use the phrase Òthe colorsÓ to refer to 
certain wavelengths of light, but the vernacular usage of this term shows that the concept 
being expressed is also about certain properties of objectsÕ surfaces, not just wavelengths 
of light. Theoretical physicists use the term ÒcolorÓ to refer to a property of quarks and 
gluons related to the strong interaction in quantum chromodynamics. This property has 
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little to do with color in the vernacular sense. So, it is important that we give an 
identifying condition that is less ambiguous than Òthe colors.Ó 
Identifying conditions are not created equal. The identifying condition that fills in 
the question ÒThe colors are identical with____?Ó with the Òthe properties Tom likes,Ó for 
instance, is a poor way of picking out the colors. First, it is only contingently true. 
Second, even if Òthe properties Tom likesÓ were made rigid, it would still be inadequate, 
because it is too indirect. One could not identify the colors using ÒThe properties Tom 
likesÓ unless one already knew how to locate the colors. One may know that Tom likes 
these properties called Òthe colorsÓ but be confused about how to locate these properties 
and so need further guidance. Thus, the best identifying condition should be as direct as 
possible so that one is not first required to locate the colors (or to know about things that 
are not the colors, e.g. TomÕs preferences) in order to understand what is being picked 
out. So, an identifying condition should comply with at least these two requirements: (1) 
The condition refers to the colors in every possible world (in which it refers at all), and 
(2) the condition, as much as possible, directly picks out the colors.  
An indentifying condition that appears to meet these criteria is to fill in the 
relevant question with (a) Òthe properties that make our vernacular claims about colored 
things true.Ó An obvious problem with this condition is that it is not as direct as one may 
like. People may be confused by the ambiguities mentioned previously, and so would 
have to sort through these first before this identifying condition would be useful. Thus, 
my preferred identifying condition with which to fill in the question ÒThe colors 
are____?Ó is (b) Òthe properties that we actually experience things as having when having 
visual experiences as of things being colored,Ó where Òan experience as of a thing being 
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coloredÓ is just an experience with that phenomenal character with which we are all 
familiar. To be clear, this condition is better than (a), because it more directly points to 
the properties we perceive with which I am concerned.  
 
2. 1: An ambiguity? 
Those who favor representationalist talk will interpret Òthe properties that we actually 
experience things as having when having visual experiences as of things being coloredÓ 
as saying Òthe properties represented by the representational content of the relevant 
experiences.Ó This poses no obvious problem for my identifying condition. However, 
Shoemaker (1994) and Chalmers (2006) have argued for dual content theories. These 
theories hold that an experience as of red, for instance, has more than one content. 
Shoemaker (1994) believes that an experience as of red has two Russelian contents, one 
that involves redness and another that involves an Òappearance propertyÓ that is distinct 
from but associated with redness. Chalmers (2006) thinks that an experience as of red has 
a Russelian content that involves what he calls Òperfect rednessÓ (a purely qualitative 
property) and a Fregean content that involves a certain functional role. 
  If either Shoemaker or Chalmers is right (or both), then my proposed identifying 
condition is ambiguous. So, assuming a dual content view, there are three options 
available. 
i. The colors are the properties represented by content A. 
ii. The colors are the properties represented by content B. 
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iii. It is incoherent that there are colors; It is only coherent that there are those 
properties represented by A and those represented by B.
2
  
 
My preferred identifying condition is (b) that the colors are those properties we 
experience objects as having when having visual experiences as of things being colored, 
where an experience as of something being colored is just an experience with that 
phenomenal character with which we are familiar. Hence, if Chalmers is right, then the 
properties with which I am interested are the Russelian contents that involve purely 
qualitative colors. So, if Chalmers is right, I say the colors are the perfect colors. If 
Shoemaker is right, then the properties with which I am interested are the Russelian 
contents that involve appearance properties. So, if Shoemaker is right, I say that the 
colors are appearance properties. If one likes option (iii), one can understand my inquiry 
to shift from being about the colors to being about the Russelian contents that involve 
appearance properties in ShoemakerÕs case and to the Russelian contents that involve 
purely qualitative properties in ChalmersÕ. So, given this perspective on how to handle 
my enquiry, if Chalmers is right, the colors* are the perfect colors, and if Shoemaker is 
right, the colors* are appearance properties. Having given a taste of how to respond to 
any ambiguities, I shall from here on assume that my identifying condition is 
unambiguous.  
 
                                                
2
 It is important not to confuse iii with the claim that external objects are not actually colored. This is 
because iii is a much stronger claim. Option iii says that the whole investigation into what the colors is just 
confused. The reasoning would go something like this: The property of being red is identical with the 
property that we represent things as having when having experiences as of red. However, there are multiple 
properties that we represent things as having when having experiences as of red. One thing cannot be two. 
So, the property of being red is a logically impossible property and mutatis mutandis for the other colors. 
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Part 1.2: A Taxonomy of Views3 
 
In this chapter, I provide a taxonomy of views on color. Regrettably, I believe that none 
of the taxonomies available are satisfactory. Without an adequate taxonomy, the inquiry 
into what the colors are is going to be much harder and more prone to confusion than it 
would be otherwise. So, in this chapter, I first examine the two newest taxonomies and 
explain why they are unsatisfactory. Specifically, I look at BrogaardÕs (section 1) and 
then CohenÕs (section 2). One of the reasons I am unsatisfied with Brogaard and CohenÕs 
taxonomies is that I find it implausible that dispositions are ipso facto relational 
properties. I provide an argument against this way of classifying dispositional properties 
(section 3). Having learned from the vices and virtues of Brogaard and CohenÕs 
taxonomies, I provide a much-improved way of taxonomizing views on what the colors 
are (section 4). My taxonomy rules out certain views, clarifies others, and shows that 
there is an unnoticed view worthy of serious consideration. 
 
Section 1: BrogaardÕs taxonomy 
Brogaard (2010a) provides what she calls Ôa category scheme for the colors.Õ
 
Her 
category scheme suggests that order, family, genus, and species relations hold between 
positions on color. BrogaardÕs category scheme can be interpreted as follows:
4
  
                                                
3
 This chapter has been published with a longer introduction and a few other minor changes in Synthese. 
Please see Roberts, 2013. Also, the article is available online at 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-013-0368-z 
4
 Brogaard (2010a) does not consistently stick to her category scheme, but she has confirmed via written 
correspondence that the taxonomy I attribute to her captures her scheme. 
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  Figure 1.1: BrogaardÕs taxonomy 
 
 
One can see from this figure that Brogaard (2010a) divides views on what the 
colors are into two orders: ÒirrealismÓ and Òrealism.Ó I understand realism to be the view 
that the colors are properties that are actually instantiated by external objects, and 
irrealism to be the view that the colors are properties that are not actually instantiated by 
external objects (Hardin, 1988; Chalmers, 2006). Under the realism node, Brogaard is 
best interpreted as holding that there are two families of views on color: role 
functionalism and realizer functionalism. The way I understand these nodes is that role 
functionalism holds that the colors are second-level properties of having properties that 
realize the appropriate roles, and that realizer functionalism is the view that the colors are 
the first-level properties that realize the appropriate roles. Brogaard would prefer to call 
the relevant nodes ÒrelationalismÓ and Ònon-relationalismÓ respectively. I understand 
relationalism to be the view that the colors are relational properties and non-relationalism 
to be the view that they are non-relational properties. So, these terms cannot be 
substituted for the others, because there can be relational properties that are not role 
properties, for example, the property of being part of the device, the property of being 
identical with phosphorus, the property of being west of London, etc. I regard the nodes 
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immediately under realism as being captured by my definitions of role and realizer 
functionalism. 
Brogaard specifies three role functionalist views: Òdispositionalism,Ó ÒCohenÕs 
view,Ó and Òcategorical ground theories.Ó Dispositionalism has historically been 
intricately linked with the secondary quality view on color. Brogaard seems to understand 
dispositionalism in this narrow historical way. Roughly, she says that dispositionalism is 
the view that the colors are dispositions to give rise to phenomenal effects. However, 
given that today there are dispositional views like Byrne and HilbertÕs reflectance 
physicalism (see below) which differ substantially from the secondary quality view, it is 
preferable to understand dispositionalism in a broader sense. I understand 
dispositionalism broadly to be the view that the colors are dispositional properties akin to 
being fragile. Understanding dispositionalism in this way allows for one to see 
similarities and differences that would otherwise go unnoticed between views on color.  
CohenÕs view, as I understand it, is that the colors are relational properties that 
construe the colors as being constituted by relations to subjects (possibly also amongst 
other things) (Cohen, 2004; 2009, p 9-10).
5
 More specifically, CohenÕs view can be 
cashed out as one according to which it is constitutive of (or essential to) any color L that 
there is a relation R such that for any object x, x is color L iff there exists an observer y 
(which need not be the same for different xÕs) such that x bears R to y (2004; 2009, p. 8-
12, 24-36). (In section 4, I distinguish between two different species of CohenÕs view.) 
CohenÕs view is best captured as relationalist not role functionalist. It is first and 
                                                
5
 Cohen (2004; 2009) does not clearly differentiate between relations and relational properties. Relations 
are not the right type of things to be the colors. Objects can have colors, but they can only stand in 
relations. So, to be charitable I interpret Cohen as holdings the view that the colors are relational properties 
not relations.  
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foremost obviously a relationalist view on color, and, as I said, there can be relational 
properties that are not role properties.
6
   
Categorical ground theories hold that the colors are the categorical grounds of 
dispositions to cause certain phenomenal effects in perceivers if viewed (Jackson, 1996). 
In other words, categorical ground theories do not hold that the colors are dispositions to 
cause certain phenomenal effects but the categorical properties that ground or realize 
these dispositions. This view is most naturally understood as realizer functionalist not as 
role functionalist, because it says that the colors are the grounds or realizers of certain 
dispositions. A role functionalist understanding would require that one accept that the 
categorical grounds of the relevant dispositions are role properties, but role properties, 
unlike categorical ones, are understood in terms of causal powers. Notice that if we 
interpret the role functionalist node to be a relationalism node, this would result in 
CohenÕs view being better categorized but would not ultimately improve things for two 
reasons: First, categorical ground theories neither fit well under a role functionalism node 
nor a relationalism node. As I said, categorical ground theories are best categorized as 
realizer functionalist. Second, I think it is implausible that dispositions are ipso facto 
relational properties (see section 3), and so it would be wrong to place a dispositionalism 
node (especially given my understanding) under a relationalism node.  
It appears that Brogaard believes that there are two species of dispositionalism 
about color: ÒcontemporaryÓ and ÒecologicalÓ dispositionalism. I understand 
contemporary dispositionalism to be the view that for any color C, C is identical with the 
disposition to cause certain experiences if viewed by a certain kind of perceiver in certain 
                                                
6
 Cohen (2009) ends up endorsing a role functionalist view, but this view is not identical with what is 
called ÒCohenÕs view.Ó According to Cohen, his role functionalist view is a species of what he calls 
ÒRelationalism.Ó CohenÕs view captures the idea of ÒrelationalismÓ given in part 1.3 of his book. 
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conditions (usually qualified Ôby normal observers in normal viewing conditionsÕ) 
(McGinn, 1983; Johnston, 1992). This view is the modern version of the secondary 
quality view famously endorsed by Locke amongst others. Ecological dispositionalism 
includes a series of views that are based on the ecological approach to zoology that insists 
the animal cannot be studied independently of its environment (Thompson, 1995; No, 
2004). The most developed view of this kind is NoÕs (2004) theory that the colors are 
dispositions to modify how an object appears with respect to its color as the relevant 
conditions change.
7
 Thompson (1995, p. 242-250) also argues for an ecological view, 
although his view is poorly developed and has been argued to collapse into contemporary 
dispositionalism (Byrne and Hilbert, 2003, p. 7-8).  
 Brogaard specifies two genuses of realizer functionalism: ÒphysicalismÓ and 
Òprimitivism.Ó I understand physicalism to hold that the colors are physical properties 
like being H2O or being atomic element 12. I understand primitivism to hold that the 
colors are non-reducible or sui generis (Yablo 1995; Westphal, 2005). That is, in contrast 
with the property of being water, which is often thought of as being reducible to the 
property being H2O, primitivism holds that the colors are properties such as being square, 
which is thought of as being irreducible. It is important to emphasize that the sense of 
ÒprimitiveÓ I just characterized is such that ÒprimitiveÓ is not synonymous with Òsimple.Ó 
Primitive properties in my sense can be complex. The way I understand things, the 
property of being a square is a primitive property even though it is composed of four 
sides of equal length. The property of being square is primitive in that it cannot be 
                                                
7
 The view I cite to No above is similar to the one Brogaard cites to him. However, NoÕs view is far from 
clearly presented, so unsurprisingly, the view that Allen (2009) cites to No is not unambiguously the same 
view that I cite to him. AllenÕs interpretation can be considered NoÕs view*. What is AllenÕs 
interpretation? He says that according to No the colors are patterns of organization in how things look (p. 
648-649).  
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reduced to any other property. The sense of ÒprimitiveÓ under which it means non-
reducible better maps onto how primitivists about color comprehend their view than the 
understanding under which the term means simple. Primitivists about color have never 
felt the need to deny that binary colors, unlike unitary colors, are composed out of other 
colors.  
A concern at this point is that Brogaard only places physicalism under the realizer 
functionalist node. However, there can be physical role properties (e.g. the property of 
being a transistor, the property of being a magnet, the property of being a jet engine, etc), 
at least under any broad conception of the physical like supervenience physicalism 
(Jackson, 1993; Chalmers, 1996). Brogaard divides the physicalism node into two species 
of view: Òmicro-structuralismÓ and Òreflectance physicalism.Ó Micro-structuralism is the 
view that the colors are identical with particular micro-structural properties (Smart; 1963; 
Armstrong, 1968). Reflectance physicalism is the view that the colors are identical with 
dispositions to reflect certain proportions of incident light at each wavelength of the 
visible spectrum (Tye, 2000; Byrne & Hilbert, 2003; 2004). An obvious concern here is 
that reflectance physicalism is a dispositional view on color as well as a physical view, 
but because of BrogaardÕs narrow conception of dispositionalism her taxonomy forces us 
to put it on the physicalism node. It would be preferable if a taxonomy of views on color 
could express that reflectance physicalism is a dispositional view.
8
 
                                                
8
 BrogaardÕs taxonomy differentiates between reflectance physicalism and the views under her 
dispositionalism node like this. Reflectance physicalism holds that the colors are realizer functionalist, 
whereas the views under the dispositionalism node holds that the colors are role functionalist. This is an 
odd way of differentiating these views given how I understand them, because reflectance physicalism being 
dispositionalist is not naturally understood as a first-level view. Dispositions are naturally understood as 
second level. One could distinguish between different stages of the second level, but this seems as if it 
would get confusing fast.  
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Perhaps this issue has made explicit a problem I have so far left implicit: Many of 
BrogaardÕs same-level nodes are prima facie compatible with each other. Brogaard has a 
unique primitivism node, but there can be primitive physical properties as well as non-
physical primitive properties. Also, Brogaard has a unique categorical ground theories 
node, but this view neither rules out physicalism nor primitivism. The categorical 
grounds of the relevant dispositions can be physical or primitive properties. Third, 
Brogaard has a unique physicalism node, but one can have physical primitive properties 
and physical dispositional properties, at least under any broad conception of the physical. 
Some of these problems, along with the issue of placing physicalism only under the 
realizer functionalist node, could be addressed by providing a narrow definition of 
Òphysical.Ó Brogaard seems to have some narrow sense of the physical in mind. 
However, it is unclear whether a narrow definition of ÒphysicalÓ could draw a principled 
distinction between views on color. An underlying problem is that the notion ÔphysicalÕ is 
difficult to get a handle on (Hempel, 1970; Crane & Mellor, 1990; Gocke, 2009).
9
 For 
this reason, it is best not to taxonomize views on color using the concept (Cohen, 2009, p. 
6-7).   
                                                
9
 Carl Hempel (1970) has argued that a theory-based conception of the physical cannot succeed. The 
problem he says is that the conception is either trivial or false. If physicalism is understood in terms of 
contemporary physics, then the theory-based conception is false. Contemporary physics is obviously not 
complete. If physicalism is comprehended in terms of a future or ideal physics, then the theory-based 
conception is trivial. We cannot presently know what is of interest to a future or ideal physics. Such a 
physics may contain ectoplasm. 
The theory-based conception of the physical is popular today regardless, but the modern version 
uses a rather broad understanding of Ôphysical.Õ The modern version of the theory-based conception says 
roughly that a property is physical iff it is either the kind of property that physics tells us about, or it is a 
property that metaphysically or logically supervenes on the kind of property that physics tells us about 
(Smart, 1978; Lewis, 1994, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 2007, p. 19-34, Chalmers, 1996, p. 71-92). 
Given this version, the notion of ÔphysicalÕ is so broad that it does not make for a particularly useful way of 
taxonomizing views on color.  
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There are three more problems with BrogaardÕs taxonomy worth mentioning. 
First, Brogaard does not metaphysically justify her taxonomic hierarchy. What would 
metaphysically justify Brogaard having role functionalism and realizer functionalism as 
her penultimate nodes instead of primitivism and non-primitivism, or what would 
metaphysically justify her having primitivism and non-primitivism over dispositionalism 
and non-dispositionalism? Perhaps answers to questions like these are of little practical 
importance, which is likely why Brogaard did not engage with them. However, this just 
goes to show that one should not accept the added complexity of hierarchical models 
without metaphysical support. Second, although I am unsure whether Brogaard intended 
her taxonomy to be exhaustive of logical space, it would be better if a taxonomy made it 
clear that there is logical room for undefended views.  
Third, BrogaardÕs taxonomy suggests that all the views that fall under the realist 
node are incompatible with irrealism, but this is wrong. It is coherent to hold that being 
red is a primitive property or a physical property, perhaps micro-structural, that nothing 
actually has. The reason why these views are compatible with irrealism is that the enquiry 
into what the colors are can be understood as one into the properties we have experiences 
as of things having when having visual experiences as of things being colored, and there 
can be an answer to what we are having experiences as of even if nothing is actually 
colored (see section 4). Another way of looking at this is that the colors are the properties 
that could make our experiences as of things being colored veridical, and there can be an 
answer as to what could do this even if nothing is actually colored. With this being said, 
when one considers that objects appear colored to us, CohenÕs view and contemporary 
dispositionalism prima facie look to be incompatible with irrealism. For Cohen, roughly, 
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if an object appears red, then it is (see section 4), and for contemporary dispositionalism, 
if an object appears red to a certain kind of perceiver in certain conditions (usually 
qualified Ònormal observers in normal viewing conditionsÓ), then it is.  
 
Section 2: CohenÕs taxonomy 
Cohen (2009) proposes what he considers to be a refined taxonomy of positions on what 
the colors are. His taxonomy says that order, family, genus, and species relations hold 
between philosophical views on color as follows (2009, p. 13):  
 
Figure 1.2: CohenÕs Taxonomy 
 
Cohen splits views on color into two orders: Ònon-relationalismÓ and 
Òrelationalism.Ó CohenÕs relational node is narrower than the role functionalist node used 
in BrogaardÕs taxonomy, at least as I understand her node. This is because Cohen says a 
view falls under the relationalism node iff it says that the Òcolors are constituted in terms 
of relations to subjects [possibly inter alia]Ó (2009, p. 10). Thus, CohenÕs relationalism 
node seems to be (basically) identical with ÒCohenÕs viewÓ as I understand it in 
BrogaardÕs taxonomy. In addition to this disparity in terms, two more disparities are 
worth mentioning. First, what Cohen (p. 13) calls Òecological relationalismÓ is the same 
as Òecological dispositionalismÓ with one caveat: Cohen only talks about ThompsonÕs 
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(1995) ecological view and does not mention NoÕs (2004) view. Second, what Cohen 
calls ÒdispositionalismÓ is the same as Òcontemporary dispositionalism.Ó This use of 
ÒdispositionalismÓ has the immediate anomalous consequence that reflectance 
physicalism is not dispositionalist. Cohen seems to be using the term ÒdispositionalismÓ 
in a historically narrow way, but, as I suggested in section 1, I think that this use is 
outdated given the assortment of views now available. 
Physicalism, micro-structuralism, reflectance physicalism, and categorical ground 
theories are not nodes in CohenÕs taxonomy. Cohen agrees with me that the notion 
ÔphysicalÕ should be avoided, because it is unclear what condition a property has to 
satisfy to be physical (2009, p. 6-7). Cohen would place categorical ground theories 
under the non-relationalism node his taxonomy (p. 187). Cohen describes his Òidentity 
theory nodeÓ as involving views that say the colors are identical with microphysical 
properties or with non-subject involving functional kinds (p. 12). CohenÕs Òtype identityÓ 
node includes views that hold the colors to be microphysical types (p. 3). ÒToken 
identityÓ views according to Cohen hold that Òthere is no one physical constitution type 
that is shared by all instances of a given color [É], but every token instance of a given 
color is a member of some or other physical type that affects light in the requisite wayÓ 
(p. 3). Given the analogy that Cohen (p. 3) draws with token identity views in the 
philosophy of mind, I interpret the above quote as saying that a token identity view on 
color holds that for every particular instance of a color Ôhaving a color xÕ there is a 
particular physical instance Ôhaving a property yÕ such that having x = having y, but there 
is no one physical property type that all havingÕs of x share in common. Cohen places 
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reflectance physicalism under the token identity node and micro-structuralism under the 
type identity node.  
In addition to the above differences, Cohen adds two more nodes that are not to be 
found in BrogaardÕs taxonomy. Cohen calls the first such view Òrole functionalism.Ó 
Despite the fact that Brogaard also has a node by this name, CohenÕs role functionalism 
node is narrower than how I understand BrogaardÕs: Cohen defines the C role as the 
functional role of disposing the bearer of the functional property to look red to a subject 
in a circumstance (2009, p. 178), while I understand BrogaardÕs node to leave the C role 
open. The second new node that Cohen adds he calls Òsensory classificationism.Ó He 
attributes a view of this kind to Matthen (2005). Cohen (2009, p. 229) says, Òsensory 
classificationism construes colors in terms of relations between [...] objects [and] the 
sensory classifications made by subjectÕs visual systems.Ó
 
He says the appropriate 
classifications are those according to a telos given by Matthen (2005, p. 230). I am unsure 
whether this is the correct interpretation. Cohen seems to think that MatthenÕs view is 
that colors are relations which hold between objects and sensory classifications. 
However, Egan (2008, p. 408) says the view is that the colors are dispositions to 
Òproduce [É] Ôepistemic actions,Õ [where] epistemic actions include coming to have a 
perceptual belief, or making further classifications or generalizations.Ó Perhaps there are 
also other interpretations. 
 CohenÕs taxonomy avoids some of the issues with BrogaardÕs, because it does not 
have a high-level split between realism and irrealism and does not have a physicalism 
node or a categorical ground theories node. Also, it is worth mentioning that CohenÕs 
taxonomy makes it clear that there are possible unspecified views. Unfortunately, it 
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should be obvious that CohenÕs taxonomy makes at least two mistakes that are similar to 
errors discussed previously. First, Cohen provides no metaphysical justification for his 
taxonomic hierarchy over the many alternatives. What would metaphysically justify his 
having non-relationalism and relationalism as his top-level nodes instead of non-
primitivism and primitivism, or what would metaphysically justify his having non-
primitivism and primitivism over non-dispositionalism and dispositionalism? We should 
not accept the added complexity of a hierarchical model without metaphysical 
justification for it. One can give the non-relationalism/relationalism distinction a 
prominent role in a taxonomy on color like Cohen wants without using a hierarchical 
model. 
Second, Cohen places contemporary and ecological dispositionalism (or 
ÒdispositionalismÓ and Òecological relationalismÓ given CohenÕs terms) under the 
relationalism node of his taxonomy, but this placement is unintuitive. Certainly 
contemporary dispositionalism is intuitively not a relational view on color. One may 
retort that this view construes the colors as constituted by relations to subjects (Cohen, 
2009, p. 11), but this would be misguided. Either something can be disposed to cause 
experiences as of yellow if viewed by a certain kind of perceiver in certain conditions if 
no perceivers exists or it cannot. Intuitively, something can be so disposed even if no 
perceivers exist. If this is right, contemporary dispositionalism cannot construe the colors 
as constituted by relations to subjects. NoÕs view also seems as if it is non-relational. 
The view certainly cannot be understood to construe the colors as constituted by relations 
to any conditions. Something can be disposed to change how it appears with respect to 
color as certain conditions change even if the relevant conditions do not happen to obtain 
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(i.e. exist). If ThompsonÕs view collapses into contemporary dispositionalism, it too 
would intuitively not be a relational view. I further support the intuition that these 
dispositions are not relational in section 3 by arguing that dispositions are not ipso facto 
relational properties.  
There are four other problems with CohenÕs taxonomy that are best discussed at 
this juncture in some depth. The first problem results from failing to realize that there can 
be primitive relational properties, given the sense of ÔprimitiveÕ under which the term 
means non-reducible that I endorse and Cohen (2009, p. 4) seems to endorse. Cohen only 
places primitivism under the non-relationalism node of his taxonomy, but there is no 
obvious reason why there cannot be relational views on color that are also primitivist 
(whether relational views are understood in CohenÕs restricted sense or not). After all, 
there can certainly be primitive properties that are also relational. For example, the 
property of being in love is plausibly a primitive relational property. Likewise, the 
relation Ôin love withÕ is probably also primitive. Even if being in love and the relation Ôin 
love withÕ are reducible, this is not obvious. The same goes for other relational properties 
like being west of London, being above the sink, etc. So, there is no clear reason why the 
colors cannot involve primitive relational properties (whether or not they involve 
subjects). Hence, CohenÕs taxonomy ought not to rule out such views.  
The second problem results from failing to realize that one of the nodes in 
CohenÕs taxonomy is not exclusive. Specifically, the issue is that Cohen places his role 
functionalism about color on one of his lowest level nodes, but this view, as far as I can 
tell, can be true as well as contemporary dispositionalism. Cohen defines the functional 
role relevant to his role functionalism as that of disposing the bearer of the functional 
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property to look red to a subject in a circumstance. However, under this definition of the 
C role, the second-level property of having some or other first-level property that realizes 
this role looks a lot like the (constituted) disposition to appear red if viewed by a subject 
in a circumstance. Hence, as far as I can tell, CohenÕs role functionalism is at least a 
species of contemporary dispositionalism and may even be identical with it. So, CohenÕs 
version of role functionalism appears as if it should not be placed on a taxonomy as a 
separate species of view from contemporary dispositionalism.
10
   
The third problem results from not properly understanding reflectance 
physicalism. Cohen (2009, p. 3) says that micro-structuralism is a type identity theory but 
claims that reflectance physicalism is a token identity view. He is right about micro-
structuralism. However, assuming that Cohen understands token identity views 
analogously to the philosophy of mind literature, he is wrong about reflectance 
physicalism. Byrne and Hilbert, the main proponents of reflectance physicalism, hold that 
the colors are dispositions to reflect incident light at each wavelength of the visible 
spectrum (2003, p. 9). This is a type identity view; it says, for example, that the property 
being red is identical with the disposition to reflect R proportions of light at each 
wavelength of the visible spectrum.
11
 Byrne and Hilbert later retreat to the position that 
the colors are types (or sets) of dispositions to reflect certain proportions of incident light, 
or as they say, Ò[É] Both determinable and determinate colors are reflectance typesÓ 
                                                
10
 To be fair, Cohen (2009, p 11, footnote 18) says that contemporary dispositionalism may collapse into 
role functionalism. If there is such a collapse, it seems to me that it would go in the opposite direction, 
because contemporary dispositionalism provides a more fundamental answer to Òwhat are the colors?Ó than 
role functionalism. Role functionalism provides a rather indirect way of saying what the colors are.  
11
 Notice that whether reflectance dispositions are physical types (Cohen, 2009, footnote 4) is irrelevant to 
whether reflectance physicalism is a token identity view. Reflectance physicalism proposes a type 
reduction of the colors. So, if reflectance dispositions were not physical types, then this would only imply 
that reflectance physicalism is a non-physical type identity view. It would not imply that it is a token 
identity view.   
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(2003, p. 11). However, this view is also not a token identity view (in the philosophy of 
mind sense); it says that the property red, for instance, is identical with a type of 
disposition to reflect certain proportions of incident light rather than the specific 
dispositions to reflect light themselves. A token identity view, on the other hand, implies 
the falsity of such type identity claims.   
  The fourth problem with CohenÕs taxonomy results from not properly 
distinguishing between the questions Òwhat are the colors?Ó and Òwhat are the particular 
instances of the colors?Ó Assuming Cohen understands token identity views the way I 
think he does, he should not place them on a taxonomy of views on what the colors are. 
Token identity views do not tell us what being red is but only what each particular 
instance of redness is. So, token identity views (in the philosophy of mind sense) should 
not be on a taxonomy of views on what the colors are. One may retort that a token 
identity view implicitly provides a response to the question Òwhat are the colors?Ó to the 
effect that it cannot be answered. In reply, we are taxonomizing positions on what the 
colors are. Thus, a rejection of this question is a view to be considered but not 
taxonomized. One should not underestimate the importance of this point: If token identity 
views are understood to implicitly reject the question Òwhat are the colors?Ó, then putting 
them on a taxonomy of views on what the colors are is likely to lead to confusion in the 
future.  
 
Section 3: Dispositions are not relational properties 
When assessing Brogaard and CohenÕs taxonomies I claimed that it is implausible that 
dispositions are ipso facto relational properties. This may be controversial, because many 
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have utterly failed to differentiate between these properties (McGinn, 1983; 1996; 
Thompson, 1995; Byrne & Hilbert, 2003; No, 2004). We have already seen some signs 
of this when discussing the taxonomies above. Now, let us look at some obvious and 
specific examples. First, Thompson (1995, p. 242-250) when talking about his ecological 
view vacillates between saying that the colors are dispositional properties and saying that 
they are relational properties with no sign that he recognizes a distinction. Second, Byrne 
and Hilbert (2003, p. 8) seem to agree with Thompson that dispositions are relational 
properties. Finally, No, like Thompson, moves between saying that the colors are 
dispositions (2004, p.144) and saying that they are relational properties (p. 149) with no 
sign that he is aware that these properties are different in nature. I shall now argue that 
dispositions are not ipso facto relational properties.    
Roughly, my argument goes like this. (a) It is essential to relational properties that 
an object having one bears a relation to something(s), and (b) it is not essential to 
dispositional properties that an object having one bears a relation to something(s). To 
present my argument, I shall first explain why (a) is true and then (b). There are positive 
and impure relational properties (Khamara, 1988). The property of being married is an 
example of the former. This property is biconditionally dependent on the relation 
Ômarried toÕ such that a person x is married at time t iff x is married to someone at t. The 
property of being married to Tom is an example of the latter. This property is such that a 
person x has the property being married to Tom at time t iff there is an individual Tom 
and x is married to him at t. (Notice that CohenÕs view discussed in section 1 is that the 
colors are positive relational properties like being married.)  
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A general analysis of both these kinds of relational properties seems prima facie 
to run as follows (Humberstone, 1996, p. 211):  
General analysis: A property P is relational iff there is some relation R such that 
for all x, x has P at t only if for some thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn at t.  
 
However, Humberstone (1996, p. 211-212) argues correctly that there are some issues 
with this general analysis. The conditional Ôif x has P at t, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, 
Rxy1Éyn at tÕ comes out as vacuously true for impossible properties, and all objects 
regardless of their properties bear the identity relation to themselves. These issues with 
the general analysis can be addressed easily enough by rewriting is as follows: 
Improved analysis: A property P is relational iff there is some relation R such that 
it is essential to P that for all x, if x has P at t, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, 
Rxy1Éyn at t.
12
 
 
If the improved analysis is correct, then (a) follows. That is, it follows that it is essential 
to relational properties that an object having one bears a relation to something(s).  
I now want to argue for (b) that it is not essential to dispositional properties that 
an object having one bears a relation to something(s). Intuitively, dispositional properties 
like the disposition to cause experiences as of red if viewed by a certain kind of perceiver 
in certain conditions are not relational properties. It does not seem essential to an object 
being disposed to cause experiences as of red if viewed by a certain kind of perceiver in 
                                                
12
 Khamara (1988) gives analyses of positive and impure relational properties using the notion of 
Ôconsisting in.Õ The improved analysis could be stated with this notion as well. Humberstone (1996) 
provides a way of understanding the notion of Ôconsisting inÕ. The improved analysis could also be stated 
using the notion of Ôconstitution.Õ Cohen (2004; 2009) holds that relational properties are constituted by 
relations. 
 34 
certain conditions that it bear a relation to anything. It certainly does not seem that an 
object being so disposed requires any perceivers to exist. Conversely, it is essential to 
something having the relational property being west of London, for example, that it bear 
the relation Ôwest ofÕ to something, namely London. So, why would anyone hold that 
dispositions are ipso facto relational properties? The only motivation I can think of is to 
explain why an object x having the disposition to M in C gives it the connection it has 
with the counterfactual Ôif x were in C, x would MÕ.
13
 The relationalist about dispositions 
answers this question as follows:   
Relational option: For any object x, its having a disposition to M in C gives it the 
connection it has with the counterfactual Ôif x were in C, x would M,Õ because for 
every disposition to M in C there is some relation R such that it is essential to that 
disposition that any object which has it bears R to something(s).  
 
There are two versions of the relational option: One in which R is a first order 
relation and one in which R is a second order relation. A relation R is second order iff at 
least one of RÕs relata is a property and first order otherwise. The first order relationalist 
will say that for every disposition to M in C there is a first order relation R
1 
such that it is 
essential to the disposition that any object which has it bears R
1
 to the states of affairs x 
having M and x having C. The second order relationalist will say that for every 
disposition to M in C there is some second order relation R
2
 such that it is essential to the 
disposition that any object which has it bears R
2
 to the properties M and C. (As an object 
                                                
13
 As the simple conditional analysis of dispositions is unpopular, it is unclear how exactly dispositions are 
related to counterfactuals. See Johnston (1992), Bird (1998), and Martin (2008) for arguments against the 
simple conditional analysis. However, even though the simple conditional analysis is unpopular, basically 
everyone agrees that there is some connection between dispositional properties and counterfactuals.  
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cannot bear a relation to something that does not exist, these options commit one to some 
heavy duty metaphysics about non-actual states of affairs and uninstantiated properties. I 
ignore this issue here, because I take it that anyone who is willing to accept one of these 
options will also be willing to accept such consequences.) 
An excellent concern is that these relational options are not relational in the right 
way. The improved analysis understands Ôrelational propertyÕ partly in terms of a relation 
holding between some things(s). The first relational option understands dispositions as 
involving relations to states of affairs, and the second relational option understands 
dispositions as involving relations to properties. Thus, more specifically, the worry is that 
states of affairs and properties are not things in the relevant sense; that is, they do not fall 
within the scope of the first order quantifier (used in first-order logic). This worry shows 
that the two relational options above are not relational in a strict sense. Even if one of the 
options turned out to be correct, dispositions could not be said to be ipso facto relational 
in the strict sense that, for example, the property of being married can be said to be. 
Nevertheless, if one of the options were correct, dispositions could be said to be ipso 
facto relational in a more liberal sense. 
I think that both relational options are problematic even when understanding 
ÔthingÕ in the liberal sense required by them. The distinction between the two versions of 
the relational option is not relevant to my argument, so I will just talk of a relation R, and 
of M and C. My argument is that the relational option should be rejected, because it fails 
to explain the relevant connection. The reason is that the relation postulated by the option 
does no explanatory work: There is no reason why R
 
holding between x, M, and C should 
metaphysically determine that an object x having the disposition to M in C bears the 
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connection in question to the counterfactual Ôif x were in C, x would M.Õ Why is it that 
R(x, M, C) being essential to an object having the disposition to M in C metaphysically 
determines that the object has some connection with the counterfactual Ôif x were in C, x 
would MÕ? There certainly does not appear to be anything in RÕs internal makeup that 
ensures that it would have this power. So, what is it that keeps the counterfactual Ôif x 
were in C, x would MÕ glued to R(x, M, C)?  
Those who believe that dispositions are ipso facto relational properties may try to 
answer this question in one of two ways. First, one may say that it is just a brute fact that 
R(x, M, C) gives an object x the connection it has with Ôif x were in C, x would MÕ. The 
problem with this answer is that it is the brute fact that is doing the real work not R(x, M, 
C). So, the relation postulated by the relational option is explanatorily superfluous. 
Second, one may try to explain what keeps Ôif x were in C, x would MÕ glued to R(x, M, 
C) by positing a relation R
* 
that holds over R and (x, M, C). The problem with this 
answer is that, similarly with R, there is no reason why R
*
{R, (x, M, C)} should 
metaphysically determine that R(x, M, C) should metaphysically determine that if an 
object x has the disposition to M in C, then it has some connection with the 
counterfactual Ôif x were in C, x would M.Õ One can just rinse and repeat all the way up 
so to speak. So, this second way of trying to address the problem, just like the first, does 
nothing to tackle the concern: The relation postulated by the relational option fails to do 
the work that it was postulated to do. Thus, the relational option should be rejected. So, 
we should accept (b) that it is not essential to dispositions that an object having one bears 
a relation to something(s).  
A corollary of this is that the following must be true: 
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Non-relational option: Whatever the explanation is for why it is the case that for 
any object x, its having a disposition to M in C gives it the connection it has with 
the counterfactual Ôif x were in C, x would M,Õ the answer is not that for every 
disposition to M in C there is some relation R such that it is essential to that 
disposition that any object which has it bears R to something(s).  
 
One salient way of choosing this option is given by BirdÕs view. Bird (2007) would say 
that what explains the connection is that dispositions are constituted by the modal role 
endowing stimulus-responses relations that they bear to other properties. To be clear, 
dispositions are constituted by relations for Bird, but it is not the case for him that it is 
essential to an objectÕs having a disposition that it bear a relation to something(s). So, 
BirdÕs view is a non-relational option. Armstrong (1983) would also choose the non-
relational option by saying that the connection is explained by his second order 
necessitation relation that holds between properties.
14
 Another option would be to say 
that the Simple Conditional Analysis (SCA) (or something like it) explains the 
connection: Necessarily, x is disposed to M in C iff if x were in C, then x would M. The 
SCA is unpopular today, so this option is unlikely to have many supporters. However, it 
is an option. There is room for other versions of the non-relational option, but it would 
take us too far afield to explain them in depth or any of the versions for that matter. 
 
 
                                                
14
 There is a concern that arguments similar to the second one I raised against the relational option (i.e. the 
argument to the effect that the relation postulated by the option does no explanatory work) will apply to 
Bird and ArmstrongÕs views (Barker & Smart, 2012; Barker; 2013), but such discussion is outside the 
scope of this article. 
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Section 4: My taxonomy 
Having learned from the virtues and vices of both BrogaardÕs taxonomy as well as 
CohenÕs, I propose the following taxonomy:  
Dispositional Relational Reductive Views on what the colors are 
No No No Non-relational primitivism  
 
No No Yes Micro-structuralism, Disjunctive micro-
structuralism, Type (or set) reflectance 
dispositionalism, ??? 
 
No Yes No Relational primitivism  
 
No Yes Yes CohenÕs view 1 and 2, ??? 
 
Yes No No Not available 
 
Yes No Yes Appearance dispositionalism, Reflectance 
dispositionalism, ??? 
Yes Yes No Not available 
 
Yes Yes Yes ??? 
 
Table 1.1: My Taxonomy 
 
I do not think that there is good metaphysical reason to accept the added 
complexity of a hierarchical taxonomy. So, according to my taxonomy, views on color 
are grouped according to three characteristics: dispositional/non-dispositional, 
relational/non-relational, and reductive/non-reductive. Dispositional properties connect 
objects with counterfactuals in a special way that non-dispositional properties (also called 
Ôcategorical propertiesÕ) do not.
15
 So, if the colors are dispositions, one must hold that 
they give objects a special connection with counterfactuals. The reflectance 
dispositionalist, for example, must say that a colored object has a special connection with 
                                                
15
 This special connection is described by my analysis of dispositional properties presented in part 2.3. 
Essentially, x is disposed to M in C iff non-circuarly if x were in C, x would M.  
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Ôif it were illuminated, it would reflect certain proportions of incident light at each 
wavelength of the visible spectrumÕ. Although categorical properties may not all be 
structural like shape properties are, it is natural for a color categoricalist to understand the 
colors similarly to shapes and say that what it is to be colored is to have a certain 
structure. A categorical primitivist could point to the structure of the familiar color solid, 
and a categorical reductivist, for instance, to some micro-physical structure described by 
physics or chemistry. 
A view is relational iff it says that the colors are relational properties. I presented 
my improved analysis of relational properties in the last section. Further, I argued that 
dispositions are not ipso facto relational properties. So, one cannot say that dispositional 
views are relational views. This will be a surprising consequence for those who have 
conflated these properties. However, absent a good response to my argument in the last 
section, one should accept its conclusion. Also, it should be clear from what I have said 
that some relational properties are not dispositional. Being left of London, for example, is 
clearly not a dispositional property of any kind. Hence, it is possible for there to be 
relational views on color that are also categorical. This shows that, although arguments 
for dispositional monism (Mumford, 2004; Bird, 2005a; 2005b; 2007) may count against 
certain relationalist views, arguments for categorical monism (Armstrong, 1997) need not 
rule out relationalism about color. 
A view is reductive iff it says that a property picked out in one domain of enquiry 
is identical with a property in another and non-reductive (also called ÔprimitivistÕ) 
otherwise. My identifying condition (part 1.1) provides the domain of enquiry for color. 
In the case of color, the domain of enquiry comprises the properties that we have 
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experiences as of objects having when having visual experiences as of objects being 
colored. Given this way of defining the domain, the reductivist says that the colors are 
identical with properties in a domain like that of the physical sciences or any other 
domain separate from the phenomenological one we are accustomed to in visual 
experience, while the non-reductivist denies this.
 
Notice that given how I define the 
domain of enquiry there is no issue with there being an answer to Òwhat are the colors?Ó 
even if nothing is colored. There can be an answer to what the properties are that we have 
experiences as of even if we are under a persistent illusion. Also, it is important to note 
that any respectable non-reductivist will hold that discovering what the colors are 
requires arduous philosophical investigation. All that is meant is that according to the 
non-reductivist the answer to ÒWhat are the colors?Ó has been hiding in plain sight.  
My taxonomy implies that there can be no non-reductive, dispositional views on 
color. WatkinsÕ (2002) says that he holds a Ònon-reductive,Ó dispositional view. What 
Watkins means by this is that the colors are dispositions that are neither reducible to their 
realizers nor to relational properties (p. 137). However, as one can see from what I wrote 
above, my definition of Ònon-reductiveÓ is entirely different from this. My argument 
against there being non-reductive, dispositional views is based on the premise that we do 
not experience what dispositions are. It goes like this. Given how I defined "reductiveÓ 
and Ònon-reductiveÓ as well as the domain of enquiry, it follows that non-reductive views 
on color hold that we experience what the colors are in our visual experiences as of 
colored objects. A property P is dispositional =df for some manifestation M and 
circumstances C, P is identical with the disposition to M in C. So, if there could be non-
reductive dispositional views on what the colors are, we would have to experience the 
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relevant M and CÕs for the dispositions said to be identical with the colors in our visual 
experiences as of colored objects. I see no way around this. I think that it is somewhat 
plausible, at least prima facie, that we experience the relevant MÕs. For example, the 
relevant M for the property red could be said to be that (pointing to the redness of an 
object).  
 However, we do not experience any circumstances C in our visual experiences as 
of objects being colored. For my argument, one need merely reflect on oneÕs experiences 
as of the colors so as to establish whether in these experiences any circumstances are 
experienced. I cannot recall ever being phenomenally presented with a circumstance(s) 
during an experience as of an object being colored. I only experience an object as being 
like that (pointing to a red object) or like that (pointing to a green one), and so on. In fact, 
I cannot even conceive of being phenomenally presented with a circumstance during an 
experience as of an object being colored. Of course, I can conceive of having an 
experience as of an object being colored and of a circumstance(s). Perhaps the object is 
also fragile, and I am experiencing it dropping. However, this would not be an experience 
as of an object being colored but of it being colored and dropping. Hence, this is 
irrelevant to my argument.
16
 Thus, it should be clear that dispositions cannot satisfy what 
is required of a non-reductive view. If I am correct, then no one, including Watkins, can 
be a non-reductive, dispositionalist about color (in my sense).  
                                                
16
 My argument is neither an argument that we cannot see dispositions (McGinn, 1996, p. 540) nor an 
argument to the effect that colors do not look like dispositions (Boghossian and Velleman, 1989, p. 86; 
1991). It is only an argument that we do not experience any circumstances in our visual experiences as of 
colored objects, and so if colors are dispositional properties, we do not experience what they are in our 
visual experiences as of colored objects. Thus, there can be no non-reductive dispositional views given how 
I understand ÒreductiveÓ etc. This would only imply that the colors are not dispositional properties if one 
assumes that we experience what the colors are in our visual experiences as of colored things. Johnston 
(1992) thinks that something like this is a core belief about the colors. If he is right, there is reason to 
worried about all reductive views.  
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 Reflectance dispositionalism is the same view called Òreflectance physicalismÓ in 
BroggardÕs taxonomy. The view that colors are types (or sets) of reflectance dispositions 
that Byrne and Hilbert eventually retreat to is best categorized alongside micro-
structuralism. We should also put in the category in which micro-structuralism is placed 
the view that the colors are disjunctions of micro-structural properties. I define 
appearance dispositionalism broadly as the view that the colors are dispositions to appear 
certain ways if certain generally specified stimulus conditions are met. Appearance 
dispositionalism divides into internal and external variants. Internal dispositionalism 
encompasses what is called Òcontemporary dispositionalismÓ in BrogaardÕs taxonomy 
and ÒdispositionalismÓ in CohenÕs. Internal dispositionalism is the view that the 
appearances that the relevant dispositions are disposed to give are internal to us. CohenÕs 
role functionalism is a kind of internal dispositionalism. External dispositionalism holds 
that the appearances are external to us. NoÕs ecological dispositionalism is a kind of 
external dispositionalism, because No endorses what he calls Òphenomenological 
objectivismÓ (2004, p.141-144) under which the appearances are in external objects. It is 
unclear whether ThompsonÕs (1995, p. 242-250) theory is an internal or external variant 
of appearance dispositionalism. If one accepts Byrne and HilbertÕs claim that the view is 
equivalent to contemporary dispositionalism, ThompsonÕs view is a kind of internal 
dispositionalism. Regardless, my taxonomy makes room for the view wherever it may 
fall.
17
 
                                                
17
 There are some dispositional views on color that are not mentioned by Brogaard and Cohen. Gert (2013) 
says, Òx has color R iff subjects of kind S would have responses to x that can be summarized as a function 
FR(c). The domain of FR(c) is the set of possible viewing circumstances and the range of FR(c) is the set of 
possible apparent colorsÓ (p. 187). This looks like an internal dispositionalism of sorts. Acording to Gert, it 
is a multiple aspect version of simpler response-dependent accounts. For Gert, because the (objective) color 
is associated with the function FR(c), only the apparent colors are strictly speaking located in the familiar 
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I have split CohenÕs view into two versions that are close to the surface in his 
(2004; 2009) work. I said in section 1 that CohenÕs view is one according to which it is 
constitutive of (or essential to) any color L that there is a relation R such that for any 
object x, x is color L iff there exists an observer y (which need not be the same for 
different xÕs) such that x bears R to y (2004; 2009, p. 8-12, 24-36). CohenÕs view 1 
requires condition 1 below for when x bears R to y, and CohenÕs view 2 requires 
condition 2.   
1. R holds of <x, y> iff y is a viewing subject who is having a perception as of x 
being L.  
2. R holds of <x, y> iff if a viewing subject y were to view x, then he would have 
a perception as of x being L. (For both options the viewing subject could be 
constrained so he must be normal or constrained in some other way. Cohen 
would be very loose with his constraints on the viewing subject.) 
A case could perhaps be made for CohenÕs view 2 being a dispositional view on 
color, because it gives the colors a connection with counterfactuals. However, as I said, a 
                                                
color solid (what he calls ÔHSBÕ space) (p. 187, 192). Recall that my identifying condition for this essay is 
that colors are the properties that we actually experience things as having when having visual experiences 
as of things being colored,Õ where Ôan experience as of a thing being coloredÕ is just an experience with that 
phenomenal character with which we are all familiar. At least some of the properties picked out by this 
identifying condition are located in the familiar color solid. For example, scarlet has a location in the 
familiar color solid. So, GertÕs view on color is ruled out by my identifying condition in part 1.1. If one 
makes a distinction between the colors and the apparent colors in GertÕs sense, then the colors are the 
apparent colors. (BroackesÕs view according to Gert is similar to his, but it is not sufficiently clear for me to 
be sure about this. If Gert is right, Broackes view may also be in trouble.)  
Egan (2010) proposes that attributing the property being green to an object delivers the centered 
worlds proposition that is true at a world (w), time (t), and individual (i) iff the object is disposed to look 
green to i in the circumstances i occupies at t in w. This sounds like a relativist, internal dispositionalist 
view. If so, it could be placed in my taxonomy as a type of internal dispositionalism. However, as Egan 
states the view as one about when Ôbeing greenÕ is true using an ÔiffÕ, it is difficult to be sure exactly of 
what he is saying the colors are. I will not in this essay distinguish between relativist and non-relativist 
forms of dispositionalism. If EganÕs view is indeed a form of internal dispositionalism, then I believe that 
what I say in this essay should be relevant to it. Also, what I say about CohenÕs view (part 3.2) should also 
be relevant, because EganÕs view has similar motivations. 
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property P is dispositional =df for some manifestation M and circumstances C, P is 
identical with the disposition to M in C. So, if CohenÕs view 2 were a true dispositional 
view, one would think it would be expressible using the locution Ôthe disposition to M in 
CÕ. It is hard to imagine this being done effectively. So, I prefer to classify CohenÕs view 
2 as non-dispositional. If this is right, the view cannot give the colors the special 
connection to counterfactuals that a dispositional view would. It is also important to note 
that CohenÕs view 1 and 2 have unintuitive consequences that quintessential dispositional 
views like appearance dispositionalism do not. Namely, both versions imply that objects 
would lose their colors if no observers existed. This is because x cannot bear R to an 
observer y if there are no observers. CohenÕs view 1 also has the consequence that an 
object is not colored unless an observer y is perceiving it.  
Cohen (2009, p. 10, footnote 16) says that his view is reductive. I have done as he 
says and taxonomized his view accordingly.
18
 However, as I have said, there is no 
obvious reason why there cannot be non-reductive relational properties. One may argue 
that the colors do not phenomenally look like relational properties (McGinn 1996, p. 541; 
Tye, 2000, p. 152). If sound, such arguments would pose a special problem for there 
being non-reductive, relational views on color. If primitivism is true, the colors had better 
phenomenally look like the properties we are accustomed to in the phenomenological 
domain of visual color experience. Nevertheless, it is unobvious whether the cited 
arguments work (Byrne and Hilbert, 2001). So, what I call Òrelational primitivismÓ is an 
important but unrecognized view worthy of serious consideration. Such a view would 
allow one to accept something like ÔRevelationÕ that the natures of the colors are fully 
                                                
18
 There is a circularity in CohenÕs view that is worrying to his opponents (Tye, 2012). Because of this 
circularity, one may reasonably doubt whether his view succeeds in giving a reduction of the colors.  
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revealed to us in perception (Johnston, 1992), while also allowing one to avoid CohenÕs 
(2004; 2009) worry about ad hoc stipulation in variation cases.
19
 Different versions of 
this view depend on the relation involved, its relata, and when it holds of its relata. For 
primitivists who find relationalism hard to stomach, there is also non-relational 
primitivism.
20
 All primitivist views must be species of either relational or non-relational 
primitivism.  
 Where do realism/irrealism, physicalism, categorical ground theories, BrogaardÕs 
role and realizer functionalism, CohenÕs identity theory, and sensory classificationism fit 
in my taxonomy? Realism/irrealism are compatible with most of the views in my 
taxonomy. CohenÕs view and contemporary dispositionalism are prima facie exceptions. 
As I mentioned, I agree with Cohen that the notion ÔphysicalÕ should be avoided, as it is 
unclear what condition a property has to satisfy to be physical. Categorical ground 
theories are compatible with all of the non-dispositional theories in my taxonomy. 
BrogaardÕs role functionalism is compatible with any view that takes the colors to be 
second-level properties like appearance dispositionalism, and her realizer functionalism is 
compatible with all the views that take the colors to be first-level properties like micro-
structuralism. My reductive characteristic subsumes CohenÕs identity theory node by 
encompassing reductive views. Because of issues of interpretation, I leave it open as to 
where exactly MatthenÕs sensory classificationism belongs.  
                                                
19
 With this being said, I ultimately do not think that a primitivist version of CohenÕs view is a good idea. 
In part 3.2 section 2, I argue that CohenÕs concerns about ad hoc stipulation do not constitute a convincing 
argument. Moreover, part 3.2 section 4 speaks against the colors being constituted by relations to subjects 
(see also Roberts, Andow, and Schmidtke, 2014). Of course, none of this alone rules out all forms of 
relational primitivism.  
20
 It is worth mentioning that there has been an attempt to develop a relativist, non-relational primitivism in 
order to better account for worries about ad hoc stipulation (Brogaard, 2010b). According to this view 
objects can only have non-relational primitive color properties relative to a viewer in a normal condition. 
What I say in part 3.2 against CohenÕs relational view should be relevant to BrogaardÕs view, because they 
have similar motivations.  
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Conclusion 
 
Without an adequate taxonomy the ontology of color is going to be much more difficult 
and prone to confusion than it would be otherwise. So, in this article, I first distilled two 
of the newest taxonomies and explained why they are unacceptable. Namely, I looked at 
BrogaardÕs taxonomy (section 1) and then CohenÕs (section 2). I then provided a 
comprehensive argument against classifying dispositions as relational properties (section 
3). Having learned from the vices and virtues of Brogaard and CohenÕs taxonomies, I 
provided a much-improved way of taxonomizing views on color (section 4). My 
taxonomy rules out certain views, clarifies others, and shows that there is an unnoticed 
view worthy of serious consideration. 
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Part 2: Dispositional views 
 
In this part, I investigate dispositional views on color. All known dispositional views on 
color are reductive and non-relational. In part 2.1, I argue against appearance 
dispositionalism; in part 2.2, I argue against reflectance dispositionalism; and in part 2.3, 
I provide a general argument against the colors being dispositions.  
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 Part 2.1: Against Appearance Dispositionalism 
In this chapter, I examine appearance dispositionalism. This is the view that for any color 
C, C is the disposition to appear some way if certain stimulus conditions are met 
(Bennett, 1971, p. 89-123; Dummett, 1979; McGinn, 1983; Peacocke, 1984; McDowell, 
1985; Johnston, 1992; Wiggins, 1998, p. 189; Levin, 2000; No, 2004, p. 123-161). This 
view splits into internal dispositionalism and external dispositionalism.
21
 Internal 
dispositionalism holds that the appearances that the relevant dispositions are disposed to 
give are something in us, and external dispositionalism holds that the appearances are 
something external to us. Both views can be further divided into circular and non-circular 
variants. Thus, appearance dispositionalism is divisible into four different views: internal-
circular dispositionalism, internal-non-circular dispositionalism, external-circular 
dispositionalism, and external-non-circular dispositionalism. I look at the motivation for 
internal variants of dispositionalism (section 1) and then the motivation for external 
variants (section 2). After doing this, I discuss the argument from circularity against 
circular variants of appearance dispositionalism (section 3). Roughly, this argument is 
that the circularity inherent to circular dispositionalism is problematic. Finally, I inspect 
non-circular variants (section 4). Roughly, I argue that these views all fail to adequately 
eliminate circularity.  
 
                                                
21
 Two things are important to note. First, internal versions of appearance dispositionalism attempt to give 
some refinement of the stimulus conditions. Often internal variants define the stimulus conditions to say Ôif 
viewed by a normal observer in normal conditions.Õ There is a lot of discussion in the literature about how 
to understand both Ônormal observerÕ and Ônormal conditionsÕ (Tye, 2006; Allen, 2010), but I am going to 
avoid this debate here.  
Second, there is technically, logical room for versions of internal dispositionalism that do not state 
the stimulus conditions in terms of being viewed by a perceiver. However, as these logically possible 
versions are extremely implausible even absurd and are not defended by anyone, I for reasons of simplicity 
collapse internal dispositionalism with contemporary dispositionalism in this chapter and elsewhere.  
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Section 1: The motivation for internal variants 
In this section, I look at the some arguments in favor of internal dispositionalism. Internal 
dispositionalism is an old view on color, and so I will not try to be comprehensive. I 
avoid arguments based on outdated theories of perception like the sense data theory. See 
Byrne and Hilbert (2011) for a response to some arguments based on such views. I also 
avoid looking at LockeÕs arguments. These arguments are old hat for anyone who has 
done a philosophy degree and suffice to say not particularly clear or convincing. My plan 
is as follows: First, I look at a possible historical origin of internal dispositionalism and 
show that it cannot be used as a motivation. I then examine two early modern 
motivations, the first being based on the idea that we cannot conceive of the colors 
independent of how they phenomenally look and the second being based on idea that 
internal dispositionalism resolves an incompatibility with physics. Finally, I look at 
JohnstonÕs (1992) attempt to motivate internal dispositionalism. 
 
1. 1: A possible origin of internal dispositional views. 
Internal dispositional theories on color can be traced to an argument developed by 
Galileo (1623). He thought that we cannot conceive of a material substance without also 
imagining it as having a certain shape and size, as being located in space and time, as 
moving or not, as being in contact or not with other bodies, and as having a number. 
Thus, Galileo thought that the world really is the way it appears with respect to these 
properties. However, he went on to argue that we can conceive of a material substance 
without also conceiving of it as having a taste, making an odor, or having a color. Thus, 
he thought Ò[t]astes, odors, colors, etc so far as their objective existence is concerned, are 
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nothing but mere names for something which resides exclusively in our sensitive body, so 
that if the perceiving creature were removed all those qualities would be annihilated and 
abolished from existenceÓ (Galileo, 1623, p. 28).  
GalileoÕs argument that tastes, odors, and colors are mind-dependent had a 
powerful impact on subsequent generations. It appears that we can conceive of a world 
full of tasteless, odorless, and colorless objects, but we cannot imagine a world full of 
shapeless objects. This distinction in what can be conceived influenced modern era 
philosophers like Descartes and Locke to believe that having a taste, having an odor, and 
being colored are dispositional properties (or something a lot like them called Ôsecondary 
qualitiesÕ) (Hacker, 1991, p. 1-12). The reasoning may have gone like this. The 
explanation for why we experience objects as having tastes, smells, and colors even 
though they do not really have these properties is that the geometrical and numerical 
qualities of objects somehow cause us to have these experiences. Hence, an objectÕs 
appearing red, for instance, is really just an effect of that objectÕs having certain 
geometrical and numerical properties. So, if redness is anything at all, it is merely a 
dispositional property of objects to causes us to have certain experiences.  
The first well-known, modern philosopher to endorse a dispositional view on 
color was probably Descartes. In The Principles of Philosophy, Descartes says, Ò[colors 
are] simply various dispositions in those objects that enable them to trigger various kinds 
of motions in our nerves that are required to produce all the sensations in our soulÓ (2008, 
4-198). John Locke later alludes to an internal dispositional theory by saying, Ò[colors] 
nothing but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by 
the size, shape, texture, and motion of their imperceptible partsÓ (2004, ii-viii-10). Reid 
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(2005, 6-3, 4), among others, also endorsed an internal dispositional theory. These views 
are still popular today but increasingly less so. (It is worth noting that the reasoning 
outlined above could plausibly be used in an attempt to motivate other dispositional 
views besides internal dispositionalism. In fact, it is not clear from the Descartes quote 
that he accepted internal dispositionalism. My below arguments can be applied to 
attempts to use the above to motivate other versions of dispositionalism.)  
 
1. 1. 1: Can this history motivate internal dispositional views?  
In this section, I shall argue that the historical origin of internal dispositional views as 
outlined above cannot be used to motivate such views. The central problem with using 
the historical origin to motivate internal dispositional views is that there is a serious 
problem with reasoning from GalileoÕs conclusion that the colors are mind-dependent to 
the colors being dispositional properties. The issue is that the reasoning is internally 
inconsistent. GalileoÕs argument that the colors are mind-dependent properties may have 
lead to the view that they are dispositional, but dispositional properties are not mind-
dependent ones (in any relevant sense). This is true even when dealing with a disposition 
specified by mentioning things that are mind-dependent. The reason is that an object can 
be disposed to cause an experience as of red if a certain kind of human were to look at it 
(in certain conditions) regardless of whether any humans exist. Thus, dispositional 
properties are not mind-dependent, and so reasoning from GalileoÕs argument that the 
colors are mind-dependent to the view that colors are dispositions is inconsistent.    
 Even if the reasoning from GalileoÕs conclusion to the colors being dispositional 
properties were consistent, the historical origin for internal dispositionalist views would 
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still fail to provide a reason to accept them, because GalileoÕs argument fails to show that 
the colors are mind-dependent. Galileo thinks that the mind-dependence of tastes, odors, 
and colors follows from our ability to conceive of a material substance without also 
conceiving of it as having any of these properties; however, this is a non sequitur. I can 
conceive of my computer not having a keyboard, but the existence of its keyboard is 
obviously not mind-dependent. What GalileoÕs argument requires is the premise that we 
cannot conceive of an object instantiating tastes, smells, and colors independently of our 
minds. Unfortunately, we can conceive of objectÕs instantiating these properties 
independently of us quite easily (Hacker, 1991). I can conceive of the sky retaining its 
color, the flowers their odor, and the fish its flavor, regardless of whether there is anyone 
around to see the sky, smell the flowers, or savor the fish. 
 
1. 2: Two early modern motivations 
In this section, I will look at two modern motivations for internal dispositionalism. The 
first motivation is based on a conceptual argument involving the idea that we cannot 
conceive of the colors independent of how they phenomenally look, and the second is 
based on the idea that internal dispositionalism resolves an incompatibility with physics.   
 
Section 1. 2. 1: Conceptual argument 
Contrary to what I said above, there is an Oxford tradition that our concepts of the colors 
are the concepts of mind-dependent properties. It is also a part of this tradition that these 
mind-dependent properties are internal dispositionalist. This is just confused, because, as 
I argued, dispositional properties are not mind-dependent or at least they are not mind-
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dependent in the sense that their existence depends on minds. As I said, this is true even 
when dealing with a disposition specified by mentioning things that are mind-dependent 
(e.g. appearances). Regardless, the view in question has influenced many generations 
starting with John Cook Wilson (1926), then H.A Prichard (1909), then Gilbert Ryle 
(1949), William Kneale (1950), Michael Dummett (1979), Gareth Evans (1980), and 
finally John McDowell (1985).  
The argument that the colors are mind-dependent, internal dispositional properties 
is based on the idea that we can conceive of an entity as being mind-independent only if 
we can insert it into a simple theory of perception. In order to do this we must be able to 
recognize the duality of our experiences. That is, we need to be able to distinguish 
between the thing in the world on the one hand and our experiences of it on the other 
(Evans, 1980, p. 277). Recognizing the duality of our experience requires that we be able 
to conceive of that which the experience is of as existing independent of our experiencing 
the thing in question. Cook Wilson explains that we need to be able to identify Òpositive 
content different [É] from [our experiences of some thing], and clearly distinguishable 
from itÓ (1926, p. 773). However, as the argument goes, we can only conceive of, for 
example, scarlet in terms of how this property phenomenally appears in perception and 
mutatis mutandis for the other colors. Thus, the colors are mind-dependent, internal 
dispositional properties. (For more on this argument see Allen, 2007.) 
 Dispositions are not mind-dependent properties, and so the argument in question 
cannot show that the colors are mind-dependent, internal dispositions. In order to see 
whether this is the only reason to reject the argumentÕs conclusion, let us take the 
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dispositional component out. Taking this component out of the argument, it can be 
presented as follows: 
P1. A property P is mind-independent only if one can conceive of an object 
having P independent of any minds experiencing the object being P. 
P2. One can conceive of the property being scarlet only in terms of how it 
phenomenally appears, and mutatis mutandis for all the other colors.  
(3). The colors are mind-dependent properties. (from P1, P2) 
 
Does this version of the argument work? The answer, I think, is that it fails, 
because it is invalid. The reason for this is that whether one can conceive of the property 
being scarlet only in terms of how it phenomenally appears is irrelevant to whether one 
can conceive of an object being scarlet independent of any minds experiencing the object 
being scarlet. Our conception of the colors can go no deeper than what is phenomenally 
presented to us in color experiences, but it nevertheless be the case that we can conceive 
of an object being scarlet independent of our experiencing it being scarlet. In fact, as 
Hacker (1991, p. 116) correctly points out, we can easily conceive of objects being 
scarlet independently of our experiencing them: One need just conceive of an object as 
having that property with no mind around to perceive it. Thus, one can see that the 
argument for the colors being mind-dependent, dispositional properties in question fails 
regardless of whether I am right that dispositions are mind-independent.  
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Section 1. 2. 2: The physics argument 
Another reason that many probably find internal dispositional theories compelling is that 
they resolve an apparent incompatibility between theoretical physics and our experience. 
Colors are not amongst the micro-structural properties by which theoretical physics 
describes the world. For example, The Standard Model of Particle Physics, which is able 
to explain most observed data, does not mention colors (in the vernacular sense). 
However, our experience represents the world in a mosaic of color. Internal dispositional 
theories say that both pictures are correct. Theoretical physics is correct that colors are 
not amongst the micro-structural properties needed to describe the world, and our 
experience is correct that the world is multiply colored. Colors are certain dispositions of 
the micro-structural properties talked about in physics. Of course, this same argument can 
be used to motivate other dispositional theories, but I will just look at this version of the 
argument. If this version fails then the others do to.  
This attempt to motivate internal dispositional views is utterly unconvincing. The 
problem with this motivation is that the appearance of an incompatibility between 
theoretical physics and our experience is an illusion that arises from a suppressed premise 
that the only non-dispositional properties of objects are those mentioned in theoretical 
physics, but this premise is dubious at best not to mention question begging. So, there is 
no reason to accept the suppressed premise. Of course, this is not to say that theoretical 
physics is wrong. It is just to say that to completely describe the world we must mention 
those categorical properties given to us in perception in addition to those discovered by 
theoretical physics.  
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1.3: JohnstonÕs argument  
A much more recent argument that I will discuss here is due to Johnston (1992).
22
 
Johnston seems to endorse the natural sign theory of perception. According to this view, 
color perception involves figuring out the colors of external objects from the mental 
effects they produce in us, the natural signs. So, given this view of perception, it is 
natural to take Johnston to favor a non-circular variant of internal dispositionalism, 
whereby the appearances that the colors are disposed to give are mental effects and not 
the colors. However, contrary to this, Johnston (1992) often writes in a way that suggests 
he supports a circular variant of internal dispositionalism. Because of this lack of 
specificity, for simplicity I interpret Johnston as defending internal dispositionalism in 
general. So, I shall consider JohnstonÕs argument here.  
Before I can explain JohnstonÕs reasoning, I must present what he considers to be our 
core beliefs about the colors, as his argument is an abductive one to the effect that the 
internal variant best satisfies the relevant beliefs. The core beliefs are as follows (1992, p. 
222-223): 
(1) Paradigms. Some of what we take to be paradigms of canary yellow things (i.e. 
some canaries) are canary yellow. 
                                                
22
 There are other recent arguments that have been given in favor of internal dispositionalism besides 
JohnstonÕs. Wiggins has argued for internal dispositionalism by saying, ÒSurely it is simply obvious that 
colour is something subjectiveÓ (1987, p. 189). This attempt to motivate the view is hard to take seriously. 
McGinn thinks that it is a logical or conceptual truth that x is red iff x (standardly) seems red (1983, p. 6, 
note 2). He has said that Ò[i]t is a conceptual truth that red things typically look redÓ (p. 11). I can easily 
conceive of a world in which red things do not typically look red. In fact, I can even conceive of the red 
things in the actual world not being those things that typically look red. So, I have no idea what McGinn is 
talking about. Boghossian and Velleman (1989, p. 84) and Byrne and Hilbert (2011) have more to say 
against claims like McGinnÕs. 
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(2) Explanation. The fact of a surface or volume or radiant source being canary 
yellow sometimes causally explains our visual experience as of canary yellow 
things. 
(3) Unity. Thanks to its nature and the nature of the other determinate shades, canary 
yellow, like the other shades, has its own unique place in the network of 
similarity, difference and exclusion relations exhibited by the whole family of 
shades. (Think of the relations exemplified along the axes of hue, saturation and 
brightness in the so-called color solid. The color solid captures central facts about 
the colors, e.g. that canary yellow is not as similar to shades of blue as they are 
similar among themselves, i.e. that canary yellow is not a shade of blue.) 
(4) Perceptual availability. Justified belief about the canary yellowness of external 
things is available simply on the basis of visual perception. That is, if external 
things are canary yellow we are justified in believing that just on the basis of 
visual perception and the beliefs which inform it. (Further philosophical 
explication of this belief would come to something like this: If you are looking at 
a material object under what you take to be adequate conditions for perceiving its 
color and you take yourself to be an adequate perceiver of color then your visually 
acquired belief that the material object is canary yellow is justified simply on the 
strength of (i) the information available in the relevant visual experience and (ii) 
those general background beliefs about the external causes of visual experiences 
which inform ordinary perception.) 
(5) Revelation. The intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard 
visual experience as of a canary yellow thing.  
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With these core beliefs in mind, Johnston believes that two views stand out as 
prima facie, plausible options: The view that the colors are categorical, physical 
properties that causally explain our experiences as of color (what he calls ÒThe Primary 
Quality ViewÓ), and the view that the colors are (constituted) dispositions to cause certain 
experiences in us if viewed (what he calls ÒThe Secondary Quality viewÓ). He admits that 
both views have a difficult time accounting for all the core beliefs but argues that the 
internal variant of appearance dispositionalism (The Secondary Quality View) ultimately 
does a better job of satisfying them. So, Johnston concludes that we ought to accept the 
internal variant of appearance dispositionalism, because this view but not The Primary 
Quality View best captures our core beliefs about the colors. More or less inclusively 
speaking internal appearance dispositionalism is the right view. 
 
1.3.1: Why JohnstonÕs argument fails 
There is a serious problem with JohnstonÕs (1992) above reasoning. The issue with it is 
that whenever he thinks of examples of categorical, physical properties he thinks of those 
kinds of properties discussed in modern physics. It does not take a genius to see that there 
are going to be issues with such properties fulfilling all of JohnstonÕs core beliefs, and I 
think that Johnston argues correctly that they do not. However, if Johnston had only 
loosened the condition he thinks a property must satisfy to be physical, he would have 
noticed that there are categorical, primitive properties available that are at least equally 
good if not better candidates for satisfying JohnstonÕs core beliefs, namely those 
primitive properties we experience objects as having when having visual experiences as 
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of colored objects.
 23
 In part 3.3 of this essay, I shall argue that primitivism is the best 
theory on color, because it best accommodates our core beliefs.  
 
Section 2: The motivation for external variants 
Internal variants of appearance dispositionalism are well-known in the ontology of color, 
and so it was easy to present JohnstonÕs motivation for these views directly without first 
explaining them in depth. However, external variants of appearance dispositionalism are 
not known so well.  So, in this section, I shall first in 2.1 present a version of the external 
variant with which to work, and then in 2.2 I shall discuss the motivation for this variant.  
 
2.1: A variant of external appearance dispositionalism  
A well-developed and often cited external variant of appearance dispositionalism is based 
on the ecological approach to zoology. This approach to zoology insists that the animal 
cannot be studied independently of its environment. James Gibson (1979), Prindle et al 
(1980), Turvey (1981), Evan Thompson (1995), and Alva No (2004) are supporters of 
the ecological method in zoology. The relevant external variant is the result of an attempt 
by No (2004) to carry the teachings of this method in zoology to the metaphysics of 
color.
24
 On first pass, NoÕs external variant seems to be that the color of an object is its 
disposition to modify its appearance with respect to color as relevant conditions change 
(2004, p. 144).  
                                                
23
 Interestingly Johnston has now forsaken dispositional views on color (1997, 1998). 
24
 Thompson (1995) and No (2004) have both discussed ecological theories of color. NoÕs (2004) view 
seems to be an external dispositional theory. However, upon analysis, I think that ThompsonÕs view is 
identical with internal dispositionalism. Byrne and Hilbert (2003a) agree by saying that ThompsonÕs view 
does not seem to be any different from internal dispositional views (or as they say Òtraditional 
dispositionalismÓ). So, I will not provide a separate discussion of ThompsonÕs view. 
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 However, an important clarification is in order. No distinguishes between what 
for him are two numerically distinct properties: The colors objects appear to instantiate 
(the apparent colors) and the colors they ÒreallyÓ instantiate (the real colors). The real 
colors of objects are those that we normally associate with them. I shall refer to NoÕs 
real colors as Òthe colors,Ó for this seems to be what they are. The apparent colors for 
No are non-mental properties of external objects that we perceive in cases of color 
illusion (and perhaps also in cases of veridical perception).
25,
 
26
 I suspect my reader will 
find this notion obscure. One may worry that the apparent colors are mysterious. Either 
the apparent colors are phenomenally like the colors or they are not. If they are not 
phenomenally like the colors, they are not properties that are phenomenally presented in 
our color experiences. So what are they? It is utterly mysterious. If they are 
phenomenally like the colors, an experience as of something being apparent red, for 
instance, is identical with an experience as of something being red, but redness is the only 
property we experience things as having when having experiences as of red. So, as the 
apparent colors are supposed to be distinct from the colors, the apparent colors cannot be 
phenomenally like the colors. Thus, either way the apparent colors are mysterious 
properties to say the least. Regardless, using whatever understanding one has been able to 
gain, my first pass at understanding NoÕs external variant can be improved to say that 
                                                
25
 No says, ÒAn object with a determinate color acts on, or responds to, its environment in a certain way. 
For instance, it grows darker in a characteristic way in shadow, and it becomes brownish in green light 
[É]. [É] To be a particular red is to bring about these sorts of apparent changes in how things lookÓ (2004, 
p. 143). Then on p. 144 No says, ÒColors, like all appearances, are genuine features of the environmentÓ 
(2004, p. 144). No also says, Òyou are able to experience [an objectÕs] merely apparent color [É] (2004, p. 
143). 
26
 Allen (2009) interprets No as having a view in which the apparent colors are mind-independent in the 
sense that that things would have them regardless of whether there are any minds. One reason to think 
Allen is wrong is that the apparent colors change dependent on color relevant conditions, and color relevant 
conditions include dependencies between sensory stimulation and bodily movement (see below). I will not 
here take a side on whether the apparent colors are mind-independent in the relevant sense or not.  
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the view is that the (real) color of an object is its disposition to modify its apparent color 
as color relevant conditions change. 
 For any color, the color relevant condition is that colorÕs sensorimotor profile 
(2004, p. 132). Sensorimotor profiles are constituted by movement-dependent 
contingencies and object-dependent ones (2004, p. 129-132). Movement-dependent 
sensorimotor contingencies are dependencies between sensory stimulation and bodily 
movement. No provides us with some examples (2004, p. 129): First, as a subject rotates 
a shape, differing amounts of light will reflect off its surface. The human retina is 
sensitive to the magnitude of incoming light. So, as one looks at a rotating shape, the 
ÒdataÓ being sent to oneÕs brain changes. Second, as one moves oneÕs eyes, incoming 
light stimulates parafoveal receptors rather than foveal ones. Parafoveal receptors include 
more rods than cones, while foveal receptors are primarily composed of cones. Rods 
unlike cones are not sensitive to wavelength. Hence, as one moves oneÕs eyes, the 
wavelength ÒdataÓ sent to oneÕs brain are continuously modified. Third, the fovea of the 
eye has a yellow pigment. The yellow pigment absorbs greater amounts of short 
wavelength light than long. So, different sensory effects result from eye movements 
across blue, green, and red objects.    
 Object-dependent sensorimotor dependencies are dependencies between object 
movement and sensory stimulation. No says that these dependencies are determined by 
regularities between a colored object, ambient light, the colors of other surrounding 
objects, and so on. For example, the sensory effects caused by an object change as it 
moves with respect to ambient light. Objects that are lit by green ambient light influence 
the retina differently than objects lit by red ambient light (2004, p. 130-131). Color 
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contrast effects constitute other examples (2004, p. 126). For instance, a television 
produces black images by failing to emit light in certain regions. When an old-fashioned 
TV is turned off its screen looks greenish gray not black. So, how does the TV produce 
black images? It is a contrast effect generated between the non-light emitting part of the 
screen and those nearby parts that are emitting light.  
 With these ideas in mind, NoÕs view can be further refined to say that the color 
of an object is the disposition to change its apparent color (a property of the object) in 
accordance with the appropriate dependencies between sensory stimulation and bodily 
movement, and with the appropriate dependencies between object movement and sensory 
stimulation. As far as I can tell, the appropriate dependencies seem to be whichever ones 
are associated with the definiendum. For example, the property red is identical with the 
disposition to change apparent color in accordance with the dependencies between 
sensory stimulation and bodily movement, and with the dependences between object 
movement and sensory stimulation characteristic of red objects. Thus, I believe that 
NoÕs view can be articulated as follows:  
Ecological Dispositionalism:  For any color C, that color C is identical with the 
disposition to modify an objectÕs apparent color (in NoÕs sense) in accordance 
with the C sensorimotor profile (which captures the appropriate dependencies 
between sensory stimulation and bodily movement and the appropriate 
dependencies between object movement and sensory stimulation for the color C) 
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2.2: The motivation for ecological dispositionalism 
No suggests that ecological dispositionalism is motivated by his ideas on color 
experience (2004, p. 141). I believe that NoÕs ideas can be divided into two theses. The 
first is NoÕs thesis that our ability to perceive the colors is partly composed by 
sensorimotor knowledge. This thesis stems from a belief that No has about perceptual 
ability in general (2004, p.12, 27).
27
 Sensorimotor knowledge is, for instance, knowledge 
that a sound appears louder the closer one is to its source, or knowledge that an object 
appears bigger as one moves towards it. With respect to color perception, the relevant 
sensorimotor knowledge is an implicit understanding of the ways objectsÕ apparent colors 
change with respect to color-critical conditions (2004, p. 129). The way an objectÕs 
apparent color changes with respect to color-critical conditions is given by its 
sensorimotor profile. Therefore, the relevant sensorimotor knowledge in the case of color 
perception is knowledge of objectsÕ sensorimotor profiles.   
 The second thesis is about what it is for an object to look red. No distinguishes 
between looking colored here and now (apparent color) and looking colored (real color) 
(2004, p.139). NoÕs idea seems to be that for an object to look apparent red is for it to 
look in such a way as to enable one to distinguish it from blue things in some ways, from 
scarlet things in others, and so on for all the colors (2004, p. 140). In contrast, for an 
object to look red is for it to look in such a way as to vary in apparent color in accordance 
with the red color profile (2004, p 140, 144). It seems that color profiles and sensorimotor 
                                                
27
 No believes that this first idea has at least two important consequences. The first is that only life forms 
with the appropriate knowledge can be perceivers. With humanoid life forms, for example, Ò[É] a basic 
familiarity with the sensory effects of eye or hand movements and so forth [É]Ó is required (2004, p. 2). 
The second is that perception is not a process by which the brain forms internal representations of the world 
(2004, p.2). No does not mean to imply that perception does not depend on brain processes. Rather, what 
No means is that perception is more than merely a process in the brain; it is a Ò[É] kind of skillful activity 
on the part of the animal as a wholeÓ (2004, p. 2). 
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profiles are the same thing for No (2004, p. 132). So, we can say that for an object to 
look red is for it to look in such a way as to vary in apparent color in accordance with the 
red sensorimotor profile.  
 Having distilled the above two theses, it is unclear how either can motivate NoÕs 
metaphysics. NoÕs idea that sensorimotor knowledge partly composes our ability to 
perceive the colors is logically unrelated to what the colors are. To think otherwise is to 
confuse epistemology with metaphysics. Thus, there is no obvious reason to think that 
NoÕs first thesis can be used to motivate his view. What about NoÕs second thesis that 
for an object to look red is for it to look in such a way as to vary in apparent color in 
accordance with the red sensorimotor profile? Again, this thesis is unrelated to the 
metaphysics of color. However, there is a prima facie plausible premise by which to 
move from how the colors appear to how they are (Hardin, 1988; Boghossian & 
Velleman, 1991). This premise is known as Infallibility (and is often considered part of 
JohnstonÕs 1992 Revelation). Infallibility =df If after careful reflection (on our 
experiences as of the colors) it appears to be in the nature of the colors that p, then p is 
true (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007b). So, Infallibility can be used to get from NoÕs second 
thesis to that red objects vary in apparent color in accordance with the red sensorimotor 
profile. The red sensorimotor profile is the way red things affect our senses (as we move 
and as they move in relation to other things) (2004, p. 129-132). Thus, it follows that red 
objects vary in apparent color in accordance with the way red things affect our senses. 
Call this, ÒVariation.Ó 
 There are two readings of Variation. The first reading is that Variation says red 
objects cause viewers to have differing experiences according to how red objects affect 
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viewersÕ senses. This interpretation is not NoÕs, but I shall consider it briefly. Variation 
under this interpretation is something that I believe any color theorist should accept. 
However, it is also a claim that any color theorist can accept, because there is nothing 
contentious about red objects causing differing experiences in observers according to 
how red objects influence viewersÕ senses. So, Variation under this interpretation is 
unable to motivate any kind of external dispositionalist view. The second reading is 
closer to what No would intend and is that red objects vary in their apparent color, in 
NoÕs sense, according to how red things affect viewersÕ senses.  
 There are two interpretations of this second reading. The first is that the apparent 
colors and the colors are numerically the same. This is not NoÕs view, but I shall 
nevertheless consider it briefly. Under this interpretation, Variation holds that objects 
vary in their color dependent on how their color affects our senses. If the colors of objects 
varied in accordance with how their colors affected our senses, would this imply that 
some kind of external dispositionalism is true? It may seem that the answer is ÔmaybeÕ: 
Properties are either non-dispositional or dispositional, and if an object is square, it is so 
regardless of its effects on us. Upon closer examination, however, we can see that this 
answer is wrong. To see why, imagine a magic object that changes its shape dependent 
on how its shape affects us. The magic object could change its shape thousands of times a 
second, but whatever shape it is at a time, it would be that shape non-dispositionally. So, 
whether the colors of objects vary in accordance with how their colors affect us is 
irrelevant to whether some kind of external dispositionalism is true. 
 Of course, as I said, the first interpretation of the second reading is not NoÕs. He 
believes that the colors and the apparent colors are numerically distinct properties. Hence, 
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the most textually accurate interpretation of Variation is that red objects vary in their 
apparent color in accordance with how their being red affects us. Unfortunately for No, 
it is unobvious how Variation under this interpretation, just like with its other 
interpretations, is supposed to motivate any kind of external dispositionalism. The reason 
is that there is nothing contentious about the interpretation other than its holding that the 
apparent colors are properties of external objects that we perceive (at least) in illusion 
cases, but whether this is true is unrelated to whether the colors are dispositional 
properties: One can just as easily hold that the colors are non-dispositional properties and 
that there are also NoÕs apparent colors as one can hold that the colors are dispositional 
properties and that there are NoÕs apparent colors. At the very least, I cannot see any 
reason why this is not true, so No need needs to say more.   
 As I have shown, it is utterly unclear how either of NoÕs theses about perception 
is supposed to motivate his metaphysical view on color. So, why does No seem to think 
that they do? I am unsure of the answer to this question, but what follows is my attempt 
to give a clear argument for ecological dispositionalism using NoÕs first thesis: 
P1. Our ability to perceive the colors is partly composed by sensorimotor 
knowledge. The relevant sensorimotor knowledge is knowledge of sensorimotor 
dependencies between sensory stimulation and bodily movement, and between 
object movement and sensory stimulation. (NoÕs first thesis) 
P2. If a certain kind of knowledge partly composes our ability to perceive the 
colors, then it must look to be in the nature of the colors that this kind of 
knowledge partly composes our ability to perceive the colors.   
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P3. If after careful reflection on our experiences as of color a proposition p 
appears to be in the nature of the colors, then p is true. (Infallibility) 
P4. The best explanation of it being in the nature of the colors that they are partly 
composed by dependences between bodily movement, object movement, and 
sensory stimulation is that they are dispositions in NoÕs sense.   
(5). It must look to be in the nature of the colors that they are partly composed by 
dependencies between bodily movement, object movement, and sensory 
stimulation. (P1-P2)  
(6). It is in the nature of the colors that they are partly composed by dependences 
between bodily movement, object movement, and sensory stimulation. (P3, (5)) 
 (7). Therefore, the colors are dispositions in NoÕs sense. (P4, (6)) 
 
There are a lot of things about the above argument that are suspicious, and so 
because of this I do not think it could ever be a convincing argument. The most notable 
problem is step (5).
28
 Unfortunately, this step does not follow from P1-P2. The reason is 
that it can look to be in the nature of the colors that sensorimotor knowledge partly 
composes our ability to perceive the colors without it looking to be in the nature of the 
colors that they are partly composed by sensorimotor dependences (i.e. dependencies 
between bodily movement, object movement, and sensory stimulation). It can look to be 
in the nature of x that the ability to perceive x is partly composed of Q1ÉQn without it 
looking to be in the nature of x that it is partly composed by Q1ÉQn. Thus, the argument 
under consideration is invalid at step (5).  
                                                
28
 I question Infallibility in part 3.3. By so doing I call P3 into question.  
 68 
Section 3: Against the circular variant 
The argument from circularity against the circular variant of appearance dispositionalism 
is that the circularity inherent to the view is problematic. The internal version of the 
circular variant is that for any color C, C is identical with the disposition to cause 
experiences as of C if viewed (McGinn, 1983; McDowell, 1985; Wiggins, 1998, p. 185-
214) and the external version being considered (ecological dispositionalism) is the view 
that for any color C, C is identical with the disposition to change the apparent color of 
any object with the disposition in accordance with the C sensorimotor profile (No, 2004, 
p. 123-161). Why ought we to be worried about circularity? One may point out that the 
identity claim that the property red is identical with the property red is circular, but this 
does not seem to be an issue. Of course, one may say that if the circular variant were a 
semantic theory, there would be a genuine worry, because circular definitions are useless 
at explaining their definiendums to anyone who does not already have an understanding 
of their meanings. Circular dispositionalism, however, is not a semantic theory. So, I 
shall look at why the inherent circularity is detrimental to this view on color. For 
simplicity, I shall concentrate on the internal variant of circular dispositionalism when 
presenting the arguments, but most of what is said for this view can be said for NoÕs 
circular, external variant (in addition to a circular, sensory classificationism under Cohen 
and EganÕs interpretations). I shall look at the argument from vacuity in section 3.1 and 
then the argument I endorse in 3.2.  
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3. 1: Argument from vacuity  
The first argument I will discuss for the circularity being problematic is that it would 
result in the content of our experiences as of the colors being vacuous. This argument is 
very close to the surface in Boghossian and Velleman (1989, p. 90). For example, they 
say, Òthe proposed circular definition would imply that the content of color experience is 
vacuousÓ (1991, p. 83).
29 
The argument from vacuity runs as follows: (1) Assume that 
(internal) circular dispositionalism is true, and so that being red is identical with the 
disposition to cause experiences as of red if viewed.
 
So, (2) an experience represents an 
object as red iff it represents it as having the disposition to cause experiences as of red if 
viewed. Hence, (3) an experience represents an object as red iff it represents it as having 
the disposition to cause experiences as of [the disposition to cause experiences as of red if 
viewed] if viewed and mutatis mutandis ad infinitum. Thus, (4) we cannot represent 
objects as being red. (5) We can represent objects as being red. Therefore, (6) circular 
dispositionalism must be false. 
                                                
29 Boghossian and Velleman (1989, p.90) are explicitly responding to the view that ÒRed [i.e., the property 
that objects are seen as having when they look red] =df a disposition to appear red under standard 
conditionsÓ (1989, p. 84). Byrne and Hilbert (2011, p. 340) interpret this as a statement of property identity, 
and so following them I understand Boghossian and Velleman to be responding to the circular variant of 
dispositionalism. To avoid worries regarding whether this is the correct interpretation, I will stop short of 
pinning the argument from vacuity on Boghossian and Velleman, but it is important to realize that, at the 
very least, they endorse something similar.  
Boghossian and VellemanÕs original words are as follows: Ò[Given the definition of red above] an 
experience can represent its object as red only by representing it as disposed to provide visual experiences 
that represent it as red. The problem here is that the experiences that the object is thus represented as 
disposed to produce must themselves be represented as experiences that represent the object as red, rather 
than some other colourÑlest the object be represented as disposed to appear something other than red. Yet 
these experiences can be represented as representing the object as red only if they are represented as 
representing it as disposed to produce experiences that represent it as red. And here the circle gets vicious. 
In order for an object to appear red rather than blue, it must appear disposed to appear red, rather than 
disposed to appear blue; and in order to appear disposed to appear red, rather than disposed to appear blue, 
it must appear disposed to appear disposed to appear red, rather than disposed to appear disposed to appear 
blue; and so on. Until this regress reaches an end, the objectÕs appearance will not amount to the 
appearance of one colour rather than another. Unfortunately, the regress never reaches an end.Ó (1989, p. 
90) 
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 There are two objections to this argument. The first objection is to say that the 
inferences from (1) to (3) are invalid. This objection must be taken seriously, because it is 
unclear whether it is valid to substitute identicals in representational contexts (Byrne and 
Hilbert, 2011, p. 342-346).
 
In fact, it seems plausible that one cannot substitute identicals 
in representational contexts when using any relevant sense of 'represent' close to the 
vernacular. The second objection is to say that the inference to (4) is invalid. This 
objection must be taken seriously, because it is unclear why the circularity in circular 
dispositionalism would force our visual systems to run Òan endless gamut of visual 
appearancesÓ (Boghossian and Velleman, 1989, p. 89).  
 The above two objections constitute a serious predicament for the argument from 
vacuity. The issue is that to avoid the first objection, the argumentÕs proponent must hold 
that identicals can be substituted in representational contexts, but then he cannot avoid 
the second objection. Let me explain. If the argumentÕs proponent holds that identicals 
can be substituted in representational contexts, then he must say that the term ÔrepresentÕ 
should be read transparently in the argument. Given this reading of the term, it is true that 
one can represent that an object is red iff one represents it as having the disposition to 
cause experiences as of [the disposition to cause experiences as of red if viewed] if 
viewed and mutatis mutandis ad infinitum, but this is something that one can easily do. 
All one has to do is transparently represent that the object has the disposition to cause 
experiences as of red if viewed, end of story. There would be no need to run an endless 
gamut of visual experiences (Byrne and Hilbert, 2011, p. 342-346).   
 Perhaps there is a way out for the proponent of the argument from vacuity. The 
argument may run as follows: We can represent an objectÕs being red transparently only 
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if we can be directly acquainted with an objectÕs being red. Only non-dispositional 
properties can give objects a structure with which to be directly acquainted. Call this, 
ÔDirect-Acquaintance.Ó So, we can be directly acquainted with an objectÕs having a 
property only if that property is non-dispositional. Circular dispositionalism holds that 
the colors are dispositional properties. Thus, the proponent of this view cannot say that 
the disposition to cause experiences as of red if viewed gives objects a structure. 
Therefore, assuming that circular dispositionalism is true, we can get that the inference to 
(4) in the argument from vacuity is indeed valid.  
 I am sympathetic with the premise Direct-Acquaintance. Unfortunately, as I 
suspected, the proponent of the vacuity argument cannot avoid my second objection 
without admitting that the inferences from (1) to (3) are invalid. Let me explain. If 
Direct-Acquaintance is true, then it does not make sense to read the term ÔrepresentsÕ 
transparently in the vacuity argument. Thus, in accepting Direct-Acquaintance one should 
admit that the inferences from (1) to (3) are invalid. Thus, although I am sympathetic 
with Direct-Acquaintance, a premise Boghossian and Velleman (1989, p. 90-91) may in 
fact implicitly appeal to, it should be clear that the premise cannot be used to defend the 
vacuity argument against circular dispositionalism.  
 
3. 2. My reasoning about the circularity 
Internal circular dispositionalism, in so far as it is an answer to the question Òwhat are the 
colors?Ó as appropriately understood for this essay, must provide us with the identity 
conditions for the colors. Identity conditions, as I explained in part 1.1 of this essay, tell 
us what the entities are that are identical with the colors. Unfortunately, internal circular 
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dispositionalism either fails to provide an answer to the relevant question appropriately 
understood or provides a nonsensical one. Either internal circular dispositionalism tells us 
what the entities are which are identical with the colors or it does not. If it does not, then 
the view fails to answer the relevant question as understood in this essay: The relevant 
question as correctly understood, as I just said above, requires an answer that tells us 
what the entities are that are identical with the colors. 
 If internal circular dispositionalism does tell us what the entities are that are 
identical with the colors, then the view says that, for instance, the property of being red is 
identical with the thing, the disposition to cause experiences as of the property of being 
red if viewed. The relevant thing is composed of the property red and the disposition to 
cause experiences as of [something] if viewed. Thus, if internal circular dispositionalism 
tells us what the entity is that is identical with redness, it says that redness is identical 
with redness and the disposition to causes experiences as of [something] if viewed, and 
mutatis mutandis for the other colors. Unfortunately, as redness cannot be a proper part of 
itself, this kind of answer is an incoherent answer to the question Òwhat are the colors?Ó 
Thus, one can see that internal circular dispositionalism either is not an answer at all to 
the relevant question or is an incoherent one.
30
  
The only premise that I can anticipate anyone questioning is the one that says, 
Ôthe property of being red is a proper part of the thing, the disposition to cause 
experiences as of red if viewed.Õ Although I can anticipate someone balking at this 
premise, I think that in the end it is sound and obviously so. The relevant entity, the 
disposition to cause experiences as of red if viewed, has the following structure: The 
                                                
30 Johnston (1998) also rejects circular dispositionalist views because they hold that being red is identical 
with something that has being red as a proper part. He agrees that this is incoherent.  
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disposition to M in C, where M is Ôcause an experience as of the property RÕ and R is 
Ôredness.Õ Thus, one can see that being red is a proper part of the thing, the disposition to 
cause experiences as of red if viewed. Of course, it is a logical proper part and not a 
spatial-temporal proper part, but this is irrelevant. In light of what I have said, circular 
dispositionalism must be rejected as an adequate view on color.   
 
Section 4: Against the non-circular variant 
In this section, I will first in 4.1 examine the internal version of non-circular 
dispositionalism, and next in 4.2 I shall examine the external version of non-circular 
dispositionalism.  
 
4.1: The internal version of non-circular dispositionalism 
According to internal, non-circular dispositionalism every color C is identical with the 
disposition to cause an experience as of P if viewed, where the entity picked out by P 
must be different from that picked out by C. There are two versions of this view. The first 
holds that P must pick out a non-mental entity of some sort. The second holds that P 
picks out something mental. This mental entity could be a sensational property or a 
mental object like sense-datum. Peacocke has devoted a lot of ink to developing a view 
that falls into the second category. Peacocke holds that an object is red iff it is disposed 
Ò[É] in normal circumstances to cause the region of the visual field in which it is 
presented to be red ́ [a property of the visual field] in normal humansÓ (1983, p. 39; 1984, 
p. 60). Given this view, one must interpret the phrase Ôan experience as of PÕ to say 
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something like Ôa P experienceÕ (and this applies below). I shall now look at two 
arguments against internal, non-circular dispositionalism. 
 
4. 1.1: My first argument 
My first argument against (internal) non-circular dispositionalism runs as follows: Non-
circular dispositionalism says that, for instance, an object is red iff it is disposed to cause 
experiences as of some other property red* if viewed (where red* is either a mental entity 
or some sort of external color-like entity). Red* is either a non-dispositional property or 
another disposition to cause experiences as of something or another if viewed. If it is the 
former, then we must ask, ÒWhy is red* a non-dispositional property but not being red?Ó 
No answer is readily available, and so we should reject this option. If it is the latter, then 
in order to avoid circularity the non-circular dispositionalist must say that the property 
red* is identical with a non-circular disposition. The only choice forthcoming is to say 
that red* is the disposition to cause experiences as of red** if viewed. Unfortunately, this 
option also fails, because it attempts to explain the property red* using a mysterious 
red** property. Thus, non-circular dispositionalism should be rejected as a poor theory 
about what the colors are.    
 I think that this argument shows that there is a serious issue with non-circular 
dispositionalism. Unfortunately, the argument has some weaknesses. The worst weakness 
is that the non-circular dispositionalist can reject the premise to the effect that the second 
option fails, because it tries to explain the property red* using a mysterious red** 
property. The proponent of non-circular dispositionalism can say that explanations must 
come to an end eventually, and that they come to an end with these color** properties. Of 
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course, I admit that this response on behalf of the non-circular dispositionalist is going to 
have limited appeal. The reason is that, even though explanations must come to an end 
eventually, it is unattractive that they should come to such an odd one. Regardless, there 
is a stronger argument than this one.    
 
4.1.2: My second argument 
My second argument against non-circular dispositionalism is roughly that the property 
red* must be identical with the property red, and so non-circular dispositionalism 
collapses into circular dispositionalism and succumbs to my previous objection regarding 
circularity. My argument runs as follows: The property red* (whether a mental entity or a 
non-mental property of external objects) is either phenomenally like the property red or 
some other property, call it Òrad.Ó If the property red* is phenomenally like the property 
red, then to cause an experience as of red* is to cause an experience as of red. So, if red* 
is phenomenally like the property red, then non-circular dispositionalism collapses into 
circular dispositionalism. Unfortunately, as I showed in the previous section, circular 
dispositionalism cannot succeed, because the view implies, nonsensically, that the colors 
are identical with a property of which they are proper parts. 
 I believe that introspection shows that experience is transparent: The properties 
phenomenally presented in our experience are represented as properties of the external 
world (Harman, 1990, p. 667; Tye, 2000, p. 45-51, 2002; Speaks, 2009).
31
 So, if red* is 
                                                
31
 HarmanÕs well-known example of transparency is worth providing here: ÒWhen Eloise sees a tree before 
her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of 
them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of 
anything as intrinsic features of her experiences. And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about 
Eloise's visual experience. When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of 
your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. 
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phenomenally like the property rad, then an experience as of an object being red* 
represents (in the sense relevant here) that the object is rad. Ex hypothesi, red objects are 
disposed to cause experiences as of red*. So, it follows that whenever we direct our gaze 
towards a red object (at least in typical conditions) we represent that the object is rad. 
Redness is roughly the property that we represent all red objects as having in common in 
typical circumstances. Hence, the property rad must be the same as the property red. 
Thus, an experience as of red* must just be an experience as of red. Therefore, under 
both options, non-circular dispositionalism collapses into circular dispositionalism and so 
succumbs to my argument from circularity.   
 A likely retort is to reject my premise to the effect that if red* is phenomenally 
like the property rad, then an experience as of an object being red* (under either 
interpretation) represents (in the relevant sense) that the object is rad. I think that this 
premise has strong introspective support and so is not easily set aside. Nevertheless, if 
one does not believe that the premise is true, it is probably because one finds at least 
some anti-intentionalist, thought experiment based arguments convincing (Shoemaker, 
1982; 1991, p. 511-513; Boghossian & Velleman 1989, p. 93-94). Anti-intentionalist 
arguments attempt to show (amongst other things) that two experiences E1 and E2 can 
differ in representational content but not in phenomenal character. Thus, if anti-
intentionalist arguments are sound, an experience as of red* can be phenomenally like an 
experience as of rad but not represent objects as being rad. 
 I believe that this response is anodyne. My argument against non-circular 
dispositionalism only requires that the properties phenomenally presented in experience 
                                                
I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented 
treeÓ (1990, p. 667). 
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be represented as properties of the external world in typical conditions. However, anti-
intentionalist arguments employ atypical scenarios to show (amongst other things) that it 
is not necessarily the case that if two experiences differ in representational content, then 
they differ in phenomenal character. ShoemakerÕs (1982, p. 362-362) no-inference 
argument, for example, requires a complicated thought experiment in which a man named 
ÔFredÕ goes through a series of color inversions relative to a color circle such that, after 
some time, it appears to Fred as if each color on the color circle has been replaced by its 
complement on the opposite side of the circle. Therefore, it is compatible with the 
success of anti-intentionalist arguments that it is typically the case that if two experiences 
differ in representational content, then they differ in phenomenal character. Thus, my 
second argument has nothing to worry about.  
 
4.2: The external variant of non-circular dispositionalism 
In order to avoid the argument from circularity against ecological dispositionalism, one 
may try to develop a non-circular variant of this view. Doing so would give us a non-
circular variant of external dispositionalism. Here is one way of trying to develop such a 
variant. According to No, an objectÕs color profile is composed of the appropriate 
dependencies between sensory stimulation and bodily movement (movement-dependent 
dependences), and with the appropriate dependencies between object movement and 
sensory stimulation (object dependent dependencies) (2004, p. 129-132). However, there 
is no immediately obvious reason why these dependences cannot be defined non-
circularly. For example, one may try to capture movement-dependent dependences non-
circularly by using a three dimensional coordinate system. The position marked 0, 0, 0 
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could be used to represent the color. The coordinates x, y, z, other than 0, 0, 0, could be 
used to represent oneÕs position relative to the color. With these ideas in mind, it may be 
said that we can capture the colorÕs effects on our senses as we move by writing them 
next to each coordinate x, y, z on the graph, other than 0, 0, 0. This mess can be cultivated 
into a list LC that says how the color affects our senses at each coordinate.  
 I do not believe that any attempt to capture the appropriate movement-dependent 
and object-dependent dependencies non-circularly can succeed. There are two prima 
facie plausible interpretations of ÔourÕ in the phrase Ôaffects our senses as we move.Õ The 
first reading is that ÔourÕ means Ôthe people on Earth around now.Õ The issue with the 
strategy under this interpretation is roughly that it is physically possible for people to 
evolve sensory apparatusÕ that are affected differently by red objects. My argument is as 
follows: Assume being red is identical with the disposition to modify apparent color in 
accordance with LR restricted to people on Earth around now. Now, suppose that future 
people although they can see redness have senses that are affected in a wholly different 
way by this property. Given this supposition, it follows that being red would not vary in 
apparent color in accordance with its effects on these peopleÕs visual systems, but this at 
the very best is very strange. After all, why would the colors not vary in apparent colors 
for future people with different visual systems? So, we ought to reject that being red is 
identical with the disposition to change apparent color according to LR restricted to 
people on Earth about now, and mutatis mutandis for the other colors.  
 The second reading of ÔourÕ is that it means Ôall metaphysically possible people.Õ 
The issue with this reading is roughly that it is metaphysically possible for there to exist 
infinitely many people whose visual systems red objects affect differently. My argument 
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runs as follows: Assume that being red is identical with the disposition to modify 
apparent color in accordance with LR restricted to metaphysically possible people. There 
are infinitely many metaphysically possible people who can see redness but whose visual 
systems are affected differently by red objects. A person with electronic eyes, for 
instance, is a person nevertheless. Therefore, the red profile cannot be non-circularly 
captured by a list LR that says how the color affects our senses at each coordinate under 
this interpretation, as the list could never be specified in full without mentioning redness. 
The same goes mutatis mutandis for the other colors.  
 My opponent could respond by saying that even though the red profile cannot be 
captured by a list LR without mentioning redness, the property red is not a part of the list: 
For any color C, that color is identical with the disposition to change the apparent color 
of any object with the disposition in accordance with an infinitely long list LC, merely 
picked out using C. I think this response is decent as far as it goes, but there is a serious 
deficiency with the aforementioned view on color. The deficiency is that one cannot get 
oneÕs mind around an infinite list. So, the response leaves an important part of what the 
colors are unexplained: What exactly are the C lists? Although this is not a knock down 
argument, it is a reason for caution: Why accept a view that leaves such an important part 
of what it says the colors are unexplained, especially considering that the colors are 
familiar properties that we perceive external objects as having? Perhaps there is an 
answer to this question. However, one has not yet been provided. Recall that NoÕs theses 
about perception fail to motivate his ecological dispositionalism. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined appearance dispositionalism. This view can be split into 
internal dispositionalism and external dispositionalism. Internal dispositionalism holds 
that the appearances that the relevant dispositions are disposed to give are something in 
us, and external dispositionalism holds that the appearances are something external to us. 
Both views can be further divided into circular and non-circular variants. Thus, 
appearance dispositionalism is divisible into four different views: internal-circular 
dispositionalism, internal-non-circular dispositionalism, external-circular 
dispositionalism, and external-non-circular dispositionalism. I looked at the motivation 
for internal variants of dispositionalism (section 1) and then the motivation for external 
variants (section 2). After doing this, I discussed the argument from circularity against 
circular variants of appearance dispositionalism (section 3). Then I inspected non-circular 
variants (section 4). Most generally, I have shown that appearance dispositionalism is a 
poor view on color and so should be rejected.  
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Part 2.2: Against Reflectance Dispositionalism 
In this chapter, I shall examine reflectance dispositionalism. This is the view that the 
colors are identical with dispositions to reflect certain proportions of incident light at 
each wavelength of the visible spectrum (Byrne and Hilbert, 1997, 2003a; Tye, 2000). 
These dispositions can be called Ôsurface spectral reflectance propertiesÕ (or 
ÔreflectancesÕ for short). There are three things I want to do in this chapter. First, I will 
sharpen reflectance dispositionalism and look at its motivation (section 1). Second, I will 
argue that reflectance dispositionalism succumbs to the modal version of what I call the 
Òobjection from structureÓ (section 2). Roughly, the objection states that reflectance 
dispositionalism is unable to account for the resemblance relations that necessarily hold 
between the colors. Third, I will argue that reflectance dispositionalism succumbs to what 
I call the Òobjection from metamersÓ (section 3). The problem stems from the empirical 
truth that objects with distinct reflectances often appear to have the same color to normal 
observers under normal viewing conditions.  
 
Section 1: Sharpening and motivating 
1. 1: Sharpening reflectance dispositionalism 
Reflectance dispositionalism says that the colors are identical with dispositions to reflect 
certain proportions of incident light at each wavelength of the visible spectrum. However, 
there is a vagueness here left open in the literature as to how we ought to qualify 
Ôincident light.Õ The reason this vagueness is a concern is that the proportion of incident 
light reflected at each wavelength of the visible spectrum is dependent, among other 
things, on the wavelength proportions of the illuminate. The proportion of wavelengths 
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found in the illuminate is, for example, causally dependent on its source. The amount of 
red light (620-750nm) produced by a translucent red light bulb is disproportionate to that 
of the other wavelengths. So, the proportion of red light reflected by an object illuminated 
by a red light bulb will be different from the proportion emitted by that same object 
illuminated by an ordinary bulb.  
 The immediate solution to our problem is that the terms Ôincident lightÕ should be 
qualified to say Ônormal (incident) light in normal conditions.Õ However, how we should 
understand this qualification is a contentious issue. Moreover, the situation gets 
complicated quite quickly. I take it that there are four ways to clarify Ônormal light,Õ and 
four ways to clarify Ônormal conditions.Õ This leaves us with sixteen plausible options 
total for understanding Ônormal light in normal conditions.Õ Let us look at the four ways 
to understand Ônormal lightÕ and Ônormal conditions.Õ The first is to say that Ônormal 
lightÕ and Ônormal conditionsÕ should be clarified to say Ôany physically possible visible 
lightÕ and Ôany physically possible conditionsÕ respectively. The second is that the terms 
should be clarified to say Ôroughly statistically average visible lightÕ and Ô roughly 
statistically average conditionsÕ respectively. The third is that the terms should be 
clarified to say Ôideal lightÕ and Ôideal conditionsÕ respectively, where Ôideal xÕ means x 
of a certain kind other than statistically average. The fourth strategy is that Ônormal lightÕ 
should be clarified to say Ôlight that would be judged normal by a person who we ought 
to listen to concerning such matters,Õ and similarly with Ônormal conditions.Õ  
 I believe that the proponents of reflectance dispositionalism must provide a story 
of normal light in normal conditions along one of the above options if their theory is to be 
complete. For the purposes of this chapter, we can think of Ôincident lightÕ as Ônormal 
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light in normal conditions,Õ without an exact understanding of the phrase in mind, 
because none of my arguments hinge on the qualification. I just wanted to note that 
Ôincident lightÕ must be qualified in some way. I do not want to investigate further how 
this should be done.  
 
1. 2: The motivation  
Byrne and Hilbert (B&H) believe that reflectance dispositionalism is motivated by the 
fact that it meets what they consider to be three conditions on any plausible physical 
theory of color (2003a, p. 8-9). These conditions are as follows: (1) The theory must 
reduce the colors to (or identify colors with) physical properties of objects; (2) the theory 
must reduce the colors to the right type of property to play a certain causal role in color 
perception; and (3) the theory must reduce the colors to a property that is reasonably 
illumination independent.  
 The first condition reflects the fact that the vernacular concept of color is the 
concept of a certain property of objects. Thus, the concern of a physical, philosophical 
theory of color is different from the theory of color in physics. This is because the 
concept of color employed by physicists is the concept of a certain property of light, 
while physical, philosophical theories of color endeavor, amongst other things, to explain 
what makes statements about red tomatoes true. Despite this difference, B&H believe that 
physical, philosophical theories of color ought to be primarily concerned with the 
properties represented by our experiences as of the colors. 
The second condition that B&H believe any plausible physical, philosophical 
theory of color must satisfy ensures that such theories of color are relatively similar to the 
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theory of color used in physics. After all, physicists hold that any plausible theory must 
reduce Òthe colorsÓ to the right type of property to play a certain causal role in their 
theories. The first condition, thus, ensures that physical, philosophical theories of color 
come out as distinct from theories of color set forth by physicists, and the second 
condition ensures that physical, philosophical theories of color are relatively similar to 
theories of color held by physicists.  
The third condition exists, because it is common sense that the color that we see 
an object as having remains reasonably constant through changes in illumination. For 
example, if a red tomato is taken from one illumination condition (bright sunlight) to 
another condition (fluorescent lighting), we continue to see the tomato as being red. This 
phenomenon is known as Ôcolor constancy.Õ A plausible physical, philosophical theory of 
color must, then, imply that the properties it takes to be the colors stay reasonably 
constant through changes in illumination, i.e. the properties must be to some reasonable 
extent illumination-independent. 
 
1.2.1: The motivationÕs deficiency 
The above motivation is good as far as it goes but it has a serious deficiency that I will 
now explain. The deficiency is that just because reflectance dispositionalism meets the 
three conditions listed above does not imply that it is true. In order for the motivation to 
do this one would need the following premise: The only view that can meet the three 
conditions is reflectance dispositionalism. Unfortunately, not only has no argument been 
supplied for this premise but also it is difficult to see how such a premise could ever be 
plausibly argued for: The notion of ÔphysicalÕ is unclear and problematic (part 1.2); there 
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are other properties of objects that can play a role in color perception (see part 3.1 and 
3.3); and there are also obviously many properties of objects that are more or less 
illumination independent.  
 
Section 2: The objection from structure 
The modal objection from structure rests on two crucial premises. I will explicate the first 
and then the second. Call the first premise Unity. Unity is the claim that the colors 
necessarily stand in particular resemblance relations with respect to certain intrinsic 
properties. For example, blue is necessarily more similar to purple than to green with 
respect to these intrinsic properties.
32
 Why believe Unity? The answer usually given is 
that it is appears to be obviously true upon reflection on experiences as of color 
(Westphal, 1987. p. 125; Hardin, 1988, p. 66; Boghossian and Velleman, 1991, p. 95; 
Pautz, 2006; Allen, 2009a, p. 205).
33
 As I said in 1.1, my identifying condition for the 
colors is that they are the properties that we actually experience things as having when 
having visual experiences as of things being colored,Õ where Ôan experience as of a thing 
being coloredÕ is just an experience with that phenomenal character with which we are all 
familiar. These properties certainly appear as if Unity is true of them.  
 The second crucial premise is Not-Similar. This premise states that dispositions to 
reflect certain proportions of incident light do not necessarily have the appropriate 
resemblance relations with respect to certain intrinsic properties (and the same would go 
                                                
32
 Unity is sometimes combined with the claim that the colors necessarily have a certain binary/unitary 
character (Byrne and Hilbert, 2003a; Pautz, 2006). For example, necessarily purple is a perceptual mixture 
of red and blue while green is not a perceptual mixture of any other colors. I do not understand Unity in this 
way.  
33
 This claim does not rely on Infallibility: The thesis that if a proposition p seems true of the colors, then it 
is true of the colors. Rather, the claim only relies on the much weaker premise that we know some truths 
about the colors based on how they appear. 
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for types, sets, and disjunctions of these dispositions to reflect light) (Hardin, 1988, p. 66; 
Pautz, 2006). For example, assume the reflectance dispositionalist identifies the 
reflectances Rb, Rp, and Rg with being blue, being purple, and being green respectively. 
Necessarily, being blue is more similar to being purple than to being green. However, 
Not-Similar claims that it is not the case that necessarily Rb is more similar to Rp than to 
Rg.  
 Why believe Not-Similar? The argument for Not-Similar is that upon examining 
the reflectance curves for Rb, Rp, and Rg we can see that there are no motivated means by 
which to hold that they stand in the appropriate similarity relations (and the same goes for 
types, sets, and disjunctions of reflectance dispositions). Take a look at the following 
graph (Byrne and Hilbert, 2003a, p. 13) as depicted in figure 2.1 below: 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Color similarity. The x-axis represents wavelength in nanometers (nm), 
and the y-axis represents percentage of wavelength in nm.  
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It is unobvious how to justifiably hold that the dotted line (the typical reflectance curve of 
blue objects) resembles the solid regular line (the curve for purple objects) more than it 
does the bold one (the typical curve for green objects). Thus, it is reasonable to hold that 
Not-Similar is true.  
 With the two crucial premises stated, the argument from structure proceeds as 
follows (Hardin, 1988, p. 66; Maund, 1995, p. 126-133; Thompson, 1995, p. 124; Pautz, 
2006): 
 P1. Necessarily, blue is more similar to purple than to green. (Unity) 
 P2. Necessarily, blue is identical with Rb , purple is identical with Rp, and green is 
 identical with Rg. (Reflectance dispositionalism)
34
 
P3. It is not the case that necessarily Rb is more similar to Rp than Rg. (Not-
Similar) 
 (4). Necessarily, Rb is more similar to Rp than Rg. (From P1, P2) 
 (5). Therefore, reflectance dispositionalism is false. (From 4, P3) 
 
There are three likely ways one might try to reject this modal argument. The first is to 
reject Not-Similar, the second is to reject Unity, and the third is to reject the move from 
Unity and reflectance dispositionalism to step four. I shall argue against these attempts in 
turn.  
 
 
 
                                                
34
 Reflectance dispositionalism is necessarily true if true at all, because all identities are necessary 
identities.  
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2. 1: Reject Not-Similar 
The first objection to Not-Similar is due to B&H (2003a, p. 15). The idea is complicated 
but can be simplified considerably for our purposes. First, I must briefly outline the 
opponent process theory. Roughly, opponent process theory states that the outputs of 
three cone-types (in the eye) are altered into two so-called ÒopponentÓ chromatic 
channels and one so-called Ònon-opponentÓ achromatic channel. The three cone-types are 
longwave cones (L), mediumwave cones (M), and shortwave cones (S). The channels 
created from the outputs of these cones are the red-green signal (L-M), the yellow-blue 
signal ((L+M)-S), and the achromatic signal (L+M). With respect to the chromatic 
channels, if L-M > 0, then the signal causes you to have an experience as of red. If L-M < 
0, then the signal causes you to have an experience as of green. Likewise, if (L+M)-S > 0, 
then the signal causes you to have an experience as of yellow, and if (L+M)-S < 0, then 
the signal causes you to have an experience as of blue. With respect to the achromatic 
channels, if L + M > 0, then the signal causes you to have an experience as of white, and 
if L + M < 0, then the signal causes you to have an experience as of black. With respect 
to any channel, if its value is 0, then its signal causes you to have an experience as of 
gray.  
 With these facts in mind, the rough idea is that blue is more similar to purple than 
to green in that the manifestations of blue and purple but not green are disposed to affect 
the S cone-types more than both the M and L cone-types combined. Let me explain this 
proposal in more detail. According to reflectance dispositionalism, colors are dispositions 
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to reflect certain proportions of (normal) incident light (in normal conditions).
35
 So, the 
manifestations of blue, purple, and green, being dispositional properties according to this 
theory, are certain proportions of reflected incident light. Hence, according to the 
proposal, blue is more similar to purple than to green in that the manifestations (reflected 
incident light) of both blue and purple but not green are disposed to affect the S cone-
types more than both the M and L cone-types. 
 I believe that this response can explain (more or less) why in the actual world Rb 
is more similar to Rp than Rg and so would defeat a non-modal version of the argument 
from structure, but the reply is weak against the modal version with which I am 
concerned. My argument runs as follows: B&HÕs idea is that Rb is more similar to Rp than 
to Rg in that the manifestations of Rb and Rp, certain proportions of incident light, both 
instantiate the disposition to affect the S cone-types more than the M and L cone-types 
combined, while the manifestation of Rg, also a certain proportion of incident light, does 
not instantiate the disposition to affect the S cone-types more than the M and L cone-
types combined. Whether a certain proportion of light instantiates the disposition to affect 
the S cone-types more than the M and L cone-types combined is dependent on the laws of 
physics. However, since Hume most philosophers have held that at least some laws are 
contingent (Carroll, 2004, p. 25). Thus, in order for the proposal to be widely convincing, 
B&H must argue that necessarily, the manifestations of Rb and Rp both instantiate the 
disposition to affect the S cone-types more than the M and L cone-types combined, while 
the manifestation of Rg necessarily does not instantiate the disposition to affect the S 
cone-types more than the M and L cone-types combined. B&H provide no such 
                                                
35
 It seems that B&H (p. 15) think that the type of light required for this is equal energy illuminant. So, 
perhaps they would want to define incident light as Ôequal energy light.Õ I am not sure about the conditions 
though.  
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argument. Thus, I believe that their proposal is ineffective, at least as it stands, against the 
modal version.  
 The second objection to Not-Similar is due to David Hilbert (1987, p. 117-118). 
HilbertÕs idea is based on a series of psychophysical experiments designed to test LandÕs 
retinex theory (McCann et al, 1976; Land, 1977). LandÕs theory is that the observed color 
of an image can be determined by calculating the lightness values for the image within 
the short-, middle-, and long-wavelength bands. Land defines ÔlightnessÕ as a perceptual 
property within the achromatic dimension that results from comparing the luminance 
values of the entire visual field. The wavebands are those waves of light that correlate 
with the spectral sensitivities of the S, M, and L cones. The calculation of lightness 
results in lightness triplets that were empirically determined to designate the color of the 
image (Thompson, 1995, p. 124).  
 Experiments performed to test the retinex theory found that lightness is correlated 
with scaled integrated reflectance (McCann et al, 1976). One gets a scaled integrated 
reflectance by integrating a reflectance over a waveband then scaling it so that lightness 
increments correspond equally to reflectance increments. It was found that if this 
procedure is done over all three wavebands (which correspond to the spectral sensitivities 
of the cone photoreceptors) instead of just one, then the result, called a Ôtriplet scaled 
integrated reflectance,Õ is able to predict how an object will appear while viewing certain 
Mondrian displays of arbitrarily arranged pieces of colored paper. Surfaces that had the 
same triplet scaled integrated reflectance in the experimental setting typically appeared 
the same color, but surfaces with different triplet reflectances generally appeared 
different in color (Thompson, 1995, p. 124-125).   
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 With these empirical facts in mind, HilbertÕs proposal is to preserve the 
resemblance relations between the colors via these triplet integrated reflectances. More 
precisely, Hilbert says that the resemblance relations can be captured using a three-
dimensional space, the axes of which are the reflectance values integrated over each of 
the three wavebands. The resemblance relations are captured by this three-dimensional 
space, because they are modeled by the relative distances among the reflectance triplets 
(Thompson, 1995, p. 125).
36
 Mathematically, these distances can be portrayed as follows: 
First, assume λ ranges over the wavelengths of the visible spectrum, and Rs, Rm, and Rl 
are the wavelengths by which the three cone-types are affected. With this being said, Òthe 
metrical distance p(h1(λ), h2(λ)) between reflectances h1(λ) and h2(λ) is equal to the 
three-dimensional Euclidean distance between the triples 〈 ∫Rs h1dλ, ∫Rm h1dλ, ∫Rl h1dλ 〉 
and 〈 ∫Rs h2dλ, ∫Rm h2dλ, ∫Rl h2dλ 〉, or the square root of {( ∫Rs h1dλ - ∫Rs h2dλ )
2
 + ( ∫Rm h1dλ 
- ∫Rm h2dλ)
2
 + ( ∫Rl h2dλ - ∫Rl h2dλ )
2
}Ó (Cohen, 2003a, p. 81). 
 Unfortunately, HilbertÕs attempt has been discovered not to work. If HilbertÕs 
proposal were correct, the similarity relations would correlate with the mentioned relative 
distances between the reflectance triples. However, it is now a known empirical fact that 
the relative distance between the triples only very roughly correlate with the resemblance 
relations between the colors (Thompson, 1995, p. 124-133). Hilbert conceded this fact in 
Byrne and Hilbert 1997  in which he says, Ò[T]he space of triples provides only a very 
loose approximation to the similarity relations among the colorsÓ (p .285, note 32).  
 
 
                                                
36
 It is important to note that HilbertÕs response requires that we identify the colors with these integrated 
triples. Byrne and Hilbert (1997, p. 285, note 32) admit as much. So, technically HilbertÕs defense would 
not save reflectance dispositionalism as defined even if it worked, but this is not worth getting into.  
 92 
2. 2: Reject Unity 
Three objections can be made against Unity. I think that none of them can succeed. The 
first argument against Unity is based on empirical results. Crane and Piantinida (1983) 
found that under certain experimental conditions subjects reported seeing reddish-green 
and bluish-yellow. Billock, Gleason, and Tsou (2001) have replicated the experiment. 
Both experiments were based on the idea that stabilizing a boundary between two colors 
on the retina of a subject would cause oneÕs brain to fill in the boundary (Krauskopf, 
1963). With this in mind, Crane and Piantinida sought to see how the brain would react if 
they stabilized a boundary between red and green on a subjectÕs retina and later a 
boundary between blue and yellow. They found that knowledgeable subjects such as 
psychologists and psychophysicists reported experiencing red-green in the former case 
and yellow-blue in the latter.  
 With this experiment in mind, the argument against Unity runs as follows: (1) 
Assume Unity is true. (2) If Unity is true, then the hue circle is a closed space. What I 
mean by Ôclosed spaceÕ is that necessarily the hue circle does not allow the addition of 
any new hues. The reason for (2) is twofold. (a) The adding of a new hue to the circle 
would require displacing a hue already in the circle (Westphal, 1987, p. 123), and (b) if a 
color were displaced, the resemblance relations between the colors would be different 
than they are. However, as the argument goes, (3) empirical research has found that under 
certain experimental conditions, subjects report having experiences as of red-green and 
yellow-green. (4) The best explanation of the subjectÕs reports is that they really are 
having experiences as of reddish-green and yellowish-green. (5) If it is possible to have 
an experience as of reddish-green and yellowish-green, then these are colors. The 
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rationale behind (5) is as follows: (c) If a subject has an experience as of a color, then 
something must instantiate that color, and (d) a color can be instantiated iff it is a color. 
(6) Thus, the hue circle is not a closed space (from 3, 4, 5). (7). Unity is false (from 2, 6).  
 I believe that this argument cannot succeed. There are obviously a lot of 
questionable steps, but I am just going to focus on (6) in order to avoid moving into 
adjacent territory. The problem with (6) is that it does not follow from (3), (4), and (5). 
Rather, it only follows from (3), (4), and (5) that there are colors that are new to us, but 
this is compatible with the hue circle being a closed space. After all, just because a new 
color is discovered does not imply that any hues have been added to the hue circle.
37
 It 
may be the case that there are colors in the hue circle that we do not normally see, and 
that the relevant experiments allow us to see at least some of these colors. With this being 
said, it is implausible that we can get much of a grasp about what these novel colors are 
from verbal reports. This is because our current concepts of the colors are confined to 
those colors that we normally see, and so we are going to be unable to coherently talk 
about novel colors without a lot of conceptual training. I for one have very little grasp of 
what the participants meant by Ôred-greenÕ and Ôyellow-greenÕ. 
  The second argument against Unity is due to Cohen (2003a, p. 91-92). CohenÕs 
argument does not show that Unity is false, rather it attempts to undermine our intuitions 
about Unity. His argument is as follows: (1) What is really intuitive is not Unity but that 
our experiences as of color have their resemblance relations necessarily. This intuition 
leads us to believe that Unity is true, because (2) we are disposed to mistake properties of 
our experiences as of color for properties of the colors. Call this premise ÔMistake.Õ (3) 
                                                
37
 Similar mistakes to this one are probably made by Cohen (2004; 2009) (see part 3.2), and by Allen 
(2009a) and Byrne and Hilbert (2007b) (see part 3.3).  
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Thus, our intuitions about Unity are illogically inherited from out intuitions about our 
experiences as of color (from 1, 2). (4) Therefore, we ought not to trust our intuitions 
with regard to Unity (from 3).  
 CohenÕs attempt to undermine Unity is extremely weak. The reason is that it is 
implausible that we are prone to mistake properties of our experiences as of color for 
properties external to us. Here is the argument. Assume Mistake is true. Experiences as of 
color are properties of people, while colors are properties objects. Thus, assuming 
Mistake, when we focus on what we experience, we confusedly attend to properties of 
people. However, it is false that when we focus on what we experience, we accidently 
attend to properties of people. Rather, the transparency of experience shows that when we 
focus on what we experience, we are attending to properties of external objects (Pautz, 
2006, p. 557). Therefore, Mistake is false. Without Mistake, CohenÕs attempt to 
undermine Unity cannot succeed.  
 
2. 3: Argument from structure is invalid 
The third attempt to defend the reflectance dispositionalist against the argument from 
structure is to reject the move from Unity and reflectance dispositionalism to step four, 
i.e. necessarily Rb is more similar to Rp than Rg. The way this is done is by saying that 
Unity does not mean what we think it does. Thus, the logical form of Unity is not what it 
appears to be. This can be presented more politically by saying that step four rests on a 
mistake about what it takes for Unity to be true. According to my opponent the truth 
condition for Unity is that necessarily experiences as of blue resemble experiences as of 
purple more than experiences as of green (Shoemaker, 1991, p. 519; Lewis, 1997a, p. 
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330; Mclaughlin, 2003, p. 115; Cohen, 2003a, p. 88). Call this Òthe experiential account.Ó 
If the experiential account is correct, it clearly does not follow from Unity and reflectance 
dispositionalism that (4) Rb is necessarily more similar to Rp than Rg. Thus, the argument 
from structure would be invalid if this objection were to go through.  
 This reply is unconvincing. The problem is that the claim that the experiential 
account is the right one runs against what Westphal (1987. p. 125), Hardin (1988, p. 66), 
Boghossian and Velleman (1991, p. 95), Pautz (2006), Allen (2009, p. 205), and I think 
Unity means. English speakers have a substantial degree of privileged access to the truth 
conditions of their beliefs and assertions. That is to say English-speaking subjects usually 
know what their words mean. Of course, it may be that we do not always know what our 
words mean, as it is perhaps possible given semantic externalism and unobvious 
analyticities that we sometimes do not (Pautz, 2006, p. 549). Nevertheless, I take it that if 
it is admitted that English speakers have substantial access to what their words mean, 
then the friend of the experiential account must say more to motivate their position that 
Unity does not mean what many philosophers (including myself) think it means: 
Necessarily, blue is more similar to purple than to green.  
 In order to further strengthen my position, assume that my proponents and I am 
wrong about what Unity means. That is, assume that Unity means what the experiential 
account says it does: Necessarily, experiences as of blue are more similar to experiences 
as of purple than experiences as of green. Suppose someone says, Ònecessarily squares 
are more similar to rectangles than to circles.Ó By analogy with the experiential account, 
one should hold that what this sentence means is that necessarily experiences as of 
squares are more similar to experiences as of rectangles than experiences as of circles. 
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However, it must be admitted that the experiential account of shapes is wrong headed. 
We know that the English sentence Ònecessarily squares are more similar to rectangles 
than to circlesÓ does not mean that necessarily experiences as of squares are more similar 
to experiences as of rectangles than experiences as of circles. Rather, we know that 
Ònecessarily squares are more similar to rectangles than to circlesÓ means that necessarily 
squares are more similar to rectangles than to circles. As we know that the experiential 
account if false in the case of shapes, we have good reason to hold that it is wrong in the 
case of colors are as well (Pautz, 2006, p. 550). So, the proponent of the experiential 
account must say a lot more to motivate their position than they have done.  
 Moreover, I am skeptical about whether there is any more that could be said in 
favor of the experiential account at the expense of commonsense. The intentional facts 
are somehow determined by the non-intentional facts. So, if we are wrong about what 
Unity means, there must be some non-intentional fact unusual to the case of color that 
explains why we are confused. However, all relevant non-intentional facts in the color 
case seem quite ordinary. Certainly they are not relevantly different from the non-
intentional facts that determine what we mean by English sentences about the 
resemblance relations between shapes (Pautz, 2006, p. 552). Thus, there does not seem to 
be any way to motivate the experiential account.  
 
Section 3: The objection from metamers 
Metameric objects are ones that have distinct reflectances yet appear to have the exact 
same (determinate) color to the majority of normal observers in normal viewing 
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conditions.
38
 Metameric phenomena do occur in nature but are most prevalent with man-
made paints. For example, two Subaru sedans that appear red pearl (or ÒredpÓ for short) 
to normal observers under normal viewing conditions plausibly have distinct reflectances. 
We know that metameric phenomena occur, because the human eye has only three 
receptor types with broad spectral sensitivity and hence is unable to determine the 
differences between all reflectances (Schiffman, 2001). Thus, it is physically possible for 
two reflectances Rredp and Rredp1 to be sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in 
most normal observers in normal conditions.  
 With these facts in mind, the objection from metamers is as follows: Assume that 
red pearl is identical with the reflectance Rredp (that is, assume reflectance 
dispositionalism is true). The only reason to choose Rredp over Rjade as identical with being 
red pearl is that Rredp but not Rjade is sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in most 
normal observers in normal conditions. Hence, the reflectance dispositionalist must 
subscribe to something like the following: For any reflectance x, if x is sufficient to cause 
experiences as of color y in most normal observers in normal conditions, then x = y. Call 
this ÔSufficient-Cause.Õ
39
  Now, consider that two distinct reflectances Rredp and Rredp1 are 
both sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers in normal 
conditions. By Sufficient-Cause, it follows that red pearl is identical to Rredp1 as well as 
Rredp. After all, both of these properties are sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl 
                                                
38
 B&H attempt to call metameric objects into question, because they note, among other things, that 
metameric phenomena seldom occur in nature (2003a, p. 10). However, as the objection from metamers 
should make clear, the physical possibility of metameric objects alone is sufficient to cause trouble for 
reflectance dispositionalism.  
39
 Sufficient-Cause can be thought of as a piece of reference fixing or a piece of meaning giving. If it were 
the former, the issue of whether an object is sapphire blue in a world would depend on whether the object 
has the micro-structural property responsible for objects looking sapphire blue in the actual world. If it 
were the latter, the question of whether an object is sapphire blue in a world would depend on whether the 
object causes experiences as of sapphire blue in that world. 
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in most normal observers in normal conditions. One thing cannot be identical with two. 
Thus, we should conclude that red pearl is not Rredp.  
The objection from metamers, as I see it, then, is different from the problem as 
often envisaged in the literature. First, I clearly do not conceive of the objection from 
metamers as an epistemological problem. That is, I do not conceive of it as a problem 
with how to pick out the relevant reflectance properties given that more than one 
reflectance property can appear the same color. Thus, my conception of the objection 
from metamers is different from the problem as conceived by Michael H. Brill (2003), 
Rolf G. Kuehni (2003), and Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niedere (2003) in their replies 
to B&H. I do not think that the epistemological interpretation is a serious problem for 
reflectance dispositionalism, because it is a metaphysical thesis on color. Second, I do not 
see the objection from metamers as the unintuitive consequence of reflectance 
dispositionalism that reflectances that appear the same color are actually different colors. 
Hence, the objection from metamers, as I understand it, is different from the problem as 
comprehended by Berit Brogaard (2010b) and Michael Watkins (2005).  
 
3. 1: B&HÕs defense and its ineffectiveness  
B&H suggest that the reflectance dispositionalist thesis can be defended from the actual 
existence of metameric objects by modifying the thesis in such a way that any 
determinate color is identical with a set (or a type) of reflectance properties (2003a, p. 10-
11). For example, the color red pearl = the set of reflectances {Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, Rredp3} 
that are sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers in normal 
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conditions.
40
 According to B&HÕs first condition, any plausible physical theory of color 
will identify the colors with physical properties (2003a, p. 8). Thus, it is unclear whether 
B&H can say that the colors are sets, because it is unclear whether sets can be understood 
as physical properties in the narrow sense under which they seem to understand the 
notion of Ôphysical.Õ However, perhaps there is a way to understand sets in which they 
can be considered physical properties more or less. For example, perhaps we can 
understand a set of things as the fusion of those things.  
 Regardless, if the reflectance dispositionalist assumes that colors are sets of 
reflectances, he must acquiesce that there are no objects that instantiate color properties. 
The argument runs as follows: Assume red pearl is the set {Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, Rredp3} 
that is sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers in normal 
conditions. Since a reflectance property is a disposition of an object to reflect light at a 
certain wavelength of the visible spectrum, an object can only have one reflectance 
property at any given time. No object, then, can instantiate the set of reflectances {Rredp, 
Rred1p, Rred2p, Rredp3}. It follows that no object can be red pearl. So, the assumed definition 
of red pearl commits the reflectance dispositionalist to an eliminativist conclusion about 
red and mutatis mutandis for the other colors. Thus, the reflectance dispositionalist must 
accept that objects appear to instantiate color properties but no object is actually colored. 
This is not a conclusion that most people who hold realist views including B&H would 
want to accept. It is especially not a conclusion we should accept given that there is no 
good motivation for the set-theoretic view under consideration.  
                                                
40
 It is worth noting that this view is not really a dispositional view on color. Rather, according to my 
taxonomy it is instead a categorical view on color. I shall discuss it in this chapter anyway. Given the 
dialectic, it is a natural progression from the dispositional view, and so it would be odd not to talk about it 
here.  
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 A likely retort to my above objections is say that the colors are identical with 
disjunctive properties.
41
 A disjunctive property is, for example, the property of being P1 
or P2 or P3. Disjunctive properties are physical properties (or at least seem more physical 
than sets) that objects can instantiate. Even with this change, B&HÕs defense against the 
problem of metamers would be ineffective. I shall provide the argument in terms of sets 
and disjunctive properties, as it works equally well for both. The argument goes like this. 
Assume that red pearl is identical with the set srp {Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, Rredp3} (or the 
disjunctive property drp Rredp or Rredp1 or Rredp2 or Rredp3) of reflectances that are sufficient 
to cause experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers in normal conditions. The 
only reason to hold that set srp (or disjunctive property drp) is identical with red pearl 
instead of some other set sj {Rjade, Rjade1, Rjade2, Rjade3} (or disjunctive property dj Rjade or 
Rjade1 or Rjade2 or Rjade3) is that the reflectances that compose set srp (or disjunctive 
property drp) but not set sj (or disjunctive property qj) are sufficient to cause experiences 
as of red pearl in most normal observers in normal conditions. So, B&H must be 
implicitly appealing to something like the following variant of Sufficient-Cause: For any 
set x (or disjunctive property x), if xÕs members or disjuncts are sufficient to cause 
experiences as of color y in most normal observers in normal conditions, then x = y.
42
 
Call this ÔSet-Sufficient-Cause.Õ Now, it seems that in addition to Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, and 
Rredp3 there is another reflectance Rredp4 that is also sufficient to cause experiences as of 
                                                
41
 Another possible reply is to appeal to domain specific reductions (see part 3.1). I will not discuss this 
strategy here for two reasons. First, proponents of reflectance dispositionalism do not appeal to unpopular 
domain specific reductions, and second it is unclear what domains would be relevant to reflectance 
properties. I consider domain specific reductions in part 3.1 even though they are not particularly popular, 
because they are close at home with micro-structuralism. This is because micro-structuralism was a 
somewhat popular view on color around the same time that domain specific reductions were being 
discussed in the literature. What I say in part 3.1 about domain specific reductions applies mutatis mutandis 
to any attempt to use the strategy here.  
42
 This premise can also be understood as meaning giving or reference fixing.  
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red pearl in most normal observers in normal conditions. Thus, given Set-Sufficient-
Cause, red pearl can be identical with both the set srp (or the disjunctive property drp) and 
the set srp1 {Rredp4} (or the disjunctive property drp1 Rredp or Rredp1 or Rredp2 or Rredp3 or 
Rredp4). One thing cannot be identical with two. So, the reflectance dispositionalist ought 
to conclude using his reasoning that red pearl is not identical with set srp (or disjunctive 
property drp) and mutatis mutandis for the other colors.  
B&H may attempt to deny that Rred4 is sufficient to cause experiences as of red 
pearl in most normal observers in normal conditions. However, I believe that we have 
excellent grounds for holding that B&H cannot easily deny this premise. These grounds 
are based on the following argument: Assume, as we have been doing, that Rredp, Rredp1, 
Rredp2, and Rredp3 all are sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in most normal 
observers in normal conditions. Having made this assumption, there is no reason that 
does not beg the question against the reflectance dispositionalistÕs opponent to hold that 
what is true of Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, and Rredp3 is not also true of Rredp4. This is clear once 
we consider the fact that Rredp4 can differ from Rredp3 by a minuscule amount not 
recognizable by the human eye and likewise for Rredp5 and so on. Therefore, we ought to 
hold that there is a reflectance Rredp4 that is sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl 
in most normal observers in normal conditions, and mutatis mutandis for Rredp5 and so on. 
B&H, then, cannot easily deny this premise. 
 
3. 2: Defining the colors circularly 
In a last ditch effort to defend reflectance dispositionalism, B&H may try to define the 
colors circularly in terms of sets (or disjunctive properties) whose members (or disjuncts) 
 102 
cause experiences of the relevant color in most normal observers in normal conditions. 
For example, red pearl = the set srp of reflectance properties (or the disjunctive property 
drp) such that srp includes all the reflectance properties that are sufficient to cause 
experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers under normal conditions.
 
B&H 
effectively do just this when they identify, for example, red pearl with those proportions 
of hue-magnitudes that can stimulate the opponent processing system so as to produce 
experiences as of red pearl (2003a, p. 15). Under this strategy, the set srp (or the 
disjunctive property drp) contains all the reflectance properties that can be sufficient to 
cause experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers under normal conditions. 
Hence, any reflectance property Rredpn that causes experiences as of red pearl in most 
normal observers under normal conditions is in the set (or is a disjunct).  
An immediate problem with this approach is that the argument I used to defend 
Rredp4 being sufficient to cause experiences as of pearl red (in most normal observers in 
normal conditions) demonstrates that the set srp (or disjunctive property drp) would have 
to be infinite to capture all the reflectance properties that typically cause experiences as 
of red pearl. So, we can never know exactly what the colors are given this move. This is 
particularly a problem for a view with such a weak motivation as the one being 
considered. Whatever is said about this, defining a set in terms of the color with which it 
is identical cannot avoid the objection from metamers. My argument runs as follows: 
Assume that red pearl is identical with the set srp of reflectance properties (or the 
disjunctive property drp) such that srp (or drp) includes all metaphysically possible spectral 
reflectance properties that can be sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in most 
normal observers under normal conditions (B&HÕs response). So, the set srp itself (or the 
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disjunctive property drp itself) is identical with being red pearl. Being red pearl is 
sufficient to cause experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers in normal 
conditions. Hence, the set srp itself (or the disjunctive property drp itself) causes 
experiences as of red pearl in most normal observers in normal conditions. So, by Set-
Sufficient-Cause, red pearl is identical with both set srp (or the disjunctive property drp) 
and the set of set srp (or the property of being the disjunctive property drp or Rredp, Rredp1, 
Rredp2, or Rredp3 and so on). One thing cannot be identical with two. Thus, by the 
reflectance dispositionalistÕs own thinking, it follows that red pearl is not identical with 
the set srp (or the disjunctive property drp) and mutatis mutandis for the other colors.  
A likely defense is to argue that there are consistent set theories that allow for 
self-membership. In my opinion, this type of response is a non-starter. I doubt B&H 
would be comfortable with holding that reflectance dispositionalism is true only if ZF is 
false. (ZF does not allow self-membership.) A better reply is to adopt the disjunctive 
property approach instead of the set theoretic one, and say that the property of being the 
disjunctive property drp or Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, or Rredp3 and so on is identical to the 
disjunctive property drp. This response commits B&H to being realists about disjunctive 
properties. So, B&H are committed to saying that the property of being a or b is different 
from being a or being b. However, it is difficult to see how someone can hold a view of 
property identity that allows the property of being the disjunctive property drp or Rredp, 
Rredp1, Rredp2, or Rredp3 and so on to be identical with the disjunctive property drp at the 
same time as being a realist about disjunctive properties.   
Let me explain. Generally speaking, there are three views on property identity: 
The first is that any two properties are identical iff they have the same extension; the 
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second is that any two properties are identical iff they have the same causal powers; and 
the third is that properties are individuated almost as finely as language. Of these three 
views, the third view on property identity is clearly unavailable to the reflectance 
dispositionalist who wants to say that the property of being the disjunctive property drp or 
Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, or Rredp3 and so on and the disjunctive property drp are identical. So, 
B&H must accept either the first view or the second. The first view is in tension with 
being a realist about disjunctive properties, because the property of having a or b is 
necessarily coextensive with being a or being b. The second view could perhaps be 
shown compatible with being a realist about disjunctive properties but only if it is also 
shown to be compatible with the disjunctive property drp or Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, or Rredp3, 
etc being different from the disjunctive property drp. The reason is that if one accepts that 
the property of being a or being b has causal powers above its logical parts being a or 
being b, then it seems one has to say the same about the property being drp or Rredp, Rredp1, 
Rredp2, or Rredp3, etc. 
Another possible response to my argument is to reject Set-Sufficient-Cause and 
replace it with what I will call ÔReflectance Set-Sufficient-Cause.Ó Reflectance Set-
Sufficient-Cause is as follows: For any set x (or disjunctive property x), if (1) xÕs 
members (or disjuncts) are sufficient to cause experiences as of color y in most normal 
observers in normal conditions, and (2) xÕs members (or disjuncts) are only reflectances, 
then x = y. Reflectance Set-Sufficient-Cause blocks the above implication of its cousin 
that red pearl is identical with both set srp (or the disjunctive property drp) and the set of 
set srp (or the property of being the disjunctive property drp or Rredp, Rredp1, Rredp2, or Rredp3 
and so on). Without this step, my argument fails. 
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Unfortunately, there is no principled reason for the reflectance dispositionalist to 
adopt Reflectance Set-Sufficient-Cause over its simpler cousin. The reason is that the 
reflectance dispositionalist must hold (a) that sets (or disjunctive properties) are physical 
properties and (b) that sets (or disjunctive properties) can be sufficient to cause 
experiences as of color in most normal observers in normal conditions. The reason for (a) 
is B&HÕs first condition on any plausible physical theory of color together with the fact 
that the proposal being defended by my opponent states that colors are identical with sets 
(or disjunctive properties). The reason for (b) is B&HÕs second condition on any 
plausible physical theory of color combined with the same fact as above. The problem 
with B&H holding (2) should now be clear. If sets (or disjunctive properties) are physical 
properties and can be sufficient to cause color experiences, then why are only sets of 
reflectances (or disjunctions of them) privileged with being the colors? The only answer 
that appears forthcoming is that Reflectance Set-Sufficient-Cause must be true if 
reflectance dispositionalism is true, but this is not a principled response.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the view called reflectance dispositionalism that the colors are 
identical with dispositions to reflect certain proportions of incident light at each 
wavelength of the visible spectrum. There are three things I did. First, I sharpened 
reflectance dispositionalism and explained its motivation (section 1). Second, I argued 
that reflectance dispositionalism succumbs to the modal version of what I call the 
Òobjection from structureÓ (section 2). Roughly, the objection states that reflectance 
dispositionalism is unable to account for the resemblance relations that necessarily hold 
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between the colors. The third goal of this chapter was to argue that reflectance 
dispositionalism succumbs to what I call the Òobjection from metamersÓ (section 3). This 
objection stems from the empirical fact that objects with distinct reflectances can appear 
to have the same color to normal observers under normal viewing conditions.  
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Part 2.3: A General Argument Against Dispositionalism 
In this chapter, I present a general argument against the colors being dispositions. A 
property P is dispositional =df for some manifestation M and circumstances C: P is 
identical with the disposition to M in C. Intuitively, dispositions are analyzable by 
something like the simple conditional analysis (SCA). The SCA is as follows: x has the 
disposition to M in C just in case if x were in C, x would M. To develop my general 
argument against dispositionalism, I first argue for a revised version of the SCA (section 
1). Having argued for the revised SCA, I then show that the colors are not analyzable by 
the proposed analysis (section 2). I do this by presenting the general argument form and 
then defending the argument.   
 
Section I: The revised SCA 
In order to argue for the revised SCA there are three major things I must do. In section 
1.1, I provide a defense of the SCA from myriad popular counterexamples. In 1.2, I 
examine MellorÕs (1974) case that some non-dispositional properties imply 
counterfactuals. In section 1.3, I propose the revised SCA and defend it from various 
objections.  
 
1. 1: Defense against counterexamples 
In this section, I shall defend the SCA against counterexamples. It is important to note 
here that in engaging the counterexamples, I am only concerned with dispositional 
properties explicitly expressed in the form Ôthe disposition to M in C.Õ This is because I 
want to avoid debating what the M and C are for various conventional dispositions like 
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being fragile. With this being said, the structure of this section is as follows: In 1.1.1, I 
shall discuss MartinÕs (2008, p. 15) electro-fink counterexamples. In 1.1.2, I shall focus 
on Smith (1977, p. 440) and JohnstonÕs (1992, p. 232) Mimic counterexamples. In 1.1.3, 
I will discuss JohnstonÕs (1992, p. 233) mask counterexamples and then BirdÕs (1998) 
antidotes. Finally, in 1.1.4, I shall discuss the intrinsic dispositions thesis (Lewis, 1997b; 
Molnar, 1999; Bird, 1998; Mellor, 1974).  
 
1. 1. 1: MartinÕs finks 
The first counterexample against the SCA that I want to discuss is due to Martin (2008, p. 
15). By the SCA, x has the disposition to conduct electricity from itself to a conductor iff 
if x were touched by a conductor, x would conduct electricity from itself to the conductor. 
Imagine a wire that does not have the disposition to conduct electricity from itself to a 
conductor if contacted by a conductor. Now, envisage that with a machine called a ÔfinkÕ 
attached, were a conductor to touch the wire, electricity would flow from the wire to the 
conductor. The argument holds that the correct interpretation of this thought experiment 
is that with the fink attached, were the wire touched by a conductor, electricity would 
flow from the wire to the conductor, but the wire does not have the disposition to conduct 
electricity from itself to a conductor. If this interpretation is correct, the thought 
experiment is a counterexample to the SCA in the right to left direction: If a conductor 
contacted the wire, electricity would flow from it to the conductor, but the wire does not 
have the disposition to conduct electricity if contacted.   
 This fink can also function in reverse. Imagine a wire that has the disposition to 
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conduct electricity from itself to a conductor if contacted by a conductor. Next, picture 
that with a machine called a Ôreverse-finkÕ attached, were a conductor to touch the wire, 
no electricity would flow from the wire to the conductor. The argument holds that the 
correct interpretation of this thought experiment is that the wire has the disposition to 
conduct electricity, but that with the reverse fink attached, were the wire touched by a 
conductor, it would not transmit electricity from itself to the conductor. If the argumentÕs 
position is correct, then the thought experiment is a counterexample to the SCA in the left 
to right direction: The wire has the disposition to conduct electricity, but it is false that if 
a conductor contacted the wire, then electricity would flow through the wire to the 
conductor. 
           MartinÕs counterexamples cannot succeed. MartinÕs fink counterexample requires 
that it must be simultaneously true of the wire that were a conductor to touch the wire, 
electricity would flow from the wire to the conductor but false that the wire has the 
disposition to conduct electricity from itself to a conductor. However, it seems that it is 
absurd that both of these conjuncts can be true simultaneously. So, I would say that the 
correct understanding of MartinÕs thought experiment, contrary to his ambitions, is that 
the fink gives the wire the disposition to conduct electricity if touched by a conductor. 
MartinÕs reverse-fink counterexample requires that it must be simultaneously true of the 
wire that it is disposed to conduct electricity from itself to a conductor, but that were a 
conductor to touch the wire, no electricity would flow through the wire to the conductor. 
Similarly to the fink case, however, it seems to me that both of these conjuncts cannot be 
true at the same time. Hence, I would say that Martin is incorrect about how we should 
interpret his thought experiment. Namely, I would say that the correct understanding is 
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that the wire attached to the reverse-fink does not have the disposition to conduct 
electricity if contacted by a conductor. As I think that MartinÕs interpretations of the fink 
and reverse fink thought experiments are wrong, I reject his arguments.  
 
1. 1. 2: Smith and JohnstonÕs Mimics 
MartinÕs counterexamples to the SCA fail, but there are others. The first of these was 
originally developed by A. D. Smith (1977, p. 440)) and honed by Mark Johnston (1992, 
p. 232). Both Smith and JohnstonÕs counterexamples are known as mimics. By the SCA, 
x has the disposition to remain intact if dropped iff if x were dropped, x would remain 
intact. Now, visualize a holy chalice that does not have the disposition to remain intact if 
dropped. Next, imagine a holy angel who so loves the chalice that he ensures using magic 
that were the chalice to drop, it would remain intact. My opponentsÕ interpretation of this 
thought experiment is that with the angel present, were the chalice dropped it would 
remain intact, but it is false that the chalice has the disposition to remain intact if 
dropped. If this interpretation were correct, then the thought experiment would be a 
counterexample to the SCA in the right to left direction: If the chalice were dropped, it 
would remain intact, but it is false that the chalice has the disposition to remain intact if 
dropped.  
 The angel, like the Fink, can also operate in reverse. First, Imagine a holy chalice 
that has the disposition to remain intact if dropped. Now, picture a fallen angel who so 
dislikes the holy chalice that he ensures using magic that it is false that were the chalice 
dropped, it would remain intact. My opponents claim that the correct interpretation of this 
thought experiment is that the chalice has the disposition to remain intact if dropped, but 
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that with the angel present it is false that were the chalice dropped it would remain intact. 
If this interpretation were correct, the thought experiment would be a counterexample to 
the SCA in the left to right direction: It is true that the chalice has the disposition to 
remain intact if dropped, but it is false that if the chalice were dropped, then it would 
remain intact. 
 I do not think that JohnstonÕs counterexamples can succeed. Smith and JohnstonÕs 
holy angel counterexample requires that it must be simultaneously true of the chalice that 
were it dropped, it would remain intact, but that it does not have the disposition to remain 
intact if dropped. However, similarly to what I said in response to Martin, it seems absurd 
that both of these conjuncts can be true simultaneously. So, I would say that the correct 
understanding of Smith and JohnstonÕs thought experiment, contrary to their ambitions, is 
that the holy angel gives the chalice the disposition to remain intact if dropped. The fallen 
angel counterexample requires that it must be simultaneously true of the chalice that it 
has the disposition to remain intact if dropped but false that were the chalice dropped, it 
would remain intact. However, like I have been saying, it seems that both of these 
conjuncts cannot be true at the same time. Hence, I would say that the correct 
understanding is that a chalice in the presence of the fallen angel does not have the 
disposition to remain intact if dropped. As I do not buy Smith and JohnstonÕs 
interpretations of their thought experiments, I reject their arguments.  
 
1. 1. 3: JohnstonÕs masks and BirdÕs antidotes 
The third counterexample is also due to Johnston (1992, p. 233) and the fourth to Bird 
(1998). By the SCA, x has the disposition to break if dropped iff if x were dropped, x 
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would break. Now, imagine a glass that is disposed to remain intact if dropped. Next, 
envisage destructive packaging material (e.g. rocks or bricks) that ensures were the glass 
dropped it would break. The argumentÕs interpretation of this thought experiment is that 
when surrounded by the material, were the glass dropped, it would break, but that it is 
false that the glass has the disposition to break if dropped. If this interpretation were 
correct, the thought experiment would be a counterexample to the SCA in the right to left 
direction: It is true that were the glass dropped, it would break, but it is false that the glass 
has the disposition to break if dropped.  
 The destructive packaging material can also operate in reverse. Imagine a glass 
that has the disposition to break if dropped. Now, picture protective material (e.g. 
Styrofoam packaging material) that guarantees that were the glass dropped, it would not 
break. JohnstonÕs interpretation of this thought experiment is that the glass has the 
disposition to break if dropped, but that with the protective material attached it is false 
that were the glass dropped, then it would break. If this interpretation were correct, then 
the thought experiment would be a counterexample to the SCA in the left to right 
direction: It is true that the glass has the disposition to break if dropped, but it is false that 
if it were dropped, then it would break.  
 BirdÕs antidotes are last minute masks. Antidotes function best in the left to right 
direction, so I shall only look at this kind of case. By the SCA, x has the disposition to 
kill a man if ingested iff if x were ingested by a man, x would kill him. Now, imagine a 
pill that is disposed to kill a man if ingested. Next, envisage that a man takes the pill and 
immediately afterwards the antidote. BirdÕs interpretation of this thought experiment is 
that the pill has the disposition to kill a man if ingested, but that it is false that if the pill 
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were ingested by a man, then he would die. If the argumentÕs interpretation were 
accurate, then the thought experiment would be a counterexample to the SCA in the left 
to right direction: It is true that the pill is disposed to kill a man if ingested, but it is false 
that if a man were to ingest it, then he would die.  
 I reject both JohnstonÕs masks and BirdÕs antidotes. Antidotes are just last minute 
masks. So, for simplicity, I will only consider the masking case. The destructive 
packaging counterexample requires that it be simultaneously the case that were the glass 
dropped, it would break, but that it is false that the glass has the disposition to break if 
dropped. However, like I said in the previous sub-sections, it is absurd that both of these 
conjuncts can be true at the same time. So, I disagree with JohnstonÕs interpretation of the 
thought experiment. Rather, I say that the destructive packaging gives the glass the 
disposition to break if dropped. The protective packaging counterexample requires that it 
is simultaneously the case that the glass has the disposition to break if dropped, but that it 
is false that were it dropped, it would break. Again, it is absurd that both of these 
conjuncts can be true at the same time. So, I think that the correct interpretation of the 
thought experiment is that the protective packaging removeÕs the glassÕ disposition to 
break if dropped. As I reject JohnstonÕs interpretations of the packaging material cases, I 
reject his counterexamples, and mutatis mutandis for BirdÕs antidote case.  
 
1. 1. 4: The intrinsic dispositions thesis 
A likely worry is that what I have said so far in this section implies that at least some 
dispositions are not intrinsic. However, many philosophers have held that all dispositions 
are intrinsic (Lewis, 1997b, p. 148; Molnar, 1999, p. 3; Johnston, 1992, p. 234). An 
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intrinsic property of anything is a property had by that thing regardless of what is actually 
going on outside of itself; an extrinsic property of anything is a property that depends on 
things external to that thing. In response to this worry, I join Mckitrick (2003) and Choi 
(2009) (amongst others) in accepting that there are extrinsic dispositions. I think that this 
is the correct view to take, because otherwise one cannot avoid the absurdities discussed 
above. For example, if one were to hold that all dispositions are intrinsic properties, one 
must hold that MartinÕs reverse finked wire retains its disposition to conduct electricity if 
touched, despite the fact that it would not conduct electricity from itself to a conductor if 
touched by a conductor. I cannot countenance such a conclusion, as it just seems 
incoherent. So, I deny the intrinsic dispositions thesis. 
 Of course, I should not merely reject the intrinsic dispositions thesis if it has 
overwhelming support. Surprisingly, many have simply accepted the thesis as intuitively 
true without much argument. I suspect that my opposition finds the intrinsic dispositions 
thesis to be intuitive because of something like the following rough thinking:  
A rubber wireÕs disposition to not conduct electricity must be intrinsic. No wire 
made of rubber can be disposed to conduct electricity, regardless of its physical 
environment. If this is true of rubber wires, it must be true of all dispositions.  
 
Unfortunately, this thinking does not form a valid argument. A general truth cannot be 
derived from a particular case. Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that it is 
physically impossible for a rubber wire to conduct electricity that the disposition to not 
conduct electricity is always intrinsic. The disposition to not conduct electricity can be 
intrinsic to rubber wires but not to other types of wires. For example, it is physically 
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possible for there to be a wire whose disposition to not conduct electricity is dependent 
on the temperature in which it is placed. It is physically true that temperature influences 
conductivity.  
 I know of only one well-developed argument in the literature for the intrinsic 
dispositions thesis, but I do not think that it works. The argument is originally due to 
Armstrong (1973, p. 11) but what follows is MckitrickÕs (2003, p. 172) interpretation:  
 P1. Imagine a safe glass and an endangered glass.  
  A. Both the safe glass and endangered glass are fragile 
B. The safe glass has protective packaging material and no attacker in                
sight. 
C. The endangered glass lacks protective packaging, is being struck, and 
will soon break.  
P2. The relevant extrinsic properties to the safe and endangered glasses are: 
having  protective packaging, not having protective packaging, being struck, and 
not being struck.   
P3. A glassÕs fragility depends on its having properties that are relevant to 
whether it would shatter if struck.  
(4). Both the safe and endangered glasses have properties relevant to whether they 
would  shatter if struck. (from P3 and A) 
(5). Neither the endangered nor the safe glass share any extrinsic properties that 
are relevant to whether they would shatter if struck. (from P2, B, and C) 
(6). The properties of the safe glass relevant to whether it would shatter are 
intrinsic. (from 4 and 5) 
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(7). Therefore, the safe glassÕs fragility depends on its intrinsic properties. (from 
P3 and 6) 
  
Mckitrick (2003, p. 172-173) has pointed out that there are two serious problems 
with this argument, and I agree. First, it does not show that all dispositions are intrinsic. 
A general truth cannot be obtained from a specific example. So, even if we assume that 
Armstrong has successfully described a case in which no extrinsic property of the safe 
glass is relevant to its fragility, his opponent need only describe one case in which 
extrinsic factors influence a thingÕs dispositions. There are many such examples to be 
had. Imagine a key on ShoemakerÕs keychain that has the disposition to open his front 
door. The key could lose the disposition to open ShoemakerÕs front door without 
undergoing any intrinsic change. The key could lose the disposition were the lock on 
ShoemakerÕs door replaced by one of a different kind (Shoemaker, 1984, p. 221). In 
addition to ShoemakerÕs keychain, there are myriad other examples including but not 
limited to weight, vulnerability, visibility, and recognizability. An objectÕs weight 
depends on the gravitational field in which it is placed. An objectÕs invulnerability can 
depend on a nearby defense system. Whether an object is visible can depend on 
environmental conditions. Finally, whether a man is recognizable is dependent on his 
environment. 
 The second problem is that ArmstrongÕs argument fails to show that no extrinsic 
property of the safe glass could influence its fragility. P2 of ArmstrongÕs argument says 
that the only relevant extrinsic properties to whether the glasses would shatter if struck 
are being struck, not being struck, having protective packing, and not having protective 
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packaging. Why not include fragility on this list? If fragility were included, the safe and 
endangered glasses would share an extrinsic property relevant to their shattering, namely 
fragility. So, the argumentÕs conclusion to the effect that the safe glassÕs fragility is an 
intrinsic property would not follow. The only immediately obvious answer that 
Armstrong can give to this question is that fragility is an intrinsic property and so is not 
an extrinsic property relevant to whether the glasses would shatter if struck. 
Unfortunately, this answer is clearly question begging.  
 
1. 2: MellorÕs triangle 
In this section, I examine MellorÕs triangle case that some non-dispositional properties 
imply counterfactuals. In section 1. 2. 1, I shall explain MellorÕs (1974) triangle example. 
In section 1. 2. 2, I will look at PriorÕs (1981) reply and MellorÕs (1982) defense against 
Prior. Then in section 1. 2. 3, I shall argue that MellorÕs reply cannot succeed.  
 
1. 2. 1: MellorÕs triangle 
MellorÕs triangle case is that x is a triangle iff if xÕs corners were counted correctly, then 
the result would be three (Mellor, 1974). It may be tempting to think of this as a 
counterexample to the SCA. However, this temptation would be misguided, because the 
SCA says that x has the disposition to M in C iff if x were in C, x would M. Thus, one 
cannot get from MellorÕs triangle case to the absurd conclusion that being triangular is a 
dispositional property. Nevertheless, MellorÕs triangle case is important when discussing 
an analysis of dispositional properties. This is because MellorÕs triangle shows that some 
non-dispositional properties just like dispositional ones imply counterfactuals, but it 
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would be preferable if we could use the right side of the SCA to differentiate between 
dispositional and non-dispositional properties.    
 Things are worse than they may at first appear from looking at MellorÕs case 
alone. This is because we can get that all non-dispositional properties imply 
counterfactuals. The argument runs as follows: Imagine two intrinsic non-dispositional 
properties, Q and U. Now, define a disposition D as the power to manifest state Q if in 
state U. Hence, our non-dispositional property U implies that if some object were D, it 
would manifest Q (Cross, 2005, p. 328). In order to aid understanding, let us look at a 
concrete case. Imagine two non-dispositional properties, being dropped and being 
broken. Now, define Òx is fragileÓ as x has the disposition to manifest the state being 
broken if in the state being dropped. So, the non-dispositional property being dropped 
implies that if x were fragile, x would manifest being broken.  
 The counterexamples created by the algorithm all involve circular counterfactuals. 
D is defined as the disposition to manifest Q if in state U. So, the conditional implied by x 
having U is equivalent to if x were disposed to manifest Q if in state U, then x would Q. 
What I mean by such counterfactuals being circular is that there is a property built into 
the antecedent that is also built into the consequent. For example, define Òx is fragileÓ as 
x has the disposition to manifest the state being broken if in the state being dropped. 
Hence, the conditional implied by being dropped is equivalent to if x were disposed to 
manifest the state being broken if in state being dropped, then x would manifest being 
broken. The importance of this will be clear later. Let us first discuss whether MellorÕs 
triangle implies a circular counterfactual.  
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1. 2. 2: PriorÕs reply and MellorÕs defense 
The question of whether MellorÕs triangle implies a non-circular counterfactual hinges on 
the interpretation of the term Òcorrectly.Ó Elizabeth Prior (1981; 1982; 1985, p. 59-62) 
argues that ÒcorrectlyÓ must refer to the result of counting for the appropriate 
counterfactual to be implied by x being a triangle, and so the counterfactual implied by 
MellorÕs triangle must be circular. Her argument runs as follows: There are only two 
options: ÒcorrectlyÓ either refers to the result or the method of counting. If ÒcorrectlyÓ 
refers to the method, the implication does not follow. It is metaphysically possible that on 
some world the laws of nature are different so that systematic perceptual deception 
occurs whenever one attempts to count a triangleÕs corners. Whenever someone is given 
the order to count a triangleÕs corners in that world he sees and counts fives corners 
instead of three. Hence, the relevant conditional is only implied by x being a triangle if 
ÒcorrectlyÓ refers to the result of counting. Prior says that her counterexample to 
ÒcorrectlyÓ referring to the method of counting should be understood as alluding to the 
broader point that the manner of counting cannot guarantee getting the right answer.  
 Mellor (1982) disagrees with PriorÕs argument. He says that x is a triangle implies 
that if xÕs corners were counted correctly, then the result would be three, where 
ÒcorrectlyÓ is understood as referring to the method. His argument is that given the 
correct mathematical definition of counting correctly it is impossible for one to count 
correctly yet get the wrong answer. The mathematical definition of counting a thingÕs 
corners correctly, according to Mellor, is to put its corners into a Ò1-1 correspondence 
with an initial segment of the sequence of positive integers 1, 2, 3, É The highest 
number in the segment is the result of the countingÓ (1982, p.96). According to Mellor, if 
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this procedure is followed when counting the corners of a triangle, it is impossible to 
arrive at an answer other than Ôthree.Õ  
 
1.2.3: My reply to MellorÕs defense 
In my opinion, MellorÕs defense against Prior cannot succeed. I agree with Mellor to the 
extent that when considered abstractly the result of a mathematical operation is its final 
step. So, if the final step is the right answer, performance of the operation guarantees the 
correct result. Unfortunately for Mellor, mathematical operations require counters. 
Computers, humans, intelligent aliens, and so forth are examples of counters. The result 
of a counterÕs performing a mathematical operation is an effect of the method used. 
Specifically, the event referred to by Ôthe result of a counterÕs executing a mathematical 
operationÕ is an effect of the event referred to by Ôperforming the mathematical 
operation.Õ In other words, the event Ôperforming the mathematical operationÕ is the cause 
of the event Ôthe result of the counterÕs executing the mathematical operation.Õ For 
example, when 2+2 is typed into oneÕs calculator, the result Ô4Õ printed to its screen is an 
effect of the mathematical operation that it executed.  
 Given that the result of any counting operation is an effect of the method used, it 
is possible for a counter to perform an operation that would necessarily get the right 
answer when thought of abstractly yet obtain the wrong result. In fact, the only way to 
ensure that counting a triangleÕs corners correctly results in getting ÔthreeÕ would be to 
build the result ÔthreeÕ into the notion of Ôcorrectly.Õ Unless this is done, the failure of 
counting to bring about the correct answer can occur for myriad reasons including but not 
limited to physical defects, outside interference, or buggy instructions. For example, a 
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calculator will fail to print the right result to its screen if there is a faulty internal 
connection between its screen and its logic board. Similarly, I will fail to arrive at the 
answer ÔthreeÕ when using MellorÕs method of counting corners if there is, for instance, a 
lesion to a part of my brain required for counting correctly.  
 A possible response to my criticism of Mellor is to say that I propose a false 
dichotomy by tacitly agreeing with Prior that ÔcorrectlyÕ must be interpreted to refer 
either to the method of counting or to the result. My opponent may say that the term 
ÒcorrectlyÓ can also be interpreted to mean not making a mistake, where a mistake is 
defined as a set of possibilities. The set would include possibilities such as counting the 
same corner twice, failing to put the corners into a 1-1 correspondence, using the lowest 
number of the sequence as the result. Thus, according to my opponent, one can say that x 
is a triangle implies that the result would be three if xÕs corners were counted without 
making a mistake. The notion of not making a mistake is conceptually distinct from the 
notion of getting the right answer. So, as the argument goes, if one interprets ÒcorrectlyÓ 
to refer to not making a mistake, then one can avoid the circularity argued to be inherent 
in the relevant counterfactual implied by MellorÕs triangle. 
 This response cannot succeed. To ensure that counting a triangleÕs corners yields 
the correct result, the set defined as Ônot making a mistakeÕ must include all the factors 
that would result in not getting the result Ôthree.Õ The problem is that there are endless 
possible interfering factors. Thus, there is no way to specify the relevant factors without 
circularly defining them as those factors that interfere with getting the answer Ôthree.Õ 
This is the same problem that ceteris paribus clauses (and ideal conditions etc) encounter 
when used to defend the SCA from Martin et al. and why they are useless here too 
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(Martin, 1994, p. 6; Mumford, 1998, p. 87, and Fara, 2005, p. 51-53). To fill out the 
ceteris paribus clause all possible interfering factors must be specified but these are 
infinite. Hence, to say that if xÕs corners were counted ceteris paribus, the result would be 
three is just to say that if xÕs corners were counted, unless something interfered with 
getting the result that x has three corners, the result would be three.  
 If this is right, MellorÕs triangle example is very similar to the ones that can be 
generated using the algorithm described in section 1. 2. 1. Using the algorithm one can 
get that x is being dropped implies that if x were disposed to manifest being broken if in 
the state being dropped, then x would manifest being broken. Here being broken is built 
into both the antecedent and consequent of the relevant counterfactual. Mellor says that x 
is a triangle implies that if xÕs corners were counted correctly, the result would be three. 
However, as I have argued, x is a triangle does not imply any specifiable counterfactual 
that does not build the right answer into the notion Ôcorrectly.Õ So, at best one can say x is 
a triangle implies that if xÕs corners were counted and the counter got Ôthree,Õ he would 
get the result Ôthree.Õ Here as with the algorithm one has a case in which being three is 
built into both the antecedent and consequent. Thus, clearly there is a strong analogy 
between this case and the algorithm: Both cases are ones in which the relevant 
counterfactuals are only specifiable if they are circular.  
 
1.3: An analysis and its defense 
I believe that based on sections 1.1 and 1.2 that we can develop an analysis similar to the 
SCA that allows one to differentiate between dispositional and non-dispositional 
properties. This section is divided into two subsections. In 1.3.1, I shall present my 
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analysis of dispositional properties. In 1.3.2, I will defend my analysis against some 
objections.  
 
1.3.1: My revised SCA 
We have seen that Martin et al.Õs arguments fail to refute the SCA. I admit that MellorÕs 
triangle shows that the SCA is not that useful in that it does not allow us to use its right 
side to differentiate between dispositional properties and non-dispositional properties. 
However, I have shown that the property of being a triangle as well as those generated by 
the algorithm imply counterfactuals that are only specifiable circularly. Contrary to this, 
all of the quintessential dispositional properties discussed in this chapter imply 
counterfactuals that are easily specifiable non-circularly. Thus, there is an immediately 
obvious way to improve the SCA so as to make it useful. The obvious way to improve the 
SCA is by adding the constraint that the relevant counterfactual be non-circularly 
specifiable.  Doing so results in the improved SCA: x has the disposition to M in C just in 
case non-circularly if x were in C, x would M.  
 I believe that there is a problem with using the improved SCA to differentiate 
dispositional properties from non-dispositional ones. The issue is that non-circular 
counterfactuals are necessarily implied by any object whatsoever regardless of its 
properties. For example, any object x regardless of its properties implies non-circularly, if 
x were in any circumstances whatsoever, then x would be self-identical. The best way 
around this problem is to revise the improved SCA so that it is no longer just a modal 
claim like so.  
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Revised SCA: Essentially, x has the disposition to M in C iff non-circularly if x 
were in C, x would M. 
 
The revised SCA avoids the problem just discussed. Let me explain why. x is a 
triangle implies non-circularly, if x were in any circumstances whatsoever, x would be 
self-identical. This is because any object whatsoever regardless of its properties implies 
this counterfactual. However, x is a triangle does not essentially imply non-circularly, if x 
were in any circumstances whatsoever, x would be self-identical. After all, this 
counterfactual is not essential to x being a triangle. Thus, the revised SCA avoids the 
relevant problem.  
 
1.3.2: A defense against objections 
Troy Cross (2005, p. 328) thinks that non-circularity cannot be used in an analysis of 
dispositional properties, because circularity is neither peculiar to non-dispositional 
predicates nor metaphysically relevant. With regard to the former, he asks us to consider 
the concept of inertial mass, thought of as the disposition to resist acceleration. Inertial 
mass, he says, is defined partly in terms of force, and force is defined partly in terms of 
inertial mass. With regard to the latter, Cross says that even if circularity were peculiar to 
non-dispositional predicates, this would not show a metaphysical distinction between 
non-dispositional and dispositional properties. Rather, he says that the circularity would 
only show an epistemic distinction between them.  
 CrossÕs arguments are unsuccessful. With regard to his first argument, the term 
Ôinertial massÕ does not mean the disposition to resist acceleration. Rather, the term refers 
to the non-dispositional property mass of an object, as measured by its resistance to 
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acceleration. In addition, the term Ôinertial massÕ is not defined in terms of force and 
inertial mass in the sense required for the argument. F=MA does not state that ÒforceÓ 
means mass times acceleration. If ÒforceÓ meant mass times acceleration, it would be 
discoverable a priori that F=MA, but obviously the fact that F=MA is an empirical 
discovery. F=MA is a law governing the properties referred to as force, mass, and 
acceleration. The law states, amongst other things, that if an object has a certain mass and 
acceleration, then it will have a certain force. The law does not give us the meaning of the 
terms Òforce,Ó Òmass,Ó and Òacceleration.Ó Therefore, the concept of inertial mass is 
neither dispositional nor implies a counterfactual only specifiable circularly. 
 CrossÕs second attempt to block the distinction is unclear. One interpretation of 
his response is that the debate about circularity is about concepts and so is irrelevant. 
Under this interpretation the response is misguided. The debate between Mellor, Prior, 
and myself is not about our concepts. Rather, the debate is about whether the property 
being a triangle implies that if some object x instantiates it, then if xÕs corners were 
counted correctly, the result would be three. Prior argues that x being a triangle implies 
this counterfactual only if ÔcorrectlyÕ refers to getting the right answer, and so the 
counterfactual is circular. Mellor disagrees with this necessary condition and proposes a 
new understanding of ÔcorrectlyÕ. I responded to Mellor by defending Prior that the 
method of counting cannot guarantee the right result. Therefore, I think that it should be 
clear that the debate is not merely about concepts.  
 Another way to understand Cross is as saying that a distinction amongst concepts 
does not imply that those concepts refer to separate entities. Assume that the concept of 
ÔdispositionalityÕ implies that essentially x has the disposition to M in C just in case non-
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circularly if x were in C, x would M.  Hence, the concept of Ônon-dispositionalityÕ implies 
that a property is non-dispositional just in case there is no M and C such that for all x: Px 
essentially implies that non-circularly if x were in C, x would M. Despite these 
conceptual truths, as the argument goes, it could turn out that these concepts have the 
same extension. The analogy is with superman and Clark Kent, Hesperus and 
Phosphorus, or Water and H20. For example, the concept ÔHesperusÕ is about the 
morning star, while the concept ÔPhosphorusÕ is about the evening star. However, 
astronomy has shown us that Ôthe morning starÕ and Ôthe evening starÕ both refer to the 
planet Venus. Similarly, we could learn that the concepts ÔdispositionalityÕ and Ônon-
dispositionalityÕ both refer to the same kind of property.  
 This reply cannot succeed. If it turned out that Ônon-dispositionalityÕ and 
ÔdispositionalityÕ referred to the same property, then this property would have to be 
capable of fulfilling both of these concepts. The concepts ÔHesperusÕ and ÔPhosphorusÕ 
both refer to the planet Venus only if this planet is capable of satisfying the concepts 
Ômorning starÕ and Ôevening star.Õ This condition is achieved in the actual world: Both the 
Earth and Venus rotate around the sun, and this rotation is such that the same planet 
appears overhead both in the morning and in the evening. However, if things were such 
that Venus did not appear both in the morning and in the evening, then it could not fulfill 
the concepts Ômorning starÕ and Ôevening star.Õ Similarly, the notions ÔSupermanÕ and 
ÔClark KentÕ both refer to Clark Kent only if Cark Kent can satisfy both of these 
concepts. This just so happens to be the case in the Superman fiction. Similarly, ÔWaterÕ 
and ÔH20Õ both refer to H20 only if H20 is able to play the role of both itself and water. 
Many have claimed that this requirement is met in the actual world.  
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 Thus, we can see that the reply being considered rests on whether a single 
property can fulfill both the roles of Ônon-dispositionalityÕ and Ôdispositionality.Õ Is it 
possible for one property to do this? The notion of ÔdispositionalityÕ implies that there is 
an essentially associated, non-circular counterfactual. The notion of Ônon-dispositionalityÕ 
implies that there is no essentially associated, non-circular counterfactual. So, the 
concepts Ônon-dispositionalityÕ and ÔdispositionalityÕ have contradictory implications. 
How then is a single property to fulfill both of these concepts? A property cannot do two 
contradictory things at the same time. Perhaps though this is not required. Imagine a 
metaphorical switch. When a property PÕs switch is turned to non-dis, there exists no 
associated M and C such that essentially Px non-circularly implies that if x were in C, x 
would M. When PÕs switch is dialed to dis, there is an associated M and C such that 
essentially Px non-circularly implies that if x were in C, x would M. I think it is unlikely 
that any sense can be made of this metaphorical switch. Regardless, a distinction remains: 
Non-dispositional properties are those properties with their switch set to non-dis, whereas 
dispositional properties are those with their switch dialed to dis. 
   
1.4: Summary of section 1 
It is intuitive that dispositions are analyzable by something like the simple conditions 
analysis (SCA). So far in this chapter, I argued for an analysis of dispositional properties 
similar to the SCA. I first argued that the popular counterexamples against the SCA do 
not work. Specifically, I argued that fink, mimic, mask, and antidote counterexamples to 
the SCA all fail. I examined an objection that necessarily, dispositions are intrinsic 
properties but concluded that this thesis is not a viable defense. Second, I examined 
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MellorÕs claim that some non-dispositional properties in addition to dispositional ones 
imply counterfactuals. Specifically, I inspected MellorÕs triangle example. However, I 
argued that MellorÕs triangle only implies a counterfactual specifiable circularly. In 
conclusion of section 1, I presented my own revised SCA that allows one to distinguish 
between dispositional and non-dispositional properties. 
 
Section 2: Argument from the analysis 
My argument from the analysis is roughly that the colors cannot be dispositional 
properties, because they are not analyzable by my revised SCA. Recall that the revised 
SCA is that essentially, x has the disposition to M in C iff non-circularly if x were in C, x 
would M. My argument from the analysis is as follows: All dispositions are analyzable 
by my revised SCA. Thus, if the colors were dispositional properties, then they would be 
analyzable by the revised SCA. If the colors were analyzable by the revised SCA, then 
they would essentially imply non-circular counterfactuals. However, the colors only 
imply counterfactuals circularly specifiable. Therefore, the colors cannot be dispositional 
properties.  
 
2. 1: Defense of the argument 
My argument from the analysis presupposes the premise that the colors only imply 
counterfactuals circularly specifiable, but why should anyone accept this? One reason is 
that it seems true a priori, or at least it seems true a priori to me. However, I recognize 
that others may not agree that the premise seems true. I do not think that there is a direct 
argument for the premise that could be given without begging the question. So, I shall 
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argue for it by arguing that all of the dispositional theories discussed hold that the colors 
are identical with dispositions the counterfactuals of which would have to be circularly 
specified were they to be implied by an object being colored. I will first do this for 
internal appearance dispositionalism, then the external variant of this view, and finally for 
reflectance dispositionalism. When concentrating on internal, appearance 
dispositionalism, I shall focus on the circular version, but it should be clear that what I 
say can be applied mutatis mutandis to the non-circular version.  
 
2. 1. 2: Internal, appearance dispositionalism 
According to internal (circular) dispositionalism, being red, for example, is the 
disposition to cause an experience as of red (in us) if viewed. So, if internal 
dispositionalism were the correct view on color, it would follow by my revised SCA that 
essentially x is red implies non-circularly that if x were viewed, x would cause an 
experience as of red. It is clear, however, that an object x being red does not imply this 
counterfactual. The reason for this is that a subject can view x but fail to have an 
experience as of red because of numerous factors.  
 An obvious attempt to address the above problem is to modify Ôif viewedÕ to say 
Ôif viewed by normal observers in normal conditions.Õ If this constrained version of 
internal dispositionalism were true, it would follow by the revised SCA that essentially x 
is red implies non-circularly that if a normal observer in normal conditions were to view 
x, then x would cause an experience as of red in him. How ought we to understand 
Ônormal observer in normal conditionsÕ? This is a very difficult question to answer, and 
many think that there is no satisfactory one to be had (Cohen, 2004; 2009). Regardless, 
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for my purposes this problem can be completely bypassed. This is because given what I 
am trying to do in this section, it is sufficient to understand the terms Ônormal observer in 
normal conditionsÕ as imposing a set of constraints on the viewing subject and the 
conditions of observation such that S is normal and in normal conditions iff S complies 
with constraints {c1, c2, cn, cn+1}.  
 Now, the issue is that there does not seem to be any non-circularly specifiable 
constraints {c1, c2, cn, cn+1} such that if a subject viewed a red object, then it would cause 
an experience as of red in him. Here is an argument: A red object x can fail to appear red 
to a subject because of a malfunction in his brain (or eyes). So, if x is red is to imply the 
appropriate non-circular counterfactual, then subjects with a malfunction in relevant areas 
of their brains must be disallowed by the constraints. The most promising way to do this 
without circularity is by defining Òa relevant malfunctionÓ as a one in any of a set of 
areas, but it seems that this cannot be done. There are conceivably infinitely many 
different brains types with different areas relevant to seeing red objects. Thus, for any set 
of areas, there is an area relevant to seeing red objects not in that set. Even if one could 
find some constraints that would disallow subjects with malfunctions relevant to seeing 
veridically, this would just be the beginning. The reason is that there are seemingly 
endless additional factors that would have to be ruled out.  
 
2. 1. 3: External, appearance dispositionalism 
Like with internal appearance dispositionalism so also with the external variant. The only 
developed species of external, appearance dispositionalism is NoÕs ecological 
dispositionalism. This is the view that for any color C, C is identical with the disposition 
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to change the apparent color of any object with the disposition in accordance with the C 
sensorimotor profile (or color profile). Color profiles just capture the color conditions. 
Hence, if we substitute color conditions for color profiles, we get that NoeÕs view is that 
for any color C that color is identical with the disposition to change the apparent color of 
any object with the disposition in accordance with the C color conditions. This idea can 
be captured for red as follows: 
 Red = the disposition to be    
      Apparent color
1 
in conditions y
1 
      Apparent color
2 
in conditions y
2 
      Apparent color
n+1 
in conditions y
n+1  
 
So, if NoeÕs view is correct, it follows by the revised SCA that essentially x is red implies 
that non-circularly, if x were in conditions y
1
, x would be apparent color
1
 and mutatis 
mutandis for all the other apparent colors and their color conditions.  
 Can the conditions y
1 
be specified to ensure without circularity that if x were in 
them, then x would be apparent color
1
? I doubt it. The conditions y
1
 includes dependences 
between object movement and sensory stimulation (object-dependent sensorimotor 
dependencies) and dependencies between sensory stimulation and bodily movement 
(Movement-dependent sensorimotor dependences). A malfunction in any areas relevant 
to seeing red will affect these dependences. Hence, the conditions y
1 
must disallow any 
issues that would result in x not being apparent color
1
 in conditions y
1
. The most 
promising way to do this without circularly defining conditions y
1
 is to define Òa relevant 
malfunctionÓ as one to any of a set of areas. However, similarly to what I said in response 
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to internal dispositionalism, conceivably there are an infinite number of sense organ types 
with different areas relevant to seeing colored objects. Thus, for any set of areas there is 
an area relevant to seeing not in that set. If we cannot even get a non-circular account for 
apparent color
1 
in conditions y
1
, then it is hopeless that we could ever get a non-circular 
account for the disposition No says is identical with redness.   
 
2.1.4: Reflectance dispositionalism  
Comparable problems also befall reflectance dispositionalism. This dispositional view on 
color holds that the colors are identical with dispositions to reflect certain proportions of 
incident light at each wavelength of the visible spectrum. The term ÔIncident lightÕ is, of 
course, vague and so needs some clarification. As I said in part 2.2 of this essay, it is 
possible to qualify Ôincident lightÕ so that it means Ônormal incident light in normal 
conditions.Õ How should we understand this qualification? There are myriad options 
available (see part 2.2), but similarly to what I have done above it is sufficient for my 
present purposes that we understand Ônormal light in normal conditionsÕ as imposing a set 
of constraints on the light and the conditions such that L is normal light in normal 
conditions iff L complies with the restraints {c1, c2, cn, cn+1}.  
 If reflectance dispositionalism were correct it would follow by the revised SCA 
that essentially x is red implies non-circularly, if x were struck with normal light in 
normal conditions, x would reflect R proportions of light at each wavelength of the 
visible spectrum. I do not think that any such implication can be specified non-circularly. 
The reason is that even barring the problem of metamers x is red can fail to imply the 
mentioned counterfactual because of strange physical laws, circumstances, or both. If 
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Ônormal light in normal conditionsÕ did not constrain the laws to the actual ones, there 
would be no hope of x is red non-circularly implying the relevant counterfactual. So, let 
us say that Ônormal light in normal conditionsÕ does so restrict the laws. Even so, there is 
the problem of unusual circumstances. 
 It seems there are infinitely many physically possible circumstances that could 
cause x is red not to imply the relevant counterfactual. If this is true, then the only way to 
specify the relevant counterfactual is to circularly define Ònormal light in normal 
conditions.Ó My argument runs as follows: Imagine a red box designed by advanced 
aliens that would instantly turn black as soon as it were struck with normal light in 
normal conditions. The advanced box is red, but it is false that were the box struck by 
normal light in normal conditions, then it would emit R proportions of light. Thus, in 
order to ensure that x is red implies the relevant counterfactual Ônormal light in normal 
conditionsÕ must be broadened to exclude this advanced box. What about alien rays that 
would instantly turn x black; what about alien artificial gravity devices that interfere with 
the R proportions of light reflected by red objects; What aboutÉ ? 
 Obviously, I cannot cover every conceivable interfering circumstances that would 
cause x is red not to imply non-circularly, if x were struck with normal light in normal 
conditions, x would emit R proportions of light. Thus, a likely retort is to say that I would 
eventually run out of interfering circumstances. In response, I ask my opponent to 
conjure up his inner science-fiction writer and try to imagine interfering circumstances 
for himself. That is, for any set of constraints on normal light in normal conditions, I ask 
my opponent to imagine an interfering circumstance not in that set that would cause x is 
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red not to imply non-circularly, if x were struck with normal light in normal conditions, x 
would reflect R proportions of light.  
 
2.2: A standoff between intuitions?   
One may worry that my argument from the revised SCA is going to lead to a standoff 
between intuitions. Here is how the worry may go: Let us assume that the friend of 
dispositional views on color finds some specific disposition she thinks is identical with, 
for instance, the property red. For example, she may say that the property of being red is 
identical with the disposition to cause experiences as of red (in us) if viewed by a normal 
subject in normal conditions, where these constraints are non-circularly defined as those 
in some set {c1, c2, cn, cn+1}. I argued above that no matter the non-circularly specifiable 
constraints it seems that an observer could look at a red object but not have an experience 
as of red. However, my opponent may say that she rejects this argument with respect to 
the specific disposition she thinks is identical with redness. With respect to this property, 
she may claim that given {c1, c2, cn, cn+1} it does not seem to her that an observer could 
look at a red object and not have an experience as of red. I, of course, will deny that it 
seems this way to me, and so it appears we have a standoff. 
My reply is as follows: The vast majority who are sympathetic with dispositional 
views believe that there must be constraints on the stimulus conditions for the 
dispositions they think are identical with the colors. The reason for this is that there is a 
strong, shared intuition amongst the majority of dispositionalists that the stimulus 
conditions must be constrained. My interlocutor above is no different. So, the only 
difference between my interlocutor and me is that she insists that given {c1, c2, cn, cn+1} it 
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does not seem to her that a viewer could look at a red object and not have an experience 
as of red. However, given all the similarities between my interlocutor and me, I think that 
she must be confused. This is because for the same reasons it seems to her that {c1, c2, cn, 
cn+1} are required, she should agree with me that they are insufficient. In other words, my 
point is that the same kinds of arguments that were used to show that {c1, c2, cn, cn+1} are 
required could be developed to show that these conditions are insufficient. The equivalent 
obviously goes for anyone who thinks that there must be constraints on the stimulus 
conditions relevant to the dispositions said to be identical with the colors.  
 
Conclusion 
In section 1 of this chapter, I argued for a revised version of the simple conditional 
analysis (the revised SCA). In section 2, I argued that the colors are not analyzable by my 
revised SCA. I first presented the general argument form, and then argued for the premise 
that the colors only imply counterfactuals circularly specifiable. I did this by showing that 
the counterfactuals associated with the dispositions that internal, ecological, and 
reflectance dispositionalism say are identical with the colors can only be specified in a 
circular fashion. Finally, I examined and rejected a concern about a standoff between 
intuitions. I believe that in this chapter I have not only succeeded in giving a very 
plausible analysis of dispositional properties but also succeeded in showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the colors are not dispositions.  
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Part 3: Categorical views on color 
 
In part 3, I will examine categorical views on color. The revised SCA holds that 
essentially, x is disposed to M in C iff non-circularly if x were in C, x would M. A 
property is categorical =df it is not dispositional. Categorical views can either be 
relational or non-relational, and either reductive, or non-reductive. CohenÕs view is a 
relational and reductive, categorical view; micro-structuralism is a non-relational and 
reductive, categorical view; and non-relational primitivism is a non-relational and non-
reductive, categorical view. In part 3.1, I shall argue against micro-structuralism. In part 
3.2, I shall argue against CohenÕs view. Finally, I will conclude this part of the essay by 
arguing for and defending non-relational primitivism in part 3.3. 
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Part 3.1: Against Micro-structuralism 
 
Micro-structuralism is the view that the colors are identical with micro-structural 
properties (Smart; 1963, p. 64-87; Armstrong, 1968, p. 270-283; Jackson, 1996). There 
are three things I accomplish in this chapter. First, I explain the prime motivation for 
micro-structuralism and its problems (section 1). Second, I present an argument against 
micro-structuralism similar to the argument from metamers in part 2.2 (section 2). I call it 
Òthe problem of multiple causes.Ó Roughly, the problem is that there are myriad micro-
structural properties that are causally sufficient for experiences as of color in most normal 
observers in normal conditions. Third, I present an argument that I call, Ôthe problem of 
chromatic twin-earthÕ (section 3). Roughly, the argument is that color terms refer to the 
colors, but semantic theories that take color terms to refer to micro-structural properties 
have unintuitive consequences.   
 
Section I: The prime motivation and its problems 
The following has been a prime motivation for micro-structuralism: (1) Colors are 
causally efficacious (Jackson, 1996, p. 200-201). (2) Only non-relational and reductive, 
categorical properties can be causally efficacious because of the overdetermination that 
would arise from causal competition with supervenient properties (Prior et al, 1982, p. 
255-256; Kim, 1993a; 1993b; Jackson, 1996, p. 202-203). (3) The only non-relational 
and reductive, categorical properties with which to reduce the colors are the micro-
structural properties of objects. (4). Therefore, the best view on color is micro-
structuralism.  
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1.1: The motivationÕs problems 
I think that the serious problem with this argument is premise (2). There has been a lot of 
ink spilt motivating overdetermination worries in philosophy. As far as I can tell, whether 
overdetermination occurs or is really a problem has not been shown. In other words, 
whether (2) is true is contentious to say the least. In part 3.3, I examine an 
overdetermination argument against non-relational primitivism that could just as easily be 
applied to dispositions and other second order properties. I provide and critique responses 
given by Yablo (1995, p. 486-487) and Watkins (2002, p. 107-137). I also provide my 
own preferred response. Given my response, I am just not convinced by 
overdetermination worries and so reject premise (2).  
 
Section 2: The problem of multiple causes 
The problem of multiple causes arises from the empirical truth that objects with different 
micro-structural properties can sufficiently cause the same color experience in most 
normal observers in normal conditions.
43
 More specifically, according to Nassau (1983; 
1997), there are at least about 15 different features at the micro-structural level that are 
known by physicists and chemists to sufficiently cause most normal subjects in normal 
conditions to have an experience as of, for example, an object being sapphire blue. These 
features comprise the following list: Incandescence, gas excitations, vibrations and 
rotations, transition metal compounds, charge transfer, metals, pure semiconductors, 
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 The opposite of this may be true as well. There is some evidence that objects with the same micro-
structural properties can appear different colors to normal observers in normal conditions. For example, it is 
thought that charge transfer mechanisms like those that cause an experience as of a sapphire stone being 
blue cause andalusite to appear black or brown.  
 139 
doped semiconductors, color centers, dispersive refraction, scattering, interference, and 
diffraction.  
 Let us look at these micro-structural features in more detail. Incandescence is the 
result of high temperatures causing an objectÕs atoms to emit some of their vibratory 
energy as photons (or light). Gas excitations occur when an atom in a gas or vapor has its 
electrons excited by incoming radiation. The excited electrons move into higher energy 
orbits around the nucleus of the atom (representing higher electronic energy levels). 
Whenever an electron so moves the atom emits a certain quantum of light (or amount of 
photons). The wavelength of this emitted light is determined by how the electrons move 
through their orbits. The electronic configuration of the atom together with selection rules 
determine both what higher orbits electrons move into when excited and how they so 
move. Vibrations and rotations occur when, for example, the atoms of a diatomic 
molecule oscillate and rotate about their center mass. These rotations and vibrations grant 
additional energy levels to each electronic energy level.  
 Transition metal compounds found in crystals like iron, chromium, and copper are 
one of the best-known sufficient causes of color experience in most normal observers in 
normal conditions. The atoms of these elements have inner shells (composed of the 
lowest energy electron levels) that remain partly filled and hold unpaired electrons. The 
intensity and wavelengths of light given off when the electrons of these compounds 
become excited typically fall into the visible spectrum. All the excited states of these 
electrons are defined by their respective atomÕs electronic configuration, but the position 
of the excited states is caused by the electric field surrounding the ion. This electric 
fieldÕs shape and strength is caused both by the nature of the surrounding ions and their 
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arrangement. Charge transfer occurs when an electron moves from one transition metal 
ion to another because of the absorption of light energy.  
 Being a metal is causally sufficient for having a metallic color. Metals have empty 
electron states at almost all energy levels above a certain point (called the Fermi level). 
This absence of electron states causes metals to have very high reflexivity and so to have 
a metallic appearance. In semiconductors there is a gap in the band structure (a property 
explained by what is called Òband theoryÓ) in that the valance band is full but the 
conduction band empty. Being a pure semiconductor can cause one or more different 
experiences as of color dependent on the size of its band gap. The experiences as of color 
caused by Doped semiconductors have yet another explanation. Color centers occur 
because of the displacement of an electron by irradiation. The location where the electron 
is displaced from is called a hole center, and the location of the displaced electron is 
known as the electron center. Both hole centers and electron centers can be sufficient to 
cause experiences as of color.  
 Dispersive refraction results from the change in the direction of a wave because 
of a change in its speed. The most common example of dispersive refraction occurring is 
the rainbow seen after a storm. Dispersion is a physical process by which radiation is 
forced to diverge from a straight trajectory because of one or more obstructions in the 
medium through which it is passing. The colors we see during a sunset are caused by 
dispersion. Interference can occur when two beams of light having the same wavelength 
and trajectory interact with each other creating constructive reinforcement or destructive 
cancellation. Interference results in the iridescent colors of soap bubbles, oil slicks, and 
the fur of some animals. Diffraction is the result of the way light behaves when it departs 
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from rectilinear propagation. Diffraction necessarily involves interference but the reverse 
is not the case. The coronae seen around the sun while dark clouds are passing in front of 
it are the result of diffraction.  
 Let us now look at some actual examples of objects with different micro-
structural properties that are sufficient to cause the same color experience (in most 
normal observers in normal conditions). First, butterflies make for good examples. The 
South American butterfly Morpho rhetenorÕs looking blue is thought to be sufficiently 
caused by interference, whereas scattering is thought to be a sufficient cause of the 
butterfly Papilio polamedesÕ looking blue. Second, there are many examples involving 
Gemstones. The gemstone sapphire is thought to appear blue because of interference; the 
gemstone lapis lazuli is thought to appear blue because of vibration energy; the gemstone 
Maxixe-type beryl is thought to appear blue because of a radiation-induced color center; 
and the gemstone spinel is thought to appear blue because of a transition metal 
compound. There are of course other examples.   
 With the above empirical information at hand, the objection from multiple causes 
is as follows: Assume that sapphire blue (ÔsblueÕ for short) is identical with the micro-
structural property Msblue. It is physically possible for two distinct micro-structural 
properties Msblue and Msblue1 to be sufficient to cause experiences as of sapphire blue in 
most normal observers in normal conditions. The only reason to choose Msblue over 
Mgarnet as identical with sapphire blue is that Msblue but not Mgarnet is sufficient to cause 
experiences as of sapphire blue in most normal observers in normal conditions. Thus, the 
micro-structuralist must hold something like the following: For any micro-structural 
property x, if x sufficiently causes experiences as of color y in most normal observers in 
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normal conditions, then x = y. Call this premise ÔIdentity.Õ
 44
  Given Identity, sapphire 
blue is identical to Msblue as well as Msblue1, for this latter property also causes experiences 
as of sapphire blue in most normal observers in normal conditions. One thing cannot be 
identical with two. Thus, we ought to reject the initial assumption. Sapphire blue is not 
identical with Msblue, and mutatis mutandis for the other colors. 
 The strength of my objection from multiple causes is very similar to the strength 
of my objection from metamers in part 2.2 of this essay. The strength is that there is no 
justifiable reason to identify sapphire blue with Msblue over Mgarnet other than that Msblue 
but not Mgarnet is sufficient to cause experiences as of sapphire blue in most normal 
observers in normal conditions. So, the micro-structuralist must subscribe to something 
like Identity. However, if the micro-structuralist accepts something like Identity, then he 
cannot escape the objection from multiple causes. Empirical research has shown us that 
Msblue as well as Msblue1 can sufficiently cause experiences as of sapphire blue in most 
normal observers in normal conditions. Thus, by the micro-structuralistÕs own thinking, 
he ought to say that Msblue1 is identical with the property sapphire blue, as well as Msblue. 
This is impossible. So, we ought to reject that sapphire blue is identical with Msblue, and 
mutatis mutandis for the other colors. 
 I can imagine two responses to the argument from multiple causes. The first 
response is to try to reduce the colors in a domain specific way. The second response is to 
try to reduce the colors to disjunctive properties similarly to the attempt with reflectance 
dispositionalism discussed in part 2.2. I shall consider these replies in turn.  
                                                
44
 Identity can be thought to be piece of reference fixing or a piece of meaning giving. If it were the 
former, the issue of whether an object is sapphire blue in a world would depend on whether the object has 
the micro-structural property responsible for objects looking sapphire blue in the actual world. If it were the 
latter, the question of whether an object is sapphire blue in a world would depend on whether the object 
causes experiences as of sapphire blue in that world.  
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2. 1: Domain specific reductions 
A likely reply to the argument from multiple causes is to admit that a general reduction 
of, for example, sapphire blue to a particular micro-structural property cannot succeed but 
say that perhaps domain specific reductions of sapphire blue can succeed (Lewis, 1969; 
Churchland, 1986, p. 356-358; Enc, 1983).
45
 Let me explain this type of response more 
fully. The idea is analogous to LewisÕ (1969) response to PutnamÕs arguments for 
multiple realizibility. Lewis once said that one could reduce, for example, pain to a 
chemico-physical property by saying that pain is identical to one chemico-physical 
property per structure-type. So, one could say that pain is identical with the chemico-
physical property C1 in the domain of humans, C2 in the domain of fish, C3 in the domain 
of birds, and so on. In the case of color one could say, for example, that sapphire blue is 
identical to having the micro-structural property interference in the domain of sapphire, 
having vibration energy in the domain of lapis, having a radiation-induced color center in 
the domain of Maxixe-type beryl, and so on as needed. 
 In support of domain specific reductions, Patricia Churchland (1986, p. 356-358) 
and Berent En (1983) have explained that such reductions are historically acceptable in 
the sciences. Consider the example of temperature. Temperature in the domain of gasses 
is said to be identical with mean molecular kinetic energy. Temperature in the domain of 
solid objects is thought to be identical with mean maximal molecular kinetic energy. This 
difference is understood to be due to the fact that object-composing moleculesÕ vibratory 
motions are reduced by their lattice like structure. Temperature in the domain of plasma 
is not comparable to temperature in the domain of gasses and solids, because the 
                                                
45
 I mention in part 2.2, footnote 41 that domain specific reductions are relevant to the problem of 
metamers, but explain why I do not discuss them in that chapter.  
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constituents that compose this substance have been torn apart. If these differences were 
not enough, empty space can have a temperature according to modern physics even 
though it contains no molecular constituents.   
 
2.1.1: Identity is a one-to-one relation 
An obvious reason why domain specific reductions are bad for our current purposes  
is that identity is a one-to-one relation but domain-specific reductions require a one-to-
many relation in order to answer the question Òwhat are the colors?Ó. The domain specific 
reductionist about color is someone who has given up trying to answer questions like 
Òwhat is sapphire blue?Ó (perhaps because he thinks that they are unanswerable) in favor 
of answering questions like Òwhat is sapphire blue in the domain of lapis?Ó. I have very 
little grasp on the concept Ôthe property of being sapphire blue in the domain of lapis.Õ 
So, it is difficult for me to care about the identity of this property. Regardless, I have not 
given up on finding an answer to what the colors are, so domain specific reductions have 
little place in this essay.  
 
2. 2: the disjunctive strategy  
The micro-structuralist who accepts the disjunctive strategy says that the colors are 
identical with disjuntive properties (Smart, 1975). A disjunctive property is, for instance, 
the property of being P1 or P2 or P3. Specifically, the disjunctive response in the case of 
sapphire blue is to say something like that this color is identical to the property of having 
such and such interference, or such and such vibration energy, or such and such radiation-
induced color center, or... The idea behind this strategy is to avoid the problem of 
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multiple causes by, in a sense, including all the micro-structural properties that cause 
experiences as of sapphire blue in normal observers in normal conditions within the 
property to which being sapphire blue is to be reduced.  
 There are two problems with the disjunctive strategy. The first is that it is 
probably incompatible with the motivation for micro-structuralism. The second is 
analogous to the problem that the strategy ran into in part 2.2: The disjunctive strategy 
fails to address the challenge posed by the problem of multiple causes. I shall look these 
issues in turn.  
 
2. 2. 1: The strategyÕs incompatibility  
A problem with this strategy, which has been gestured to before (Johnston, 1992, p. 234-
236), is that disjunctive properties do not seem any better off when it comes to 
overdetermination concerns than non-reducible properties or dispositions. The reason for 
this is that both primitive properties, for example, and disjunctive properties supervene on 
the micro-physical properties of objects. In fact, things seem worse with disjunctive 
properties, because there are obvious concerns about how disjunctive properties can 
contribute unique causal powers over those of their disjuncts. I am not personally that 
worried about overdetermination (see part 3.3), but the above tension between the 
disjunctive strategy and the prime motivation for micro-structuralism discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter is worth noting.   
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2. 2. 2: The strategy just does not work 
Regardless of the above concerns, the disjunctive strategy would be ineffectual. This is 
because my opponent has no reason to assume that there are a finite number of micro-
structural properties that are sufficient to cause experiences as of sapphire blue in most 
normal observers in normal conditions. There is no reason to hold that what is true of 
Msblue, Msblue1, Msblue2, and Msblue3 is not also true of Msblue4. After all, Msblue4 can differ 
from Msblue3 by such a small amount that the wavelength proportions of light it reflects 
are not disparate enough to be detectable by the human eye. Thus, like the reflectance 
dispositionalist, the micro-structuralist is forced to define the colors circularly in terms of 
disjunctive properties, the disjuncts of which sufficiently cause experiences of the 
relevant color in most normal observers in normal conditions. For example, sapphire blue 
= the disjunctive property x such that x includes all physically possible reflectance 
properties that sufficiently cause experiences as of sapphire blue in most normal 
observers under normal conditions. This is the only way the micro-structuralist can 
ensure that all micro-structural properties that are sufficient to cause experiences as of 
sapphire blue in most normal observers under normal conditions are disjuncts of the 
disjunctive property with which they are reducing the property being sapphire blue.  
One issue with this strategy is that the disjunctive property x would have to be 
infinitely large. I doubt that that this is a very plausible view on color. It seems false that 
the properties we experience in our color experiences have natures that are infinitely 
large (or complicated). Moreover, as we can never grasp the infinite, this move implies 
that we can never know exactly what it is that the colors are. This is a problem for a view 
so poorly motivated as micro-structuralism. Regardless of these problems, defining a 
 147 
disjunctive property in terms of the color with which it is identical cannot succeed. The 
worry is that the only reason to believe that the disjunctive property x is identical with 
sapphire blue and not some other disjunctive property q Mgarnet or Mgarnet1 or Mgarnet2 or 
Mgarnet3 is that the micro-structural properties that constitute the disjunctive property x but 
not the disjunctive property q are sufficient to cause experiences as of sapphire blue in 
most normal observers in normal conditions. Hence, the micro-structuralist must be 
implicitly appealing to something like the following variant of Identity: For any 
disjunctive property x, if xÕs disjuncts are sufficient to cause experiences as of color y in 
most normal observers in normal conditions, then x = y.
46
 Call this ÔDisjunct-Identity.Õ  
 With this premise in mind, please consider the micro-structuralistÕs assertion. 
Their claim is that the disjunctive property, for example, x itself is identical with sapphire 
blue. Assume sapphire blue is the color that is sufficient to cause experiences as of 
sapphire blue in most normal observers in normal conditions. Hence, given the reduction, 
the disjunctive property x itself must be sufficient to cause experiences as of sapphire 
blue in most normal observers in normal conditions. However, if this is the case, there is 
a property, namely the disjunctive property x, that is sufficient to cause experiences as of 
sapphire blue in most normal observers in normal conditions that is not a disjunct of x. 
So, using this property, we can form a new disjunctive property that is just like x but that 
it includes x as a disjunct. Call this property, Òx-plus.Ó By Disjunct-Identity, it follows 
that sapphire blue is identical with both the disjunctive property x and with x-plus. This is 
impossible. So, sapphire blue is not identical with the disjunctive property x and mutatis 
mutandis for the other colors.   
                                                
46
 This premise can also be understood as meaning giving or reference fixing. My arguments do not care.  
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The strength of this argument is that it is not easily defeated for similar to reasons 
to those discussed in part 2.2. My opponent cannot easily deny that x-plus is a different 
property from x. Doing so not only commits him to certain views on property identity but 
also commits him to views on property identity that are in tension with being a realist 
about disjunctive properties. My opponent also cannot easily claim that he does not 
subscribe to Disjunct-Identity, but instead to something like what I call ÒStern-Disjunct-
Identity.Ó Stern-Disjunct-Identity includes the requirement that the disjuncts of whatever 
property that is identical with sapphire blue be micro-structural. The reason my opponent 
cannot make this claim is that there is no principled reason for him to adopt Stern-
Disjunct-Identity over its simpler cousin. The micro-structuralist must hold that 
disjunctive properties are sufficient to cause experiences as of color in most normal 
observers in normal conditions if he wants the colors to be causally efficacious. So, why 
hold the requirement that only disjunctions of micro-structural properties are capable of 
being identical with the colors? The only reason forthcoming is that unless the micro-
structuralist accepts this requirement his view cannot succeed, but this is unprincipled.  
 
Section 3: The problem of chromatic twin-earth 
The problem of chromatic twin-earth is roughly that color terms refer to the colors but 
semantic theories that take color terms to refer to micro-structural properties result in 
unintuitive consequences. This argument requires that I move from ontological concerns 
to semantic concerns (to a discussion of the meaning of color terms). This move is useful, 
because colors terms refer to the colors (or at least this is an intuitive assumption on 
which to base an argument). It follows that the plausibility of micro-structuralism 
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depends on the plausibility of a semantic theory that takes color terms to refer to micro-
structural properties. I will argue that semantic theories that take color terms to refer to 
micro-structural properties result in unintuitive consequences and, thus, are implausible. 
Therefore, I will conclude that micro-structuralism is significantly less plausible than is 
commonly believed by its proponents.  
 
Section 3. 1: The semantic theory 
Call semantic theories compatible with Micro-structuralism, ÒMicro-structuralist 
semanticsÓ (ÒMSÓ for short). MS may be understood as having two primary influences. 
First, Saul Kripke (1972) and Hilary Putnam (1975) have presented strong arguments in 
favor of the view that natural kind terms and names are rigid designators, i.e. natural kind 
terms and names designate the same property (or object) in every possible world. The 
rigidity of natural kind terms and names allows for two non-synonymous terms (two 
terms that differ in cognitive significance) to necessarily refer to the same property and 
thus, for an identity statement containing these terms to be necessarily true even if the 
two terms are not synonymous. For example, the rigidity of natural kind terms allows for 
two non-synonymous terms such as ÒwaterÓ and ÒH2OÓ to necessarily refer to the same 
property H2O. Hence, the identity Ôwater = H2OÕ is true necessarily, despite the terms on 
either side of the identity operator not being synonymous. The relationship between the 
two terms in such identity statements may be understood as a relationship between a 
definiendum and its definiens. Thus, the identity statement Ôwater = H2OÕ may be 
understood as an a posteriori definition of the true essence of water. 
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 Second, so-called ÒcausalÓ theories of reference for names and natural kind terms 
have become popular since the late 80s. These causal theories hold that in order for a 
term to refer to an object, certain causal connections must obtain between the speakersÕ 
use of a term and the object (Boyd, 1988). Causal theories attempt to explain both how a 
term first comes to refer to a particular object, and how speakers can use the term to refer. 
For example, if a speaker says ÒwaterÓ while drinking this stuff that happens to be H2O, 
then ÒwaterÓ comes to refer to H2O because of causal mechanisms. Speakers can later use 
the term ÒwaterÓ to refer to H2O by standing in appropriate causal relations to the original 
use of the term.  
 We are now in a position to understand MS. MS treats color terms as natural kind 
terms, although it does not commit itself to BoydÕs causal theory of reference in 
particular. MS merely says that two terms that are not synonymous can be used to refer 
necessarily to the same micro-structural property.
47
 Moreover, MS should be understood 
as saying that the relationship between two non-synonymous terms that refer to the same 
property is analogous to the relationship between a definiendum and its definiens. Thus, 
for example, according to MS, identity statements such as Ôred = micro-structural 
property xÕ should be considered necessary, a posteriori definitions of what redness is. 
MS can be formally stated as follows: 
 
MS: Color terms have a posteriori and necessarily true micro-structural 
definitions such that (1) color terms stand in some type of necessary relation R to 
certain micro-structural properties (or disjunctions of them) and (2) color terms 
                                                
47
 The way I understand this is that a term only necessarily refers once the appropriate relation between the 
term and the property to which it will refer has occurred. Thus, for example, it is not necessary that ÒredÓ 
refer to physical property x simply because of anything to do with the word Òred,Ó but because speakers say 
ÒredÓ when they see this ÒstuffÓ that is physical property x.
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necessarily refer to the micro-structural properties to which they stand in this 
relation R. 
 
Section 3. 2: The argument against MS  
 
To set the stage for my argument against the plausibility of MS and, thus, micro-
structuralism, I must first present a thought experiment. Consider another planet called 
Òchromatic-twin-earth.Ó Chromatic-twin-earth is exactly like earth except for that fact 
that the color terms used by its speakers happen to be appropriately R related to different 
micro-structural properties (or disjunctions of micro-structural properties) from the color 
terms used by the people of earth. For example, let us say that on twin-earth the word 
ÒredÓ refers to the micro-structural property RT instead of RE, ÒyellowÓ refers to the 
micro-structural property YT instead of YE, and so on for all color terms. Both objects 
with RT and those with RE look phenomenally red to both the earthlings and twin-
earthlings, and both objects with YT and those with YE look phenomenally yellow to both 
the earthlings and twin-earthlings, and so on for all ÒcolorÓ properties. Thus, chromatic-
twin-earth is exactly like earth, except that, for example, ÒredÓ is appropriately R related 
to the micro-structural property RT instead of RE and so refers to RT instead of RE.  
 With this thought experiment in mind, we can see that the semantic physicalist 
must claim that the chromatic-twin-earth term, for example, ÒredÓ has a necessarily 
distinct definition from the earth term Òred.Ó To be clear, the semantic physicalist must 
hold that this disparity in meaning holds because of the following three reasons: (1) The 
earth and twin-earth color terms refer to distinct properties; (2) according to MS, the 
definitions of color terms depend on the properties to which they refer, and (3) according 
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to MS, color terms necessarily refer to the properties to which they refer in the 
environment in which they are used. Thus, in order for the micro-structuralist semantic 
theory MS to accommodate the thought experiment, my opponent must hold that, for 
example, the definition of ÒredÓ on earth is necessarily different from the definition of 
ÒredÓ on twin-earth, and so on for all the other color terms. 
Hence, as the earth term ÒredÓ and twin-color-earth term ÒredÓ have necessarily 
distinct definitions, the semantic physicalist must hold that the two terms also have 
necessarily distinct meanings. So, according to MS, it also follows that any 
disagreements about redness (or any color for that matter) between the two groups of 
humans (the earthlings and twin-earthlings) would only be disagreements about the 
meaning of the word Òred.Ó Effectively, what is implied by this disparity in meaning is a 
form of meaning-relativism; what ÒredÓ means to earthlings is different than what ÒredÓ 
means to twin-earthlings. This meaning-relativism implies that if the two groups of 
humans were to come into contact, they would be unable to have any legitimate 
discussion about the redness of objects, and so on for the other colors.  
This inability for the two groups of humans to have any legitimate discussion 
about the redness of objects is strongly opposed to what seems true in this case. Consider 
this thought experiment. An earthling and a twin-earthling are in a room together looking 
at an object with RE. Unbeknownst to the earthling he has color inverting contact lenses 
in his eyes, whereas the twin-earthlingÕs eyes are as they are naturally. The twin-earthling 
says the object is red, whereas the earthling says that the object is green. According to 
MS, there is no substantial dispute here about the color of the object between the 
earthling and the twin-earthling, because their color terms have different meanings. 
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Moreover, MS implies that both the twin-earthling and the earthling are equally wrong, 
despite the fact that the former is seeing things naturally and the latter seeing things 
unnaturally due to tampering. These consequences are very odd in my opinion. 
Intuitively, the earthling and the twin-earthling are having a substantial debate about the 
color of the object, and the twin-earthling is right and the earthling wrong. 
 A likely worry is that MS is compatible with both the earthling and twin-earthling 
creating some sort of translation manual between earth and twin-earth color terms, and is 
this not enough? After all, one may think, such a translation manual would allow the 
parties to have legitimate debate about, for instance, whether an object is earth-red or 
twin-earth-red. In response to this worry, I do not think that only allowing for legitimate 
debate about, for example, whether objects are twin-earth-red and earth-red is enough to 
accommodate our intuitions. A likely concern about my response here runs thusly: 
Putnam/Kriple style semantics imply similar consequences to the ones I claim are false in 
the case of MS when used to say that natural kind terms necessarily refer to physico-
chemical properties. However, many have accepted the translation manual approach 
despite these consequences in the case of natural kind terms. So, the translation manual 
approach in the case of natural kind terms is at least not obviously wrong.  
In my opinion there is a significant difference between the colors and natural 
kinds. The difference is that the colors are phenomenally presented to us in experience 
whereas natural kinds are not. One is phenomenally presented with the yellowness of 
gold but certainly not the goldness of gold. It seems that our color terms refer to those 
properties phenomenally presented to us in our color experiences. That is, ÒredÓ refers to 
that property phenomenally presented in experiences of things being red. Ex hypothesi, 
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earth colors and twin-earth colors look phenomenally the same. Therefore, it certainly 
seems the earthlings and twin-earthlings must be referring to the same property when 
they use the word Òred.Ó Unfortunately, the translation manual approach cannot 
accommodate this conclusion. A corollary of this is that I do not think that colors should 
be treated the same as natural kinds like water and gold.   
 
Section 3. 3: Discussion 
The argument from chromatic-twin-earth gains its strength from the fact that color terms 
clearly refer to the colors (in ordinary English usage). Thus, if micro-structuralism were 
true, there would have to be some true semantic theory that allows color terms to refer to 
micro-structural properties. However, there are few semantic theories from which to 
choose that satisfy this constraint. The reason is twofold. First, it seems that color terms 
either have analytically true definitions or definitions that are true a posteriori. The 
relationship between color terms and physical terms is not analytic. Thus, an analytic 
semantic theory is incapable of taking the meaning of color terms to be micro-structural 
properties. Second, it seems that color terms are rigid designators and so must refer 
necessarily. Thus, the semantic constraint on micro-structuralism puts its proponents in a 
precarious situation.  
My argument has some weaknesses too. I have not shown that micro-
structuralism implies MS. So, the micro-structuralist can attempt to avoid my argument 
against her by providing a semantic theory compatible with Micro-structuralism that does 
not have the same problems as MS. The only obvious alternative is a variant of MS that 
allows the meaning of color terms to be something other than the colors even though 
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color terms refer to the colors. For instance, the micro-structuralist could hold that the 
semantic values of color terms are Fregean concepts that pick out physical colors in a 
given environment. I am doubtful, however, as to whether a theory that attempts to 
separate the meaning of color terms from their referents is plausible in part because of 
PutnamÕs argument for the connection of meaning with reference (1975), and in part 
because it just seems absurd that the meaning of our terms could be independent of their 
referents.  
Moreover, a variant of MS that takes the meaning of color terms to be something 
other than the colors would imply that what makes human color claims true is different 
from what makes twin-human claims true, but this has unacceptable consequences in my 
opinion. Let us call this variant of MS, ÒVMS.Ó It is not clear what the best version of 
VMS is, as there are many possible variants of MS that take the meaning of color terms 
to be something other than the colors. Nevertheless, I take it that VMS must hold (1) that 
color terms stand in some sort of reference fixing relation R to specific micro-structural 
properties, and (2) that color terms necessarily refer to the properties to which they stand 
in this relation. The reason for (1) is that any plausible variant of MS must tell us a story 
about how the reference of color terms gets fixed, and the reason for (2) is that color 
terms seem to be rigid designators.   
With (1) and (2) in mind, please think back to the chromatic-twin-earth thought 
experiment discussed in 3.2. Chromatic-twin-earth is exactly like earth but for that fact 
that the color terms used by its speakers are R related to different micro-structural 
properties such that on twin-earth the word ÒredÓ refers to the micro-structural property 
RT instead of RE, ÒyellowÓ refers to the micro-structural property YT instead of YE, and 
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so on for all color terms. With this thought experiment in mind, we can see that VMS 
implies that the chromatic-twin-earth term, for example, ÒredÓ necessarily refers to RT 
instead of RE. Hence, according to VMS, what makes earthling claims about red true is 
necessarily different from what makes twin-earthling claims about red true, and so on for 
all color terms. Therefore, VMS implies standard relativism about color terms; what is 
red to earthlings is not red to twin-earthlings.  
Unfortunately, this implication of VMS, like that of MS, seems to run contrary to 
our intuitions. Again, consider the following thought experiment: An earthling and a 
twin-earthling are in a room and are both looking at an object with RE. Unbeknownst to 
the earthling he has color inverting contact lenses in his eyes, whereas the twin-
earthlingÕs eyes are as they are naturally. The twin-earthling says the object is red, 
whereas the earthling says that the object is green. VMS can allow for substantial debate 
unlike MS, but still fails to entirely capture our intuitions. Unlike with the natural kinds, 
it is intuitive that the twin-earthling is right, and the earthling wrong, as the twin-
earthlingÕs visual system is functioning as it naturally would but the earthlingÕs has been 
tampered with. However, VMS cannot handle this. VMS can give us the consequence 
that the earthling is wrong as his eyes have the inverting lenses, but it is unable to give us 
the consequence that the twin-earthling is right. Hence, although VMS may perhaps work 
for natural kinds (not saying it does), VMS seems implausible when it comes to the 
colors.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Micro-structuralism is the view that the colors are identical with micro-structural 
properties. There are three things I accomplished in this chapter. First, I explained the 
prime motivation for micro-structuralism and its problems (section 1). Second, I 
presented an argument against micro-structuralism similar to the argument from 
metamers (section 2), which I called Òthe problem of multiple causes.Ó Roughly, the 
problem is that there are myriad micro-structural properties that are causally sufficient for 
experiences as of color in most normal observers in normal conditions. Third, I presented 
an argument that I called, Òthe problem of chromatic twin-earthÓ (section 3). Roughly, the 
argument is that color terms refer to the colors, but semantic theories that take color terms 
to refer to micro-structural properties have weird consequences.   
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Part 3.2: Against CohenÕs Relationalism 
CohenÕs Relationalism (or just ÒrelationalismÓ for short) is roughly the view that the 
colors are relational properties like being married or being a sibling (Cohen, 2004; 2006a; 
2006b 2007; 2009; 2010). In this chapter, I discuss the plausibility of this view. I have 
four principal aims: My first is to give a precise formulation of CohenÕs view with which 
to work (section 1); my second is to argue that the color variation argument used to 
support his view is unconvincing (section 2); my third is to argue that CohenÕs response 
to the objection that his view implies certain absurdities is incompatible with the 
argument for his view (section 3); and my fourth is to defend the introspective rejoinder 
that CohenÕs relationalism stands in stark contrast to our phenomenally-informed, pre-
theoretic intuitions, and so should be rejected (section 4).  
  
Section 1: A precise formulation of relationalism 
Relationalism is a metaphysical view on color that has been popularized by Cohen (2004; 
2006a; 2006b; 2007; 2009). His view provides an ecumenical response to color variation 
cases that says everyone is right. Color variation occurs whenever two or more 
perceptions represent some thing or things as having apparently conflicting colors. 
CohenÕs relationalism, more specifically, is a view according to which there is a relation 
R such that for any object x, x is color L iff there exists an observer y (which need not be 
the same for different xÕs) such that x bears R to y (2004; 2009, p. 8-12, 24-36). Cohen 
provides further details about the relation involved and what the relation holds over. 
Cohen suggests that the relation is a three-place relation identifiable by means of color 
words. For example, in the case of the color red, the relevant relation is a three-place 
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ÔredÕ relation. Let us call this relation the ÒRLÓ relation. What does RL hold over? Cohen 
says that RLÕs relata must be an external object that bears the color property, a viewing 
subject, and a viewing circumstance (2004; 2009, p. 9; 24-36; 128-130). 
 With the above in mind, CohenÕs view on color can be presented as follows:   
CohenÕs view: It is constitutive of (or essential to) any color L that there is a three-
place relation RL such that for all x, x has L iff for a viewing subject y1 and a 
viewing circumstance y2, RLxy1y2 (Section 1.2; Roberts, 2013).
48
  
CohenÕs view can be split into two versions that are close to the surface in CohenÕs 
(2004; 2009) work. CohenÕs view 1 requires condition 1 below for when x bears RL to y1 
and y2, and CohenÕs view 2 requires condition 2 (section 1.2; Roberts, 2013).  
1. RL holds of <x, y1, y2> iff y1 is a viewing subject in circumstance y2 and y1 is 
having a perception as of x being L. 
 2. RL holds of <x, y1, y2> iff if a viewing subject y1 in a viewing circumstance y2 
were to view x, then y1 would have a perception as of x being L. 
CohenÕs view 2 better captures CohenÕs relationalism understood as a kind of 
dispositionalism or role functionalism about color. I however do not understand CohenÕs 
view to be a dispositional view on color (see Section 1.2; Roberts, 2013). Regardless, I 
have provided both formulations here, because everything I say below applies to CohenÕs 
view 1 and 2.  
 
 
 
                                                
48
 In part 1.2, I leave viewing circumstances out of the formulation of CohenÕs view, because it is 
inconsequential to anything in that chapter. It is important that I add it in for this chapter though.  
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Section 2: The argument from color variation  
The following propositions have a strong intuitive pull (Westphal, 1987; Hacker, 1991; 
Byrne & Hilbert, 2003a): 
Incompatibility: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate 
color all over at the same time. (The term ÒcolorÓ in this proposition refers to 
those properties in the familiar color solid. Scarlet, jade, aquamarine, sand, etc are 
determinate colors. Red, orange, yellow, green, etc are determinable colors.)
49
 
 
Realism: External objects are actually colored. 
 
Objectivism: The colors of objects are mind-independent.  
 
However, recently, these intuitive propositions have been questioned by what I call, Òthe 
(color) variation argument.Ó This now prevalent and influential argument presupposes the 
empirical premise that there is interspecies, intrapersonal, and interpersonal perceptual 
variation in what colors objects appear to have (Òcolor variationÓ for short). Color 
variation occurs whenever two or more perceptions represent some entity or entities as 
having seemingly conflicting colors. Generally construed, the variation argument can be 
presented as follows:  
P1. There is no reason why one variant is veridical rather than another in X type (a 
variable to be filled in soon) color variation cases.  
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 Reddish, yellowish, greenish, etc are super-determinable colors. If the determinate/determinable 
distinction is best understood as graded, then this can be easily accounted for by adding Ôof the same gradeÕ 
to Incompatibility. 
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P2. The best explanation of P1 is that Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility 
and Objectivism is false.  
3. Therefore, Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is  
false (Hardin, 1988; 2004; Mclaughlin, 2003; Cohen, 2004; 2006a; 2007; 2009; 
Chalmers, 2006; Kalderon, 2007; Mizrahi, 2007; Allen, 2009a). 
 
Cohen (2004; 2009) uses an instance of this argument to support his view. Cohen 
thinks that the best explanation of P1 is that Incompatibility and Objectivism are false 
and believes that the denial of these propositions is best captured by his view. 
Selectionists also use an instance of this argument (or something close) to support their 
view that visual systems pick out disparate properties to be the colors (Kalderon, 2007; 
Mizrahi, 2007; see also Allen, 2009a). Many selectionists believe that the best 
explanation of P1 is that Incompatibility is false and believe that the denial of this 
proposition is best captured by their view. In addition, color relativists use an instance of 
this argument to support their view that the colors are relative to perceivers (Brogaard, 
2010b; Egan, 2010). Color relativists seem to believe that the best explanation of P1 is 
that Incompatibility and Objectivism are false, and think that the denial of these 
propositions is best captured by their view. Finally, Eliminativists use an instance of the 
variation argument to support their view (Boghossian and Velleman, 1989; Chalmers, 
2006; Hardin, 1988; and Maund, 1995). Eliminativists think that the best explanation of 
P1 is that Realism is false and believe that some version or another of eliminativism best 
captures the falsity of this proposition.  
 162 
There are two versions of the variation argument, the metaphysical version and 
the epistemic one. If we interpret P1 metaphysically, we get the metaphysical version of 
the argument. If we interpret P1 epistemically, we get the epistemic version of the 
argument. The metaphysical and epistemic interpretations of P1 respectively are as 
follows: 
M1. There is nothing to make one variant veridical rather than another in X type 
color variation cases.  
E1. There is no reason to believe that one variant is veridical rather than another 
in X type color variation cases.  
 
 Further, there are generally speaking three instances of both M1 and of E1. The 
first instance results from filling in X with ÔInterspecies.Õ Interspecies variation occurs 
whenever two or more speciesÕ experiences represent that an entity is two or more 
different colors in the same circumstances. The second instance results from filling in X 
with ÔIntrapersonal.Õ Intrapersonal color variation occurs whenever a single subjectÕs 
experience represents that an entity is two or more different colors in two or more 
different circumstances. The third instance results from filling in the variable ÔXÕ with 
ÔInterpersonal.Õ Interpersonal variation occurs whenever two or more subjectsÕ 
experiences represent that an entity is two or more different colors in the same 
circumstances (lighting is the same etc). 
 In this section, I provide a comprehensive defense of Incompatibility, Realism, 
and Objectivism from the variation argument by giving separate responses to the three 
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most salient versions of its instances.
50
 In section 2.1, I examine a version of the 
metaphysical, interspecies instance involving typical differences in speciesÕ visual 
systems; in section 2.2, I inspect a version of the metaphysical, intrapersonal instance that 
involves color contrast effects; and in section 2.3, I examine a version of the 
metaphysical, interpersonal instance dealing with normal observers. Having discussed the 
most salient versions, in section 2.4 I scrutinize three versions of the epistemic instance 
of the variation argument that run parallel to them. Finally, in section 2.5, I briefly give a 
general response to color variation cases. It is unlikely that my defense of the three 
propositions will bring my opponents to my side, but I shall have succeeded if I can show 
them that the arguments considered are ultimately unconvincing. 
 
2.1: A version of the metaphysical, interspecies instance 
In this section, I examine a version of the metaphysical, interspecies instance based on 
the empirical fact that many non-human animals differ from us in how their visual 
systems are typically constructed. Empirical research shows that the eyes of typical 
pigeons, goldfish, and ducks, for example, contain four types of retinal receptor (each 
sensitive to different broadband spectral features). On the other hand, empirical research 
shows that typical human eyes contain only three types of retinal receptor. Thus, typical 
pigeons, goldfish, and ducks have what is called Ôtetrachromatic vision,Õ and typical 
humans have what is called Ôtrichromatic vision.Õ As a result of this difference, it takes 
four appropriately chosen spectral lights (lights that emit certain wavelength proportions) 
                                                
50
 Cohen (2009) suggests that the structural similarity between types of variation means we should prefer a 
uniform response. I do not agree with this. Sure, there is a structural similarity between variation cases, but 
they are also very different. If one concentrates on the similarities, it may seem that a uniform response is 
preferable, but as soon as one focuses on the differences this appearance fades away.  
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for typical pigeons, goldfish, and ducks to perceptually match any given spectral stimulus 
(an entity that emits or reflects certain wavelength proportions) in standard conditions, 
whereas it takes three spectral lights for typical humans to perceptually match any given 
spectral stimulus in standard conditions (Jacobs, 1981; Thompson, 1995, p. 141-160).  
 With these above facts in mind about animal visual systems, the version of the 
metaphysical, interspecies instance with which I am concerned is as follows: 
M1
species
.
 
There is nothing to make one variant veridical rather than another in at 
least some interspecies color variation cases involving typical differences in 
visual systems in standard conditions. 
M2
species
. The best explanation of M1
species
 being true is that Incompatibility, 
Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is false. 
3. Therefore, Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is 
false. 
 A popular argument for M1
species 
rests on the following dilemma: Imagine that 
there are three spectral lights L that perceptually match a spectral stimulus S for (typical) 
humans but not for (typical) pigeons (in standard conditions). So, the lights appear the 
same determinate color to humans but do not appear the same in some respect to the 
pigeons. Now, ask whether the pigeons or the humansÕ perceptions of the match are in 
general veridical. There are four options worth considering. (I) Both the pigeon and 
humansÕ perceptions of L are veridical, but only the humans represent color properties. 
The human represents L as having a color y, and the pigeon represents L has having a 
color* z (which to be clear is not a color property). (II) The pigeonsÕ perceptions of L 
veridically represent its color, but the humansÕ perceptions falsidically represent its color 
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(or vice versa). (III) Neither the pigeons nor the humans veridically represent the color of 
L. (IV) Both the pigeon and humansÕ perceptions of L are veridical, and their experiences 
both represent color properties. The human represents L as having a color y, and the 
pigeon represents L has having a color z. 
 With this dilemma in mind, the argument for M1
species
 is as follows: (I) is 
revisionary, because ordinary people as well as philosophers and color scientists have 
been concerned with the colors that non-human animals perceive. However, if (I) were 
true, it would turn out that these groups were wrong in their endeavor to understand the 
colors that non-human animals like pigeons perceive. (II) and (III) are revisionary, 
because all (or almost all) ordinary people, philosophers, and scientists hold that people 
and pigeonsÕ experiences are typically veridical. Hence, as options (I)-(III) are 
problematic, option (IV) is the best one available. Thus, option (IV) must be true. 
Therefore, M1
species
 is true (Cohen, 2004, 2006a, 2009, p. 27; see also Kalderon, 2007; 
Mizrahi, 2007; Allen, 2009a).
51 
Call this, Òthe dilemma argument.Ó 
  There are two excellent replies to the relevant version of the metaphysical, 
interspecies instance, depending on how option (IV) of the dilemma argument is 
interpreted. On the first interpretation, Incompatibility is consistent with both the pigeons 
and humansÕ perceptions of L being veridical. Call this Ò(IV)
1
.Ó There are various 
versions of (IV)
1
. Allen (2009a) says that the pigeons and humansÕ perceptions of L are 
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 Cohen (2009, p. 27) specifically says the following: ÒConsidered by itself, option (i) seems 
objectionably chauvinistic, while, considered by themselves, (ii) and (iii) seem unduly modest. This is not 
to say that the chauvinism following upon (i) or the modesty following upon (ii) or (iii) is incoherent, but 
only that these choices are revisionist with respect to quite a lot of ordinary and scientific talk about color 
[É]Ó Cohen (2009) goes on to say (p. 28) that option (I) (option (i) for him) would result in a lot Òof what 
has passed for color ontology and color science [É] [not being] about color after all. [Thus option (i)] 
would not only revise our taxonomy of fields of enquiry, but also the impression presumably underlying 
that taxonomy that the properties perceived by pigeons and other non-human organisms are [É] colors.Ó  
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veridical and represent determinate color properties of different kinds in that the colors 
they represent vary over different dimensions of determination from the three (hue, 
saturation, and lightness) that our colors vary over. As a consequence of this, the colors 
that pigeons see are not internally related to the colors that we see with respect to these 
dimensions. Also, because the familiar color solid represents the colors along the relevant 
dimensions, we can see that the different-kinds view does not locate the colors pigeons 
see in this solid. I find (IV)
1
 under AllenÕs view to be worrying, because it is conceptually 
problematic: The analogy would be with a view that says that there are shapes which do 
not vary over number of sides, length of sides, etc. Allen (2009a, p. 214-219) tries to 
argue that the conceptual problem is not decisive. Unfortunately, the identifying 
condition I gave in part 1.1 for the colors is that they are the properties that we actually 
experience things as having when having visual experiences as of things being colored,Õ 
where Ôan experience as of a thing being coloredÕ is just an experience with that 
phenomenal character with which we are all familiar. These properties vary over hue, 
saturation, and lightness. So, AllenÕs different kinds view is ruled out by the indentifying 
condition by which I defined the enquiry into what the colors are. Regardless, what 
explains M1
species 
in the pigeon and human case according to AllenÕs different-kinds view 
is that the pigeons represent L as having colors of a non-human kind that are compatible 
with the determinate colors that the humans represent L as having. 
If AllenÕs different-kinds view were the only version of (IV)
1 
available, I could 
see being hesitant about selecting this option regardless of what might be said in its favor. 
However, there is a more conceptually respectable variant of (IV)
1
 from which to choose. 
This version of (IV)
1
 states that pigeons represent more finely grained colors of the 
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human kind than humans and L instantiates such properties. For example, perhaps 
pigeons veridically represent super-determinate colors. Super-determinate colors would 
stand to the determinate colors the way the determinate colors stand to the determinable 
ones. Thus, super-determinate colors would vary over the same dimensions of 
determination as the colors that we see and hence would be internally related to them 
with respect to hue, saturation, and lightness. So, super-determinate colors are going to be 
located in the familiar color solid. What explains M1
species 
in the pigeon and human case 
given this human-kind view is that the pigeons represent L as having super-determinate 
colors of a human kind that are compatible with the determinate colors that the humans 
represent L as having. Regardless of whether this is right, if either the human-kind view 
or AllenÕs different-kinds view were correct with respect to the pigeon and human case, 
one should reply to the relevant version of the metaphysical, interspecies instance by 
accepting M1
species
 but rejecting M2
species
 (and mutatis mutandis for other interspecies 
cases). 
I said that the human-kind view is a conceptually more respectable version of 
(IV)
1
 than AllenÕs. However, there is an argument close to the surface in Allen (2009a) 
against this view. It is as follows: Assume that Infallibility is true. Infallibility =df if a 
proposition p seems true of the colors after careful reflection (on our experiences as of 
the colors), then p is true of the colors (Johnston, 1992; Byrne and Hilbert, 2007b). After 
careful reflection, it seems as if the familiar color solid does not allow for the 
introduction of any novel colors, because the solid spatially represents internal relations 
of similarity and difference (Westphal, 1987). Call this ÒClosed.Ó So, from Infallibility, 
we get that Closed is true. If there are colors that must be introduced to the familiar solid, 
 168 
then Closed is false. If there are human-kind colors that we cannot perceive, then there 
are colors that must be introduced to the solid. So, there can be no human-kind colors that 
we cannot perceive. Thus, pigeons cannot veridically represent super-determinate 
colors.
52
 (If one is wondering, this argument is only relevant to the human-kind view, 
because AllenÕs non-human-kind colors are not to be found in the familiar color solid.) 
 This argument against the human-kind view requires the premise that if there are 
human-kind colors that we cannot perceive, there are colors that must be introduced to 
the familiar solid. Unfortunately, there can be human-kind colors that we cannot perceive 
that are already in the solid. Thus, for the argument to succeed, it must be shown that we 
see all the human-kind colors in the solid. I admit that it appears that we see all the 
determinate and determinable colors of the human-kind. The reason is that it seems the 
only way there could be determinate or determinable colors of the human-kind that we 
cannot see would be if they were slotted into the familiar color solid (like pie pieces), but 
Closed disallows the displacement that would result (Westphal, 1987; Allen, 2009a). 
However, no such worry arises for human-kind colors that are more finely grained than 
the ones we see. Super-fine-grained colors would not need to be slotted into the familiar 
color solid but would just exist underneath (so to speak) the determinate, human-kind 
colors in the solid like the determinate, human-kind colors are ÒunderneathÓ the 
determinables. So, for example, a super-determinate of scarlet would not need to be 
slotted in next to scarlet like a pie piece but would exist ÒunderneathÓ scarlet like scarlet 
is ÒunderÓ red.  
                                                
52 Allen (2009, p. 205-206) says, ÒAssuming that the similarity relations are essential to the colors, 
changing the distances on the hue circle changes the internal relations, and thereby the properties, that the 
hue circle represents. As such, the extra colors that pigeons perceive cannot be located on our hue circle.Ó  
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 One may reply that there is evidence that pigeons do not see the same 
determinable colors that we do (Allen, 2009a). Wright and Cumming (1971), for 
instance, found that pigeons group wavelengths that fall either side of 540nm and either 
side of 595nm into separate color categories, whereas humans do not. There are two 
things I wish to say in response. First, just because some non-human animal or other 
groups the wavelengths differently from the way humans do does not imply that the 
animal is seeing things differently. Pigeons, for instance, because of their unique 
environmental needs, may just conceptually divide up the human-kind colors differently. 
Second, even if the human-kind view were dubious in the pigeon case, the view may be 
the best fit with regard to some other non-human animal. In light of all the differences 
between non-human animals (Hardin, 1988; Thompson, 1995) it is unlikely that there is a 
one size fits all response to interspecies cases. Unfortunately, I cannot in this chapter 
delve into the relevant empirical data needed to pursue such enquiries. I only wish to 
show that the human-kind view is a conceptually more respectable way to choose (IV)
1
 
than AllenÕs different-kinds view and that the view has not been ruled out a priori.  
 If (IV) under its first interpretation turned out to be a poor option, (IV) must be 
interpreted to say that the pigeon and humansÕ perceptions of L are veridical, and that 
their experiences both represent determinate color properties of the human-kind. Call this 
Ò(IV)
2
.Ó If (IV)
2
 were the best option to the dilemma, then the relevant version of the 
metaphysical, interspecies instance would succeed. Unfortunately, the dilemma argument 
gives no convincing reason to think that (IV)
2
 is the best option. What the common man 
believes who is uneducated in the relevant areas could never have much force in this 
debate. With regard to what philosophers and scientists think, it is at best unclear whether 
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(IV)
2
 or (I) is the most revisionary. If this is right, then the dilemma argument fails to 
provide a convincing reason to prefer (IV)
2
 over (I). M1
species
 does not follow from (I), as 
(I) is not a case of interspecies color variation. (I) implies that pigeons see just colors*, 
which to be clear are not colors, but M1
species 
is only concerned with interspecies color 
variation cases. Thus, given (IV) understood as (IV)
2
, I reject M1
species 
as not sufficiently 
motivated in the case of pigeons and humans (and mutatis mutandis for versions of (IV) 
that deal with other interspecies cases). In order to show that it is at best unclear which 
option is the most revisionary with respect to what philosophers and scientists believe, I 
will first point out that (IV)
2
 is revisionary to the views of many philosophers. Then, I 
shall explain why (I) is consistent with scientific research.   
 It is undeniable that many philosophers, including but not limited to Putnam 
(1956), Westphal (1987), Hacker (1991), and Byrne & Hilbert (2003a), going back to 
WittgensteinÕs ÒRemarks on Color,Ó have held, and many continue to hold, that no object 
can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time. In 
other words, many philosophers endorse that Incompatibility is a true proposition about 
the colors. (IV)
2
 says that the pigeons and humansÕ perceptions of L are veridical, and 
their experiences both represent determinate color properties of the human kind. So, if 
(IV)
2
 is true, then Incompatibility must be false. Hence, we can get that (IV)
2
 is 
revisionary with regard to the views of numerous philosophers.    
 With regard to (I), I admit that it may be inconsistent with what some of the 
sentences used by scientists mean, especially when simplifying their research for the 
layman. Nevertheless, Hardin (1988, p. 148) explains that for every scientist who talks 
uncritically about a particular animalÕs ability to see the colors, there is another scientist 
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who issues warnings about making such claims. Hardin goes on to say that scientists 
become increasingly uneasy with the idea that an animal has color vision as its 
evolutionary distance from us increases. The reason is twofold. (a) Just because some 
animals are able to make similar discriminations to humans does not mean that they see 
colors. (b) Scientists (almost exclusively) rely on behavioral definitions of color vision 
(Jacobs & Deegan, 1999; Palacios et al., 1990; Wright & Cumming, 1971). For example, 
although it may seem that Griebel and Peichl (2003) are committed to aquatic mammals 
having color vision given their title ÒColor Vision in Aquatic MammalsÑFacts and Open 
Questions,Ó two pages in the authors explicitly say that Ò[t]he term Ôcolor visionÕ refers to 
the capability of a visual system to respond differently to light differing in wavelength 
onlyÓ (2003, p. 19). In light of (a) and (b), we can see that (I) (which is that the pigeons 
and humansÕ perceptions of L are veridical, but only the humans represent colors) is 
consistent with scientific research.  
 I have been arguing in the last few paragraphs that CohenÕs (2004; 2006a; 2009, 
p. 27) dilemma argument fails to provide a convincing reason to favor (IV)
2
 over (I), 
because it is at best unclear whether (IV)
2
 or (I) is the most revisionary to what 
philosophers and scientists think. (Recall that (IV)
2
 is that the pigeons and humansÕ 
perceptions of L are veridical, and that their experiences both represent determinate color 
properties of the human-kind.) At this point, I suspect that my opponent who thinks that 
(IV)
1
 (which is that incompatibility is consistent with both the pigeons and humansÕ 
perceptions of L being veridical) must be false is likely to admit that what I say is 
convincing but suggest that Byrne and Hilbert (2007b) and Allen (2009a) hint at a better 
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argument for preferring (IV)
2
 over (I).
53
 The argument is that (IV)
2
 is superior to (I), 
because this latter option is implausible given all the similarities between human and 
pigeon visual systems. If it were the case that (IV)
1
 must be false and the case that the 
present argument succeeds, then Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism would be in 
trouble.  
 I can see how the argument at hand may appear convincing. However, it is 
ultimately unconvincing because of a serious flaw. The defect is that it presupposes the 
premise that if a (functioning) visual system A is similar in design to a (functioning) color 
representing visual system B, then A probably also represents color properties. One 
cannot make this inference, because doing so would ignore that the differences between A 
and B are likely going to have some impact on the properties that they represent. So, to 
say that A represents color properties, one needs to know that the ways in which A differs 
from B are irrelevant to whether it represents colors. Alas, with regard to non-human 
animal visual systems like those of pigeons it is unclear whether this is the case 
(Thompson, 1995; Hardin, 1988; see also Watkins, 1999; 2002). Hardin (1988, p. 150-
152), for instance, makes it explicit that we should not assume that the neurological 
differences between human and non-humans are irrelevant to seeing the colors. So, at 
most my opponent can use the premise that if a (functioning) visual system A is similar in 
design to a (functioning) color representing visual system B, then A probably represents 
properties at least similar in kind to the colors. However, this premise, unlike the 
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 Allen (2009) says, Òalthough comparative ecology is not an exact science, it would not be possible at all 
if other species did not have perceptual mechanisms that are [É] similar to those found in humans, and it 
seems incredible to suppose that other species should use these essentially similar perceptual mechanisms 
to perceive properties that differ fundamentally in kind to the properties that humans perceive.Ó Byrne and 
HilbertÕs (2007b) argument is similar. They say, Ò[option (I)] implausibly supposes that different types of 
animals use very similar physiological machinery [É] to detect unrelated properties.Ó  
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presupposition, fails to support (IV)
2
 over (I), because (I) is compatible with it being the 
case that pigeons represent colors* that are similar in kind to the colors, just not the same 
in kind.
 54
  
 
2. 2: A version of the metaphysical, intrapersonal instance 
In this section, I examine a version of the metaphysical, intrapersonal instance based on a 
phenomenon called ÔColor contrast effects.Õ Color contrast effects occur roughly 
whenever an entity that reflects a particular proportion of incident light appears to change 
color dependent on the particular proportion of incident light reflected by another nearby 
in time or space entity (or entities). There are simultaneous contrast effects, which 
involve the space element, and successive contrast effects, which involve the time 
element (Hardin, 1988). I shall look at simultaneous color contrast effects that occur 
whenever an entity that reflects a particular proportion of incident light appears to change 
color to typical observers in typical (daylight) conditions (or something similar) 
dependent on the particular proportions of incident light reflected by objects in its 
surround. Here are two examples (Cohen 2004; 2009).  
 
  Figure 3.1. Color contrast example 1 
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 The majority of what I said in this section can be applied mutatis mutandis to variation cases involving 
differences between humans with typical visual systems and humans with tetrachromatic visual systems. 
Those concerned with dichromacy may wish to read Byrne and HilbertÕs (2010) article on color blindness. 
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The above two central squares in figure 3.1 reflect the same proportion of incident light. 
However, typical observers in typical conditions report that the central squares look 
different colors depending on what is surrounding the central squares. In this example, 
typical observers in typical conditions report that the right central square looks lighter 
than the left central square.  
  
  Figure 3.2. color contrast example 2 
The above two thin strips in figure 3.2 reflect the same proportion of incident light. 
Nevertheless, typical observers in typical conditions report that the strips look different 
colors depending on what is surrounding the strips. In this case, typical observers in 
typical conditions usually report that the left strip looks lighter than the right one.  
 Having explained simultaneous color contrast effects, the version of the 
metaphysical, intrapersonal instance with which I am concerned is as follows:  
M1
intra
. There is nothing to make one variant veridical over another in 
intrapersonal color variation cases involving simultaneous color contrast effects 
and typical observers in typical (daylight) conditions (or something similar). 
M2
intra
. The best explanation of M1
intra
 is that Incompatibility, Realism, or 
Incompatibility and Objectivism is false. 
3. Therefore, Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is 
false. 
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 An immediate reply to this version of the metaphysical, intrapersonal instance is 
to say that there is something to make one variant veridical rather than another in (at least 
most) simultaneous color contrast cases involving typical observers in typical conditions, 
namely the colors. Hence, it is important to ask, ÒWhy should I believe that M1
intra
 is 
true?Ó A very interesting and prevalent argument runs as follows: It is hard to imagine 
what could make one experience as of the simultaneous color contrast examples had by 
an typical observer in typical conditions veridical rather than another. Thus, it must be the 
case that there is nothing to make one experience as of the color contrast examples (had 
by a typical observer in typical conditions) veridical rather than another. Therefore, 
M1
intra
 is true (Cohen, 2004, 2006a, 2009; see also Kalderon, 2007; Mizrahi, 2007).
55  
Call this, Òthe color contrast argument.Ó  
 A decent reply is to reject the relevant version of the metaphysical, intrapersonal 
instance by rejecting the color contrast argument for M1
intra
. One way to do this is to say 
that it is not difficult to imagine what could make at most one experience as of the color 
contrast examples veridical. What could make at most one experience as of, for example, 
one of the central squares veridical is if at most one experience coincided with the actual 
color of the squares, and mutatis mutandis for the other example. A likely retort is to say 
that this reply is question begging, but to do so confuses the dialectic. The reply is merely 
trying to defend Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism not argue for them. In 
addition, arguing against this reply by saying, for instance, that being red is like being 
funny (Cohen, 2006a, note 7) is question begging, because, as Byrne (2006) says, 
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 Cohen (2009, p. 22) specifically says the following: Ò[É] it is difficult to imagine a well motivated, 
principled, and non-question-begging answer. That is to say, it is hard to imagine what, other than 
stipulation, could make it the case that one of the backgrounds [É] is such that when the stimulus is 
viewed against that one, it is visually represented as bearing the color that it has.Ó  
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whether this analogy holds is the very issue under discussion.
56
 However, as 
simultaneous color contrast is so salient to the color contrast argument, it would be more 
convincing to say something specifically relevant to such cases.  
 Byrne and Hilbert (2003b; 2004) reject M1
intra
 by saying more along the lines of 
the above reply. My preferred response to the relevant version of the metaphysical, 
intrapersonal instance departs significantly from theirs. Instead of rejecting M1
intra 
roughly my preferred response is to accept M1
intra
 but reject M2
intra
, because I think that 
the colors of objects are dependent on the colors of the surround. I believe that the central 
squares, the strips, and the relevant parts of all other simultaneous color contrast 
examples have their respective colors at least nomologically dependent on the colors of 
the surround against which they are placed such that typical perceivers in typical daylight 
conditions (or something similar) perceive the colors of the examples veridically. Call 
this ÒDependence.Ó The truth of M1
intra
 follows from Dependence. However, I do not 
think that the best explanation of this premise is that Incompatibility, Realism, or 
Incompatibility and Objectivism is false. This is because I think that what explains M1
intra
 
is that Dependence is true, and this proposition is compatible with Incompatibility, 
Realism, and Objectivism. So, my preferred response is to accept M1
intra
 but reject 
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 Cohen (2006b) has an argument that we should treat colors like humor properties. He argues that (1) we 
do not make inductions about the causal effects of, for example, red things. But, he says, (2) Òif we do not 
make such inductions about red things, this shows that we are not committed to (indeed, we are doubtful 
of) the existence of any shared constitutive ground for our inductions about being redÓ (2006b, p. 434-435). 
Cohen concludes from this that (3) colors are analogous to humor properties, not objective properties like 
having a temperature.  
I think that it is clear that this is a separate argument from the color variation based ones with 
which I am concerned, because its conclusion that the colors are like humor properties and so subjective in 
character does not depend on there being color variation cases. So, I will not consider this argument in-
depth. Regardless, I believe that it is worth quickly pointing out that the first premise is suspect at best. 
Here is one inductive inference about the causal effects of colored things: All the black cars I have owned 
get really hot in the summer; therefore, if I buy this black car it is going to be too hot in the summer. It is 
not that difficult to think of others.   
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M2
intra
. In order words, my preferred response is an Incompatibility, Realism, and 
Objectivism respecting ecumenical response to simultaneous color contrast cases in 
which most people are right.  
I favor my response over Byrne and HilbertÕs, because holding Dependence is the 
only way to hold onto the seemingly true view that typical observersÕ color experiences 
represent the colors veridically in typical daylight conditions (Veridicality) (or something 
like this) if one holds Incompatibility.
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 Here is why. First, color contrast effects, unlike 
shape contrast effects, are ubiquitous in our environment (Pervasiveness) (Hardin, 1988; 
Thompson, 1995; Allen, 2011). I agree with Byrne and Hilbert (2003a; 2003b; 2004) that 
one ought to distinguish between color and the conditions necessary to perceive color. 
So, I admit that one can accept that some experiences as of simultaneous color contrast 
are veridical without accepting Dependence or giving up Incompatibility. Specifically, it 
is easy to accept that experiences as of related colors like brown, which can only be seen 
as a consequence of contrast, are usually seen veridically. However, clearly only a 
minority of cases can be accounted for in this way. Thus, if Dependence is false, then 
either Veridicality is false or Incompatibility is false.  
Second, Incompatibility is true. Third, Veridicality is true. A likely worry about 
Veridicality is that the empirical data appears to suggest its falsity. However, Allen 
(2010b) and Roberts and Schmidtke (2012) have shown that this appearance is probably 
just that. Roberts and Schmidtke show that a lot of the disagreement suggested by the 
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 Veridicality presupposes that the word ÔscarletÕ refers to the property scarlet and only the property 
scarlet assuming it refers at all, and so on for the other colors. This rules out, for example, there being real 
scarlet and apparent scarlet in NoÕs sense (2004, p. 143-144). There is only one property of being scarlet. 
This in turn rules out trying to hold Veridicality and Incompatibility without holding Dependence by saying 
that in color contrast cases we see the apparent colors of objects veridically: If the real colors are the colors, 
then the apparent colors are irrelevant to Veridicality; if the apparent colors are the colors, one ends up with 
Dependence after all.   
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empirical data is explained by conceptual factors relevant to the tasks used, and so the 
data falls short of showing the mass perceptual disagreement necessary to undermine 
Veridicality. The factors Allen points out are too numerous to list here. However, one of 
my favorites is that unique green tends to shift towards shorter wavelengths with age, 
because the crystalline lens in the eye becomes more opaque over time. Hence, if we 
exclude the elderly, who make up a minority (about 12% are over 60), from the 
population statistics, we can see that there is less disagreement amongst people than it 
would otherwise seem. In light of these articles, it appears that the empirical data is 
consistent with Veridicality. The data certainly does not support the vast degree of 
perceptual disagreement that would be the case given Pervasiveness were Incompatibility 
true and Dependence false. Accepting the three propositions Pervasiveness, 
Incompatibility, and Veridicality (or something close to it), the truth of Dependence 
follows.  
 Having provided a reason to hold Dependence, I will now look at the proposition 
in some depth. I defined Dependence broadly, because I desire to remain neutral about 
whether the colors of objects nomologically or metaphysically depend on the colors of 
the surround. Regardless, there are some things that can be clarified. Dependence implies 
that an objectÕs color neither supervenes in a strong nor a weak sense on its intrinsic 
micro-physical properties but is compatible with the colors more globally supervening on 
these properties. Is Dependence compatible with the colors being physical properties? 
The answer to this question is ÒyesÓ at least under supervenience physicalism (Jackson, 
1993; Chalmers, 1996). Does dependence imply that the colors are relational properties? 
The answer to this question is clearly ÒnoÓ with respect to the weaker, nomological 
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version of Dependence. The answer is also ÒnoÓ with respect to the stronger, 
metaphysical version. In order to see why one need only examine my improved analysis 
of relational properties (part 1.2). 
Improved analysis: A property P is relational iff there is some relation R such that 
it is essential to P that for all x, if x has P, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn. 
It follows from the metaphysical version of Dependence that there is some relation R 
such that for all x, if x is, for example, red, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn. 
However, this is insufficient given the analysis to show that redness is a relational 
property. The analysis requires that it be essential to redness that if x is red, then for some 
thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn. In fact, it is a priori that redness does not meet the improved 
analysis. So, not only does Dependence not imply that the colors are relational but also 
given the improved analysis I developed in part 1.2 one, can see that redness is not a 
relational property and the same goes for all the colors.    
 At this juncture, I shall address some concerns. First, I realize that my response to 
the version of the metaphysical, intrapersonal instance being considered may be 
unpopular. The main reason is this. (a) My response depends on the central squares in 
example one, the strips in example two, and the relevant parts of all other simultaneous 
color contrast examples having their respective colors dependent on the colors of the 
surround. However, it is often implicitly held (b) that the colors are independent of 
surround, and (c) that the color contrast effects would remain even if the central squares 
and the strips were causally isolated from the surround. Thus, what is often implicitly 
believed seems to rule out parts of color contrast examples having their respective colors 
dependent on the colors of the surround.  
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 In order to respond to the concern about (b) I must differentiate between two 
propositions. The first, call it ÒWeak-Independence,Ó is that the determinable colors are 
mostly independent of the surround, and the second, call it ÒStrong-Independence,Ó is that 
the determinable and determinate colors are always independent of the surround. Color 
contrast effects seldom cause an object to appear a different determinable color (although 
this happens occasionally as one can see from example two above). So, with this 
distinction in hand, it is clear that Dependence is compatible with Weak-Independence. 
Hence, Dependence implies a falsity only if Strong-Independence is true. Why believe 
Strong-Independence over Weak-Independence? My opponent may say that the reason is 
that our intuitions favor Strong-Independence over Weak-Independence. In reply, I admit 
that we should not deny that the colors are to some degree independent of surround. 
However, I find it difficult to see why we should trust any intuitions that favor Strong-
Independence over Weak-Independence. In fact, there is a very good reason not to. 
Because color contrast effects rarely cause an object to appear a different determinable 
color, it is easy not to notice them even though they are ubiquitous in our environment. 
This is why Hardin (1988), amongst others, had to bring the pervasiveness of color 
contrast to the attention of philosophers. Thus, it would hardly be surprising for our 
intuitions to favor Strong-Independence even though it is Weak-Independence that is 
really true.  
The reason people believe (c) is that if one were to look at, for example, the 
central squares through a reduction scope, the color contrast effects would no longer be 
visible. This is a poor reason to believe (c). Plausibly using a reduction scope would 
result in falsidical perceptions of the central squares. This is because it is suspicious that 
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blocking out the light emitted by the objects that surround the central squares would put 
us in a position to veridically represent the squaresÕ colors. The analogy is with size 
where we know that restricting the background information coming into our eyes can 
result in illusions. The Ames room is a good example of this (Gibson, 1979, p. 281; 
Runeson, 1988, p. 296). If reduction scopes result in falsidical perceptions, then such 
scopes cannot be used to rule out the possibility that the colors of the central squares are 
causally dependent on the colors of their surrounding objects and mutatis mutandis for 
parts of all other simultaneous color contrast effects. 
A second concern is that that ordinary practice for determining an objectÕs real 
color in contrast cases is to remove it from its surround. In reply, I admit that some 
examples suggest that ordinary practice is to treat color contrast effects as if they result in 
illusions (Tye, 2000, p. 155). For example, I confess that if one bought yellow paint for a 
highlight wall in a room in which the other walls were green, one would not return the 
paint claiming that the wall changed the paintÕs color. However, there are other examples 
in which it would seem that people do not treat color contrast effects like they result in 
illusions. For example, most would describe the colors of an artwork (e.g. a Piet 
Mondrian) as if they are really there and not an illusion brought about by color contrast 
effects. In fact, people often talk about using color contrast to make a color more vibrant, 
brighter, or darker, not just to make it appear in those ways. Thus, looking at what people 
do does not allow one to arrive an unambiguous ordinary practice.  
A third worry is that once one accepts Dependence one is on a slippery slope to 
being forced to hold that the colors of objects depend on lighting conditions. However, 
this slope is not as steep as it appears. Because of the phenomenon of color constancy, the 
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argument I gave for Dependence cannot straightforwardly be exploited to show that the 
colors of objects depend on lighting: One is not committed to saying that if the colors of 
objects are independent of lighting, then either Veridicality is false or Incompatibility is 
false, because in typical daylight conditions the colors of objects appear to remain 
constant through changes in illumination. It is true that even in typical daylight 
conditions shadows influence how an object appears. The natural account though is not 
that a, for example, red object half covered in shadow appears to have different colors. 
Rather, the natural account is that the object appears to be red and half covered in 
shadow. Phenomenologically, it is as if the shadow is on the object obstructing our view 
of its color. Even in cases involving ÒbadÓ lighting, it is usually the case that the colors of 
objects do not appear to change. When a concentrated, blue beam of light shines on a 
white wall, we do not experience the wall as having a blue part but the wall as having 
blue light on it. Phenomenologically, it is as if the blue light is on the wall obstructing our 
view of its color. Likewise, the absence of light seems to just conceal the colors. 
A fourth concern is that there are some color contrast cases for which Dependence 
seems ill equipped to provide the ecumenical response for which it was intended. The 
worrying cases are ones in which an object appears one color when viewed from a 
perspective in which a particular surround is visible and then another color when viewed 
from a perspective in which another is. One cannot say that the object is both colors all 
over at once without denying Incompatibility, and one cannot say that it changes colors 
dependent on oneÕs perspective without denying Objectivism. Regardless, the relevant 
cases can be easily addressed. Physical objects are highly complex, as can be seen when 
looking through a microscope, and so cannot be seen in their entirety from any one 
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perspective. Thus, the friend of Dependence can preserve the desired ecumenical 
response by holding the plausible thesis that when viewing an object from different 
perspectives one is always seeing (at least slightly) different parts of the object. Given 
this thesis, one can say that an object really does have both the colors it appears to when 
viewed from one perspective and then another; but it is never the case that it has both 
colors all over at once, and it is never the case that its colors change mind-dependently.  
One may retort that it does not appear that one is seeing different parts when one 
only makes minor alterations in perspective, but it is unobvious that this is true. Even a 
simple wall has a complex texture that can be seen. If one changes perspective just a 
little, does it not appear that one is seeing different features or parts of this texture? 
Proponents of Dependence would not need to give up much even if this question must be 
answered in the negative. They can still use Dependence to provide an ecumenical 
response to the majority of color contrast cases. In fact, perhaps they would not need to 
give up anything. They can say that the content of experience never includes particular 
surfaces of objects. Rather, the content is always that there is a surface(s) that is F (at 
such and such a distance away). If proponents of Dependence were to accept such an 
existential view on the contents of perception, they could provide an ecumenical account 
for the cases being considered. Experience 1 represents that there is a surface(s) that is 
red, and experience 2 represents that there is a surface(s) that is green, and, because of 
Dependence, the object has a surface(s) that is red and a surface(s) that is green. Whether 
an existential view of the contents of perception is correct is the subject of a heated 
debate (McGinn, 1982; Campbell, 2002) that cannot be discussed here. Regardless, it 
should be clear that the relevant cases are not sufficient to show that Dependence is false.  
 184 
 A final likely concern is that my argument for Dependence is question begging, 
because it relies on Incompatibility and Realism. However, this concern is a result of 
confusing the dialectic. So far, I have said that the relevant version of the metaphysical, 
intrapersonal instance is flawed at M2
intra
, because what explains M1
intra
 is that 
Dependence is true. So, in order to defend the relevant version of the metaphysical, 
intrapersonal instance, my opponent must argue that those who accept Incompatibility, 
Realism, and Objectivism cannot justifiably explain M1
intra
 using Dependence. One does 
not have to assume that Realism and Incompatibility are false when defending them from 
their opponents. So, I am free to use these propositions to argue for Dependence. Hence, 
for my opponent to reject my explanation of M1
intra
 by denying Dependence, he must at 
the very least undercut my argument for Dependence without just assuming the falsity of 
Incompatibility or Realism (or both).   
My opponent may try to do this is by providing an independent argument for the 
falsity of Incompatibility or Realism (or both). Whether such an argument succeeds is 
beside the point, as this article is focused on color variation arguments. Above I provided 
a defense of Veridicality (or something close enough to it) by appealing to Allen (2010b), 
and Roberts and Schmidtke (2012), but my opponent may wish to push me on the truth of 
this proposition. Clearly, any attempt to do this by providing an independent argument 
for the falsity of Incompatibility or Realism (or both) is beside the point given the scope 
of this article. Moreover, arguing against Veridicality (or something like it) is not open to 
selectionists and relationalists who hold that something similar to this proposition is 
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true.
58
 Finally, whatever one may think of Veridicality, the dialectical force of what I 
have said should not be underestimated.   
 
2. 3: A version of the metaphysical, interpersonal instance 
In this section, I inspect a version of the metaphysical, interpersonal instance based on the 
claim that there is interpersonal variation in color perception amongst normal observers. 
Imagine two people, John and Jane, who are both normal observers, according to the 
Ishihara or Farnsworth color blindness tests, and in identical conditions. As I said, I am 
not convinced in light of Allen (2010b), and Roberts and Schmidtke (2012) that there is 
anywhere near as much perceptual disagreement about the colors as the empirical 
literature appears to suggest. Nevertheless, empirical research seems to suggest that the 
following type of variation often occurs: John and Jane are both viewing, for example, 
Munsell chip 527, which is just a chip painted blue527. However, whereas the chip looks 
blue without a tinge of any other color to John (unique blue), it looks blue with a tinge of 
green to Jane (Tye, 2006).
 
 Having elucidated this type of variation, the version of the metaphysical, 
interpersonal instance with which I am concerned can be stated as follows:  
M1
inter
. There is nothing to make one variant veridical rather than another in 
interpersonal color variation cases involving normal observers in identical 
conditions.   
M2
inter
. The best explanation of M1
inter
 is that Incompatibility, Realism, or 
Incompatibility and Objectivism is false. 
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 An eliminativist may worry that evolution poses a threat to Veridicality (Chalmers, 2006). I refer my 
reader to Byrne and Hilbert (2007b) who have a thorough reply.   
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3. Therefore, Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is 
false. 
 I believe that M1
inter
 is false, because it seems to me that at least on occasion there 
is something to make one variant veridical rather than another in interpersonal color 
variation cases involving normal observers (in identical conditions), namely the colors. 
Thus, I must ask, ÒWhy should I believe that M1
inter 
is true?Ó
 
A very popular and 
intriguing argument runs as follows: It is difficult to imagine (or as some philosophers 
say arbitrary, unjustifiable, or implausible) what could make it true that John or Jane but 
not both veridically represents the chipÕs color (call this, ÒEitherÓ), given that they are 
both normal observers (Cohen, 2004; 2006a; 2009; Chalmers, 2006; Cohen, Hardin & 
McLaughlin, 2006; Kalderon, 2007; see also Hardin, 1988; 2004; McLaughlin, 2003; 
Mizrahi, 2007). Thus, there must be nothing to make JohnÕs perception veridical over 
JaneÕs (and vice versa) in this case.
59
 Therefore, M1
inter
 is true. In other words, the 
problem is that my opponents cannot imagine an answer to how it is possible (or think 
that it is arbitrary, unjustifiable, or implausible) that Either is true, given that John and 
Jane are normal observers. Call this, Òthe normality argument.Ó  
 Byrne and HilbertÕs favored response to the normality argument for M1
inter
, 
similarly to the reply they endorse against the color contrast argument, is to say that it is 
                                                
59 Let us look at three examples of this argument. First, Cohen (2006a, p. 310) when motivating his 
argument from perceptual variation says the following: ÒWhen two normal trichromatic observers 
[emphasis mine] view ship C under identical perceptual conditions, C looks unique green to one of them 
but bluish green [..] to the other.Ó Then, Cohen goes on to say that the problem with this situation is that Òit 
is extremely hard to imagine what could (metaphysically) make it the case that [Either is true]. Second, 
Chalmers (2006, chapter 6) says that accepting Either is problematic, because Òit imposes an asymmetry on 
what otherwise seems to be a quite symmetrical situation.Ó He says the problem with this is that both 
subjectsÕ [John and Jane in our case] perceptual mechanisms are functioning in a way that is normal 
[emphasis mine] for [their] communities.Ó Third, Kalderon (2007, p. 566) says, ÒSince Norm and Norma 
[John and Jane for us] are normal perceivers, it is arbitrary to suppose that one and not the other is 
misperceiving the color of the chip.Ó There are many other examples.  
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not difficult to imagine what could make Either true (2003a; 2003b; 2004; 2007b). 
Rather, as they say, what could make Either true is if the chip were either, but not both, 
unique blue or blue tinged with green.
 
My opponent may say that this reply is question 
begging, but to say this, just like it was earlier, would be to confuse the dialectic. Byrne 
and Hilbert are just defending Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism not arguing for 
them. The argument via analogy with the property being funny also works no better here 
than it did before. However, there is room for more to be said, because the normality 
argument is that it is difficult to imagine what could make Either true, given that (or 
because) John and Jane are normal observers.
 
Thus, it would be preferable to respond to 
the argument by saying something about John and Jane being normal.
 
 
 Unlike with the color contrast argument, I basically agree with Byrne and 
HilbertÕs response to the normality argument, but as I mentioned, there is room for more 
to be said about John and Jane being normal. What explains the possibility of Either, 
given that John and Jane are normal observers? The answer is that the scientists who 
designed the Ishihara and Farnsworth tests were only concerned with discerning those 
who would have difficulties completing certain tasks, not with veridicality (Japanese 
Ophthalmological Society, 2003; The American Society For Nondestructive Testing, 
2003).
 
Byrne and Hilbert (2007a) mention normality but assume that the notion of 
normality that the Ishihara and Farnsworth tests were designed to measure is statistical. 
However, the Ishihara and Farnsworth exams were designed for the Japanese and US 
military respectively, and these organizations would have been principally concerned 
with ensuring that recruits could adequately perform their duties, not with whether they 
have (statistically) average color vision. This is because it could have turned out that 
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merely average vision is insufficient to perform the relevant tasks or that it is more than 
enough. Therefore, the notion the tests were designed to measure is going to be functional 
rather than statistical. 
 Improving on Byrne and HilbertÕs favored reply, I have dismantled the normality 
argument for M1
 inter 
by demystifying how there can be interpersonal variation despite 
normality (according to the Ishihara and Farnsworth exams). So, although the normality 
argument has been popular and persuasive, it is ultimately unconvincing. I now want to 
make a broader point that any variant of the normality argument that appeals to the 
results of exams for normality is bound to fail. Tests for normality could either be 
designed with the purpose of distinguishing veridical perceivers or not. It would only 
make sense to design tests to distinguish veridical perceivers if there could be real 
perceptual disagreement. So, if the tests were designed to distinguish veridical perceivers, 
then the scientists who designed them would have decided what makes it true that we 
perceive veridically and in what conditions we do so. Assume scientists say that being 
blue is identical with reflectance type RB, and that blue objects are veridically perceived 
in natural daylight. People who passed tests with such assumptions would agree that 
objects with RB look blue when viewed in natural daylight. Thus, no form of the 
normality argument could appeal to the results of such tests and mutatis mutandis for all 
similar tests.  
 If the tests were not designed to distinguish veridical perceivers, then there could 
be nothing puzzling about people who passed the tests perceptually disagreeing about the 
color of some stimulus. Assume scientists design the tests to distinguish people who can 
operate certain equipment, as they did with the Ishihara and Farnsworth exams. Anyone 
 189 
who passed a test with such a purpose would be able to operate the relevant equipment, 
but it should be unsurprising if it is later discovered that those who passed disagree about 
what looks blue. If there is nothing odd about people who pass tests with such a purpose 
perceptually disagreeing, then it should be easy to imagine what could make one but not 
the otherÕs experience veridical and mutatis mutandis for all similar tests. Thus, either 
way you go, any form of the normality argument for M1
inter
 that appeals to the results of 
tests cannot succeed.   
 
2. 4: The epistemic, variation argument 
I now want to briefly turn to the epistemic interpretation of the variation argument (Òthe 
epistemic argumentÓ for short), because this interesting argument is close to the surface 
in Cohen (2004; 2009) and Mizrahi (2007).
 
The argument is as follows:  
E1. There is no reason to believe that one variant is veridical over another in X 
type color variation cases. 
E2. The best explanation of E1 is that Incompatibility, Realism, or 
Incompatibility and Objectivism is false. 
3. Therefore, Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is 
false.
60
 
There are three general instances of E1 (E1
species
, EI
intra
, and E1
inter
) depending on whether 
one fills in X with Òinterspecies,Ó Òintrapersonal,Ó or ÒinterpersonalÓ respectively. Thus, 
there are three general instances of the epistemic argument (the interspecies, 
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 Consider, for example, the fact that the second premise of CohenÕs (2004, 2009, p. 24) master argument 
for relationalism is that Òthere is no independent and well-motivated reason for thinking [emphasis mine] 
that just one of the variants [É] is veridical [É].Ó For another example, consider that Mizrahi (2007, p. 
290) says, Òthe problem [É] is that there is no [É] knowable standardÓ by which to determine that one 
variant is veridical over another.  
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intrapersonal, and interpersonal instances). For the purposes of this chapter, the versions 
of these three instances with which I wish to concentrate parallel those focused on in the 
above sections.  
 Given my previous responses to the relevant versions of the metaphysical, 
interspecies, intrapersonal and interpersonal instances (in subsections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 
respectively), it is justifiable to deny the relevant instances of E2 for every instance E1. 
Based on what I said in subsection 1, either the relevant interspecies cases are not 
examples of color variation or the best explanation of E1
species
 is that such cases are ones 
in which animals see super-fine-grained colors that are compatible (according to 
Incompatibility) with the colors we see. With regard to what I said in subsection 2, what 
explains E1
intra 
is that the colors of objects are dependent on the colors of the surround 
such that typical observers in typical conditions represent simultaneous color contrast 
examples veridically. Given what I said in subsection 2.3, what explains E1
inter
 is that the 
tests that, for example, John and Jane passed (the Ishihara and Farnsworth exams) were 
only designed to discern perceivers who would have difficulties performing certain tasks. 
A likely reply is that what I said about John and Jane suggests that it is impossible 
to know who perceives veridically in interpersonal cases involving normal observers, but 
this is problematic for Incompatibility and Realism. The argument may run as follows: It 
is unreasonable to postulate a property if it is impossible to verify (for premises like this 
see Cohen, 2004; 2009; Triplett, 2007; see also Hardin, 1988; 2003).
61
 The interpersonal 
                                                
61 Cohen (2009, p. 33) says, ÒIt is reasonable to think that, in the absence of a non-stipulative criterion that 
makes one of the variants under consideration veridical at the expense of the others, it is preferable to treat 
the variants uniformly.Ó Triplett (2007, p. 168) says when speaking of color variation cases that Òit is 
unreasonable to posit the existence of a physical object or property if it cannot, in principle, be 
intersubjectively verified.Ó In addition to these examples, Byrne and Hilbert (2007a) say that 
verificationism is close to the surface in Hardin (1988; 2003).  
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case of John and Jane in subsection 2.3 is one in which we cannot verify using the 
Ishihara and Farnsworth tests who perceives the Munsell chipÕs color veridically if we 
accept Incompatibility. Moreover, Cohen (2009, p. 32) points out that neither looking at 
what the majority sees nor using the CIE 1931 standard observer specification would 
allow us to determine whether John or Jane is the veridical observer. Thus, as the 
argument goes, this interpersonal color variation case shows that either we ought to reject 
Realism or we should give up on Incompatibility.  
The response being considered has some dialectic force if the ÔcannotÕ is 
understood as logical impossibility. There is certainly something wrong with postulating 
a property the verification of which is logically impossible. For example, there is 
something objectionable about postulating angels that by their very nature avoid all 
attempts at verification in order to explain gravity. John and Jane like variation cases, 
however, at most imply that it is practically impossible to verify who perceives 
veridically, because our current inability or even a repeated failure (Cohen, 2006a, p. 
313) to do something does not even imply that it is physically impossible to do that thing. 
Hence, although it may be difficult to imagine how to verify whether John or Jane is 
right, no reason has been given for thinking that it cannot be done. There is certainly 
nothing in the nature of the colors that logically precludes verifying whether John or Jane 
is right. Thus, at the very most what can be said is that we do not know how to verify 
whether John or Jane is right and as far as we can tell there are going to be practical 
issues with doing so, but this is no reason to give up on either Realism or Incompatibility.  
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2. 5: A general response to color variation cases 
I have focused on salient versions of interspecies, intrapersonal, and interpersonal color 
variation cases: In subsection 2.1, I responded to interspecies color variation cases due to 
typical differences in visual systems in standard conditions; in subsection 2.2, I 
responded to simultaneous color contrast effects involving typical observers in typical 
conditions; and in subsection 2.3, I responded to interpersonal color variation cases 
involving normal observers in identical conditions. Then in subsection 2.4, I said that the 
three instances of the epistemic argument with which I am concerned parallel those 
described in the above sections. Regrettably, as I restricted the type of cases to which I 
have so far provided responses, my opponents are likely to be worried about other color 
variation cases relevant to the truth of Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism.  
 It is impossible to provide a response to every conceivable color variation case, 
but I can provide a rough strategy for dealing with any color variation based argument. 
Recall that M1 says that there is nothing to make one variant veridical rather than another 
in X type color variation cases. So, the strategy is that for every iteration of this premise 
one should say that one of four possibilities is going to be true: (1) M1 is irrelevant, 
because the variants are not seeing colors; (2) M1 is true, but the best explanation of this 
is that something is causing either both variants to be falsidical or both to be veridical that 
is compatible with Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism (applies to M1
intra
); (3) M1 
is false, because there are color properties to make one variant veridical rather than 
another; or (4) M1 is too abstract but once made more concrete either (1), (2), or (3) will 
be true (applies to M1
inter 
and M1
species
). One can then use the response given to any 
version of the metaphysical, variation argument to aid a response to the parallel version 
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of the epistemic argument. Given the strategy described above, my opponentÕs concern 
about other color variation cases should be somewhat abated: I have shown that there is 
no reason to think that there is a version of the color variation argument that succeeds, 
and this is all I needed to do in order to defend Incompatibility, Realism, and 
Objectivism.  
 
Summary of section 2 
Cohen uses the color variation argument to reject Incompatibility and Objectivism and 
believes that that his view best captures the denial of these two propositions. 
Selectionists, relativists, and eliminativists also use the color variation argument to 
support their views. I have shown that although color variation based arguments against 
Incompatibility, Realism, and Objectivism have been popular they are ultimately 
unconvincing. Thus, I have shown that CohenÕs attempt to motivate his view is 
unconvincing. As a corollary, I have shown that the variation argument fails to motivate 
selectionism, relativism, and eliminativism as well.  
 
Section 3: Color incompatibility and ordinary illusion 
CohenÕs view gives a uniform response to color variation cases according to which 
everyone is right. This allows the proponent of CohenÕs view to avoid what he considers 
to be ad hoc stipulation in variation cases; he can say that everyone is right and so need 
not say that one variant is veridical at the expense of another. However, because CohenÕs 
view gives a response according to which everyone is right, it has the unintuitive 
consequence that the following propositions are false:  
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Incompatibility: No object can be more than one determinate or determinable 
color all over at the same time. (Examples of determinate colors are scarlet, jade, 
aquamarine, and sand. Examples of determinable colors are red, orange, yellow, 
and green. Reddish, yellowish, greenish, etc are super-determinable colors and so 
are not relevant to Incompatibility as defined. If the determinate/determinable 
division should be understood as graded in nature, then this can be easily 
accommodated by adding Ôof the same gradeÕ to the above statement of 
Incompatibility.) 
 
Illusion: Ordinary illusion cases occur whenever the color we perceptually 
represent conflicts according to Incompatibility with the objectÕs real color. (The 
use of ÔordinaryÕ in the definition of Illusion rules out illusion cases due to deviant 
causal chains like the case involving CohenÕs telekinetic tomato, 2007, p. 341. So, 
according to Illusion, an ordinary illusion occurs, for example, if x is red and S 
perceptually represents it as being blue and SÕs representation is not the result of 
deviant causal chains.) 
Incompatibility and Illusion are extremely intuitive. Incompatibility is cited 
alongside mathematical truths like 2+2=4 as a quintessential example of a synthetic a 
priori certainty. Illusion is intuitive, for it is biconditionally associated with the following 
intuitive proposition: 
P-Incompatibility: The colors we perceive obey Incompatibility.  
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Thus, in addition to implying the falsity of Incompatibility and Illusion, CohenÕs view 
also implies that P-Incompatibility is false. Perhaps all these intuitions are in fact false, 
but this is highly implausible. So, it would be best if CohenÕs view could accommodate 
them.  
Cohen certainly seems to agree. Cohen (2009; 2007) differentiates between 
hallucinations, illusions due to deviant causal chains, and ordinary illusions. Of these 
three kinds of perceptual error, only ordinary illusions are relevant to this section. Cohen 
claims to provide a Òrelationalist treatmentÓ of ordinary perceptual illusion (2009, p. 122-
132; 2007, p. 342-345). Under a plausible interpretation of what is going on, this 
ÔtreatmentÕ is not an attempt to explain away the intuition that Illusion is true, rather it is 
an attempt to (more or less) accommodate the intuition. Illusion is true iff P-
Incompatibility is true, and clearly if P-Incompatibility is true, then Incompatibility is 
true. So, to whatever degree Cohen can accommodate Illusion with his treatment he can 
also accommodate Incompatibility and P-Incompatibility. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate whether CohenÕs Òrelationalist 
treatmentÓ can succeed. Ultimately, I plan to show that CohenÕs treatment is in serious 
tension with the motivation for his view. In section 3.1, I focus on distilling CohenÕs 
treatment and defending my interpretation. In section 3.2, I argue that CohenÕs treatment, 
as I distilled it, is in tension with his argument from perceptual variation, and that his 
response regardless of interpretation is in serious tension with his basic arguments for the 
first premise of his argument from perceptual variation. Finally, in section 3.3, I look at 
whether there is a way for Cohen to avoid my criticisms. Specifically, I look at whether 
the basic arguments can be modified to avoid said tensions and at an attempt to explain 
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away our intuitions. Although I doubt that I will convince Cohen that his view is 
implausible, I will rest content if I can show him (and his proponents) that the considered 
Òrelationalist treatmentÓ cannot work. 
 
3.1: CohenÕs relationalist treatment 
What follows is my distillation of CohenÕs treatment of ordinary perceptual illusion. 
Under my interpretation, Cohen (2009, p. 122-132; 2007, p. 342-345) attempts to 
accommodate Illusion by distinguishing between fine-grained and coarse-grained 
relational color properties L that invoke different versions of the condition on when RL 
holds of <x, y1, y2>.
62
 With respect to fine-grained properties, the condition is the same as 
that given by 1 (or 2 if one prefers). An example of a fined-grained property is the 
property of being red to me in this my current circumstance. Cohen seems to call such 
properties fine-grained because the conditions necessary and sufficient for an object to 
have them are narrowly defined. For example, the property of being red to me in this 
circumstance (a low light environment) is a different property from being red to me in 
that circumstance (an environment in which the lighting is slightly brighter). With respect 
to these fine-grained colors, whenever a subject has a perception as of an object being a 
color, the object is that color. Thus, as I understand Cohen, Illusion and Incompatibility 
are false with respect to fine-grained colors. If Illusion is false, then P-Incompatibility is 
false too.  
                                                
62
 Cohen (2009; 2007, p. 340) accounts for errors in color perception due to hallucinations and deviant 
causal chains without having to distinguish between coarse-grained and fine-grained colors. Errors due to 
deviant causal chains cannot account for Illusion, because this intuition, as I define it, rules out deviant 
causal chains.  
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 Cohen also claims that there are coarse-grained colors. With respect to these 
colors, RL holds of <x, y1, y2> iff y1 is a normal viewing subject in a normal circumstance 
y2 and y1 has the perception as of x being L (or if one prefers iff if a normal viewing 
subject y1 in a normal viewing circumstance y2 were to view x, then y1 would have a 
perception as of x being L).
63 An example of a coarse-grained color is the property of 
being red to perceivers similar to me (normal ones) in circumstances like those I usually 
encounter (normal ones). Cohen seems to call such colors coarse-grained because the 
conditions necessary and sufficient for an object to have them are broadly defined. For 
example, an object having the property dark-green to me in this circumstance (a low light 
environment) or the property light-green to me in that circumstance (an environment in 
which the lighting is brighter) can be compatible with it also being coarse-grained red. 
Incompatibility (or something close) holds for the coarse-grained colors. Thus, as I 
understand Cohen, Illusion is true with respect to these colors. I am here, of course, 
assuming that we perceive coarse-grained colors, because these colors can only 
accommodate perceptual illusions if we perceive them. Misrepresentation requires 
representation. To whatever degree Cohen can accommodate Illusion, he can 
accommodate Incompatibility and P-Incompatibility.  
 As emphasized above, CohenÕs treatment only works if we perceive the coarse-
grained colors. What determines whether oneÕs perceptual system represents coarse-
grained or fine-grained colors? Cohen gives an explanation involving a person named 
Sally (2007, p. 343; 2009, p. 129-130). In his explanation there is an unripe tomato under 
                                                
63
 There are two important things to note here. First, Cohen thinks that there are no principled 
specifications of Ônormal observerÕ and Ônormal circumstances.Õ Second, it seems there can be different 
kinds of coarse-grained colors, but for simplicity I am just going to work with coarse-grained colors as I 
have defined them.  
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E viewing condition. E is such that (a) it lies outside the range of perceptual 
circumstances that Sally normally encounters, (b) the way the tomato appears to Sally in 
E is different from how it would appear in perceptual circumstances roughly similar to 
those she normally encounters, and (c) there are no visual clues about these facts. With 
(a)-(c) in mind, Cohen asks one to imagine that Sally naively directs her gaze towards the 
tomato. As I understand him, Cohen claims that SallyÕs perceptual system in this case 
misrepresents the tomato as having the coarse-grained color red to people like her in 
situations like those she normally encounters. Now, imagine that the experimenter 
explains to her about (a) and (b). With these facts explained, Cohen asks one to picture 
that the now informed Sally directs her gaze towards the tomato. I interpret Cohen to say 
in this case, as the informed Sally is aware of (a) and (b), that her perceptual system 
represents the tomatoÕs color veridically as having the fine-grained color red to her in her 
current circumstances. 
 Is my understanding of Cohen correct? Sometimes Cohen talks in a way that 
suggests he thinks that perceptual systems do not represent coarse-grained colors (2009, 
p. 116). So, there is some reason to think that I am incorrect. However, elsewhere Cohen 
suggests that perceptual systems do indeed represent coarse-grained colors. Cohen (2007, 
p. 343; 2009, p. 130) when explaining the Sally case above says that, before learning 
about (a) and (b), SallyÕs misrepresentation as of the tomato being coarse-grained red is a 
Òtextbook case of perceptual illusion.Ó Further down that same page, when talking about 
another example involving SallyÕs misrepresenting an objectÕs coarse-grained color, he 
says, ÒHere, too, we have a case of illusory representation of the tomatoÕs colorÓ (2007; 
p. 343). There are other examples of Cohen talking about illusions in the context of 
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coarse-grained colors (2007; p. 347). One may ask, ÒDoes Cohen define ÔillusionÕ is 
some weird way?Ó No. Cohen says the following: 
ÒAn illusion occurs when the subject perceptually represents an object x that she 
is indeed perceiving, but errs in the features she perceptually represents x as 
bearing (either by perceptually representing x as bearing features that x in fact 
lacks, or by perceptually representing x as lacking features that x in fact bears).Ó 
(2007, p. 339)  
 
So, given that Cohen defines illusions as having to do with perceptual misrepresentation, 
and says that SallyÕs misrepresentation is an illusion, indeed a Òperceptual illusion,Ó my 
interpretation of Cohen is at least very close to the surface in his work: Sally cannot have 
an illusion of the tomatoÕs coarse-grained color if she does not perceptually represent 
coarse-grained colors given CohenÕs definition of Ôillusion.Õ 
Regardless, if perceptual systems do not represent coarse-grained colors, CohenÕs 
treatment cannot accommodate Illusion. As I said, the coarse-grained colors cannot 
accommodate perceptual illusions if we do not perceive them. OneÕs perceptual system 
cannot misrepresent something that it does not represent. If CohenÕs treatment cannot 
accommodate Illusion, it cannot accommodate P-Incompatibility, because these 
propositions are biconditionally connected. Of course, his treatment could still 
accommodate Incompatibility at least for coarse-grained colors, but this is not enough to 
give the relationalist treatment of Illusion that Cohen wants. So, to see whether his 
treatment can accommodate the relevant intuitions, there is reason to interpret him as I 
have, regardless of whether my interpretation provides the correct presentation of 
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CohenÕs beliefs. This would be a bad way to go about things if my interpretation had 
nothing to offer over the interpretation under which perceptual systems do not represent 
coarse-grained colors. However, as I said, it is only under my interpretation, and not the 
other one, that CohenÕs treatment can accommodate Illusion and so P-Incompatibility. 
With all this being said, much of what I say in the next section applies regardless of 
whether coarse-grained colors are perceptually represented. I shall explain why later.  
 
3.2: The objection from motivation 
I shall now argue that CohenÕs treatment (of his viewÕs unintuitive implications) is in 
tension with the motivation for his view. Cohen uses an instance of the color variation 
argument to support his view. The argument has an epistemic and a metaphysical 
interpretation. Cohen (2004, p. 455; 2009) explicitly says that his argument should be 
understood metaphysically. The metaphysical interpretation of the variation argument is 
as follows: 
M1. There is nothing to make one variant veridical rather than another in either 
interspecies, intrapersonal, or interpersonal color variation cases.  
M2. The best explanation of M1 is that Incompatibility, Realism, or 
Incompatibility and Objectivism is false. 
(3). Therefore, Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is 
false. 
Cohen thinks that the best explanation of M1 is that Incompatibility and Objectivism are 
false and believes that the denial of these propositions is best captured by his view. He 
calls this entire line of reasoning, Òthe argument from perceptual variationÓ (2009, p. 24). 
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 To show that CohenÕs treatment is in tension with the motivation for his view, I 
will show that it implies that often there is something to make one of the perceptual 
variants in color variation cases involving humans veridical rather than another. Call this, 
ÔOften-Either.Õ According to CohenÕs treatment, it is possible for one human perceptual 
variant to be veridical rather than another with respect to the coarse-grained colors. Naive 
Sally misrepresented the unripe tomato as being coarse-grained red, because she thought 
falsely that she was in normal circumstances. However, if naive Sally had been in normal 
circumstances, she would have represented the tomato veridically as being coarse-grained 
green. This is because unripe tomatoes appear green to normal observers in normal 
circumstances, and presumably Sally is a normal observer. Thus, to show that CohenÕs 
treatment implies Often-Either, I only need to argue that it implies that we often represent 
the coarse-grained colors. Call this, ÔOften-Coarse.Õ  
 The argument for Often-Coarse runs as follows: Most of the time, we tacitly 
believe that we are normal observers, and that we are in normal circumstances. Call this, 
ÔOften-Tacit-Belief.Õ CohenÕs treatment of Sally implies that what our perceptual systems 
represent is dependent on what we believe. The naive SallyÕs perceptual system 
represented the tomato as being coarse-grained red. SallyÕs perceptual system then 
changed from representing coarse-grained colors to representing fine-grained colors, 
because she learned about (a) and (b). So, CohenÕs treatment of Sally implies that if we 
believe that we are normal observers in normal circumstances at time t, we represent 
objects as having the coarse-grained colors at t. Call this, ÔBelief-Dependency.Õ 
Conjoining Often-Tacit-Belief and Belief-Dependency, Often-Coarse follows. From here 
one can see that CohenÕs treatment implies Often-Either. 
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 From inspecting CohenÕs argument, clearly Often-Either is in tension with M1. 
This premise says that there is nothing to make one of the variants in either interspecies, 
intrapersonal, or interpersonal color variation cases veridical rather than another. 
However, Often-Either says that there is often something to make one of the variants in 
color variation cases involving humans veridical rather than another, namely the coarse-
grained colors. This shows that the instances of M1 dealing with humans (the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal instances) are incompatible with his Òrelationalist 
treatment.Ó Moreover, Cohen (2007, p. 347) wants his treatment to apply to non-human 
animals as well. He says that it is Òhardly extravagant or unusualÓ to claim that non-
human animals have the kind of Òtacit commitmentsÓ required for a variant of Often-
Either dealing with non-human animals to be true. Hence, if Often-Either is true, then M1 
of the argument from perceptual variation is in a precarious position. As I have shown, 
Often-Either follows from CohenÕs Òrelationalist treatment.Ó Thus, CohenÕs treatment is 
in serious tension with his argument from perceptual variation.
64
  
 Cohen could respond to this problem by rejecting Often-Either. He could do this 
by saying that perceptual systems do not represent coarse-grained colors. As I said in 
section 1, given this move, CohenÕs treatment cannot accommodate Illusion and so 
cannot accommodate P-Incompatibility. Assuming Cohen wants to accommodate these 
intuitions, he must modify M1. He may try to do this by changing it to say that in some 
fundamental sense there is nothing to make one variant in color variation cases veridical 
                                                
64
 A likely response is to say that only explicit beliefs influence what the perceptual system represents. If 
this response were plausible, Cohen could avoid my argument for Often-Coarse while accepting something 
like Belief-Dependency. Unfortunately, this response is not at all plausible. The masses seldom explicitly 
believe anything about their perceptual systems and viewing circumstances. Hence, if the response were 
correct, few people other than philosophers and color scientists would ever perceptually represent the 
coarse-grained colors. Thus, if the response were correct, ordinary perceptual illusion would be confined to 
intellectuals, and this over-intellectualization of ordinary perceptual illusion is clearly insane.  
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rather than another. One way to understand this that may occur to one from reading 
Cohen (2007, p. 347) is to make a distinction between the visual system and the 
perceptual system. The perceptual system could be understood as a larger structure than 
the visual system that includes elements of the cognitive system. With this distinction, 
one can define the fundamental sense in which there is nothing to make one variant in 
color variation cases veridical rather than another as having to do with the visual system 
alone. This move cannot work. It is analytic that the perceptual system is the system that 
allows us to perceive. So, if it were assumed that this system includes elements of the 
cognitive system, it would follow that these elements are necessary for perception. So, it 
would follow that the visual system alone is insufficient for perception. If this were true, 
it would follow that the visual system alone is irrelevant to perceptual variation 
arguments like CohenÕs.
65
  
Regardless, it is going to take more than a modification of M1 to save CohenÕs 
motivation for his view. The reason is that there remains a tension between CohenÕs 
treatment and his basic arguments for M1 that is different from the tension just discussed. 
The difference is such that Cohen cannot avoid this new tension by saying that perceptual 
systems do not represent coarse-grained colors. Why this is will be explained soon. 
CohenÕs basic arguments for M1 are the three arguments discussed in section 2 above for 
the three metaphysical instances of M1. The first argument is that it is difficult to imagine 
what could make one subjectÕs perception as of color veridical rather than anotherÕs, 
given that both subjects are normal observers in identical conditions (2004; 2006a, p. 
                                                
65
 Perhaps Cohen could develop an argument from visual variation, but this has yet to be done. More 
would have to be said to understand Ôvisual variation.Õ What exactly is Ôvisual variationÕ if not perceptual 
variation? Is there empirical support for it? Can it motivate CR? Why should we care about it? It is not 
even clear to me whether a distinction between visual and perceptual variation is conceptually coherent.  
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310; 2009, p. 25, 33). The second argument is that it is difficult to imagine what could 
make, for a single typical subject in typical conditions, one of his perceptions as of color 
veridical rather than another (2004; 2009, p. 19-25).  
The tension between CohenÕs treatment and these arguments for MI is that coarse-
grained color properties provide an easy route for imagining what could make one 
perception as of color veridical rather than another: What could make one perception as 
of a coarse-grained color veridical rather than another is that one perception represents a 
coarse-grained color that is in fact there and another represents a coarse-grained color 
that is not in fact there. This tension is a grave problem for Cohen. His opponents say that 
it is easy to imagine what could make one perception veridical rather than another: What 
could make one perception veridical rather than another is that one perception represents 
a color that is in fact there and another represents a color that is not in fact there (Byrne 
and Hilbert, 2003a; 2003b; 2004). Coarse-grained colors make the situation worse. If one 
can imagine coarse-grained colors making one perception veridical rather than another, 
one can also imagine non-relational colors doing this. The reason is that the metaphysical 
story for how one perception gets to be veridical rather than another is the same 
regardless of whether one is talking about coarse-grained colors or non-relational colors. 
For both types of colors the story runs as follows: One perception represents a property 
that is not in fact there and the other represents a property that is in fact there.  
This tension between CohenÕs treatment and the above argument for M1 remains 
regardless of whether the representation of coarse-grained colors is confined to our 
language and thoughts as Cohen sometimes suggests. If one can imagine coarse-grained 
colors making one color ascription or thought right rather than another, one can imagine 
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non-relational colors making one perception veridical rather than another. The reason for 
this is that the metaphysical story about how one perception gets to be veridical rather 
than another is the same as the story about how one color ascription or thought gets to be 
right rather than another. For color ascriptions, thoughts, and color perceptions the story 
runs as follows: One perception or ascription or thought represents a property that is not 
in fact there and another perception or ascription or thought represents a property that is 
in fact there. This story should be familiar. It is the story about how one representation 
gets to be correct rather than another, and is relevant to perception, language, thought, 
etc. As the same story is relevant to all these forms, if one can imagine a representation of 
one form being right rather than another of that form, one can imagine a representation of 
another form being right rather than another of that same form.  
 The third argument Cohen gives for M1 presupposes that non-human animals 
differ in the perceptual discriminations that they make. As previously stated, there are 
four options. (I) Both the pigeons and humansÕ perceptions of L are veridical, but only 
the humans represent color properties. The human represents L as having a color y, and 
the pigeon represents L has having a color* z (which to be clear is not a color property). 
(II) The pigeonsÕ perceptions of L veridically represent its color, but the humansÕ 
perceptions falsidically represent its color (or vice versa). (III) Neither the pigeons nor 
the humans veridically represent the color of L. (IV) Both the pigeons and humansÕ 
perceptions of L are veridical, and their experiences both represent color properties. The 
human represents L as having a color y, and the pigeon represents L has having a color z. 
Cohen says that (I)-(III) are revisionary, thus option (IV) is the best one available. 
Therefore, the relevant interspecies instance of M1 must be true.   
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The tension between this basic argument and CohenÕs treatment is that the 
coarse/fine-grained color distinction is revisionary. This is because the idea that coarse-
grained red and fine-grained red are both kinds of being red is unusual indeed. This 
tension is a serious problem for Cohen. The reason is that if one thinks that (I) is too 
revisionary, then one ought to question whether the coarse/fine-grained distinction is too 
revisionary. After all, the coarse/fine-grained distinction may be just as revisionary as the 
view that non-human animals do not perceive colors. Even if the coarse/fine-grained 
distinction were less revisionary than the view that non-human animals do not perceive 
colors, it would not obviously be less revisionary and so more would need to be said. Like 
with the last tensions, this tension remains regardless of whether the representation of 
coarse-grained colors is confined to our talk and thoughts. The distinction is revisionary 
because it says that coarse and fine-grained red are kinds of being red, but the only 
normally recognized kinds of being red are its determinates like being scarlet.   
 
3.3: Is there a way out? 
Cohen could try to reformulate his first basic argument for M1 to say that it is difficult to 
imagine that there is no fundamental sense in which when two subjectsÕ perceptions as of 
color disagree they are both veridical, and his second to say that it is difficult to imagine 
that there is no fundamental sense in which when two perceptions as of color had by a 
single subject disagree they are both veridical. Unfortunately, these reformulations are 
still in tension with CohenÕs treatment. Let me explain. If one can imagine coarse-grained 
colors making one perception veridical (or one color ascription or thought correct) rather 
than another, one can imagine a fundamental sense in which there is something to make 
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one color perception veridical (or one color ascription or thought correct) rather than 
another. If one can imagine this, one should have no trouble imagining that there is no 
fundamental sense in which when two color perceptions (or ascriptions or thoughts) 
disagree they are both veridical: One need only imagine that there are only coarse-
grained colors and that the fine-grained ÒcolorsÓ are not really colors. From here, one 
should have no trouble imagining that there are non-relational colors to make one 
perception veridical rather than another. The reason is that the metaphysical story for how 
one perception (or one color ascription or thought) gets to be veridical rather than another 
is identical regardless of whether one is talking about coarse-grained colors or non-
relational colors.  
 It is tricky to see how a response to the tension with CohenÕs third argument for 
M1 would go. Cohen must (at the very least) argue that the coarse/fine-grained 
distinction is less revisionary than the view that non-human animals do not see colors, but 
doing this will not be easy. Most philosophers do not hold CohenÕs fine/coarse-grained 
color distinction (Hacker, 1991; Campbell, 1993; Tye, 2000; Byrne and Hilbert, 2003a), 
so Cohen probably cannot appeal to philosophersÕ beliefs. Moreover, scientists are 
careful to rely on behavioral definitions of color vision (Jacobs & Deegan, 1999; Palacios 
et al., 1990; Wright & Cumming, 1971). For example, Griebel and Peichl say in their 
article that Ò[t]he term Ôcolor visionÕ refers to the capability of a visual system to respond 
differently to light differing in wavelength onlyÓ (2003, p. 19). As a result, scientists 
issue warnings about claiming that non-human animals see colors (Hardin, 1988, p. 148). 
Thus, Cohen probably can only appeal to the beliefs of ordinary people. However, the 
empirical evidence suggests that ordinary folk are not relationalists about color but rather 
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anti-relationalists (Roberts et al, 2014). So, appealing to them is a bad option for Cohen. 
If ordinary people are to decide these issues, CohenÕs view is in serious trouble. 
 As I have shown, the prospects for reformulated arguments for M1 are dim. So, it 
seems that Cohen must give up on his treatment. I have already argued that the tension 
between CohenÕs basic arguments for M1 and his treatment remains regardless of 
whether coarse-grained colors are only represented at the level of language and thought. 
Thus, Cohen cannot retreat to this interpretation even if he wanted to. Assuming he 
could, does Cohen provide any argument that we should not trust the intuition that 
Illusion is true and the intuition that P-Incompatibility is true? (Recall that if we do not 
perceive the coarse-grained colors, CohenÕs treatment cannot accommodate Illusion and 
P-Incompatibility.) The following argument is close to the surface in Cohen (2007, p. 
348-349): Armchair reflection cannot distinguish between language and thought on the 
one hand and perception on the other. So, deciding whether ordinary perceptual illusion 
cases occur should be left to empirical inquiry. Science may teach us that the only 
ordinary color ÒillusionsÓ that occur are those of language and thought. Thus, the 
intuition for Illusion should not be trusted and so neither the one for P-Incompatibility.
66
  
This is a poor attempt to explain away the relevant intuitions. It is unbelievable 
that armchair reflection is unable to distinguish between language and thought, and 
perception. People can easily distinguish between what they are saying and thinking on 
                                                
66 This is the passage I am pulling this argument from. Ò[A]n opponent will suggest [that] what is needed is 
that there are illusions involving the representations of color in the visual system per seÑi.e., in the visual 
system considered on its own, rather than considered as part of a larger cognitive/perceptual system. But I 
think this objection depends on treating our intuitions about error with much more evidential authority than 
they deserve. [É] [I]t is hard to see why we should trust intuitions about how the labor of producing these 
errors is divided between the visual system and other components of the cognitive/perceptual system. 
Surely thatÕs something to be sorted out by (broadly) empirical inquiry, not by the armchair consultation of 
intuitions.Ó (2007, p. 348-349)  
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the one hand and what they are perceiving on the other. A world in which people could 
not do this would be a world in which people could not distinguish between talking about 
or thinking about a unicorn on the one hand and perceiving a unicorn on the other. This 
fantasy is not the actual world. Therefore, armchair reflection is able to distinguish 
between language and thought on the one hand and perception on the other. Empirical 
enquiry is not needed. One may reply that it may not be so obvious philosophically where 
thinking ends and perceiving begins. However, whether there are philosophical thought 
experiments in which people cannot easily distinguish thought from perception is 
irrelevant to whether CohenÕs argument works. Our intuitions about Illusion and P-
Incompatibility are not based on these hard cases but everyday experience. 
There is an analogy in Cohen (2007, p. 349) with acceptability judgments that one 
could try to use to support the claim that armchair reflection cannot distinguish between 
language and thought on the one hand and perception on the other. Cohen says that, 
although it is reasonable to insist that Ôthe bulldogs the bulldogs the bulldogs fight fight 
fightÕ is unacceptable, it is unreasonable to insist that it is unacceptable because of the 
grammar of the language in particular, as opposed to being unacceptable for some other 
reason. The reason it is unreasonable to do this, according to Cohen, is that it is up to 
empirical enquiry not armchair consultation of intuitions to determine why exactly the 
relevant phrase is unacceptable.
67
  
                                                
67 This is the bit of text I am interpreting. ÒBy way of analogy, consider what the linguist says about 
acceptability judgments. It is reasonable to insist, on the basis of considering your own reactions to the 
cases, that the bulldogs fight is acceptable and that the bulldogs the bulldogs the bulldogs fight fight fight is 
unacceptable [.] [É] But it is not reasonable to insist, on the basis of considering your own reaction to the 
case, that the unacceptability of the latter string is due to its failure to conform to the grammar of the 
language in particular. On the contrary, the standard story goes, acceptability judgments are the result of the 
interaction of the grammaticality faculty with other components in the cognitive system [É], and it is up to 
systematic empirical inquiry, as opposed to armchair consultation of intuitions, to dole out the labor of 
explaining the phenomena.Ó (2007, p. 349) 
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This analogy cannot provide the needed support. Cohen may be right that it is 
unreasonable to insist that the unacceptability of the string of text is due to the grammar 
of the language. Perhaps armchair reflection cannot easily distinguish between a sentence 
being ungrammatical and its other problems. If so, there is good reason not to trust our 
intuitions that the relevant string is ungrammatical in particular. Regardless, there is a 
strong disanalogy between reflection on the grammaticality of sentences and reflection on 
perception. Being able to tell ungrammatical sentences from grammatical ones is a 
difficult task that requires a lot of training. Even university students sometimes fail to 
write grammatically. Conversely, being able to differentiate language and thought on the 
one hand from perception on the other is something that if learned at all, is learned at a 
young age. So, the analogy fails to support CohenÕs claim that armchair reflection cannot 
distinguish between language and thought on the one hand and perception on the other. 
People can at least distinguish between language and thought, and perception in everyday 
cases on which the relevant intuitions are based. 
 
Summary of section 3 
I have been examining whether CohenÕs Òrelationalist treatmentÓ of ordinary perceptual 
illusion can succeed. I first focused on distilling CohenÕs treatment and defending my 
interpretation (section 3.1). I then argued that CohenÕs treatment, as I understand it, is in 
serious tension with his argument from perceptual variation, and that his response 
regardless of interpretation is in tension with his basic arguments for the first premise of 
his argument from perceptual variation (section 3.2). Finally, I looked at whether Cohen 
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can evade my arguments against his treatment (section 3.3). Namely, I looked at whether 
his basic arguments can be modified to avoid said tensions and at an attempt to explain 
away our intuitions. Most generally, I have shown that CohenÕs Òrelationalist treatmentÓ 
has killed his patient.  
 
Section 4: The introspective rejoinder
68
 
A popular and influential objection to CohenÕs relationalism is that the view is opposed to 
our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. So, as the objection goes, because 
relationalism is opposed to these intuitions, we should reject the view. I, along with 
Cohen and Nichols (2010), shall call this argument, Òthe introspective rejoinder.Ó Many 
who have thought about color can be interpreted as endorsing the introspective rejoinder 
(at least to some degree) (Armstrong, 1987, p. 36-37; Boghossian and Velleman, 1989, p. 
86; Chalmers 2006, p. 56Ð77ff; Dancy, 1986, p. 181; Gibbard, 2006, p. 10; Johnston, 
1992, p. 226Ð27; Yablo 1995, p. 489).
69
 Here are two examples.  
But surely [relationalism] misrepresents the phenomenology of colour perception: 
when we see an object as red we see it as having a simple, monadic, local 
property of the objectÕs surface. The colour is perceived as intrinsic to the object, 
in much the way that shape and size are perceived as intrinsic. No relation to 
perceivers enters into how the colour appears; the colour is perceived as wholly 
on the object, not as somehow straddling the gap between it and the perceiver. 
Being seen as red is not like being seen as larger than or to the left of. The Ôcolour 
envelopeÕ that delimits an object stops at the objectÕs spatial boundaries. So if 
colour were inherently relational, [É] then perception of colour would 
misrepresent its structure Ð we would be under the illusion that a relational 
property is non-relational. Contraposing, given that perception is generally 
veridical as to colour, colours are not relational [É]. (McGinn 1996, p. 541Ð42)  
                                                
68
 The work on this section is the result of collaboration with James Andow (A PhD graduate from the 
University of Nottingham) and Kelly Schmidtke (A research fellow at Warwick). The work has resulted in 
a co-authored publication in Erkenntnis. Please see Roberts, Andow, & Schmidtke (2014). The work can 
also be accessed online at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10670-014-9600-6  
69
 Cohen and NicholsÕ (2010) also interpret each of these philosophers as endorsing the introspective 
rejoinder. 
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Still, it may be insisted, the relational view of colour [É] surely goes against 
ordinary colour experience. When, for example, a rubber ball looks blue to me, I 
experience blueness all over the facing surface of the ball. Each perceptible part 
of the ball looks blue to me. And none of these parts, in looking blue, look to me 
to have a relational property. On the contrary, it may be said, I experience 
blueness as intrinsic to the surface, just as I experience the shape of the surface as 
intrinsic to it. This simple fact is one that relational approaches to colour cannot 
accommodate without supposing that a universal illusion is involved in normal 
experiences of colour Ð that colours are really relational properties even though 
we experience them as non-relational. (Tye 2000, p. 152Ð53)  
 
The introspective rejoinder has been raised with such force and regularity that it is 
clear many with different theoretical commitments take the rejoinder to be a persuasive 
argument against CohenÕs relationalism (Cohen and Nichols, 2010, p. 221). The rejoinder 
supposes that phenomenally-informed intuitions provide defeasible evidence about the 
nature of color (although for readability I will often merely talk of Ôpre-theoretic 
intuitionsÕ or just ÔintuitionsÕ). There is good reason to accept this principle about color, 
regardless of whether a similar principle holds with respect to things other than color: 
The rich phenomenal character of color experiences is an important guide as to the nature 
of color properties.
70
 Indeed, I am inclined to think that any account of color which 
ignored the phenomenal character of color experience would risk failing to give an 
account of color, as it would risk changing the subject. So, it is natural to treat intuitions 
that are informed by how the colors appear in perception as providing defeasible 
evidence as to the nature of colors. The importance of phenomenally-informed intuitions 
is also the reason that the rejoinder concerns pre-theoretic intuitions. Any theoretical 
                                                
70
 My claim here is not a strong one. I think that, with respect to color, phenomenal character has at least 
some bearing on representational content in typical, every-day cases. This weak premise is all that is 
needed to motivate the introspective rejoinder. Accepting it, for example, in no way commits one to any 
necessary connections between phenomenal character and representational content (i.e. to any form of 
intentionalism). 
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commitments an individual has are likely to influence their intuitions hence limiting the 
extent to which their intuitions are based on how the colors look. 
As I think that the rich phenomenal character of color experiences is an important 
guide as to the nature of the colors, I believe that proponents of relationalist views on 
color must take the introspective rejoinder seriously. If the rejoinder is correct about our 
intuitions, the relationalist risks having to say that our intuitions are somehow misfiring 
and perhaps that Òa universal illusion is involved in normal experiences of colorÓ (Tye, 
2000, p. 152-153). With others in the debate, I think this is a problem for the relationalist. 
While widespread mistakes and/or illusions about color are, of course, possible, I think 
them implausible and cannot imagine the relationalist giving a convincing response.    
In the rest of section 4, I demonstrate that the introspective rejoinder is correct 
about our pre-theoretic intuitions. Cohen and NicholsÕ (2010) study suggests that about 
half (47%) of their participants are relationalists about color. Hence, their study provides 
reason to doubt that the introspective rejoinder is correct about our pre-theoretic 
intuitions. I note a number of reasons to be worried about the design of Cohen and 
NicholsÕ study (Sect. 4.1), and conduct an improved study of my own (Sect. 4.2). 
Contrary to Cohen and NicholsÕ results, my findings (Sect. 4.3) suggest that anti-
relationalism is the pre-theoretically intuitive position. Thus, my study suggests that the 
introspective rejoinder is accurate about our intuitions. I find some other interesting 
things. My results suggest that most ordinary people do not find it less intuitive that 
colors are objective than that shapes are. I also find some evidence, which amongst other 
things will be discussed in the final section (Sect. 4.4), that when ordinary people are 
asked just about the colors of objects, their intuitions about color and shape cases are 
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similar, but when asked to evaluate peopleÕs color ascriptions, their intuitions about color 
and shape cases differ. 
 
4.1 Cohen and NicholsÕ experiment 
 Cohen and Nichols ran an experiment to see whether the introspective rejoinder is 
correct about our pre-theoretic intuitions. They presented participants in an introductory 
logic class with cases involving putative disagreements about color and shape 
properties.
71
 In an effort to prevent participants from using linguistic differences to 
explain the putative disagreements, participants were provided with a background story 
involving aliens with perceptual systems that differ from ours. Here is an example. 
[Andrew and Abigail are] aliens from different planets. They learn English by 
reading books, and attain native fluency. Their use of English words is no more 
different from yours than that of other native speakers of English is from yours. 
But these aliens have different perceptual systems from ours. Consequently, when 
the aliens visit Earth on a spaceship and talk with their friend Harry the human, 
they sometimes disagree about whether a given English word applies to 
something. Your job is to help us settle these disputes. (2010, p. 221) 
 
 
  After receiving this background description, Cohen and NicholsÕ participants 
received cases of putative disagreement involving a tomato and the colors red and green, 
and a compact disc (or CD) and the shapes round and triangular. Their cases were worded 
as follows: 
Andrew [or Abigail] the alien and Harry the human view a ripe tomato [or an 
ordinary compact disc] in good light, at a distance of 1 metre. Harry says that the 
ripe tomato is red [or that the CD is round], while Andrew [or Abigail] says that 
                                                
71
 Cohen and Nichols also presented participants with putative disagreement cases involving gustatory 
properties (sweet, bitter, and sour) as well as cases involving the property deliciousness (2010, p. 221). The 
vast majority of their participants selected the relationalist option for both kinds of properties (2010, p. 223-
224). I concentrate on shape and color, because it is these results that are integral to my defense of the 
introspective rejoinder. 
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the very same ripe tomato is not red (in fact, he says it is green) [or that the CD is 
not round (in fact, she says it is triangular)]. (2010, p. 222)  
 
After reading the cases, participants were asked to select one of three options. Below are 
the options that were available.  
1) The tomato is red [or the CD is round], so Harry is right and Andrew [or 
Abigail] is wrong. 
2) The tomato is not red [or the CD is not round], so Andrew [or Abigail] is right 
and Harry is wrong. 
3) There is no fact of the matter about unqualified claims like Ôthe tomato is redÕ 
[or Ôthe CD is roundÕ]. Different people have different visual experiences when 
they look at the same object, and it is not absolutely true or false that the 
tomato is red [or that the CD is round]. (2010, p. 222) 
 
Cohen and Nichols (2010) found that 47% selected option (3) when presented 
with the color case and so seemed to be color relationalists, and that 30.9% selected 
option (3) when presented with the shape case and so appeared to be relationalists about 
shape. To be clear, option (3) is supposedly the relationalist friendly option, because it 
suggests that there is a subjectivity in the nature of the colors that the anti-relationalist 
would find troubling but that most relationalists would endorse, especially those of 
CohenÕs ecumenical variety (2004; 2009). Sign tests revealed that participants were more 
likely to choose the relationalist answer for colors than for shapes. This data suggests, 
contrary to the introspective rejoinder, that Òthe introspective capacities available to 
normal adults do not, by themselves, supply authoritative and unambiguous data about 
whether the colors are relationalÓ (Cohen and Nichols, 2010, p. 226). Thus, Cohen and 
NicholsÕ results suggest that there is no sense in which the introspective rejoinder is 
correct that CohenÕs relationalism is opposed to our pre-theoretic intuitions.  
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Cohen and NicholsÕ results are contrary to what I would have expected. I first 
became suspicious of their study after noticing that 30.9% of their participants selected 
relationalism about shape. As shapes are very obviously non-relational (in the relevant 
sense), this suggested that there was something about Cohen and NicholsÕ experimental 
design that biased their participants in favour of relationalism. I noticed some other things 
straight away that struck me as odd. For example, Cohen and Nichols background 
description includes the stipulation that Ò[The aliensÕ] use of English words is no more 
different from yours than that of other native speakers of English is from yoursÓ (2010, p. 
221), but then in their cases the aliens use the English words ÒroundÓ and ÒredÓ in ways 
that are utterly distinct from how normal English-speaking subjects use them (e.g. the 
aliens say things like Òthe CD is not roundÓ). Upon examining their experiment more 
closely, I discovered four further reasons to be concerned.  
First, their relationalist option, their option (3), is composed of the following three 
distinct propositions:  
(a). There is no fact of the matter about unqualified claims like [e.g. Òthe tomato is 
redÓ]. 
(b). Different people have different visual experiences when they look at the same 
object. 
(c). It is not absolutely true or false that [e.g. the tomato is red].  
This is an unwieldy mixture. One thing that is worrying is that the relationalist option 
includes (b). Participants may find (b) to be a likely explanation for why Andrew and 
Harry [or Abigail and Harry] disagree. If different people have different visual 
experiences when they look at the same object, then this would probably result in, for 
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instance, Andrew and Harry disagreeing about the tomatoÕs color. Thus, participants may 
choose the relationalist option in order to choose (b). Unfortunately, (b) is consistent with 
both relationalism and with anti-relationalism.
72
 
Second, given how Cohen and Nichols set up their experiment, the only 
alternatives to the relationalist option are to commit oneself to saying that Harry is right 
(option 1) or to commit oneself to saying that Andrew [or Abigail] is right (option 2). So, 
for the anti-relationalist to express their intuitions, they must say that Harry is right or 
that Andrew [or Abigail] is right. The shape case involves a compact disc. So, Harry is 
obviously correct and Abigail wrong (assuming she is speaking English), because discs 
are round by definition. However, it is unobvious whether in the color case Harry or 
Andrew (if either) is right. Ripe tomatoes of the common variety are red, but this is not 
true for all varieties. Thus, Cohen and NicholsÕ setup may bias anti-relationalists towards 
the relationalist option in the color case; participants with anti-relationalist intuitions may 
chose the relationalist option in the color case to avoid saying that Harry is right or that 
Andrew is right, because they are uncertain which (if either) is right.  
Third, Cohen and NicholsÕ background description, which is supposed to prevent 
participants from interpreting the disagreement case as being due to linguistic differences, 
involves aliens with perceptual systems that differ from ours. Participants may find it 
intuitive that aliens with different perceptual systems do not see colors and shapes (or at 
least not the same ones that we see) and so plausibly would mean something different 
from us by ÒThe tomato is redÓ and ÒThe CD is round.Ó So, Cohen and NicholsÕ 
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 There is another worry with (b). If one interprets Ôdifferent visual experiencesÕ to mean Ônumerically 
different visual experiencesÕ, then (b) is as close to undeniable as anything is in philosophy. So, it is 
reasonable to hold that upon reflection people would find that (b) is certain under this reading. So, 
participants may choose the relationalist option to choose (b), because they are certain that (b) is true under 
the relevant reading.   
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background description may have betrayed its purpose by skewing participants towards 
treating Harry and AndrewÕs [or Harry and AbigailÕs] dispute as being due to linguistic 
differences. There are reasons to suspect that this third concern would have more of an 
influence on participantsÕ judgements about color than their judgements about shape. 
First, participants may be sensitive to the idea that seeing shapes is universally important 
to surviving, but that the importance of being able to see colors (or the colors that we see) 
is more environmentally dependent.
73
 Second, participants may be sensitive to the idea 
that there are mathematical definitions for shapes but not for colors that the aliens could 
rely on to avoid a verbal dispute even if things look somewhat different to them.  
Fourth, I am worried that participants may chose the relationalist option in order 
to express a feeling that no one is at fault. Participants may associate someone being 
wrong with their being at fault for being wrong, because when one is wrong one is also 
often at fault for it. Option (1) implies that Andrew [or Abigail] is wrong and option (2) 
that Harry is. So, because of the association that participants may have, they may feel that 
by agreeing with (1) they are agreeing that Andrew [or Abigail] is at fault and by 
agreeing with (2) that Harry is at fault. However, participants may not feel as if either (or 
both) is at fault for being wrong, because they may think that whether Andrew or Harry 
[or Abigail or Harry] is wrong (or whether they both are) is due to factors that are outside 
of their control like a visual system malfunction. Participants may be particularly likely 
to think this in the color case because of the well-known phenomenon of color blindness, 
an inherited trait for which one is not responsible.   
 
                                                
73
 There is empirical evidence that the importance of being able to see colours is environmentally 
dependent. For example see, Changizi et al, 2006. 
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4.2: My method 
I ran an experiment to test pre-theoretic intuitions designed to avoid the problems with 
Cohen and NicholsÕ study mentioned above. All 129 of the participants (61 male) 
completed an online survey. Of the participants, 31 had postgraduate experience in 
philosophy, including some faculty, and the remaining 98 either had no training in 
philosophy or at most had completed an undergraduate degree in philosophy.
74
  
Participants either received a case involving color disagreement (N = 65) or one 
involving shape disagreement (but never both) as follows: 
Disagreement case. Alex and Harry examine an object. Alex and Harry examine 
the object in typical lighting from the same position. They are both fluent English 
speakers and have normal eyesight. Harry says that the object is red [or round], 
while Alex says that the very same object is green [or cube shaped]. 
 
 
After reading either a color or shape case, participants were asked to evaluate 7 
statements on a likert scale with 10 items from disagree to agree: 
 
Epistemic. We could find out who is right about the colour [or shape] of the 
object. 
Fault. One of them, and possibly both, is at fault for getting the colour [or shape] 
wrong. 
Appearance. The object may appear in different ways to Alex and Harry, and so, 
for all we know, both of them could be correctly reporting how the object appears 
to them. 
 
                                                
74
 These participants were recruited in two sections. The first 67 participants were recruited spring 2013 
using social media and through the University of Nottingham. The remaining 62 participants were recruited 
autumn 2013 through the University of WarwickÕs Behavioural Science GroupÕs participant recruitment 
system.  
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Meaning. Alex and Harry may only disagree about what the words "red" and 
"green" [or ÒroundÓ and Òcube shapedÓ] mean, and so given how they may be 
individually using the words, they could for all we know both be right about the 
colour [or shape] of the object. 
 
Verbal. People often disagree about what word best describes how an object 
appears. For example, people often disagree about whether something should be 
called ÒredÓ or ÒorangeÓ [or ÒroundÓ or ÒcubeÓ]. 
 
Perceptual. People disagree a lot about what colours [or shapes] things 
perceptually appear to have. 
 
Target. In reality, there is an absolute fact of the matter about the colour [or 
shape] of the object regardless of how it appears to Alex and Harry and regardless 
of what they think, say, or do. 
 
Note that Target is about the color [or shape] of the object. The reason why 
Target is phrased this way is that relationalism and anti-relationalism are metaphysical 
views and not views on how people use color [or shape] language. An additional reason 
for this phrasing concerns CohenÕs (2007; 2009) distinction between fine/coarse-grained 
colors. When it comes to fine-grained colors, everyone is more or less guaranteed to be 
right according to Cohen. However, Cohen seems to hold that typically people ascribe (in 
language) coarse-grained colors to objects. Coarse-grained color properties are such that 
error can much more easily occur, because these colors are constituted by relations that 
hold between objects and normal observers and conditions. Given this subtlety in 
CohenÕs account, it would be difficult to interpret a question about color ascriptions 
rather than the colors themselves, hence I decided to focus only on the latter.  
The order of the first six statements above was randomized, but Target always 
came last. I did this because I was worried that participants would disagree with Target in 
order to express something unrelated to their relationalist intuitions and hoped that the 
first six statements would help to disambiguate Target so that this would not happen. For 
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example, I had a concern, similar to my final worry with Cohen and NicholsÕ study, that 
participants would disagree with Target in order to express that no one is at fault for 
being wrong about the objectÕs color or shape. Participants may think that by agreeing 
with Target they are agreeing with the proposition that Alex is at fault or Harry is (or that 
both are at fault) for being wrong.
75
   
 
4. 3: My results 
The majority of participants responded 6 to 10 on Target indicating some degree of 
agreement with anti-relationalism in both the color (72.30%) and the shape (85.90%) 
conditions. Interestingly, the results suggest different trends depending on the level of 
experience that participants have in philosophy. Among those with postgraduate 
experience in philosophy (including university faculty), call this group ÔPhilpostÕ, fewer 
participants agreed with anti-relationalism about color (64.70%) than shape (92.90%). In 
comparison, among those who either had no experience in philosophy or whose highest 
experience in philosophy was at an undergraduate level, call this group ÔNot-PhilpostÕ, a 
more similar number of participants agreed with both anti-relationalism about color 
(75.00%) and shape (84.00%), see fig. 3.3.  
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 There are various reasons why disambiguating statements like Target is important in experimental 
philosophy. One should not assume that participants will understand terms like ÒtruthÓ, Òfact of the matterÓ, 
ÒcorrectÓ and ÒaccurateÓ the way we do. This is a lesson we can learn from the work of the ÒOslo SchoolÓ, 
e.g., Arne Naess and Herman TennesenÑwork which is sometimes touted as early experimental 
philosophy. Another illustrative example is that of Fain and Kaelin (1960) who, in a similar early empirical 
study, found an astonishing level of agreement among philosophy undergraduates that all or most truths are 
relative (at the beginning of term 80% and 83% in consecutive years, and at the end of term 65% and 56%). 
On further investigation they found that Òwhen a student says that the same proposition can be true for one 
person and false for another, he usually means something quite innocent: that the same proposition can be 
believed and disbelieved by different people at the same timeÓ (p.142).  
 222 
 
Figure 3.3. Division of paricipants. The percentage of participants divided into Not-
Philpost and Philpost, and color and shape cases who indicated some agreement (likert 
scale 6-10) with anti-relationalism. 
 
 
Are there any significant differences for property type (color, shape)? The Mann-
Whitney test, a nonparametric alternative to a t-test, indicated no significant difference 
between the way Target was rated in color and shape conditions on a scale of 1-10 when 
all participants were analyzed (z = 1.76, p = 0.08), although the result did approach 
significance. I find no evidence of a difference whatsoever in Not-Philpost between the 
way color and shape were rated (z = 0.84, p = 0.41). Contrary to this, I find that the likert 
ratings are different for color and shape in Philpost (z = 2.07, p < 0.05). So, it should be 
clear that it was those in Philpost who were causing the results for all participants to 
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approach significance. There is no evidence that those in Not-Philpost recognize a 
difference between color and shape.
76
 
The Mann-Whitney test was performed on the six disambiguating statements to 
test for a difference between the way color and shape were rated when all participants 
were analyzed together and then for the subgroups. I did this because I was interested in 
exploring how the participants understand color and shape cases, and thought that I might 
learn something interesting by looking at how the participants rated the disambiguating 
statements in depth. For all participants, differences were found for Appearance (z = 
2.18, p < 0.05), Verbal (z = 5.80, p < 0.01), and Perceptual (z = 2.83, p < 0.01). For Not-
Philpost the differences remained for Verbal (z = 5.62, p < 0.01)
 
and Perceptual (z = 
2.66, p < 0.01). In contrast, none of the differences were significant for Philpost, with 
only Perceptual approaching significance (z = 1.90, p = 0.06).  
I further examined the relationships between the seven statements using 
SpearmanÕs rho correlation matrices. For simplicity, I will only talk about the results 
arrived at when analyzing all of the participants together. Table 3.1 is included for 
anyone interested in whether the correlations hold for the subgroups and notes some 
differences between them. My findings support some of my concerns with Cohen and 
NicholsÕ study and shed light on the Mann-Whitney differences found for Target, 
Appearance, Verbal, and Perceptual. 
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 A critic might note that our between-subjects design could hide within-subject differences, like the 
results Cohen and Nichols found. To mitigate these concerns, 52 willing participants from the University of 
Warwick were sent a second survey about whichever property they did not respond to originally in a follow 
up email a week later. In total, 37 participants responded to the second survey (18 color). 
Descriptively, the participantsÕ responses to Target for both color and shape are very similar. For 
color the median response was eight; while for shape the median response was nine. Notably, the modal 
responses for both color and shape were 10. Statistically, these results were compared with a sign test, a 
non-parametric alternative to the repeated samples t-test. The test found no difference between participantsÕ 
color and shape responses (z = 1.24, p = 0.21). Thus, even employing a within-samples design, like Cohen 
and Nichols, we find no difference between participantsÕ color and shape Target responses.  
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All Participants 
 
Not-Philpost 
 
Philpost 
SpearmanÕs Rank Order 
Correlations 
Color 
N = 65 
Shape 
N = 64 
Color 
N = 48 
Shape 
N = 50 
Color 
N = 17 
Shape 
N = 14 
    Target Ð Epistemic ** ** ** ** *  
    Target - Fault **  **  **  
    Epistemic Ð Fault **  **  **  
    Appearance - Meaning * ** ** **  ** 
    Appearance Ð Verbal *  **    
    Appearance - Perceptual *  ** *   
    Appearance - Fault  *  *   
    Verbal Ð Meaning *      
    Verbal Ð Perceptual ** ** ** ** ** * 
    Perceptual Ð Meaning *      
 
Table 3.1 SpearmanÕs correlations. Rank Order correlations for all participants and 
across subgroups. Notes: * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. 
 
 Interesting patterns were observed for Target between the color and shape 
correlation matrices. When looking at participantsÕ responses to the color case, I found 
that Target correlates with both Epistemic and Fault (respectively, r = 0.52, p < 0.01; r = 
0.40, p < 0.01). In contrast, for participantsÕ responses to the shape case, Target was 
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found to only correlate with Epistemic (r = 0.35, p < 0.01). The discovery that Fault is 
uniquely associated with participantsÕ responses to Target in the color case supports my 
fourth concern with Cohen and NicholsÕ study. This worry was that Cohen and NicholsÕ 
participants may choose the relationalist option in the color case in order to avoid 
attributing fault to the relevant parties. The fact that Fault is uniquely associated with 
participantsÕ color responses supports my fourth concern, because it is what one would 
expect to find if participants in Cohen and NicholsÕ study were choosing the relationalist 
option in the color case in order to avoid attributing fault: If participants were choosing 
the relationalist option to avoid attributing fault, one would expect those who chose this 
option to disagree with a statement that attributes fault. 
Examining Appearance I find that there is a significant relationship between this 
statement and Meaning for both the color and shape cases (respectively, r = 0.31, p < 
0.05; r = 0.50, p < 0.01). The correlation between Appearance and Meaning supports my 
third worry with Cohen and NicholsÕ study that their background description using aliens 
with unique perceptual systems might have led their participants to believe that the 
dispute between the aliens and the humans is only due to linguistic differences. This 
correlation supports my third worry because it is exactly what one would expect to find if 
the worry were correct: If differences in how things appear, which would plausibly result 
from the aliens having different perceptual systems, lead participants to think there is 
merely a linguistic dispute going on, one would expect the discovered correlation to 
obtain. My third worry could explain why Cohen and NicholsÕ study seemed to find such 
a large percentage of relationalists about both color and shape.  
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I found three more correlations having to do with Appearance. For the color case 
I find a significant relationship between Appearance and Verbal (r = 0.27, p < 0.05). This 
was to be expected, for if something looks different to two people, they are likely to use 
different words to describe that thing. For the color case I also find a significant 
relationship between Appearance and Perceptual (r = 0.29, p < 0.05). This was also to be 
expected, because intuitively differences in how things appear lead to perceptual 
differences. Interestingly, I find neither of these correlations for the shape case. This 
absence probably has something to do with the fact that shapes have mathematical 
definitions that go beyond how they look. For the shape case I find a relationship between 
Appearance and Fault (r = -0.27, p < 0.05). Interestingly, I do not find this correlation for 
the color case. The explanation for this is difficult to see.  
   From examining Verbal, I find an interesting difference between participantsÕ 
color and shape responses. When looking at participantsÕ color responses a correlation 
emerges between Verbal and Meaning (r = 0.29, p < 0.05). This correlation was to be 
expected, because it is intuitive that two people whose colour terms have different 
meanings would end up using different colour terms to describe the same object (i.e., to 
verbal differences). However, interestingly, this relationship is not significant for the 
shape analyses. This suggests that the connection between Verbal and Meaning is 
stronger for color than shape. Perhaps this is because people are not as willing to allow 
shape terms to have alternative meanings as they are willing to allow color terms to. This 
in turn may have something to do with the fact that shapes have mathematical 
definitions.
77
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 A significant correlation also emerged between Verbal and Perceptual for both color and shape cases. 
This correlation was to be expected and suggests that participants were paying attention.  
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I shall now look at Perceptual. I observed a correlation between this statement 
and Meaning for participantsÕ responses in the color case (r = 0.28, p < 0.05). This 
finding, like the finding regarding the relationship between Appearance and Meaning, 
supports my third worry with Cohen and NicholsÕ study. The third worry, again, is that 
Cohen and NicholsÕ background description involving aliens with different perceptual 
systems might have led their participants to think that the dispute between the aliens and 
the humans is only due to linguistic differences. The correlation supports this worry 
because it is what one would expect to find if it were correct: If perceptual differences, 
which would likely result from the aliens having different perceptual systems from 
humans, lead participants to think there is merely a linguistic dispute going on, one would 
expect the mentioned correlation to obtain. Moreover, it seems I may have been right to 
suspect that the background description involving aliens would have more of an impact 
on participantsÕ color than shape judgements; I find no significant relationship between 
Perceptual and Meaning for shape (r = 0.08, p = 0.51).   
 
4.4: Discussion 
Cohen and NicholsÕ study called the introspective rejoinder into question, because their 
results suggested that the introspective capacities available to ordinary people do not 
provide unambiguous data about whether the colors are relational (2010, p. 226). This is 
a problem for the introspective rejoinder, because if our introspective capacities do not 
provide unambiguous data, then there is no sense in which it is correct to say that 
CohenÕs relationalism is opposed to our pre-theoretic intuitions. However, compared with 
53.00% of Cohen and NicholsÕ participants, 72.30% of the current participants, and 
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75.00% for Not-Philpost, indicated agreement with anti-relationalism about color. Thus, 
my results suggest that things are not nearly as ambiguous as Cohen and NicholsÕ study 
would have us believe. In fact, my data suggests that anti-relationalism is clearly the pre-
theoretically intuitive position.    
 As I said in the results section, only in Philpost were participants significantly 
less anti-relationalist about color than about shape. It is interesting to speculate about why 
this might be. Here is a thought. Perhaps philosophers are subject to something like a 
mere-exposure effect (for classic discussion of such effects see Zajonc, 1968). 
Philosophers may have more relationalist intuitions because they encounter the idea that 
colors are somehow less objective than shapes more frequently than the folk due to 
historical or sociological reasons. Starting with Galileo, Descartes, and Locke (amongst 
others) there has been an idea in philosophy that colors are (in some sense) less objective 
(or real) than shapes (Hacker, 1991). Locke is perhaps the most famous for this view. In 
the Essay he said, ÒLet not the Eyes see Light or Colors [É] and all Colors [É], as they 
are such particular ideas, vanish and Cease, and are reduced to their Causes, i.e. Bulk, 
Figure, and Motion of PartsÓ (1996, II-viii-17). At any rate, as I found that only in 
Philpost were participants less anti-relationalist about color than shape, it seems that it is 
not widely held amongst ordinary people that colors are less objective than shapes. This 
is of course compatible with colors being less objective than shapes, but it is a reason for 
caution: The intuitive position seems to be that colors are no less objective than shapes. 
My results seem to suggest that some (27.70% all groups and 25.00% Not-
Philpost) of my participants have relationalist intuitions about color. However, there is 
reason to doubt whether all those who selected the relationalist response (1-5 on Target) 
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were really expressing intuitions that accord with CohenÕs relationalism as its main 
proponents understand it. Cohen has devoted the most ink to defending his view on color, 
and relationalism of CohenÕs variety is an ecumenical view according to which if an 
object appears to be red, for instance, it has a property picked out by the English word 
ÒredÓ, which for Cohen is a relational property (Cohen 2004; 2009, p. 24). However, I 
found a significant positive correlation between participantsÕ answers to Epistemic and 
Target. In fact, in the color case, 17 out of 19 who disagreed with Target disagreed with 
Epistemic. So, there is some reason to doubt whether most of those who disagreed with 
Target can be said to be relationalists in CohenÕs sense.   
Cohen may respond to this by invoking his fine/coarse-grained distinction. As 
noted previously, coarse-grained colors, unlike fine-grained ones, are constituted by 
relations to normal observers and conditions so that with respect to these colors error can 
more easily occur. So, Cohen may try to appeal to his coarse-grained colors to explain 
why 17 out of 19 who disagreed with Target disagreed with Epistemic. Specifically, he 
may suggest that participants treat Alex and Harry as referring to coarse-grained colors. 
He may say that if Alex and Harry do so refer, at most one would be right, but it may be 
difficult (perhaps impossible) to determine which if either of them is right. In my opinion, 
the problem with this move is that, according to Cohen, coarse-grained colors are 
constituted by relations to normal observers and conditions, and the disagreeing parties in 
my case (Alex and Harry) are stipulated to be normal observers in typical (i.e. normal) 
conditions. Hence, it seems that Alex and Harry should both be right according to Cohen 
whether they are talking about fine-grained or coarse-grained colors. Thus, this response 
on behalf of Cohen does not look promising.  
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 My curiosity about the correlation between Target and Epistemic prompted me to 
ask some of my participants to respond to an additional case after responding to the other 
items (N = 62, all Not-Philpost).
78
 The cases are as follows: 
Alex is correct when he says that the object is green [or cube-shaped], and in 
addition Harry is correct when he says the object is red [or round]. In other words, 
both Alex and Harry's claims are correct. 
 
Participants in the color condition received the color version of this case and participants 
in the shape condition received the shape version. After reading the case, participants 
stated whether they disagreed or agreed with the following:  
Above-True. The above statement is true. 
  Above-False. The above statement is false.  
 
For both color and shape, participants largely disagreed with Above-True (color = 
58.10%, shape = 80.60%) and agreed with Above-False (color = 64.50%, shape = 
74.20%). Put another way, more people than not seem to find it intuitive that two color or 
shape ascriptions of properties that most philosophers deem incompatible cannot both be 
correct at the same time. The likelihood that shape and color responses are different was 
examined with the chi-square test. For Above-True the chi-square test is almost 
significant (X
2 
(1, N = 62) = 3.72, p = 0.05). This result suggests that people are more 
likely to agree that two observers can correctly ascribe color properties that most 
philosophers deem incompatible than they are likely to agree that two observers can 
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 This additional case was presented only to participants recruited in the second section through the 
University of Warwick (see footnote 8). The correlation between Target and Epistemic was first brought to 
my attention when considering the responses of participants in the first section. 
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correctly ascribe shape properties that most philosophers deem incompatible. However, it 
should be noted that for Above-False the differences did not approach significance. 
These results are very intriguing when compared to my original results using 
Target. This statement is only about the color of the object and is not phrased so as to ask 
whether Alex and HarryÕs color ascriptions are correct. This is as it should be, because 
relationalism and anti-relationalism about color are metaphysical views on the nature of 
color and not views on how people use color terms. However, the new case was phrased 
so as to ask about Alex and HarryÕs color ascriptions, because I wanted to see whether 
most of those who disagreed with Target find it intuitive that at most one party is right. 
The difference in phrasing between Target and the new case allowed me to inadvertently 
discover something intriguing: When those in Not-Philpost are asked only about the 
colors of objects, their intuitions about color and shape are similar, but when asked about 
observersÕ color ascriptions, their color and shape intuitions seem to differ. 
I explored this difference by looking at Above-TrueÕs correlations with the seven 
original statements. For shape significant correlations appeared only between Above-True 
and Target and Above-True and Epistemic (respectively, r = -0.38, p < 0.05; r = -0.41, p 
< 0.05). This suggests that whether people find it intuitive that two observers can 
correctly ascribe to objects shape properties that most philosophers deem incompatible 
may be due to epistemic factors. For color no significant correlations emerged. I find this 
puzzling. Regardless, it does show that I cannot say that most of those who disagreed 
with Target in the color case find it intuitive that at most one party is right. With this 
being said, it certainly seems that I inadvertently discovered another reason to be worried 
about Cohen and NicholsÕ experiment: Their options (1)-(3) emphasized color 
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ascriptions, but I have shown that it cannot be assumed that how people answer questions 
about color ascriptions will map onto their answers about the colors of objects. 
Relationalism and anti-relationalism are not views about language but about properties.  
 At this juncture it is important to consider some objections. One objection runs as 
follows: One could adopt relationalism about color as a solution to interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, or interspecies variation, or some combination of these types of variation, 
or all of these types of variation. The experiment I performed uses a case that involves 
interpersonal variation between Alex and Harry. Thus, as the objection goes, there is a 
worry that my experiment is only relevant to relationalism as a view designed to account 
for interpersonal variation. In reply, the crucial statement in the experiment, called 
Target, that I asked participants whether they agree with is as follows: In reality, there is 
an absolute fact of the matter about the color [or shape] of the object regardless of how it 
appears to Alex and Harry and regardless of what they think, say, or do. If one agrees 
with this statement, then it is unlikely that one finds it intuitive that the colors are 
constituted by relations to subjects, because by agreeing with the statement one is 
endorsing the claim that the color of the object is independent of how it appears to Alex 
and Harry and independent of what they think, say, or do. Thus, I think that that my 
experiment, regardless of how my case is stated, is relevant to all forms of relationalism 
defined as CR in section 1 of this chapter. I am happy to admit that a participantÕs 
agreeing with Target does not rule out his having intuitions that accord with relationalism 
in some broader sense.  
Here is another potential objection. My opponent may grant that phenomenally-
informed intuitions are a good guide when theorizing about color, but challenge the 
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assumption that phenomenology plays any significant role in informing my participantsÕ 
responses. I can only think of two factors to which an opponent may appeal. They are as 
follows: 
(1) In a pilot study, I found that some participants appealed to quasi-scientific 
theories of color, e.g., red is a particular wavelength of light. Perhaps participantsÕ 
responses were influenced by such a theory and not by their phenomenology.   
(2) In the same pilot study, some participants appealed to color-blindness cases. 
Perhaps those for whom such cases were salient distanced themselves from any 
influence of their own experience due to some sort of epistemic humility.  
 
That is the best I can do, and I am prepared to be fairly flat-footed in response. The strong 
correlation between Fault and Target weighs heavily against (2) being a major influence. 
If drawn to anti-relationalism due to some sort of epistemic humility, one would not 
expect participants to agree that 'One of them, and possibly both, is at fault for getting the 
color wrong.' The fact that only a small number of participants (5/67) in the pilot 
explicitly appealed to quasi-scientific views weighs against (1).
79
 It is possible that the 
number influenced (perhaps tacitly) by such views was really much higher. However, 
absent any concrete reason to think that this is the case, I am not worried. It seems 
plausible that when it comes to something as visual as color that for most people 
phenomenology would be the principal influence; when one thinks of a color it is the 
phenomenal character of that color that is foremost before oneÕs mind.  
Here is a third worry about my study. One may object that I should not ignore that 
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 The fraction 5/67 represents the proportion of participants who appealed to quasi-scientific views across 
three variants of a pilot study run in Autumn 2012.  
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a number of my participants (27.70% all groups and 25.00% Not-Philpost) indicated 
agreement with relationalism. The problem with this one may say is that I cannot be 
certain that the majorityÕs responses, rather than the minorityÕs, accurately indicate 
phenomenally-informed intuitions or even whether everyoneÕs phenomenology is 
relevantly similar (Cohen and Nichols, 2010, p. 255-226). There are two objections here, 
one on either side of the disjunction. In reply to the former, I find it way more plausible 
that about 28% of my participants are failing to indicate phenomenally-informed 
intuitions than that about 72% are. As I said, it seems plausible when it comes to 
something as visual as color that for most people phenomenology would be the principal 
influence. So, absent an argument against this, I am not worried. Further, the fact that 
participants in Not-Philpost are just as (statistically) likely to be relationalist about color 
as about shape supports my claim that the minority are failing to indicate phenomenally-
informed intuitions. Shapes very obviously appear non-relational.  
In reply to the latter objection, I find it highly implausible that for some people 
the colors phenomenally appear relational and for others anti-relational. I suspect that 
everyone enjoys the same color phenomenology; that the 72% were accurately indicating 
phenomenally-informed intuitions, and that the 28% just did not understand the questions 
as intended and/or were theoretically biased in some way. However, it is possible that I 
am wrong. Maybe people really do have divergent color phenomenology. This is an 
empirical matter and one I would be incredibly interested to investigate, although I am 
not sure how to. If I am wrong, then that would be extremely interesting. It would raise 
all sorts of issues concerning the method of relying on phenomenally-informed intuitions. 
For example, if the colors really do phenomenally appear relational to some and anti-
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relational to others, is one to infer that there are really two different types of color 
property, relational ones and non-relational ones? Notice that if that is what should be 
inferred, the whole debate between relationalists and anti-relationalists would be 
undermined; neither view admits the metaphysical possibility that both relational and 
non-relational colors exist. Regardless, the full repercussions of divergent 
phenomenology are not something I can explore here and has been assumed not to be the 
case in this essay. 
I am confident, contrary to Cohen and Nichols, that anti-relationalism about color 
is in accordance with our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions and so is likely 
the correct view on color. One may worry that that such an inference supposes that being 
in accordance with our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions is evidence that 
anti-relationalism is true. However, as I noted, such a principle seems plausible in the 
case of color, as it flows from the idea that the phenomenal character of color experiences 
is an important guide as to the nature of the colors. It is open to my opponents to argue 
against the principle. This has not been done, and I cannot imagine it being done 
convincingly.  
 
Summary of section 4 
In this section, I concentrated on whether the introspective rejoinder against CohenÕs 
relationalism has empirical support. Cohen and NicholsÕ (2010) experimental results 
suggest that almost half (47%) of their participants were relationalists about color. I noted 
a number of reasons to be worried about Cohen and NicholsÕ experimental design, and 
conducted a study of my own to address the concerns. Contrary to Cohen and NicholsÕ 
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results, my findings suggest that anti-relationalism is by far the most pre-theoretically 
intuitive position. Thus, my study supports that the introspective rejoinder is remarkably 
accurate about our intuitions.   
 
Conclusion 
CohenÕs Relationism is roughly the view that the colors are relational properties like 
being married or being a sibling. The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the 
plausibility of this view. I had four principal aims. My first aim was to give a precise 
formulation of CohenÕs view with which to work (section 1). My second aim was to 
argue that the color variation argument used to support CohenÕs view is unconvincing 
(section 2). My third aim was to argue that CohenÕs response to the objection that his 
view implies certain absurdities is incompatible with how he goes about motivating his 
view (section 3). My fourth aim was to defend the introspective rejoinder that CohenÕs 
relationalism stands in stark contrast to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic 
intuitions, and so should be rejected (section 4). Most generally, I have shown that 
CohenÕs relationalism is unmotivated and has serious problems. Thus, I believe that the 
view is not in the least bit plausible and should be rejected. 
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Part 3.3: In Defense of Non-relational Primitivism 
In this chapter, I shall argue that the colors are non-reducible and non-relational, 
categorical properties similar to what is true for the property of being square (Campbell, 
1993; Hacker, 1991; Westphal, 2005; Yablo, 1995). I call this view, Ònon-relational 
primitivism.Ó There are two things I shall do in this chapter. First, I will present my 
positive argument for non-relational primitivism. Second, I shall defend non-relational 
primitivism from a battery of recent objections proposed mainly by Byrne and Hilbert but 
also by Hardin (section 2).   
 
Section 1: Argument for Non-relational primitivism 
In order to argue for non-relational primitivism I shall first argue that primitivism best 
captures our core beliefs about the colors and then I shall argue that non-relational 
primitivism is a better view than relational primitivism. What are our color beliefs about 
the colors? According to Johnston (1992, p. 222-223) the following constitutes our core 
beliefs: 
(1) Paradigms. Some of what we take to be paradigms of canary yellow things (i.e. 
some canaries) are canary yellow. 
(2) Explanation. The fact of a surface of volume or radiant source being canary 
yellow sometimes causally explains our visual experience as of canary yellow 
things. 
(3) Unity. Thanks to its nature and the nature of the other determinate shades, canary 
yellow, like the other shades, has its own unique place in the network of 
similarity, difference and exclusion relations exhibited by the whole family of 
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shades. (Think of the relations exemplified along the axes of hue, saturation and 
[lightness] in the so-called color solid. The color solid captures central facts about 
the colors, e.g. that canary yellow is not as similar to shades of blue as they are 
similar among themselves, i.e. that canary yellow is not a shade of blue.) 
(4) Perceptual availability. Justified belief about the canary yellowness of external 
things is available simply on the basis of visual perception. That is, if external 
things are canary yellow we are justified in believing that just on the basis of 
visual perception and the beliefs which inform it. (Further philosophical 
explication of this belief would come to something like this: If you are looking at 
a material object under what you take to be adequate conditions for perceiving its 
color and you take yourself to be an adequate perceiver of color then your visually 
acquired belief that material object is canary yellow is justified simply on the 
strength of (i) the information available in the relevant visual experience and (ii) 
those general background beliefs about the external causes of visual experiences 
which inform ordinary perception.) 
(5) Revelation. The intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard 
visual experience as of a canary yellow thing.  
 
Revelation is an attempt by Johnston to capture a core belief about the colors that 
many philosophers have attempted to express. Here are two examples of such attempts.   
"The particular shade of colour that I am seeing [...] may have many things to be said 
about it. [...] But such statements, though they make me know truths about the colour, 
do not make me know the colour it self better than I did before: so far as concerns 
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knowledge of the colour it self, as opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know the 
colour perfectly and completely when I see it and no further knowledge of it itself is 
even theoretically possible.Ó (Russell, 1912, p. 47)  
 
"Color words are words for properties which are of such a kind that their whole and 
essential nature as properties can be and is fully revealed in sensory quality 
experience given only the qualitative character that that experience has.Ó (Strawson, 
1989, p. 224) 
 
Revelation succeeds in roughly capturing the ideas expressed in these quotes. However, 
there are two interpretations of Revelation depending on how the word ÒrevealedÓ is 
understood. I think that only one of them plausibly captures a core belief about color. The 
first interpretation understands ÒrevealedÓ in a propositional sense. It is like seeing that or 
appearing that. Given this interpretation of Òrevealed,Ó JohnstonÕs Revelation can be 
expressed as follows: 
Propositional Revelation (PR). It appears that p after careful reflection on our 
experiences as of the colors where p is about the nature of the colors iff p is true.  
 
PR is the conjunction of the following two theses:  
Infallibility: If it appears that p after careful reflection on our experiences as of the 
colors where p is about the nature of the colors, then p is true.  
 
Self-Intimation: If a proposition p is about the nature of the colors and p is true, 
then it appears that p after careful reflection on our experiences as of the colors.  
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It is not uncommon for philosophers to interpret Revelation along the lines of PR 
(Byrne and Hilbert, 2007; Allen, 2011). However, it is doubtful that PR is a core belief 
about color. It is somewhat plausible that Infallibility is a core belief, because theories 
that are unable to accommodate what appears to be true about the nature of the colors 
after careful reflection (on our experiences as of the colors) are often taken to be false 
(Hardin, 1988; Boghossian & Velleman, 1991; Johnston, 1992). However, with regard to 
Self-Intimation, if it were true, then all truths about the nature of the colors would be 
revealed to us upon careful reflection on our experiences. Thus, it would be easy to 
discover what the colors are. We would need only to carefully reflect on our experiences 
and reject any view that was not revealed to be true. Things are not this easy and no one 
thought they would be. Investigation into the nature of color requires more than mere 
reflection on experience (Allen, 2011). Even the primitivist about color should admit that 
this is true. So, the interpretation of Revelation that understands ÒrevealedÓ to be 
propositional revealing does not capture a core belief about the colors. 
 The second and better interpretation of Revelation is that the sense of ÒrevealedÓ 
in this core belief is non propositional. When we have an experience as of Canary Yellow 
we do not experience that Canary Yellowness is whatever it is, but we do experience 
what it is. This talk of experiencing what Canary Yellowness is should not be understood 
propositionally. The idea is not that we see that Canary Yellowness is whatever it is. 
Rather the idea being expressed by Ôexperience what it isÕ is that we experience the entity 
that is identical with Canary Yellowness. Whatever Canary Yellowness is, we experience 
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it. According to this interpretation of Òrevealed,Ó the core belief can be expressed as 
follows: 
Non-propositional Revelation (NR). We experience what the colors are (the entities 
that are the colors) in our visual experiences as of objects being colored.
80
  
 
NR captures the basic idea behind nave realism in the philosophy of perception that our 
experience puts us into direct contact with the external world, and so has a strong claim 
to being a core belief about color. Also, NR avoids the issue with PR. NR says that 
whatever it is that Canary Yellowness is, we experience it in our visual experiences. NR 
does not say that whatever it is that Canary Yellowness is, it appears that Canary 
Yellowness is that thing. So, I believe that NR is the core belief that Johnston attempted 
to capture with his statement of Revelation.    
 JohnstonÕs list of core beliefs leaves out an important core belief. The missing 
belief is roughly that nothing can be red and green, yellow and orange, scarlet and sea 
green, or aquamarine and ruby, etc all over at once. This is such an intuitively true belief 
that it amazes me that Johnston did not include it on his list. That nothing can be red and 
green all over at the same time is usually used as an example of a synthetic a priori 
certainty to teach first year philosophy students the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
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 NR has an affinity with what Campbell (2005, Sect. 2) calls Ôtransparency,Õ which is the thesis that 
Ôexperience of color provides knowledge of the categorical color property intervention on which changes 
the experiences of observers.Õ The reason is that CampbellÕs knowledge of the colors is not knowledge that 
certain propositions are true. Despite this similarity, CampbellÕs Transparency is obviously different from 
NR. Most importantly, NR says we experience the entities that are the colors, while transparency is not 
similarly formulated: it does not say that experience gives us knowledge of the entities that are the colors. 
So, transparency is compatible with the colors being, for example, low-level physical properties, and 
Campbell agrees (2005, Sect. 2). Campbell thinks that it is transparency not PR that is a core belief about 
the colors. I do not wish to take issue with whether transparency is a core belief. I only wish to assert that 
NR is a core belief. 
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Although not explicitly called a core belief in the last chapter, the intuitively true belief in 
question was captured in that chapter as follows: 
Incompatibility. No objects can be more than one determinable or determinate 
color all over at the same time.  
Incompatibility should be understood as the sixth core belief about the colors and so 
added to the above list originally developed by Johnston. With this core belief stated, I 
have a clear and powerful list of core beliefs with which to argue for primitivism.  
 As I said, my argument for primitivism is that the view best captures our core 
beliefs about the colors. I cannot compare primitivism to every conceivable view on 
color. So, I shall instead compare primitivism to all the other views in my taxonomy in 
part 1.2: micro-structuralism, the disjunctive variant, CohenÕs view, appearance 
dispositionalism, reflectance dispositionalism, and the type variant of this view. All these 
views can accommodate Paradigms, assuming they are taken to be realist.
81
 I think they 
can also all account for Explanation. What about well-known overdetermination 
arguments when it comes to this core belief? First, it is important to note that 
overdertermination arguments can be brought against any view on color that holds that 
the colors are realized by lower-level properties. So, overdetermination arguments can be 
brought against all the views being discussed accept perhaps micro-structuralism. 
Second, I shall in the next section show how the non-relational primitivist can respond to 
overdetermination worries. What I say can be applied to the other views. All of these 
views but CohenÕs can accommodate Incompatibility. I already argued in part 3.2 that 
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 Reflectance dispositionalism, as stated, has an issue accommodating paradigms. Light is colored but its 
color does not come from reflecting incident light. This issue can be easily avoided by understanding 
ÒreflectÓ to just mean something like emit or transmit (Byrne and Hilbert, 2003). I understand the term in 
this broader way for the purposes of this paper. However, I will continue to use the word Òreflect.Ó 
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CohenÕs view implies the falsity of Incompatibility, and that his attempt to address this 
odd consequence is incompatible with the motivation for his view. Thus, I shall not worry 
about which of these views can accommodate Paradigms, Explanation, and 
Incompatibility. Rather, I shall only consider which of these views can accommodate 
Unity, Perceptual Availability, and NR. 
 Let us first look at Unity. Primitivism can easily accommodate this core belief. 
The primitivist will just say that due to the primitive identity of Canary Yellow as 
revealed in experience and the primitive identity of the other colors as also so revealed, 
Canary Yellow necessarily stands in similarity, difference, and exclusion relations to all 
the other colors in the familiar color solid. This answer may not satisfy the desire for a 
deep, reductive explanation, but it shows that primitivism can accommodate Unity. This 
is all I care about here. Can the other views accommodate Unity? What about Micro-
structuralism and the disjunctive variant of this view? There are at least 15 features at the 
micro-structural level that are sufficient to cause normal subjects in normal conditions to 
have an experience as of, for example, an object being sapphire blue: Incandescence, gas 
excitations, vibrations and rotations, transition metal compounds, charge transfer, metals, 
pure semiconductors, doped semiconductors, color centers, dispersive refraction, 
scattering, interference, and diffraction (Nassau, 1983; 1997). Can any of these features 
or disjunctions of them accommodate Unity? It certainly seems extremely doubtful.  
 What about reflectance dispositionalism and its type variant? In part 2.2, I argued 
that reflectance dispositionalism and its type variant cannot accommodate Unity using the 
modal argument from structure. This is the argument that reflectances (and types of 
reflectances) do not necessarily stand in the resemblance relations required to satisfy the 
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relevant core belief. The argument that this is true is quite simple. It is that upon 
examining the reflectance curves for Rb, Rp, and Rg , for example, we can see that there is 
no motivated means by which to hold that they stand in the appropriate similarity 
relations (and the same goes for types of reflectances). Take a look at figure 2.1. There is 
no way to justifiably and non-arbitrarily hold that the dotted line (the typical reflectance 
curve of blue objects) resembles the solid regular line (the curve for purple objects) more 
than it does the bold one (the curve for green objects). Thus, it seems very plausible that 
reflectance views cannot accommodate Unity. Of course, it is unsurprising that 
proponents of reflectance views have made attempts to accommodate Unity (Byrne and 
Hilbert, 2003, p. 15; Cohen, 2003, p. 88; 91-92). It is equally unsurprising that there are 
also those, including myself in part 2. 2, who argue that ultimately such attempts fail 
(Pautz, 2003; 2006). However, this debate is largely beside the point. All I need one to 
see is that primitivism can easily accommodate Unity, but that it is at best unclear 
whether reflectance views can do this and at worst extremely implausible that they can. If 
this is right, then it is reasonable to hold that primitivism does better with respect to Unity 
than reflectance views.  
 What about appearance dispositionalism and CohenÕs view? I think that 
appearance dispositionalism can accommodate Unity. A proponent of this view can say 
that Canary Yellow is necessarily more similar to Auburn than to Scarlet in that the 
appearance of Canary Yellow that the disposition identical with this color is disposed to 
give is more similar to the appearance of Auburn that the disposition identical with being 
Auburn is disposed to give than to the appearance of Scarlet that the disposition identical 
with being Scarlet is disposed to give. CohenÕs view on color can also accommodate 
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Unity. Roughly, CohenÕs view is that the colors are constituted by relations that integrate 
objects and perceiversÕ experiences. So, proponents of this view can say that Canary 
Yellow is necessarily more similar to Auburn than to Scarlet in that perceiversÕ 
experiences as of Canary yellow, which are part of being Canary Yellow (in some logical 
sense), are more similar to perceiversÕ experiences as of Auburn, which are part of being 
Auburn (in this same sense), than perceiversÕ experiences as of Scarlet, which are part of 
being Scarlet (in the relevant sense). Thus, primitivism, appearance dispositionalism, and 
CohenÕs view do a better job accounting for Unity than the other views. 
 Let us now look at Perceptual Availability. Primitivism can easily accommodate 
this core belief. The primitivist can say that external objects are actually colored and that 
we see the colors of objects in a very strong and direct sense. The primitivist can say that 
when we visually experience x being Canary Yellow, we are seeing the very entity that is 
Canary Yellow. This is sufficient to be justified in the Canary Yellowness of external 
things based simply on visual perception. Unlike primitivism, reflectance views, micro-
structuralism, and the disjunctive variant of micro-structuralism are unable to 
accommodate Perceptual Availability. We are neither justified simply on the basis of 
visual perception in believing that objects have reflectance dispositions nor in believing 
that they have micro-structural properties. That objects have reflectance dispositions was 
a scientific discovery and so also was the fact that they have complex micro-structural 
properties. Hence, if reflectance dispositionalism or its type variant or micro-
structuralism or its disjunctive variant were true, we would not be justified in believing 
that objects are colored simply based on visual perception. We would only be justified in 
believing that objects are colored after the scientific discovery that they have the relevant 
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properties (Jackson, 2012). Therefore, with respect to Perceptual Availability, 
primitivism is better off than these views on color.  
Like any argument in philosophy responses are available. Friends of these views 
may try to reject the use of LeibnizÕ law in epistemic contexts. However, Leibniz law is a 
core metaphysical belief that is not understood to be context sensitive. So, this response 
forces its proponents to reject (or heavily modify) a core metaphysical belief in order to 
accommodate a core color belief, whereas there is no need for the primitivist to do this. 
One may also try to avoid the argument by rejecting the presupposition that what is 
required to be justified in believing that something has P is a property of P, but again this 
is a poor solution. Intuitively, what is required for justification in believing that 
something has P is a function of P. This is why physicists could infer from the standard 
model to the Higgs being such that E would be justification for believing in its 
instantiation, but it follows from this that the Higgs has the property of being such that E 
would be justification for believing in its instantiation (Jackson, 2012). Thus, the problem 
with the current response is that it commits proponents to rejecting the intuitive premise 
that what is required for justification in believing that something has P is a function of P, 
whereas there is no need for the primitivist to do this. Thus, it is clear that primitivism is 
better off with respect to Perceptual Availability than the relevant other views.  
 I have been arguing that primitivism is better off with respect to Perceptual 
Availability than reflectance dispositionalism, its type variant, micro-structuralism, and 
its disjunctive variant. What about the other two views? Based solely on the fact that 
objects appear colored (and the beliefs which inform perception) it is reasonable to hold 
that we can infer that they are disposed to appear colored. If this is right, then, if 
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appearance dispositionalism were true, we could be justified simply based on visual 
perception in believing that objects are colored. CohenÕs view does not say what it is 
exactly that the colors are. All we can say is that according to CohenÕs view the colors are 
reductive, relational properties that meet the analysis mentioned in parts 1.2 and 3.2. It is 
reasonable to think that such a view cannot accommodate Perceptual Availability. That 
objects have reductive, relational properties of the kind CohenÕs view says the colors are 
would surely be a philosophical discovery. Thus, it seems that we are not justified in 
believing that objects have such relational properties simply based on perception. 
This conclusion could be avoided if it could be shown that the beliefs which 
inform perception allow us to infer that objects have the relevant properties based on how 
they appear. CohenÕs (2004; 2009) argument from perceptual variation for his view on 
color is much too philosophical for this. The argument requires the premise that Òthe best 
way to implement [É] an ecumenical reconciliation between apparently incompatible 
variants is to view them as the result of relativizing colors to different values of certain 
parameters, which is just to admit that the colors are relations between objects and those 
parametersÓ (Cohen, 2009, p. 24). Surely such a premise is not part of the beliefs which 
inform perception. In fact, CohenÕs view on color seems to run against the beliefs which 
inform perception. His view, for example, has it that an experience as of a surface being 
green and an experience of that same surface being blue can both be right at the same 
time, but this runs against our common sense understanding of perceptual color 
disagreements. Thus, we can say that primitivism and appearance dispositionalism are 
better off than the other views with respect to Perceptual Availability. 
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I shall now consider NR. This core belief says that we experience what the colors 
are (the entities that are the colors) in our visual experiences as of objects being colored. 
The primitivist answers the question Òwhat are the colors?Ó with the answer that they are 
the properties that we experience objects as having when having visual experiences as of 
objects being colored. Thus, the primitivist can easily accommodate NR. Reflectance 
dispositionalism, its type variant, micro-structuralism, its disjunctive variant, appearance 
dispositionalism, and CohenÕs view must all reject that we experience what the colors are 
in our visual experiences as of colored objects. All of these views are reductivist. To 
conclude, with respect to NR, we can say that color primitivism does better than all the 
other views. See table 3.2 for a comparison of the views. 
  Primitivism Reflectance  
Dispositionalism 
and the type 
variant 
Micro-
Structuralism 
and the 
disjunctive 
variant 
Appearance 
Dispositionalism 
CohenÕs View 
Paradigms 1 1 1 1 1 
Explanation 1 1 1 1 1 
Unity 1 0 0 1 1 
Perceptual 
Availability 
1 0 0 1 0 
Non-Prop. 
Revelation 
1 0 0 0 0 
Incompatibility 1 1 1 1 0 
Total 6/6 3/6 3/6 5/6 3/6 
Table 3.2. Comparison of the views 
This table shows that reflectance dispositionalism, its type variant, micro-
structuralism, its disjunctive variant, and CohenÕs view all do a poor job of 
accommodating our core beliefs. It is worth noting a few things. First, even if reflectance 
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views, micro-structuralism, and its disjunctive variant could accommodate Unity, these 
views would only score 4 out of 6. Second, even if CohenÕs view could somehow 
accommodate perceptual availability, it would also only score 4 out of 6. Third, 
primitivism would still score better than the other views even if a point were subtracted 
from every view but micro-structuralism because of overdetermination worries with 
Explanation. Fourth, even if appearance dispositionalism could accommodate NR, it 
would at most follow that primitivism is on equal footing with appearance 
dispositionalism when it comes to satisfying our core beliefs. This would be sufficient for 
what I am trying to show. I am only attempting to show that primitivism must be taken 
seriously as a view on color. (It is important to note here that core beliefs are not all that 
is relevant to what the colors are. Even if appearance dispositionalism was on equal 
footing with primitivism, there may be other reasons to reject the view. In part 2.1 of this 
essay I argued against appearance dispositionalism, and in part 2.3 I argued against 
dispositional views in general. Also, regardless of whether primitivism best accounts for 
our core beliefs there may be overarching reasons to reject the view. I consider objections 
against primitivism in the next section.) 
The way I see it is that primitivism is the only view on color discussed that can 
clearly accommodate all six of our core beliefs about the colors. This gives us an 
extremely good reason to take the view seriously when considering what the colors are. 
Moreover, given the troubles that other views have with accommodating our core beliefs, 
before realizing that primitivism is an option, one may think, like Johnston (1992), that 
we must be content with a view on what the colors are that merely accommodates most of 
our core beliefs as opposed to all of them. This is what Johnston (1992) calls speaking of 
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the colors Òmore or less inclusivelyÓ as opposed to speaking of the colors Òever so 
inclusivelyÓ (p. 221). In my opinion, there is no clear reason for us to hastily make such a 
sacrifice. Primitivism allows us to speak of the colors ever so inclusively. Thus, we 
cannot reject the possibility that there are colors ever so inclusively speaking until we 
have genuinely considered primitivism as a competing view.  
So far I have shown that primitivism best accounts for our core beliefs. There are 
both relational and non-relational variations of primitivism. Which of these versions is 
best? I shall argue that non-relational primitivism is superior to relational primitivism, 
because the colors are not analyzable by the improved analysis of relational properties 
developed in part 1.2 of this essay. As I said in part 1.2, the improved analysis is as 
follows: 
Improved analysis: A property P is relational iff there is some relation R such that 
it is essential to P that for all x, if x has P, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn 
 
With this analysis in mind, my argument goes like this: If the property of being red were 
a relational property, then according to the analysis it would have to be essential to 
redness that if x is red, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn. However, it is a priori that 
redness does not meet this requirement. It does not seem essential to redness that if x is 
red, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn, and the same goes for the other colors. Hence, 
a priori we can reject that the colors are relational properties. They just do not meet the 
analysis.  
 Perhaps our intuitions on this matter could be overturned if there was a really 
good reason to accept that the colors are primitive relational properties. One may think 
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that the color variation argument provides the needed justification. As I said in part 3.2 of 
this essay, generally construed the variation argument can be presented as follows:  
P1. There is no reason why one variant is veridical rather than another in X type 
(filled in with either interspecies, intrapersonal, or interpersonal) color variation 
cases.  
P2. The best explanation of P1 is that Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility 
and Objectivism is false.  
3. Therefore, Incompatibility, Realism, or Incompatibility and Objectivism is 
false 
 
Cohen (2004; 2009) uses an instance of this argument to support his relational 
view on color. Cohen believes that the best explanation of P1 is that Incompatibility and 
Objectivism are false and believes that the denial of these propositions is best captured by 
his view. So, presumably the primitivist could likewise say that the best explanation of 
P1 is that Incompatibility and Objectivism are false and that the denial of these 
propositions is best captured by a primitivist version of CohenÕs view. I have no problem 
admitting that such a relational primitivism would better capture the denial of these 
propositions than CohenÕs view. Primitivism unlike CohenÕs reductive view can easily 
accommodate Perceptual Availability and Non-Propositional Revelation. Unfortunately, 
the argument from color variation fails to provide reason to accept any view on color, 
because, as I argued, the variation argument is unconvincing. Even if it the argument 
were more convincing than it is, I have provided an empirical argument that the colors do 
not appear to be constituted by relations to subjects. So, this would seem to rule out 
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accepting a primitive version of CohenÕs view. Finally, if the relational primitivist denies 
Incompatibility, he must accept that this view only scores 5 out of 6. Thus, using the 
variation argument to motivate a primitivist version of CohenÕs view over non-relational 
primitivism would defeat the motivation for accepting primitivism over appearance 
dispositionalism. 
Thus, we can conclude by saying that there is good reason to accept non-relational 
primitivism. I argued that primitivism is able to accommodate all our core beliefs about 
the colors. The only other view that comes close is appearance dispositionalism. 
However, I argued that appearance dispositionalism unlike primitivism is unable to 
accommodate Non-Propositional Revelation (NR). Thus, I said that there is a strong 
albeit defeasible reason to prefer primitivism to appearance dispositionalism. There are 
relational and non-relational variants of primitivism. I argued that the colors are not 
analyzable by the improved analysis of relational properties. A priori it does not seem 
essential to redness that if x is red, then for some thing(s) y1Éyn, Rxy1Éyn, and the same 
goes mutatis mutandis for the other colors. So, we should only hold that the colors are 
relational properties if there is very good reason to override our a priori intuitions. I 
argued that we do not have any such reason.    
 
Section 2: Objections against non-relational primitivism 
In this section, I want to discuss four recent objections to non-relational primitivism. The 
first is the objection from overdetermination (Hardin, 1988), the second is the objection 
from cosmic coincidence (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007b), the third is the objection from the 
falsity of Self-intimation (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007b), and the fourth is the objection from 
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animal color vision (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007b). In what follows I will consider these 
arguments in turn.  
 
 2. 1: The objection from overdetermination 
The objection from overdetermination for non-relational primitivism (Hardin, 1988, p. 
61) is analogous to the objection from overdetermination for the causal efficacy of mental 
properties in the philosophy of mind (Kim, 1993a; 1993b).
82
 So, the objection is not 
unique to non-relational primitivism. As such, the property dualist should not find the 
objection convincing for whatever reasons that he does not find overdetermination issues 
convincing in the philosophy of mind. Also, given the analogy, whatever is said in 
response to the overdetermination problem for non-relational primitivism is going to be 
relevant to overdetermination in the philosophy of mind, but I will only concentrate on 
color. With these things being said, the overdetermination objection is roughly that non-
relational primitivism is incompatible with the colors being causally efficacious, because 
the colorsÕ causal work is bizarrely overdetermined by the micro-structural properties 
upon which they supervene (nomologically or metaphysically). In other words, the 
                                                
82 It is not abundantly clear what HardinÕs objection is exactly. I am engaging with the objection under a 
plausible interpretation. This is what Hardin says: ÒBut is there any reason to suppose that colors are 
among the elementary properties of bodies [i.e. that R-primitivism is true]? Consider: either the colors that 
Cornman supposes to attach to physical objects (call them Cornman colors or C-colors for short) are 
causally connected to the other physical properties of those objects or else they are not so connected. 
Suppose that they are, and that C-colors have physical effects. Then one ought to be able to test for their 
presence or absence by physical means, and a physical theory that makes no reference to them would be 
incomplete. But Cornman makes no claim to be remedying a deficiency in existing physical theories. So it 
seems that we must take C-colors either to be free of causal relations to an objectÕs physical properties or 
else to be epiphenomena of some of them. In neither case will C-colors play a role in determining what 
wavelengths of light are emitted or reflected from or transmitted through the surface of a physical 
object...How, then, could they make any difference to our beliefs about colors?Ó (1993, 61)  
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overdetermination argument seeks to show that non-relational primitivism is unable to 
accommodate the second core belief about the colors called Explanation.  
 The overdetermination objection is as follows: Imagine four properties. The first 
is the property of being red (R), the second is the property of having an experience as of 
red (E), the third is the property of having some physical property (nomologically or 
metaphysically) sufficient for R (PR), and the fourth is the property of being in some 
brain state (nomologically or metaphysically) sufficient for E (BE). Science instructs us 
that PR is a sufficient cause of BE (in most normal human observers in normal 
circumstances) and also teaches us that BE is at least nomologically sufficient for E (in 
most normal human observers in normal circumstances). So, given this scientific 
knowledge, we must hold that PR is a sufficient cause of E. Unfortunately, RÕs causal 
work seems a priori to be that it is a sufficient cause of E, and the non-relational 
primitivist believes that R is a distinct property from PR. Hence, the non-relational 
primitivist must admit that RÕs causal work is systematically overdetermined by PR.  
 Unfortunately for the non-relational primitivist, as the argument goes, systematic 
overdetermination is weird and so ought not to be allowed. Why is systematic 
overdetermination so objectionable? Many philosophers seem to admit that it 
unacceptable, but they disagree as to why. Let us look at three examples. First, Kim 
(1993a, p. 281) says that overdetermination is Òabsurd.Ó Second, Melnyk (2003, p. 291) 
says that it involves an Òintolerable coincidence.Ó Third, Schiffer remarks, Òit is hard to 
believe that God is such a bad engineer [that he would permit mass overdetermination]Ó 
(1987, p. 148). Whatever the correct reason is for overdetermination being objectionable, 
assuming it is, the non-relational primitivist should conclude that R is not a sufficient 
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cause of E. We know that R is causally sufficient for E. This is (more or less) a core 
belief after all. Thus, non-relational primitivism must be wrong about what the colors are.  
 
2. 1. 2: YabloÕs response 
The strategy behind YabloÕs (1992; 1995, p. 486-487) response to the overdetermination 
objection is effectively to try to provide some therapy for his opponentsÕ discomfort with 
the causal overdetermination in cases like that above. Yablo thinks that if he can get the 
proponent of the overdetermination problem to see that systematic overdetermination is 
not so weird, then presumably he can get his opponent to believe that, for example, RÕs 
causal work being systematically overdetermined by PR is not a reason to deny that R is 
causally efficacious. Yablo assumes that it is obvious that the overdetermination between 
determinates and their determinables is not objectionable, because determinables are (in 
some sense) part of their determinates. However, as YabloÕs argument goes, the 
relationship between R and PR (the supervenient/subvenient relation) is remarkably 
similar to the relationship between a determinable and its determinate. So, as Yablo says, 
as there is no problem with determinates overdetermining the causal powers of their 
determinables, by analogy, there should be no problem with PR overdetermining RÕs 
causal powers.  
 A likely concern is to wonder why Yablo is so convinced that there is nothing 
objectionable about determinates overdetermining the causal powers of their 
determinables just because determinables are parts of their determinates (Kim, 1993, p. 
362). The reason this concern must be taken seriously is that assuming YabloÕs 
opposition accepts his analogy between the determinate/determinable and 
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subvenient/supervenient relation, he should say the following: The argument from 
overdetermination says that the systematic overdetermination between R and PR is weird 
and thus ought not to be allowed. Generalizing from this, we ought not to allow 
supervenient properties to be causally efficacious. However, as Yablo has pointed out, 
the determinable/determinate relation is analogous to the supervenient/subvenient 
relation. Therefore, as the oppositionÕs argument should go, by analogy, we should hold, 
contrary to what Yablo says, that determinable properties are not causally efficacious.   
 Thus, it is clear that in order for YabloÕs treatment of the overdetermination 
problem to be convincing to his opponents he must provide an argument for his claim 
that the overdetermination of determinables by their determinates is not objectionable. 
What follows is the argument closest to the surface in Yablo (1995, p. 486-487): Imagine 
a scale that is designed to sound an alarm if an object placed on it weighs more than 70 
pounds. The scale is constructed using a balance-beam so that it is insensitive to 
differences in the weight of objects over 70 pounds. Imagine that a 72 pound object is 
placed on the scale. The determinate property being 72 pounds and the determinable 
property being over 70 pounds are both causally sufficient (on earth) for the alarmÕs 
sounding. However, the property of being over 70 pounds is a better causal explanation 
of the alarmÕs sounding than the property of being 72 pounds in this case, because the 
alarm would have sounded as long as the object was over 70 pounds. If an object having 
a determinable property is sometimes a better causal explanation of an effect than its 
having a determinate of that determinable, then the systematic overdetermination 
between that determinate and its determinable is unobjectionable. All determinable 
properties are in certain circumstances better explanations of an effect than their 
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determinates. Therefore, the systematic overdetermination between determinates and 
their determinables is unobjectionable.  
 This argument is unconvincing. The reason is that the argument presupposes the 
premise that if a determinable is sometimes a better explanation of some effect than its 
determinate, then the systematic overdetermination between that determinate and its 
determinable is unobjectionable, but this premise is going to be rejected by the 
opposition. Those worried by YabloÕs analogy about determinates overdetermining the 
causal powers of their determinables will admit that TomÕs shirt being red would be a 
better explanation of the red hating robot vaporizing him than his shirtÕs being scarlet, but 
say that it is weird regardless that both TomÕs shirt being red and its being scarlet are 
causally sufficient (given the appropriate circumstances) for the robotÕs vaporizing him. 
Therefore, I think that YabloÕs response to the overdetermination problem is not going to 
be compelling to his opponents. Thus, I will not rely on YabloÕs response to the 
overdetermination objection to defend non-relational primitivism. With this being said, it 
is important to note that I am not convinced that Yablo is wrong.  
 
2. 1. 3: WatkinsÕ response 
Watkins (2002; see also 2005; 2010) draws on YabloÕs (1995) view that the 
overdetermination between determinates and their determinables is unobjectionable, for 
determinable properties are (in some sense) part of their determinates. Watkins also relies 
heavily on the work of Shoemaker (1975; 1984; 1990; 1991; 1998). Roughly, WatkinsÕ 
idea is that the overdetermination between R and PR is not weird, because RÕs causal 
power is part of PRÕs power. WatkinsÕ (2002) thinks that properties are nothing above 
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their causal powers. However, Watkins after conversation with Shoemaker appears to 
believe that his answer to the overdetermination problem might perhaps work regardless 
of this commitment (2002, p. 126). Below is my reconstruction of WatkinsÕ (2002, p. 
125) argument having taken out his commitment that properties are nothing above their 
causal powers.  
P1. The causal powers contributed by R are (as a matter of nomological or 
metaphysical necessity) a subset of the causal powers contributed by PR.  
 P2. The instantiation of PR is (nomologically or metaphysically) sufficient for the 
 instantiation of R.  
P3. For any properties P and Q, if the instantiation of P is (nomologically or     
metaphysically) sufficient for the instantiation of Q, and if the set of causal 
powers contributed by Q is a proper subset of the powers contributed by P (as a 
matter of nomological or metaphysical necessity), then the overdetermination 
between P and Q is not weird.  
 (4). Therefore, overdetermination between PR and R is not weird and so not 
 objectionable, and mutatis mutandis for all other colors and their micro-physical 
 realizers. (from P1-P3) 
I believe that this argument fails at both P1 and P3. I shall not argue for why the 
argument fails at P1 at the moment, as the reason should become clear later in this 
chapter. Thus, for now I shall only look at why the above argument fails at P3.  
 I think the problem with P3 is that it begs the question against the proponent of 
the overdetermination objection. The reflective proponent of the overdetermination 
argument is going to believe that P3 is false, because he is sympathetic to both P1 and P2 
yet rejects (4). WatkinsÕ opponent already holds (P1) that the causal powers of R are a 
subset of the causal powers of PR, and (P2) that PR is sufficient for R. The rationale for 
(P2) is obvious. The fact that PR is sufficient for R is clearly stated by the argument. The 
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rationale for (P1) takes a little more reflection. According to the overdetermination 
argument, an object having R is sufficient to cause E and the same for PR. Moreover, 
according to the argument, PR is also sufficient to cause BE. Finally, the 
overdetermination argument says that RÕs causal work is that it is sufficient to cause E. 
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that WatkinsÕ opponent is sympathetic to both (P1) 
and (P2). However, despite the fact that WatkinsÕ opponent seems to be sympathetic to 
both (P1) and (P2), he thinks that the overdetermination brought about by the relationship 
between R and PR is weird and objectionable. Thus, it seems that WatkinsÕ reflective 
opponent is going to believe that P3 is false priori to the argument under consideration 
being presented.    
 Why is it that Watkins (and Shoemaker?) thought that the above argument might 
perhaps work? The following is my diagnosis: Watkins says roughly that competition for 
causal efficacy between R and PR arises only if the causal powers contributed by having 
R come from outside the powers contributed by PR (2002, p. 117). The thought seems to 
just be YabloÕs (1992; 1995) idea that the overdetermination between the causal powers 
of a whole and a part of that whole is not weird and so is unobjectionable. Hence, I 
imagine that Watkins implicitly thought that he could solve the overdetermination 
problem if he could show that R is part of PR, because if this were true, then the causal 
powers contributed by having R would not come from outside the powers contributed by 
PR. Rather, the powers would come from inside PR so to speak. So, I think Watkins 
thought the relevant argument might work, because when he wrote this part of his book 
he was invalidly moving from the powers contributed by R being a subset of the powers 
contributed by PR (P1) and PR being sufficient for R (P2) to R being part of PR. 
 260 
 We can understand why Watkins may have made this mistake if we look at the 
type of examples in his (1992) book. In this book, Watkins often uses examples involving 
properties that stand in a relationship similar to R and PR and of which it is natural to 
think of as standing in a part/whole relation (in at least some sense). Watkins favorite 
example is one involving the properties of being cubical and having a polygonal side. 
Similarly to the relationship between R and PR, the causal powers of having a polygonal 
side seem to be a subset of the causal powers of being cubical, and being cubical is 
sufficient for having a polygonal side. Thus, the explanation for WatkinsÕ questionable 
move is probably that he was implicitly thinking that the above similarities between 
being cubical and having a polygonal side and PR and R showed that R must be part of PR 
just like how having a polygonal side is part of being cubical.  
 Can WatkinsÕ implicit thoughts be used to show that R is part of PR? I do not 
think so. First, let us ask, Òunder what sense of ÔpartÕ is it natural to think of having a 
polygonal side as being part of the property being cubical?Ó It seems that the answer is 
that the relevant sense of ÔpartÕ is logical in nature; it is a conceptual truth that all square 
objects are polygonal ones. Thus, having answered this question, we can see that the 
analogy, if it were to succeed, would  show that that R and PR stand in a logical 
part/whole relation. However, a priori we can also see that R is not logically part of PR, 
because it is conceptually coherent for an object to have R without it also having PR. Of 
course, this may not be metaphysically possible, but this is irrelevant. Thus, WatkinsÕ 
thoughts cannot be used to create an argument for P3. At the very least, I think a lot more 
would have to be said to make this convincing to his opponents. 
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 Regardless of why Watkins thought the relevant argument might work, his 
solution to the overdetermination problem has some merit if we hold that properties are 
just sets of causal powers like he does. The reason for this is that if we make such an 
assumption, then it follows from RÕs causal powers being a subset of PRÕs to R being part 
of PR in a set-theoretic sense. Unfortunately, any argument that requires the assumption 
that all properties are just sets of causal powers is not going to be convincing to the 
majority who believe there must be some categorical nature to objects (Ellis 2001; 
Molnar 2003). Any argument that makes the assumption is certainly not going to be 
convincing to me, because I accept the categorical/dispositional distinction. Thus, I 
cannot rely on WatkinsÕ response to the overdetermination problem in order to defend 
non-relational primitivism.  
 
2. 1. 4: My response 
I will now present my response to the overdetermination problem. I said in section 2. 1 
that philosophers disagree over why systematic overdetermination is objectionable. Kim 
(1993a, p. 281) says that overdetermination is objectionable, because it is Òabsurd.Ó 
Melnyk (2003, p. 291) says that overdetermination is objectionable, because it involves 
an Òintolerable coincidence.Ó Schiffer (1987, p. 148) thinks overdetermination is 
objectionable, because Òit is hard to believe that God is such a bad engineer [that he 
would permit mass overdetermination].Ó KimÕs explanation is unclear. What exactly is 
supposed to be absurd about causal overdetermination? I do not see what the intolerable 
coincidence is supposed to be. Surely, if R and PR both cause E, this is not due to a 
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coindence, but follows from metaphysical and/or physical law. Thus, MelnykÕs 
explanation is also unsatisfying.  
 Despite my being dissatisfied with both Kim and LoweÕs explanations. I think 
that Schiffer is basically right. The reason why the overdetermination between R and PR 
is objectionable is that its existence seems like it would imply a grave inefficiency in the 
causal workings of the world. In the overdetermination case in 2.1, PR is sufficient for R, 
and it is implied that R does not add any causal powers not given by PR. Hence, if the 
situation as described in 2.1 were to actually exist, then the world would appear to be 
such that any object with PR has an additional property R that adds nothing to the causal 
mix. Thus, it would follow from the overdetermination case discussed in 2.1 that this 
world is vastly, causally inefficient. However, as Schiffer has pointed out, it seems that 
this world cannot possibly be so inefficient. Therefore, overdetermination like that 
suggested in 2.1 is objectionable.  
  There are two responses to the overdetermination argument given my 
understanding of what is objectionable about mass overdetermination. The first is to say 
that barring a belief in a god who cares about efficiency it is unobvious why this world 
should not be drastically inefficient. In other words, the first response is to reject that the 
overdetermination case is objectionable, because there is nothing problematic with the 
world being causally inefficient. This reply is going to be unconvincing to those who 
share the intuition that the world is not so inefficient. Moreover, inference to the best 
explanation (the principle that ceteris paribus we should choose the theory that has the 
best ratio of simplicity and explanatory power) would seem to favor a causally efficient 
world. The second response, and the one that I will now pursue in depth, is to argue that 
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the property being red (R) adds something to the causal picture. In other words, the 
second response is to reject that the overdetermination case is objectionable not because 
there is nothing objectionable about causal inefficiency but because the causal 
inefficiency suggested by the overdetermination argument does not really obtain.   
Call the claim that R adds something to the causal mix, ÒNovel.Ó In order to show 
that Novel is true, it is important to differentiate between a property having a power 
simpliciter and a property having a power dependently. A property P has a power Z 
simpliciter iff an objectÕs having P is sufficient for its having Z independently of any 
other states of affairs. A property P has a power Z dependently iff an objectÕs having P is 
sufficient for it having Z only dependent on other states of affairs. For example, the 
disposition to break if dropped has the power to cause objects with it to break if dropped 
simpliciter, because an object with this disposition essentially implies that non-circularly 
if the object were dropped, then it would break (see part 2.3). However, the property of 
having a glass structure does not essentially imply any such counterfactual. Rather, this 
property only has the power to cause objects with it to break if dropped dependent on 
other states of affairs (e.g. the local gravitational force).  
 I will now argue for Novel. The overdetermination objection says that a priori R 
is sufficient to cause experiences as of red in most normal observers in normal 
conditions. However, R does not have this power simpliciter, because it does not imply 
the relevant counterfactual (see part 2.3). Rather, an object being R at time t implies that 
if one were to have a veridical experience as of x at t, then one would have an experience 
as of x being red at t. Veridical observers have veridical experiences. Thus, we can 
conclude that R is sufficient to cause simpliciter experiences as of red in veridical 
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observers. According to the non-relational primitivist, PR is not identical with R, and an 
experience as of an object being red is veridical iff the object is red. So, it follows that 
according to non-relational primitivism PR does not have the power to cause simpliciter 
experiences as of red in veridical observers. Thus, Novel follows, and so we can see that 
there is no causal inefficacy between R and PR: In reality, R has a power that PR does not 
have. Thus, the overdetermination problem can be solved. Moreover, we can say that 
there is no reason to be worried about primitivism and Explanation.  
  A likely concern is that my reply to the causal overdetermination problem is not 
compatible with the intuition that R is causally sufficient for experiences as of red in 
most normal observers in normal conditions. I must admit that it is my view that R is not 
sufficient to cause simpliciter experiences as of red in most normal observers in normal 
conditions. Nevertheless, RÕs not being causally sufficient simpliciter for experiences as 
of red in such observers and conditions is compatible with R being causally sufficient for 
experiences as of red in such observers and conditions. RÕs not being causally sufficient 
simpliciter for experiences as of red in most normal observers in normal conditions is 
compatible with R being sufficient to cause experiences as of red dependently in such 
observers and conditions. R is sufficient to cause experiences as of red in most normal 
observers in normal conditions dependent on PR.   
 Another likely worry is that my view is incompatible with the causal closure of 
the physical, because it holds that R contributes a causal power not contributed by PR 
(Kim, 1993). I do not think that this worry is well founded. My reasoning goes as 
follows: The theory-based conception of the physical that a property is physical iff it is 
the type of property that physics currently tells us about is much too narrow. 
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Contemporary physics is clearly not complete (Hempel, 1969). Moreover, many 
physicalists, for example, do not believe that mental properties are reducible to the types 
of properties in physics. So, we should reject the above theory-based conception of the 
physical. However, if we reject this conception, there is no obvious reason for holding 
that R is not a physical property. Thus, there is no clear reason to be worried about my 
view implying that causation is not closed under the physical.  
 
2. 2: The objection from cosmic coincidence 
The objection from cosmic coincidence (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007b, p. 96-99) is a 
dilemma for the primitivist about color not just the non-relational primitivist. However, I 
shall for simplicity assume that Byrne and Hilbert (B&H) are specifically targeting non-
relational primitivism (and will do the same for the other objections against primitivism 
from B&H). It is also important to point out that the argument is supposed to be one 
against the realist version of primitivism. As it is only this version that can accommodate 
Paradigms, what I call ÒprimitivismÓ in this section should be understood as realist 
primitivism. Some further stage setting is required. According to B&H (2007b), 
primitivism can be divided into nomological coextensive primitivism and metaphysical 
coextensive primitivism. Generally construed, nomological coextensiveness and 
metaphysical coextensiveness can be defined respectively as follows: 
Nomological Coextensiveness (NC): For any color c, there is a reflectance type P 
such that c is nomologically coextensive with P.  
Metaphysical Coextensiveness (MC): For any color c, there is a reflectance type P 
such that c is necessarily coextensive with P. 
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I assume that the reflectance type P is defined in terms of the color c such that the type of 
reflectance properties that constitute P are those (nomologically or metaphysically) 
sufficient for c. However, whether this is what B&H intend is unclear. 
  With the above distinction in mind, the argument from cosmic coincidence is 
roughly that the primitivist is committed to the NC variant, but this variant commits one 
to an objectionable pre-established harmony or cosmic coincidence. B&HÕs argument for 
why the primitivist is committed to the NC variant is as follows: It is simply that the 
motivation for primitivism is that the connection between colors and reflectance types 
seems metaphysically contingent, so the primitivist must accept NC primitivism. So, the 
primitivist must accept the NC variant or undermine the motivation for this view on 
color.  
 Why do B&H think that the NC variant commits one to an objectionable pre-
established harmony or cosmic coincidence?
 
The answer involves a thought experiment.
 
 
Imagine two possible worlds w1 and w2 that are as close to the actual world as possible 
given the ways in which they differ. On w1 the reflectance types coextensive with the 
colors are sufficient to cause experiences as of the colors for which they are 
nomologically coextensive. So, for example, on w1 the reflectance type R
red  
is 
nomologically coextensive with redness, and the reflectance type R
yellow 
is nomologically 
coextensive with yellowness, and so on. Unlike on w1, on w2 the reflectance types 
coextensive with the colors are such that they are sufficient to cause experiences as of 
colors other than the ones for which they are nomologically coextensive. So, for example, 
on w2, unlike w1, the reflectance type R
red 
is nomologically coextensive with yellowness, 
and the reflectance type R
yellow 
is nomologically coextensive with the redness, and so on 
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for all the colors. The differences between these two worlds can be captured using the 
below conceptual aid, see figure 3.4.  
 
W1 Redness 
⇑⇓ 
Rred   causes  Expred 
 
Figure 3.4. The two worlds
 
W2 Yellowness 
⇑⇓ 
Rred   causes  Expred 
 
 
B&HÕs argument is as follows:
 
According to the NC variant, both w1 and w2 are 
metaphysically possible. World w1 is one in which its inhabitants see the colors of objects 
veridically, because the reflectance types coextensive with the colors in this world cause 
experiences as of colors for which they are coextensive. The inhabitants of w2 are not so 
lucky, because on w2 the reflectance types coextensive with the colors cause experiences 
as of colors other than the ones for which they are coextensive. Thus, the residents of w2 
never see the colors veridically. Primitivism (as I have defined it for this section) holds 
that we see the colors veridically. According to NC primitivism, it is metaphysically 
possible that we are on a world like w2 instead of one like w1. Thus, the NC primitivist 
must hold that by a pre-established harmony or cosmic coincidence (a.k.a. chance) we are 
on a world like w1 rather than one like w2. However, as B&H say, it is neither acceptable 
to appeal to a pre-established harmony nor to a cosmic coincidence to explain why we are 
in a world like w1. The above could also be stated as an argument that primitivism cannot 
accommodate Paradigms.  
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2. 2. 1: Why B&HÕs cosmic coincidence argument cannot succeed. 
The objection from cosmic coincidence cannot succeed. With respect to B&HÕs argument 
for why the non-relational primitivist is committed to the NC variant, I agree that a 
motivation for primitivism is that the connection between colors and reflectance types 
seems metaphysically contingent. It seems metaphysically possible for there to be a 
world in which an object has R
red
 but is not red. However, I disagree that this is the only 
motivation for primitivism. My argument for primitivism is that this view best accounts 
for our core beliefs about color. This argument does not depend on the metaphysical 
possibility of reflectances and colors coming apart. Thus, the primitivist is not committed 
to the NC variant. So, The primitivist can accept the MC variant and thus accommodate 
Paradigms. 
 Regardless, as B&HÕs argument that the NC variant commits the primitivist to a 
cosmic coincidence cannot succeed, the NC variant is also available. B&HÕs argument 
against the NC variant befalls a serious dilemma. On one horn, somethingÕs being 
metaphysically possible does not imply that we must appeal to chance or cosmic 
coincidence to explain why the possibility does not actually obtain. It is metaphysically 
possible that I could become the president of the United States, but there is no need to 
appeal to chance or cosmic coincidence to explain why this possibility will never actually 
obtain. On the other horn, if B&H were to reject this, then their argument would threaten 
to over generalize. Many things are metaphysically possible. Therefore, if somethingÕs 
being metaphysically possible implies the need to appeal to chance or cosmic 
coincidence, then it is going to be required that we appeal to chance or cosmic 
coincidence to explain quite a lot of things.   
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2. 2. 2: An epistemological reply 
B&H say that their argument that the NC variant commits one to a cosmic coincidence or 
pre-established harmony should be understood metaphysically. As I have shown, the 
argument fails utterly under this interpretation. However, an epistemic version would 
avoid my above repudiation. The epistemic interpretation is as follows: Assume that NC 
non-relational primitivism is true. It follows from this that the actual world may be like 
w2. If our experience gives us knowledge as to the color of objects, we know that we are 
not in a world like w2. However, worlds like w1 and w2 would give rise to qualitatively 
indistinguishable experiences. Hence, we have no reason to believe that the actual world 
is like w1 rather than w2. Thus, given NC non-relational primitivism, our experiences as 
of color fail to provide us with epistemic access to the colors of objects. Contrary to what 
NC non-relational primitivism implies, our experiences as of color do give us epistemic 
access to the colors of objects. Thus, NC non-relational primitivism is false.
83
 A similar 
argument could perhaps be used to show that non-relational primitivism cannot 
accommodate the core belief about color called Explanation. 
 I do not think that this epistemic interpretation of B&HÕs argument can succeed. 
Let me explain. There is nothing in the epistemic reasoning used in the argument that 
differs from that used in skeptical arguments against knowledge of the external world. 
Consider the following analogous argument using the same kind of epistemic reasoning:  
Possibly, there is a world wBIV that is distinct from what we naively believe to be 
the actual world in that objects never are the way they appear, because the people 
of wBIV are brains in vats (BIVs). If our experiences give us epistemic access to 
                                                
83
 This epistemic argument is close to the surface in Allen (2011), but he uses it to argue that the colors 
have their causal powers essentially. Given the similarities, what I say here should address AllenÕs 
argument.  
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the external world, we know that we are not BIVs and so not in wBIV. The 
experiences of a BIV are indistinguishable from those of a normal human being. 
Hence, we do not know that we are not in wBIV. Thus, we have no knowledge of 
the external world.  
 The analogy between the epistemic interpretation of B&HÕs argument and the 
above skeptical argument shows two things. First, it shows that non-skeptics cannot 
endorse the epistemic interpretation of B&HÕs argument. The second thing that the 
analogy shows us is that the non-relational primitivist can use any of the well-known 
responses to skepticism about the external world to defend themselves against the 
epistemic interpretation of B&HÕs argument. Answers to skepticism about the external 
world are divisible into incompatibilist and compatibilist responses. The incompatibilist 
holds that ordinary knowledge of the external world and skepticism are in conflict. The 
compatibilist holds that ordinary knowledge and skepticism are in harmony. 
Incompatibilism comes in skeptical and dogmatic variants. In the former skepticism is 
successful, and in the latter ordinary knowledge is victorious. Compatibilism is divisible 
into anti-closure and contextualist versions. The former holds that ordinary knowledge 
coexists with skeptical doubt within the same knowledge relation, and the latter holds that 
they coexist in different knowledge relations referred to in disparate contexts.  
 Perhaps the non-relational primitivist prefers incompatibilism. Incompatibilist 
skepticism is not a viable option for the non-relational primitivist, but he may accept 
dogmatism. Dogmatism is divisible into at least three forms, deductionism, direct 
realism, and abductionism. The first is the view that we can know that skeptical situations 
do not actually obtain by reasoning through the closure inference (Klein, 1981). As a 
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deductionist, the non-relational primitivist response to the epistemological argument is 
that the knowledge that we have hands is sufficient to show that we know the colors of 
objects. The second view is that we can know skeptical scenarios do not actually obtain 
by perceiving the external world directly (Brewer, 1999). The primitivist response, as a 
direct realist, is that we know the true colors of objects, because we perceive them 
directly. This option should be especially attractive to the primitivist, as direct realism 
about perception and primitivism about color are well suited to each other. The third view 
is that we can know that skeptical scenarios do not actually obtain via an inference to the 
best explanation (Vogel, 1990). The abductionist, non-relational primivist response is that 
all skeptical scenarios are inferior explanations of appearance and so should be rejected.  
 Perhaps the non-relational primitivist prefers compatibilism of the anti-closure 
form. This form is divisible into anti-closure relevantism, anti-closure tracking, and anti-
closure reliabilism. The first variant is that one can fail to know that ~q for some q that 
implies ~p but know that p, because q is not a relevant substitute to p (Dretske, 1970; 
1981). As an anti-closure relevantist, the non-relational primitivist response is that we can 
fail to know that skeptical scenarios do not obtain but know that objects are colored, 
because skeptical scenarios are not relevant alternatives. The second variant is that one 
can fail to know that ~q for some q that implies ~p but know that p if one can track its 
truth to the nearest world in which ~p is true (Nozick, 1981). As an anti-closure tracking 
theorist, the non-relational primitivist should say that we know objects are colored 
regardless of whether we know that skeptical scenarios obtain, because we can follow 
this truth to the nearest world in which it is false. The third version is that one can fail to 
know that ~q for some q that implies ~p but know that p, because one came to believe p 
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via a reliable process (Goldman, 1979; Heller, 1999). The non-relational primitivist, as an 
anti-closure reliabilist, will say we know that objects are colored despite not knowing 
whether skeptical scenarios obtain, because our perceptual systems are, in fact, generally 
reliable.  
Perhaps the non-relational primitivist likes the contextualist form of 
compatibilism. The contextualist holds that one can fail to know that ~q for some q that 
implies ~p but know that p, because q is not relevant given the context (Cohen, 1988; 
1999; DeRose, 1995; Lewis, 1996). For example, the contextualist holds that given 
every-day contexts one can know that one has hands. It is only during philosophical 
discussions of skepticism that this knowledge is undermined. As a contextualist, the non-
relational primitivist response is that ordinarily we know that the world is colored 
regardless of the fact that we fail to know whether skeptical scenarios obtain, because 
skeptical scenarios are not relevant in ordinary, every-day contexts. So, from what I have 
shown thus far, one can see that basically any response to skepticism about the external 
world can be applied to B&HÕs argument interpreted epistemically. This consequence 
should hardly be surprising, because the colors are merely one feature of the external 
world. 
 
2. 3: The objection from the falsity of Self-Intimation 
There is an argument close to the surface in B&H (2007b, p. 79-81) against non-
relational primitivism that I shall call Ôthe argument from the falsity of Self-Intimation.Õ 
Although B&H stop short of explicitly calling what they say an argument against 
primitivism, it is clear that they think what they say is worrying for the view. I shall for 
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readability talk as if the argument is in fact B&HÕs.
84
 Before I can explain the argument 
from the falsity of Self-Intimation, it is first necessary that I remind my reader of what is 
called ÒRevelation.Ó Revelation I said can be interpreted as Propositional Revelation or 
Non-Propositional Revelation. Propositional Revelation is that it appears that p after 
careful reflection on our experiences as of the colors where p is about the nature of the 
colors iff p is true. Propositional Revelation is divisible into two halves. The first half, 
called ÔInfallibility,Ó says that if a proposition p appears to be in the nature of the colors 
after careful reflection on our experiences as of the colors, then p is true. The second half, 
                                                
84 Given the complexity of B&HÕs argument, here are the passages where the argument from the falsity of 
self-intimation is close to the surface. ÒMinimal Primitivism may be further explicated by the claim that the 
colors have no non-chromatic nature, in the following sense: if ÔIt is in the nature of the colors that pÕ is 
true, then ÔpÕ is a purely chromatic sentence-- a sentence that is (at least) solely composed of topic neutral 
and color vocabulary. [É] 
Let Q be the (true) proposition that it is in the nature of the colors that p. (Since Q is true, it is also 
true that p.) If all such propositions seem true after careful reflection on color experience, then Self-
Intimation follows. Assume that Minimal Primitivism is true, and hence that ÔpÕ is purely chromatic.  
Suppose that Q does not seem true after reflection on color experience. There are two cases: (i) 
either Q does not seem true be- cause ~Q seems true, or (ii) neither Q nor ~Q seem true--color experience 
is silent on whether Q is true.  
Case (i) is ruled out by the assumption of Infallibility. Supposedly, ÔIt seems not to be in the 
nature of the colors that pÕ is true. What sentences α are such that ÔIt seems not be in the nature of the 
colors that αÕ is true? Almost any sentence: it seems not to be in the nature of the colors that tomatoes are 
red, that tomatoes are fruits, that itÕs raining, that itÕs not raining,É But, given Minimal Primitivism, ÔpÕ is 
purely chromatic, which narrows the field considerably: it seems not to be in the nature of the colors that 
every shade of orange is greenish, that canary yellow is a shade of blue, and so forth. Since (we may grant) 
it seems to be in the nature of the colors that no shade of orange is greenish, that canary yellow is not a 
shade of blue (etc.), by Infallibility it is in the nature of the colors that no shade of orange is greenish (etc.). 
Plausibly, given Infallibility, if ÔIt seems not to be in the nature of the colors that pÕ is true, and ÔpÕ is purely 
chromatic, then ÔpÕ is false. But, since by hypothesis ÔpÕ is true, case (i) is ruled out. 
That leaves case (ii). Could careful reflection on color experience fail to deliver a verdict on 
whether it is in the nature of the colors that p (where ÔpÕ is purely chromatic)? For example, might 
reflection leave one undecided whether it is in the nature of the colors that blue is the hue that is brightest at 
maximum saturation, or whether red17 (a very fine grained shade) is more similar to purple93 than to 
purple94? At any rate if we idealize the ÔÔcareful reflectionÕÕ, the relevant range of color experience, and the 
subjectÕs powers of discrimination, there is some initial plausibility to the view that a verdict (right or 
wrong) would be forthcoming--call this Completeness. With that assumption, case (ii) is also ruled out. We 
may conclude that--vagueness and unclarity aside--Minimal Primitivism, Infallibility, and Completeness 
entail Self-Intimation.Ó (2007b, p. 79-81) 
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known as ÒSelf-intimation,Ó says that if a proposition p is in the nature of the colors, then 
p seems true upon careful reflection on our experiences as of the colors.   
 With Propositional Revelation in mind, what follows, presented in premise-
conclusion form because of its complexity, is the argument from the falsity of Self-
Intimation:  
P1. Assume that non-relational primitivism is true.  
P2. Non-relational primitivism can be understood as the view that if a proposition 
p is in the nature of the colors, then p is expressible only using a purely chromatic 
sentence. (Examples of purely chromatic sentences include: ÔEvery shade of 
orange is reddishÕ, ÔCanary yellow is not a shade of blueÕ, ÔPurple is more similar 
to red than to yellowÕ, and so on.) 
P3. Let Q be a true proposition, expressible by only purely chromatic sentences, 
that p is in the nature of the colors.  
P4. All Q type propositions seem true after careful reflection.  
P5. Self-Intimation is false.  
(6). It is in the nature of the colors that if a proposition p is in the nature of the 
colors, then p is expressible only using a purely chromatic sentence. (from P1, P2) 
(7). If all Q type propositions seem true after careful reflection, then Self-
intimation is true. (from P3, (6)) 
(8). Self-intimation is true. (From P4, (7)) 
(9). Non-relational primitivism is false. (From P5, (8)) 
I agree with B&H that Self-Intimation is false. The idea that all truths about the colors are 
apparent upon careful reflection on our experiences as of the colors is absurd. B&H are 
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free to define a Q proposition in P3, and step (8) follows from P4 and (6). Nevertheless, 
in what follows I will provide three separate arguments against P2, step (7), and P4 
respectively.  
 
2. 3. 1: Why the self-intimation objection cannot succeed  
Why does B&HÕs argument fail at P2?  The reason is that non-relational primitivism, at 
least as I have defined the view, is the theory that the colors are non-reducible and non-
relational, categorical properties of objects, and this is a truth about the nature of the 
colors that is not specifiable in purely chromatic terms. In other words, that the colors are 
non-reducible and non-relational, categorical properties is not a truth about the nature of 
the colors that is specifiable by sentences like Òevery shade of orange is reddishÓ, 
ÒCanary yellow is not a shade of blueÓ, ÒPurple is more similar to red than to yellow,Ó 
etc. So, P2 is false. That is, it is false that non-relational primitivism can be 
comprehended as the view that if a proposition p is in the nature of the colors, then p is 
expressible only using a purely chromatic sentence. 
 A likely worry is that but for the proposition that the colors are non-reducible and 
non-relational, categorical properties it seems that P2 is true. So, assuming that B&HÕs 
argument is otherwise sound, we can get that non-relational primitivism implies 
something close to Self-intimation and is this not objectionable? In reply, the variant of 
Self-intimation that excludes the proposition that the colors are non-reducible and non-
relational categorical properties avoids the absurdities of the original. My argument is as 
follows: The modified Self-intimation excludes the proposition that non-relational 
primitivism is true. So, the modified Self-intimation cannot be used to accept non-
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relational primitivism directly. Moreover, it must be impossible to use the modified 
version to establish non-relational primitivism by rejecting the other views. After all, if 
this could be done, it would follow that if non-relational primitivism is true, then non-
relational primitivism appears true after careful reflection. So, the modified version of 
Self-intimation must be compatible with disagreement regarding views on color that do 
not appear to be true simply after careful reflection on our experiences as of the colors. 
As what is worrying about Self-intimation is that it allows one to rule out any view on 
color that does not appear true after careful reflection our experiences as of the colors, 
this consequence shows that the modified Self-intimation avoids what is worrying about 
the original.  
 Why does B&HÕs argument fail at step (7)? For the move to (7) to be valid, it 
must be that all true propositions about the nature of the colors are expressible in purely 
chromatic language. Step (6) is supposed to give one this, because it says that it is in the 
nature of the colors that if a proposition p is in the nature of the colors, then p is 
expressible only using a purely chromatic sentence. However, (6) cannot do what is 
needed, because (6) is in the nature of the colors yet is not expressible by a purely 
chromatic sentence. An obvious way to avoid this issue is to change (6) so that it is not a 
claim about the nature of the colors, but B&H cannot do this. B&H must hold that (6) is a 
claim about the nature of the colors, because their reason for holding it is that they think 
that non-relational primivitivism is the view that if a proposition p is in the nature of the 
colors, then p is expressible only using a purely chromatic sentence.  
 B&H may try to avoid my objection by changing the definition of Self-intimation 
so that it excludes (6). Recall that (6) says that it is in the nature of the colors that if a 
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proposition p is in the nature of the colors, then p is expressible only using a purely 
chromatic sentence. Unfortunately, like with the attempt to modify Self-intimation to 
avoid my argument against step P2, this modified version of self-intimation avoids the 
problems with the original. The modified version excludes (6). So, it must be impossible 
to use this modified Self-intimation to accept non-relational primitivism as understood by 
B&H directly. Moreover, it must be impossible to accept non-relational primitivism (as 
understood by B&H) indirectly by rejecting the other views. If we could do this, then it 
would be true that if (6) is true of the colors, then (6) appears true after careful reflection. 
Hence, one must be unable to use the variant of Self-intimation that excludes (6) to rule 
out views that do not appear true after careful reflection on our experiences. Thus, the 
modified Self-intimation avoids the issues of the original. 
 Now I want to show why P4 is implausible. P4 is that all Q type propositions 
seem true after careful reflection. A Q type proposition is a true proposition about the 
nature of the colors that is only expressible in purely chromatic terms. So, assuming P4 is 
true, any proposition that says something is true of the nature of the colors and is only 
expressible in purely chromatic terms must seem true after careful reflection. 
Unfortunately this is implausible. Colors like unique red, unique yellow, unique green, 
and unique blue (unitary colors) have been thought by certain people (Berkeley, 1708-9; 
Goethe 1810, Brentano, 1907; Hering, 1920) to appear in some sense essentially 
uncomposed, whereas all the other colors (the binary colors) have been thought by these 
same people to appear in some sense to be essentially composed out of other colors. 
However, despite many supporting this unitary/binary distinction, well-known 
psychologists including Kulpe, Titchener, and Ebbinghaus have denied that any colors 
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appear to be essentially composed (Allen, 2011, p. 164-165). As those on both sides are 
respectable scientists and philosophers, it is implausible that they have failed to carefully 
reflect on their experiences. Thus, the claim that all Q type propositions seem true after 
careful reflection is implausible.  
 
2. 4: The objection from animal color vision 
The objection from animal color vision can be found in B&H (2007b, p. 94-95). What 
follows is an interpretation of B&HÕs argument designed to fit in with past things said in 
this essay.
85
 The argument from animal color vision is similar to the dilemma argument 
for the first premise of the metaphysical, interspecies instance of the variation argument 
discussed in part 3.2. As I mentioned in that chapter, it has been empirically shown that 
                                                
85 As the argument is complicated, I am including here B&HÕs original words for my readers. ÒHuman 
beings are not the only animals with color vision. Consider, for example, the common goldfish (Carassius 
auratus). [É] How should the R-primitivist describe the discriminatory abilities of the goldfish? One 
natural and well-motivated description is that goldfish really are responding to colors, albeit not those that 
human beings can detect. It is unclear, though, whether the R-primitivist can agree, because the claim that 
goldfish are responding to colors is in some tension with Revelation. If there are goldfish colors, then 
presumably they have some nature in common with the human variety. The nature of the human colors, 
then, should somehow make room for goldfish colors. But careful reflection on (human) color experience 
seems, if anything, to exclude the possibility of colors that are not located within the familiar color solid. 
That is, if the nature of the human colors is revealed to us by color experience, as Revelation claims, then 
(arguably) goldfish colors do not exist. [É] 
One alternative description is that both human beings and goldfish are responding to the same 
range of colors but that one group--let it be the latter!-- is prone to systematic errors in color discrimination. 
[É] This view suffers from two related problems. First, the explanation of why one species is right and the 
other wrong is left incurably mysterious. Second--setting aside the comparison with humans--convicting 
goldfish of error is not very well motivated, because they are responding to objects in a way that correlates 
with real physical differences. Of course, humans are not sensitive to these differences, but they are there 
nonetheless.  
There is one other option available to the R-primitivist [É]. On this view, although goldfish are 
perhaps detecting genuine properties of objects, these are not colors. [É] This view comes in two versions. 
On the first, each non-human species with so-called ÔÔcolor visionÕÕ perceives a family of properties (ÔÔc-
propertiesÕÕ) idiosyncratic to that species. [É] This version implausibly supposes that different types of 
animals use very similar physiological machinery, sensitive to very similar types of environmental features, 
to detect unrelated properties. On the second version, human beings see primitive colors, while non-human 
animals merely perceive physical features (reflectance types, say) of objects in their environment. On both 
versions of the third option, as with the second, it is mysterious how to motivate and justify the special 
treatment of human beings.Ó (2007b, p. 94-95) 
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non-human animals differ from us in the construction of their visual systems. For 
example, the eyes of (typical) goldfish, ducks, and pigeons contain four retinal receptor 
types. However, (typical) human eyes contain just three retinal receptor types. Hence, 
goldfish, ducks, and pigeons have what is called Òtetrachromatic vision,Ó while humans 
have what is called Òtrichromatic vision.Ó This difference in visual systems results in its 
taking four appropriately chosen spectral lights for goldfish, ducks, and pigeons to 
perceptually match any given spectral stimulus (in standard conditions), and its taking 
three spectral lights for humans to perceptually match any given spectral stimulus (in 
standard conditions) (Jacobs, 1981; Thompson, 1995, p. 141-160).  
 The objection from animal color vision rests on the following dilemma: Imagine 
three spectral lights L that perceptually match a spectral stimulus S for humans but not for 
goldfish. That is, the lights appear the same in respect to some determinate color to 
humans but do not appear the same in some respect to the goldfish. Now, the question is 
whether the goldfish or the humansÕ perceptions of the match are veridical. There are 
four plausible answers to consider, which are as follows: (I) The goldfish and humansÕ 
perceptions of L are both veridical, but different types of properties are represented by 
their experiences. The human represents L as having a color y, and the goldfish represents 
L has having a color* z (which is not a color). (II) The goldfishÕ perceptions of L 
veridically represent its color, but the humansÕ perceptions falsidically represent its color 
or vice versa. (III) The color of L is neither veridically represented by the humans nor by 
the goldfish. (IV) The goldfish and humansÕ perceptions of L are both veridical, and their 
experiences both represent color properties. The human represents L as having a color y, 
and the goldfish represents L has having a color z. 
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 With this dilemma in mind, the objection from animal color vision is as follows: 
Option (I) is objectionable, because it is mysterious why goldfish would represent 
different properties from humans given that their visual systems are so physiologically 
similar. (II) is objectionable, because it seems that we would be unjustified in saying that 
either the goldfish or the humans but not both perceive veridically, because both species 
are responding to objects in ways that correlate with physical differences. (III) is 
objectionable, because it seems we typically see the colors of objects veridically. A color 
realist must accept this. Given that (I)-(III) are objectionable, the only plausible option 
left is (IV). However, the non-relational primitivist cannot accept (IV). Thus, non-
relational primitivism should be rejected. 
 Why is it that the primitivist cannot accept (IV)? The idea seems to be that the 
primitivist is committed to Revelation and that this core belief excludes the possibility of 
colors not located in the familiar color solid. The variant of Revelation relevant to B&HÕs 
argument is Propositional Revelation. I rejected this as a core belief above. The 
primitivist is only committed to Non-Propositional Revelation. This likely avoids the 
argument, because Non-Propositional Revelation does not imply anything about what 
propositions appear true of the colors after careful reflection.
86
 Putting this aside, I think 
that by using Propositional Revelation, specifically the half called ÒInfallibility,Ó one can 
develop an argument that appears sound. Infallibility =df if a proposition p seems to be in 
the nature of the colors after careful reflection, then p is true. After careful reflection it 
seems that Closed is true of the colors. What I am calling ÒClosedÓ here is the claim that 
the familiar color solid is a closed space, because the solid spatially represents internal 
                                                
86
 In fact, Campbell (2005; see also Allen, 2011) has defended primitivism from B&H by denying that the 
primitivist is committed to what I call ÒPropositional Revelation.Ó 
 281 
relations of similarity and difference (Allen, 2009; Westphal, 1987 p. 125). Hence, as the 
argument goes, the non-relational primitivist is committed to Closed. If there are colors 
that we cannot see, then Closed is false. Call this, ÔComplete.Õ Option (IV) implies that 
there are colors that we cannot see. Thus, the non-relational primitivist cannot accept 
(IV).   
 
2. 4. 1: Why the animal color vision objection cannot succeed 
Closed follows from Unity. Unity is a core belief about the colors. Moreover, the fact that 
the non-relational primitivist can account for this core belief was advertised above as an 
advantage of the view. Thus, the non-relational primitivist should not reject Closed. 
However, the non-relational primitivist can reject Complete. This premise presupposes 
that if there are colors that we cannot see, these colors would have to be introduced to the 
familiar color solid. It is this introduction that would undermine Closed. The non-
relational primitivist, however, can reject this presupposition for reasons similar to those 
discussed in part 3.2. There are two options here for the non-relational primitivist. Option 
(IV) A is to say that there are colors that we cannot perceive that are already in the solid 
and so do not need to be introduced. Option (IV) B is to say that there are colors that we 
cannot perceive that are not in the familiar color solid at all.  
 The non-relational primitivist can choose (IV) B by accepting AllenÕs (2009) 
view on interspecies variation. Allen (2009) says that the goldfish and humansÕ 
perceptions of L are veridical and represent determinate color properties located in 
goldfish color space. These colors vary over different dimensions of determination from 
the three (hue, saturation, and lightness) that our colors vary over. As a consequence of 
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this, the colors that goldfish see are not internally related to the colors that we see with 
respect to these dimensions. Personally, as a non-relational primitivist I would be hesitant 
to choose (IV) B, because I find it conceptually problematic. I can no better understand 
there being colors that do not vary of hue, satuation, and lightness than I can understand 
shapes that do not vary over number of sides, length of sides, etc. With this being said, 
the point of this section is not to argue against AllenÕs view on interspecies variation. 
Perhaps there are grounds for calling certain properties colors even though they do not 
vary over hue, saturation, and lightness (Allen, 2009, p. 214-219), but I cannot discuss 
this here.  
  The non-relational primitivist can choose (IV) A by saying that the goldfish 
represent more finely grained colors of the kind located in the familiar color solid than 
humans and L instantiates such properties, as described in part 3.2 of this essay. For 
example, perhaps goldfish veridically represent super-determinate colors. Super-
determinate colors would stand to the determinate colors the way the determinate colors 
stand to the determinable ones. Thus, super-determinate colors would vary over the same 
dimensions of determination as the colors that we see and would be internally related to 
them with respect to hue, saturation, and lightness. However, super-determinable colors 
would not need to be slotted into the familiar color solid. They would exist ÒunderneathÓ 
the determinate colors like the determinate colors are ÒunderneathÓ the determinables. So, 
for example, a super-determinate of scarlet would not need to be slotted in next to scarlet 
but would exist ÒunderneathÓ scarlet like scarlet is ÒunderÓ red.  
 As I have shown, there are two ways that the non-relational primitivist can accept 
(IV). However, is (IV) really the best option to the dilemma like B&H say? I suspect that 
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the reality of the situation is that we have no a priori reason to prefer (IV) over (I). In 
reality it is probably that for some animals (IV) A is the best option, for others (IV) B 
(assuming the conceptual issues can be sorted out), and for others (I). One could only 
justifiably choose one of these options over the other two for any particular species after 
extensive empirical investigation into its visual system. B&H disagree. They clearly think 
that (I) is inferior to (IV) A and B on a priori grounds. They think that option (I) is 
inferior, because they think it is implausible that goldfish would represent different 
properties from humans given that their visual systems are so physiologically similar. 
As I mentioned in part 3.2 of this essay, this argument against (I) presupposes the 
premise that if a (functioning) visual system Q is similar in design to a (functioning) 
color representing visual system U, then Q probably also represents color properties, but 
one cannot make this inference. Doing so ignores that the differences between Q and U 
likely have some impact on the properties that they represent. So, to say that Q represents 
color properties, one needs to know that the ways in which Q differs from R are irrelevant 
to whether it represents colors. Alas, with regard to non-human animal visual systems 
like those of goldfish it is unclear whether this is the case (Thompson, 1995; Hardin, 
1988; see also Watkins, 1999; 2002). Hardin (1988, p. 150-152), for example, makes it 
explicit that we should not assume that the neurological differences between human and 
non-humans are irrelevant to seeing the colors. So, at most my opponent can use the 
premise that if a (functioning) visual system Q is similar in design to a (functioning) 
color representing visual system U, then Q probably represents properties at least similar 
in kind to the colors. However, this premise, unlike the presupposition, fails to show (I) is 
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implausible, because (I) is compatible with it being the case that goldfish represent 
colors* that are similar in kind to the colors but not the same in kind. 
 
Conclusion 
I argued in this chapter that the colors are non-reducible and non-relational, categorical 
properties similar to what is true for the property of being square. I called this view, 
Ònon-relational primitivism.Ó First, I presented my positive argument for non-relational 
primitivism. Second, I defended non-relational primitivism from a battery of recent 
objections proposed mainly by Byrne and Hilbert but also by Hardin (section 2). Thus, 
most generally I have shown that non-relational primitivism is an excellent view on color.  
 
 
 
  
 
Part 4: Should we be Realists? 
 
The colors are non-relational and non-reducible, categorical properties, but are these 
properties actually instantiated by external objects? In part 3.2, I defended realism 
indirectly by showing that no instance of the color variation argument can succeed 
because this form of argument has also been used to support irrealism. In part 4, I will 
further defend realism by refuting the argument from mass disagreement. 
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Part 4.1: Against The Argument from Mass Disagreement 
The argument from mass disagreement is roughly that the best explanation of there being 
mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects is that irrealism is true (section 
1). Why should one accept that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of 
objects? One motivation is that the claim is supported by the empirical literature. The 
secondary motivation comes from a philosophical argument based on evolutionary 
speculation. I argue that the empirical literature does not support there being mass 
perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects (section 2), and that the evolutionary 
argument fails (section 3).  
 
Section 1: The irrealist argument 
Before I can present the irrealist argument, it is necessary for me to define some terms. P-
Disagreement =df There is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors. 
Incompatibility =df No object can be two or more different determinate or determinable 
colors all over at the same time. Objectivism =df the colors are mind-independent 
properties. Veridicality =df typical observersÕ color experiences represent the colors 
veridically in typical daylight conditions.  
I do not know of any particularly clear statement of the argument from mass 
disagreement, but it is close to surface in the work of certain irrealist sympathizers. 
Broadly construed the argument can be presented as follows: 
 P1. P-Disagreement is true.  
 P2. Objectivism and Incompatibility are true. 
 P3. The best explanation of Veridicality being false is that irrealism is true. 
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(4). So, either Objectivism or Incompatibility is false, or Veridicality is false. 
(From P1) 
 (5). Hence, Veridicality is false. (From 4, P2) 
 (6). Therefore, irrealism is probably true (Hardin, 1988; 2004; Mclaughlin, 2003; 
 Chalmers, 2006). (From 5, P3) 
 
The irrealist argument is valid. I have argued that the colors are non-relational properties. 
So, I cannot hold that they are mind-dependent. I believe that Incompatibility is true and 
have defended it elsewhere. In what follows I will question the truth of P1.  
 
Section 2: P-disagreement empirically supported?
87
 
Does the empirical literature really support P-Disagreement? Allen (2010b) has 
questioned whether P-Disagreement is really supported by the empirical literature. Allen 
points out that the amount of disagreement measured by experiments depends on many 
methodological factors, including but not limited to the participantsÕ native language 
(Berlin & Kay, 1969), age (Schefrin & Werner, 1990), and retinal illuminance (Ayama et. 
al., 1987). Moreover, Allen argues that the amount of disagreement is highly affected by 
the particular color(s) studied, with unique green causing the most disagreement. Thus, 
when analyzing multiple studies it is important to remember that disagreement will arise 
not only due to participantsÕ color perception but also due to many methodological 
differences between the studies (Ayama et. al., 1987; Kuehni, 2004).  
                                                
87
 This section is the result of collaboration with Kelly Schmidtke (a research fellow at Warwick) who 
helped me run the experiment in 2.1. The ideas culminated in a published article in Review of Philosophy 
and Psychology. Please see Roberts & Schmidtke (2012). The final publication is also available online at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g587787114328685/.  
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 I admire AllenÕs attempt to bring some needed scrutiny to whether the empirical 
literature really supports P-Disagreement. However, one plausibly confounding factor 
that most philosophers including Allen have overlooked is task type.
88
 In this section, I 
argue that the type of task employed in most empirical studies that appear to support P-
Disagreement calls this support into question. Broadly speaking, there are two types of 
tasks used in the empirical literature, matching and naming tasks. 
Matching Tasks =df An experimental procedure in which participants are 
presented with at least two colored examples and asked whether they look the 
same or different. 
Naming Tasks =df An experimental procedure in which participants are presented 
with colored example(s) and asked to name them.    
 Naming tasks depend on participantsÕ having concepts of the particular colors 
(color concepts) associated with color words, while matching tasks do not so depend. 
Naming tasks require participants to say, for instance, which example is best described by 
a certain color term (e.g. Ôunique redÕ). So, in order for participants to complete a naming 
task, they must have a color concept associated with the given color word. In contrast to 
naming tasks, matching tasks only require participants to be able to say whether colored 
examples look the same or different. Hence, in order to complete a matching task, 
participants are not required to have, for instance, a color concept associated with the 
word Ôunique red.Õ Of course, we admit that matching tasks require concepts. Matching 
and naming tasks require, amongst others, both the concept of something being colored 
and the concept of something being the same or different. Our claim is merely that 
                                                
88
 Byrne and Hilbert (2007a, footnote 5) mention that task type is important but other than this example I 
am unaware of any philosophers who have talked about task type in relation to P-Disagreement.  
 289 
matching tasks do not depend on participants having color concepts associated with color 
words, while naming tasks do so depend (Jordan & Mollon, 1994).  
 Philosophers use empirical studies to support P-Disagreement. An overview of 
the literature reveals that the majority of the studies that appear to support P-
Disagreement use naming tasks not matching ones (see Allen 2010b for a review). Let us 
look at the tasks used by a few of them. Perhaps the most widely recognized large-scale 
color research is the World Color Survey (Cook, Kay & Reigier, 2011).89 In this research, 
participants are first presented with various differently colored chips one at a time and for 
each chip asked what basic color term best describes it. In a later task, participants are 
shown all the differently colored chips at once and asked to say which chip is best 
described by a given color term. Although not part of the World Color Survey, Wuerger, 
Atkinson, and Cropper (2005) use a similar task. In their task, participants are given a 
color term and then view 12 differently colored circles on a computer. After selecting the 
colored circle that is best described by the given color term, the computer presents 12 
colored circles that give off a narrower range of wavelengths from which the participant 
again selects the best example for the given color term.   
In other researchersÕ naming tasks, the wavelengths that cause experiences as of 
the unique colors are determined by presenting participants with colored examples and 
asking whether they contain too much of a neighboring color to be a unique color. For 
example, when measuring unique green, participants see a green-ish color and say 
whether it contains too much blue or yellow to be unique green. If the participant says, 
for instance, that the example contains too much blue, then the experimenter adjusts the 
                                                
89
 One may argue that the world color study deals with focal colors, not unique colors. This discrepancy is 
not problematic to our claims as Miyahara (2003) found that participantsÕ mean focal colors and unique 
hues were strikingly similar for red, green, blue and yellow.  
 290 
color by reducing the exampleÕs blueness. This process repeats for a pre-determined 
number of trials or until the participant indicates that the example is unique green 
(Schefrin & Werner, 1990; Malkoc et al., 2005, Unique Hue Settings; Webster et al., 
2000). It is important to note that many experiments that do not consist entirely of 
naming tasks have a naming task component. For example, Ayama et al. (1987) asked 
participants to name unique color examples at different illuminances. Then participants 
were presented with a new color example and asked to match this new color with their 
previously chosen unique colors at different illuminances. 
 I suspect that the additional conceptual factor in naming tasks (the color concepts 
participants associate with color words) is responsible for a lot of the empirically 
measured disagreement that appears to support P-Disagreement. Thus, I expect results 
based on naming tasks to vary considerably more across participants than the results of 
matching ones. My hypothesis implies that conceptual factors not perceptual ones explain 
a notable amount of the empirically measured variation. P-Disagreement is the 
proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects 
amongst human observers in typical conditions. Thus, if our hypothesis is correct, then P-
Disagreement is in a precarious position. Without strong empirical support, we ought to 
seriously question whether P-Disagreement is true, as the premise is in conflict with 
common sense. According to common sense there is little perceptual disagreement 
amongst most human observers in typical conditions.  
 My aim in calling P-Disagreement into question is to provide a defense of 
Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality from the empirically based form of 
argument under consideration. A defense of these propositions is an attack against 
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selectionism, relationism, and eliminativism. This is because selectionism (the view that 
our visual systems select different properties to be the colors) implies that Incompatibility 
is false (Allen, 2009a; Kalderon, 2007; Mizrahi, 2007); relationism (the view that the 
colors are relational properties that combine objects and perceivers) implies that 
Objectivism is false (Cohen, 2004; 2006a; 2007; 2009), and eliminativism (the view that 
external objects are not colored) implies that Veridicality is false (Boghossian and 
Velleman, 1989; Chalmers, 2006; Hardin, 1988; Maund, 1995; and Pautz, 2006).
90
 
Moreover, a defense of the relevant propositions is also a defense of primitivism (the 
view that the colors are non-reducible properties) and physicalism (the view that the 
colors are properties like those mentioned in modern physics), with my preferred view 
obviously being non-relational primitivism. The reason for this is that both primitivism 
(Campbell, 1993; Westphal, 1987; 2005; Watkins, 2002; 2005) and physicalism (Byrne 
& Hilbert, 2003a) (as often conceived) are species of realism and objectivism about 
color.  
 
2.1: The experiment  
I ran an experiment to test my hypothesis that the relevant conceptual factor is 
responsible for a lot of the empirically measured variation. In a classroom lit with Philips 
Master 26W/840/P4 bulbs, 24 philosophy students (19 male) at the University of 
Nottingham voluntarily participated in my study to understand visual color disagreement, 
                                                
90
 Some believe that dispositionalism is a form of relationalism (for example see Cohen, 2009). For the 
purposes of this chapter, I understand relationalism to be incompatible with dispositionalism, because 
relationalism but not dispositionalism is the denial of Objectivism.  
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none of who acknowledged having any color deficiency.
91
 Each participant received two 
worksheets: half the participants received a green matching worksheet and a red naming 
worksheet, while the other half were given a red matching worksheet and a green naming 
worksheet. Participants could modify the angle they viewed the sheets from as they 
desired. The order of the worksheets and the items within the worksheets were 
counterbalanced across participants, and no order effects emerged.  
The colored items were constructed using Microsoft PublisherÕs CMYK color 
index.
92
 Unique green and unique red were defined so that CMYK for green = 
100.0.100.36 and CMYK for red = 0.100.100.20.
93
 The worksheets were printed using a 
professional grade color printer, run by a professional print shop, called ÔThe Xerox 700 
Digital Color Press,Õ which has received the FOGRA Validation Print Certification 
measuring color accuracy and consistency. 
 Both the matching and naming worksheets contained 20 pairs of items (see figure 
4.1, but keep in mind that the color accuracy will depend on the monitor or printer used).  
 
                                                
91
 A likely concern is to worry about the fluorescent lighting used in the room in which we conducted our 
experiment. Since we were concerned with comparing disagreement in the naming task with disagreement 
in the matching one, the only reason to be worried about the lighting would be if there were good reasons to 
suspect that it differentially affected our tasks. However, not only are our results for each task 
independently predicted by the psychophysical data (see p. 8-11), but also our pilot experiment conducted 
in natural daylight found comparable results (see p. 12).  
92
 The letters in the initialism ÔCMYKÕ stand for Cyan, Magenta, Yellow, and Black respectively.  
93
 The black ink was added so as to decrease the lightness and prevent the items from appearing washed 
out. The green items needed more black ink than the red ones to obtain this goal.    
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  Figure 4.1. Examples of worksheets  
 
Each pair contained a standard item positioned left of a comparison item. The standard 
items on the matching worksheets were rectangles colored to exemplify unique green or 
unique red. In contrast, the standard items on the naming worksheets were the words 
ÒTrue GreenÓ or ÒTrue Red.Ó
94
 The comparison items for both worksheets were colored 
rectangles. Only one of the comparisons matched the standard. The remaining 19 
comparisons differed from the standard in that they contained different amounts of cyan, 
magenta, or yellow by 5 unit steps. Instructions on the top of both worksheets read, 
                                                
94
 We used the terms ÒTrue GreenÓ and ÒTrue Red,Ó because it is our understanding that these terms in the 
vernacular mean what Òunique greenÓ and Òunique redÓ mean respectively to color scientists. We defined 
Òtrue greenÓ and Òtrue redÓ for our participants in the same way that Òunique greenÓ and Òunique redÓ are 
defined in color science. 
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ÒCircle the box that contains the same items.Ó The instructions were also verbally 
explained. I explicitly told participants that they were only to circle one pair for the 
matching task and one pair for the naming task. 
After checking that my participants followed the directions correctly, their 
responses were entered into analyses as the number of units that their chosen comparison 
differed from the standard. The standard deviation was highest for the green naming 
worksheet (SD = 9.41), followed by the red naming worksheet (SD = 8.38), and lastly the 
green and red matching worksheets, which both had the same standard deviation (SD = 
4.52), see figure 4.2. The Brown-Forsythe test for equality of variances was selected to 
compare these groups, as this test has greater power than other tests designed to compare 
variance with non-normal distributions (Conover, Johnson & Johnson, 1981; Algina, 
Olejnik, & Ocanto, 1989). These tests revealed that the naming worksheets produced 
more disagreement than the matching worksheets (F(1, 46) = 7.93, p < 0.01). This 
difference was significant for the green worksheets (F(1, 22) = 6.06, p < 0.02) but not the 
red worksheets (F(1, 22) = 2.37, p > 0.05). There was no significant difference between 
the green and red matching worksheets, and no significant difference between the green 
and red naming works. 
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s.   
Figure 4.2. Standard deviations across participants. Standard Deviations (SD) for 
the red and green matching and naming worksheets across participants. A 
significant difference appears between matching and naming tasks. The difference 
remains when green matching and naming tasks are compared but does not remain 
when red matching and naming tasks are compared. No significant difference 
appeared between the matching worksheets or between the naming worksheets. 
 
 
2.2: Discussion  
The results show that significantly more interpersonal disagreement emerges in naming 
than matching tasks. So, the results should cast doubt on whether P-Disagreement is true 
by supporting my hypothesis that the additional conceptual factor in naming tasks (the 
color concepts participants associate with color words) accounts for a lot of the 
empirically measured variation. P-Disagreement implies that at least one of the 
propositions Incompatibility, Objectivism, or Veridicality is false. Thus, by showing that 
P-Disagreement is in trouble, I have provided a defense of these three propositions about 
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the colors. A defense of the relevant propositions is an attack against selectionism, 
relationalism, and eliminativism as well as support for physicalism and primitivism.  
 A competing hypothesis that would support P-Disagreement is that my results are 
explained by widespread color transformations rather than the relevant conceptual 
factors. There are three (approximate) reflectional symmetries in color space that would 
allow for three transformations all of which would be largely if not completely 
undetectable: red-green inversion, blue-yellow and black-white inversion, and complete 
inversion (Palmer, 1999). If these three inversions were distributed amongst the 
population, then there would be mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects 
but no reason to suspect increased disagreement about whether they look the same or 
different. Thus, if these three inversions were distributed amongst us, it may seem that 
there would be more disagreement in naming tasks than matching ones, and this is 
exactly what we find. My opponent may have similar expectations for at least some of the 
behaviorally detectable transformations. 
 Whether color transformations (behaviorally detectable or not) are widespread is 
an important question, but I do not think that they can explain the results of the 
experiment. The argument is as follows: One would associate different color concepts 
with color words dependent on how oneÕs color space was transformed. For example, 
someone who was red-green inverted would associate the concept of being green with the 
word ÔredÕ and the concept of being red with the word Ôgreen,Õ and so, despite the 
inversion in how things phenomenally look, he would verbally agree with the non-
inverted that, for instance, the forest is green and that fire trucks are red. In naming tasks, 
participants are presented with colored sample(s) and asked to name them. One can only 
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name the relevant examples using oneÕs color words. Thus, inversions in color space 
cannot explain why I found more disagreement in the naming task than the matching 
task. Of course, if one believes that such inversions obtain based on other grounds, one is 
going to be unconvinced by our experiment that P-Disagreement is in trouble. 
Regardless, the results support my conceptual hypothesis and not the color transformation 
one.   
 Another worry is that I only found that naming tasks result in significantly more 
disagreement than matching ones with respect to unique green. It is my opinion that this 
finding is sufficient to call P-Disagreement into question. A review of the empirical 
literature (Allen, 2010b) reveals that disagreement primarily occurs with respect to 
unique green, while significantly less disagreement emerges with other unique colors. For 
example, Kuehni (2004) reviewed 10 color experiments, and found that the variation with 
unique green (Mdn Range = 62 nm) was larger than both unique blue (Mdn Range = 21.5 
nm) and unique yellow (Mdn Range = 9 nm).
95
 Using Munsell chips, The World Color 
Survey supports the same pattern, with the most variation arising with green (VAR = 3.01 
chips) then blue (VAR = 2.45 chips), red (VAR = 0.46 chips) and finally yellow (VAR = 
0.31 chips) (Webster & Kay, 2005). Therefore, supporting my hypothesis with respect to 
unique green is sufficient to call P-Disagreement into question. 
 A third concern is that matching tasks also suggest disagreement, and so is the 
disagreement measured using these tasks not enough to support P-Disagreement? While 
matching tasks do produce disagreement, the disagreement is dramatically less than that 
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 The largest exception to this general pattern is Ayama et al. (1987). The small number of participants (N 
= 2) in Ayama et al.Õs experiment can explain the observed deviation, because such small numbers of 
participants likely make variation larger. Also, it is interesting to note the absence of data available for 
unique red in Ayama et al.Õs experiment. Unique red is a non-spectral color and the tasks compared by 
Ayama et al. all use spectral stimuli.  
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in naming tasks, as evidenced by the present experiment as well as many others. One 
frequently used matching task is the Rayleigh match. In this task, participants view a split 
stimulus where the first half emits a combination of wavelengths (e.g. green + red) and 
the second half emits a single wavelength (e.g. yellow). The participant then adjusts the 
light waves emitted by the first half so that it matches the second half. The researcher 
then records the percentage of red light in the first stimulus so that the scores range from 
0 to 1. It has been found that participantsÕ mean Rayleigh matches vary little across (from 
M = 0.547 to 0.555) and within experiments (from SD = 0.021 to 0.037) (Lutze et al., 
1990, Table 5).  
 In other research using matching tasks, it was found that people with clinically 
defined normal color vision can distinguish between wavelengths of 1 nm at the middle 
of the spectrum where green is located (500 and 600 nm). PeopleÕs ability to distinguish 
wavelengths does degrade to about 6 nm at the ends of the spectrum where violet and red 
are located (Wright & Pitt, 1934), but recall that an nm is only one billionth of a meter. 
Of course, people with color deficient vision vary more in color perception tasks than 
those with normal color vision (Barbur, 2008), but only a small minority of the 
population (about 4%) have color deficiencies. Thus, while matching tasks do suggest 
disagreement, the disagreement is not nearly as much as naming tasks suggest and 
certainly not sufficient to support P-Disagreement. On the contrary, the results of 
matching tasks are what we would expect if P-Disagreement were false.   
 I pointed out in the introduction to section 2 that Ayama et alÕs (1987) experiment 
includes a matching component, and so this studyÕs results are important to addressing 
the present concern about matching tasks. In support of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and 
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Veridicality, the results were that participants demonstrated a spectacular ability to match 
new colors with previously chosen ones. The location of unique colors did change with 
retinal illuminance for both tasks but never so much as to cause disagreement about 
unique colors (e.g. examples identified as unique blue were never identified as unique 
green). The disagreement that was measured by Ayama et al. must be cautiously 
considered. First, the experiment included a naming task component and so is susceptible 
to my general worry about using such tasks to support P-Disagreement. Second, like 
many color studies this experiment included a small number of participants (N = 2), and 
studies that use such small numbers of participants are insufficient to provide more than a 
modicum of support for P-Disagreement.  
 A final concern may result from wondering about the impact that the large-scale 
disagreement evidenced by naming tasks has on P-Disagreement. In reply, P-
Disagreement is that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects 
amongst human observers in typical conditions. The experiment suggests that the 
additional factor in naming tasks (the color concepts participantsÕ associate with colors 
words) accounts for a lot of the empirically measured variation. Hence, in order to 
support P-Disagreement using naming tasks, it must be that the color concepts we 
associate with color words affects the colors that our visual systems represent, but it is 
unclear whether the relevant factor can do what is required. In fact, whether this factor 
can influence what our visual systems represent touches on contentious issues relevant to 
the debate about perceptual content (McDowell, 1994; Tye, 2000) and cognitive 
penetration (Raftopoulos, 2005; Macpherson, 2012).
96
 Thus, although the disagreement 
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 One reason to be suspicious as to whether the relevant factor can influence what our perceptual systems 
represent is that it would seem that how the colors phenomenally look to people does not change based on 
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evidenced by naming tasks is relevant to the debate about P-Disagreement, the relevance 
has no impact on my argument to the effect that P-Disagreement is in an unstable 
position.   
 Why is there a significant difference between the green naming and matching 
worksheets but not one between the red naming and matching worksheets? I believe that 
this result is best explained by the participants associating either (1) a larger number of 
relatively narrow concepts with the word Ôunique greenÕ or (2) one or more broader 
concepts with Ôunique green.Õ
97
 If (1) were true, this would mean that the question being 
considered is primarily explained by there being more disagreement between people 
about which concept is associated with the word Ôunique greenÕ than there is about which 
concept is associated with Ôunique red.Õ If (2) were true, this would mean that the 
question is mostly explained by there being many more greens that satisfy the concept 
people associate with the word Ôunique greenÕ than reds that satisfy the concept people 
associate with Ôunique red.Õ 
 An alternative explanation is that the participantsÕ concepts were comparable, but 
that they had less plausible examples of unique red from which to choose than unique 
green. Some of the examples on the red worksheet look orange to me, while all the 
examples on the green worksheet look green. I do not think that this alternative 
                                                
their concepts of the particular colors. Here is an argument: Assume that how the colors phenomenally look 
changes based on peoplesÕ concepts of them. Necessarily, if two experiences E1 and E2 differ in 
phenomenal character, then they differ in representational content (Representationalism). So, we get that 
when someone first forms a concept of a color like aquamarine, he comes to represent something new. 
However, the correct view of what is happening when someone first forms the concept of a color like 
aquamarine is that he has come to have the concept of the color property represented by his visual system 
when in his life he had phenomenally aquamarine experiences. Thus, we can conclude that how the colors 
phenomenally look does not change based on peoplesÕ concepts of them. 
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 A concept is only broad or narrow relative to another concept. A concept C1 is broader than another C2 
=df a greater number of differing entities can satisfy C1 than C2. A concept C1 is narrower than another C2 
=df a fewer number of differing entities can satisfy C1 than C2.  
 301 
explanation is correct. In a pilot experiment very similar to the main experiment of this 
section, which was conducted in a room with natural daylight, the comparisons for red 
differed from the standard by 3 unit steps while the comparisons for green differed by 5 
(as opposed to both differing by 5 in the present experiment), but this did not make a 
difference. The worksheets with green items revealed that the naming worksheet 
generated more variation than the matching worksheet; in contrast, the worksheets with 
red items generated similar variation. 
 With respect to my preferred explanation, the question remains whether the 
participants had a larger number of relatively narrow concepts or one or more broad 
concepts associated with the word Ôunique green.Õ As Hardin (1988) reports, peopleÕs 
unique color settings remain stable and reliable even for experimental sessions that are 
weeks apart (p. 39). In other words, there is a lot of intrapersonal consistency in the 
samples that people say fall under, for instance, the concept associated with Ôunique 
green,Õ and so it would seem that the participants sharing one or more broad concepts 
cannot explain the results. Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned about whether 
what Hardin reports can be used in this way. The reason is that plausibly the answer that 
a participant gives to the question, for example, ÒWhich colored sample is unique green?Ó 
in the first session of an experiment designed to test his unique color settings has some 
influence on the color concept he associates with Ôunique green.Õ 
In order to test whether participants have a larger number of relatively narrow 
concepts or one or more broad concepts associated with Ôunique green,Õ I propose a one 
trial test thus avoiding the above worry. In my proposed test, participants would be 
presented with either green or red worksheets like the naming sheets in figure 1. 
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Participants who received the red worksheet would be asked to circle every box that 
exemplifies unique red and participants who received the green worksheet would be 
asked to circle every box that exemplifies unique green. It is important that participants 
be informed that a unique color is one that appears to have no neighboring hues in it, as 
plausibly they would not know what the word ÔuniqueÕ means given the context.  My 
pilot experiment (which was very similar to the main experiment of this paper) suggests 
that if participants are not specifically instructed to only circle one box, they will circle 
multiple boxes to exemplify a unique color. 
 Regardless of whether our participants had a larger number of relatively narrow 
concepts or one or more broad concepts associated with the word Ôunique greenÕ, it is 
important to appreciate that participants recognize more different greens than different 
reds. On a 160 Munsell chip array about 30% of the chips are described as falling under 
the basic color term Ôgreen,Õ while less than 10% are described as falling under the basic 
color term ÔredÕ (Roberson et al., 2000). My rationale for thinking that this is important is 
twofold: (a) If people can distinguish between more greens than reds, then plausibly 
during our lives we encounter more objects that look not to be red than not to be green. 
So, during our lives we are likely presented with more plausible samples for unique green 
than unique red. (b) There is empirical evidence that both the variation in the association 
of concepts with words across individuals and the narrowness of a concept within 
individuals depend on the number of different examples used during instruction (Posner 
& Keele, 1968; Heit & Feeney, 2005). 
With regard to the association of concepts with words, Fried & Holyoak (1984) 
found that participants trained using myriad visually disparate examples (e.g. more 
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dissimilar checkerboard patterns) exhibit more variable performance when asked to 
perform certain relevant tasks than people trained using less disparate examples (e.g. 
more similar checkerboard patterns).
98
 Regarding the narrowness of concepts, French et 
al. (2004) conducted a study in which infants were familiarized with either pictures of 
cats or dogs. The cats represented by the cat pictures were highly variable in their 
features (e.g. ear and hair length), while the dogs represented by the dog pictures were 
less variable. After repeated exposure, the infants were presented with both a novel cat 
and a novel dog picture. Those infants who were familiarized with cat pictures showed no 
preference for looking at either novel picture, suggesting that they had formed a broad 
concept satisfied by both dogs and cats. In contrast, those infants who had been 
familiarized with dog pictures preferred looking at the novel cat picture, suggesting that 
they had formed a narrower concept that was not satisfied by cats. 
 In addition to people recognizing a lot more greens than reds, they also recognize 
a lot more blues than reds (Roberson et al., 2000). Thus, just as we found significantly 
more variation with the green naming than matching task, I expect more variation in blue 
naming tasks than matching ones. This consequence not only shows a plausible way of 
testing my preferred explanation but also further weakens the support that the empirical 
evidence for mass interpersonal variation provides for P-Disagreement.  
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 The results found with arbitrary stimuli, such as checkerboard patterns, extends to more natural stimuli 
such as speech sounds (Wade, Jongman & Sereno, 2007) and to detection of dangerous items in a briefcase 
via an X-ray image (Gonzalez & Madhavan, 2010). 
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Section 3: The evolution argument 
I have shown that P-Disagreement is not supported by the empirical literature. Let us now 
examine the philosophical argument based on evolution for P-Disagreement. The 
evolutionary argument runs as follows:  
 Ev1. A personÕs color space has no impact on his evolutionary fitness.  
Ev2. Mutations for color transformations could have easily occurred in our 
evolutionary past. (An easy way to understand the idea of a color transformation 
is to imagine your experience of the rainbow being inverted. If you were to 
suddenly have your experience of the rainbow inverted it would appear to you 
roughly as if the rainbow had suddenly turned upside-down.) 
(3). Therefore, P-Disagreement is probably true (Chalmers, 2006; Byrne and 
Hilbert, 2007b).  
 
3. 1: Transformations and fitness 
There are two problems with the evolution argument. The first problem is that Ev1 is 
false, because most transformations of color space would have an influence on 
evolutionary fitness. The second problem is that there is no reason to think that the color 
transformations that would have no impact on fitness could have easily occurred in our 
evolutionary past. The rationale for why most transformations would affect fitness is 
twofold: First, there are asymmetries in color space (Palmer, 1999), and second, any 
transformation that did not respect these asymmetries would result in detectable 
behavioral anomalies and so would have an effect on fitness. The two asymmetries that I 
will discuss are color composition and lightness.  
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 Let us look first at color composition. It is generally accepted today that there are 
both binary and unitary colors. Binary colors (which include all but four of the colors) are 
composed in some sense of the unitary colors (unique red, unique yellow, unique green, 
and unique blue), while the unitary colors in the same sense have no proper parts. Thus, 
any attempt to invert a personÕs color space that failed to respect the binary/unitary 
distinction would have behavioral consequences. For example, it is impossible to invert a 
personÕs color space by inverting the colors of the rainbow without the inversion being 
behaviorally detectable. Someone whose color space was inverted in this way, unlike 
those with normal vision, would perceive a unique purple, unique chartreuse, unique 
orange, and unique cyan (Palmer, 1999 p. 925).  
 Let us now examine lightness. When philosophers like Chalmers (2006) theorize 
about the possibility of color transformations, they often underestimate the 
dimensionality of color space. There are three dimensions to color space, hue, saturation, 
and lightness (sometimes also called ÒbrightnessÓ by philosophers although ÒlightnessÓ is 
the correct term). A colorÕs hue, saturation, and lightness correspond to its position in 
color space, see figure 4.3. 
  
Figure 4.3. The dimensions of color space (Palmer, 1999) 
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A colorÕs hue is the angular direction in the horizontal plane from its central axis to its 
location. This is the dimension that we sometimes associate with the color of an object. A 
colorÕs saturation corresponds to the perpendicular distance from the central axis to its 
location. The higher a colorÕs saturation the more pronounced (or vivid) the color 
appears. For example, the colors of the rainbow are located along the outside edge, for 
they are 100% saturated. A colorÕs lightness corresponds to its height in figure 3. The 
higher a colorÕs lightness the more washed out (or white) it appears. All colors have some 
lightness, but this dimension is most easily noticed with viewing the achromatic grays 
located along the central axis (Palmer, 1999).  
 A color circle like the one Newton developed represents the perimeter of an 
oblique slice of color space, see figure 4.4.  
 
      Figure 4.4. NewtonÕs color circle  
 
The reason is that the most saturated yellows are light and so higher in color space, 
whereas the most saturated blues are dark and so lower. Thus, any color transformation 
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must respect this difference in lightness amongst colors that are maximally saturated. For 
example, any attempt to rotate color space 180 degrees about its vertical axis would be 
behaviorally detectable. Such a rotation would result in making the most saturated 
yellows appear dark and the most saturated blues appear light. In fact, according to 
Palmer (1999, p. 295-296) color space has no rotational symmetries. Thus, any rotational 
color transformation would be detectable.  
 Most color transformations would be behaviorally detectable and so would have 
an effect on fitness. However, it appears like there are three (approximate) symmetries in 
color space (Palmer, 1999, p. 926). These symmetries allow for three different 
transformations all of which would be largely if not completely undetectable, see figure 
4.5.  
 
        Figure 4.5. Behaviorally undetectable transformations (Palmer, 1999) 
  
Color space can be inverted with respect to red and green in the blue-yellow-
black-white plane without much if any effect on evolutionary fitness (figure 4.5.A) for 
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two reasons; First, red and green are approximately the same in lightness, and second 
blue and yellow are mapped to themselves thus respecting the binary/unitary distinction. 
Color space can be inverted with respect to the blue-yellow and black-white axis (figure 
4.5.B) without much if any effect on fitness, because this inversion approximately 
reverses the lightness for the black-white dimension. Reversing the black-white 
dimension solves the lightness problem that would arise from just trying to invert the 
blue-yellow axis. Finally, color space can be completely inverted (figure 4.5.C) without 
having much if any effect on fitness, because a complete inversion respects the 
binary/unitary distinction and roughly the lightness asymmetry as well.  
 
3. 2: Mutations and transformations 
The second problem with the evolutionary argument is as follows: There are only three 
transformations that would have no effect on evolutionary fitness. Thus, for the evolution 
argument to be convincing, it must be the case that mutations causing red-green, blue-
yellow and black-white, or complete inversion could have easily occurred. Call this 
ÒEv2*.Ó Unfortunately, Ev2* unlike the original version lacks any support whatsoever. 
Ev2 is supported by the fact that there are many known variations to human color space. 
For example, 8% of males have color spaces that do not coincide with the majority. 
Contrary to this, Ev2* is not supported by there being known examples of the relevant 
transformations, because the transformations are just the ones that are largely if not 
completely undetectable. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how to discover whether it 
would have been easy for the transformations to occur, for time obscures our ability to 
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answer questions about the past. Thus, the realist can avoid the argument from evolution 
by rejecting Ev2* as unmotivated and unverifiable conjecture.  
 A likely reply to this line of argument is to insist that there is a reason to believe 
that red-green inverted people in specific actually exist (Nida-Rumelin, 1996). The 
argument runs as follows: The majority of humans are trichromats who have long-
wavelength (L), short-wavelength (S), and medium-wavelength (M) cones each with their 
respective pigment. On the other hand, protanopes have a gene that causes their L cones 
to have the same pigment as their M cones, and deuteranopes have a gene that causes 
their M cones to have the same pigment as their L cones. Both protanopes and 
deuternopes are red-green color blind, because the human visual system processes this 
dimension of color space by taking the difference between the outputs of the M and L 
cones. Thus, it seems that if someone had the protanope gene and the deuteranope gene, 
then they would be red-green inverted with respect to trichromats.  
 I do not think that this reply can succeed. The reply involves inheriting red-green 
inversion not with a mutation for red-green inversion. However, just because it is 
possible to inherit red-green inversion based on inheriting some combination of genes 
does not imply that mutations for red-green inversion could have easily occurred. Thus, 
the reply fails to adequately support Ev2*. Moreover, inheriting red-green inversion 
would require inheriting both the protanope gene and the deuternope gene, but both of 
these genes are rare in the population. Hence, it would be extremely unlikely for anyone 
to inherit red-green inversion. Therefore, inheriting red-green inversion cannot account 
for P-Disagreement.   
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3. 3: The best explanation?  
What if a species of the evolution argument were shown to succeed? Perhaps it is 
determined in the future that mutations causing red-green, blue-yellow and black-white, 
or complete inversion could have easily occurred in our evolutionary past. If a species of 
the argument were to succeed, P-Disagreement would probably be true. Thus, assuming 
Incompatibility and Objectivism, we would have to hold that Veridicality is probably 
false. This would be an unhappy consequence for any commonsense philosopher. Even 
so, I think that the realist who accepts Incompatibility and Objectivism like I do has some 
hope of resisting the irrealist argument. The reason is that, given the evolution argument 
for P-Disagreement, my proponent can say that the best explanation of Veridicality being 
false would seem to be that (1) red-green, blue-yellow and black-white, or complete 
inversion would have no impact on fitness, and (2) mutations for these color 
transformations could have easily occurred. However, realism and P-Disagreement are 
certainly not happy bedfellows and so it would be better to secure Veridicality.  
 
Conclusion 
As I said, the argument from mass disagreement is roughly that the best explanation of 
there being mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects is that irrealism is 
true. Why should one accept that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors 
of objects? One motivation is that the claim is supported by the empirical literature. The 
other motivation comes from a philosophical argument based on evolutionary 
speculation. I argued that the empirical literature does not support there being mass 
perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects and then also that the evolutionary 
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argument fails. In the end, I have shown that the argument from mass disagreement rests 
on an unverified premise and so can be rejected.  
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 Summary Conclusion 
 
This essay was divided into four parts. The first was entitled ÒStage settingÓ and had two 
subparts. In 1.1, I provided a more thorough explanation of the question of which this 
essay is concerned, i.e. the question Òwhat are the colors?Ó I first discussed how I think 
we should understand this question. I then looked at how we ought to identify (or pick 
out) the properties with which I am concerned. In 1.2, I concentrated on providing a 
taxonomy of views. I first examined the two newest taxonomies and explained why they 
are unsatisfactory. Specifically, I looked at BrogaardÕs and then CohenÕs. I then provided 
an argument against the colors being dispositions. Having learned from the vices and 
virtues of Brogaard and CohenÕs taxonomies, I provided a much-improved way of 
taxonomizing views on color. My taxonomy ruled out certain views, clarified others, and 
showed that there is an unnoticed view worthy of serious consideration. 
Part 2 was entitled ÒDispositional viewsÓ and had three subparts. In 2.1, I argued 
against appearance dispositional views. I looked at the motivation for internal variants of 
appearance dispositionalism and then the motivation for external variants. After doing 
this, I discussed the argument from circularity against circular variants of appearance 
dispositionalism. Finally, I inspected non-circular variants. In 2.2, I argued against 
reflectance dispositionalism. First, I sharpened reflectance dispositionalism and explained 
its motivation. Second, I argued that reflectance dispositionalism succumbs to the modal 
version of the objection from structure. Third, I showed that reflectance dispositionalism 
succumbs to the objection from metamers. Finally in 2.3, I provided a general argument 
against the colors being dispositions. I first argued for a revised version of the simple 
conditional analysis (SCA). Having argued for the revised SCA, I then showed that the 
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colors are not analyzable by it. I did this by first presenting the general argument form 
and then defending the premise that the colors are not analyzable by the revised SCA. 
Part 3 was entitled ÒCategorical viewsÓ and had three subparts. In 3.1, I argued 
against micro-structuralism. First, I explained the original motivation for micro-
structuralism and its problems. Second, I presented an argument against micro-
structuralism similar to the argument from metamers called Ôthe problem of multiple 
causes.Õ Third, I presented the problem of chromatic twin-earth. In 3.2, I argued against 
CohenÕs relationalism. My first aim was to give a precise formulation of CohenÕs view. 
My second aim was to argue that the color variation argument used to support CohenÕs 
view is unconvincing. My third aim was to argue that CohenÕs response to the objection 
that his view implies certain absurdities is incompatible with the argument for his view. 
My fourth aim was to defend the introspective rejoinder that CohenÕs relationalism stands 
in stark contrast to our phenomenally-informed, pre-theoretic intuitions. Finally in 3.3, I 
argued for and defended non-relational primitivism. First, I presented my positive 
argument for this view. Second, I defended non-relational primitivism from a battery of 
objections proposed mainly by Byrne and Hilbert but also by Hardin. 
In the last major section of this essay, I looked at whether we should give up on 
the belief that external objects are colored. This section had only one subpart. In this part, 
I rejected the argument that the best explanation of mass disagreement is that irrealism is 
true. I first argued that the empirical literature does not support there being mass 
perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects. I then argued that the evolutionary 
argument provides no reason to think that there is mass disagreement. Ultimately, in this 
essay I have shown that appearance dispositionalism, reflectance dispositionalism, micro-
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structuralism, and CohenÕs relationalism all have serious problems and so should be 
rejected; that non-relational primitivism accounts for our core beliefs about the colors 
better than these other views and avoids the objections levied against it; and that there is 
no reason to give up on realism about the colors.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 315 
References 
Algina, J., Olejnik, S., & Ocanto, R. (1989). Type I error rates and power estimates for  
selected two-sample tests of scale. Journal of Educational Statistics, 14, 373-384.  
Allen K. (2007). The mind-independence of colour. European Journal of Philosophy, 15, 
137-158. 
Allen, K. (2009a). Inter-species variation in colour perception. Philosophical Studies, 142, 197- 
220. 
Allen, K. (2009b). Being coloured and looking coloured. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 39, 647-670. 
Allen, K. (2010a). In defense of natural daylight. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91, 1-
18. 
Allen, K. (2010b). Locating the unique hues. Rivista di Estetica, 43, 13-28. 
Allen, K. (2011). Revelation and the nature of colour. Dialectica, 65, 153-176. 
Armstrong, D. M. (1968). A materialist theory of mind. London: Routledge & Kegan  
Paul.  
Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, truth, and knowledge. New York: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press.  
Armstrong, D.M. (1987). Smart and the secondary qualities. In Metaphysics and 
Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, eds., P. Pettit, R. Sylvan and J. 
Norman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in Byrne and Hilbert 1997, 33Ð46. 
 316 
Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ayama, M., Nakatsue, T., Kaiser, P. (1987). Constant hue loci of unique and binary hues  
at 10, 100, and 1000 Td. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 4, 1136Ð
1144. 
Barbur, J. L, Rodriguez-Carmona, M., Harlow, J. A., Mancuso, K., Neitz, J., & Neitz, M. 
(2008). A study of unusual Rayleigh matches in deutan deficiency. Visual 
Neuroscience, 25, 507Ð516. 
Barker, S. (2013). The emperorÕs new metaphysics of powers. Mind. doi:  
10.1093/mind/fzt082. 
 
Barker, S. & Smart, B. (2012). The ultimate argument against dispositionalist monist  
accounts of laws. Analysis, 72, 714-723. 
Bennett, J. (1971). Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Berkeley, G. (1707-8). Philosophical Commentaries, in M. Ayers ed., Philosophical  
Works, London: Everyman, 1975.  
Berlin B., & Kay, P. (1969). Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. 
Berkeley: University Press. 
Billock, V. A., Gleason, G. A., & Tsou, B. H. (2001). Perception of forbidden colors in 
retinally stabilized equiluminant images: An indication of softwired color 
opponency? Journal of the Optical Society of America, 18, 2398-2403.  
Bird, A. (1998). Dispositions and antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly, 48, 227- 
234. 
Bird, A. (2005a). The dispositionalist conception of laws. Foundations of Science, 10,  
353-70. 
 317 
Bird, A. (2005b). Laws and essences. Ratio, 18, 437-461. 
Bird, A. (2007). NatureÕs metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press. 
Boghossian, P. A. & Velleman, J. D. (1989). Color as a secondary quality. Mind, 98, 81-
103.  
Boghossian, P. A. & Velleman, J. D. (1991). Physicalist theories of color. Philosophical 
Review, 100, 67-106. 
Boyd, R. (1988). How to be a moral realist. In G. Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral 
Realism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Braddon-Mitchell, D., and Jackson, F. (2007). Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brentano, F. (1907). Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie, reprinted Hamburg: Felix  
Meiner Verlag.  
Brewer, W. (1999). Perception and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Brill, M. H. (2003). ÒColor realismÓ shows a subjectivist mode of thinking. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 26, 23-24 
Broackes, J. (1997). The autonomy of color. In A. Byrne & D. Hilbert eds., Readings on 
color 1: The philosophy of color. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Brogaard, B. (2010a). Color. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy  
doi:10.1093/obo/9780195396577- 0021. 
 Brogaard, B. (2010b). Perspectival truth and color primitivism. In C. Wright and N. 
Pederson, eds., New Waves in Truth and Pluralism. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
 318 
Byrne, A. (2006). Comments on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and Levine. Dialectica, 60, 223-244. 
Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. R. (1997). Colors and reflectances. In A. Byrne & D. Hilbert, 
eds., Readings On Color. MIT Press. 
Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. R. (2001). Do colours look like dispositions? Reply to Langsam 
and others. The Philosophical Quaterly, 51, 238-245. 
Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. R. (2003a). Color realism and color science. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 26, 3-21. 
Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. R. (2003b). Color realism redux. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26,  
791-794. 
Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. (2004). Hardin, Tye and color physicalism. Journal of Philosophy, 
101, 37-43. 
Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. (2007a). Truest blue. Analysis, 67, 87-92.  
Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. (2007b). Color primitivism. Erkenntnis, 66, 73-105. 
Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. (2010). How do things look to the color-blind? In Jonathan D. 
Cohen and Mohan Matthen eds., Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. 
Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. (2011) Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In L. Nolan, ed., 
Primary and Secondary Qualities. Oxford University Press. 
Byrne, A. & Tye, M. (2006). Qualia ain't in the head. Nos, 40, 241-255. 
Campbell, J. (1993). A simple view of colour. In J. Haldane & C. Wright, eds., Reality, 
 Representation and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Campbell, J. (2005). Transparency versus revelation in color perception. Philosophical  
Topics, 33, 105-115. 
 319 
Carroll, L. (1994). Laws of Nature. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 
Chalmers, D. J. (2006). Perception and the fall of Eden. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, eds., 
Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Changizi, M. A., Zhang, Q., & Shimojo, S. (2006). Bare skin, blood and the evolution of 
primate colour vision. Biology Letters, 2, 217-221. 
Choi, S. (2009). The conditional analysis of dispositions and the intrinsic dispositions  
thesis.  Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 78, 568-590. 
Churchland, P. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Cohen, J. (2003a). On the structural properties of the colours. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 81, 78-95. 
Cohen, J. (2003b). Color: A functionalist proposal. Philosophical Studies, 113, 1-42.  
Cohen, J. (2004). Color properties and color ascriptions: A relationalism manifesto.  
Philosophical  Review, 113, 451-506. 
Cohen, J. (2006a). Colour and perceptual variation revisited: Unkown facts, alien modalities, 
and perfect psychosemantics. Dialectica, 60, 307-319. 
Cohen, J. (2006b). Color, variation, and the appeal to essences: Impasse and resolution. 
Philosophical studies, 133, 425-438 
Cohen, J. (2007). A relationist guide to error about color perception. Nous, 41, 335-353. 
Cohen, J. (2009). The red and the real. Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, J., Hardin, C. L.  & McLaughlin, B. P. (2006). True colours. Analysis, 66, 335-340. 
Cohen, J. & Nichols, S. 2010. Colours, colour relationalism, and the deliverances of 
introspection. Analysis, 70, 218-228.  
 320 
Cohen, S. (1988). How to be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 91Ð123.  
Cohen, S. (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.  
Philosophical  Perspectives, 13, 57Ð89. 
Conover, W. J., Johnson, M. E., & Johnson, M. M. (1981). Comparative study of tests for  
homogeneity of variances: with applications to the outer continental shelf bidding  
data. Technometrics, 23, 351-361.  
Cook Wilson, J. (1926), Primary and Secondary Qualities. In A. Farquharson ed., 
Statement and Inference, Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cook, R., Kay, P., & Regier, T. (2011). The World Color Survey. Retrieved November 
15, 2011, http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/wcs/ 
Crane, T. & Mellor, D.H. (1990). There is no Question of Physicalism. Mind, 99, 185Ð 
206. 
Crane, H. & Piantinida, T. P. (1983). On seeing reddish green and yellowish blue.  
Science, 221, 1078-1080 
Cross, Troy (2005). What is a disposition? Synthese, 144, 321-41. 
Dancy, J. & Hookway, C. (1986). Two conceptions of moral realism. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume 60, 167Ð87.  
DeRose, K. (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review, 104, 1Ð52. 
Descartes, R. (2008). Principles of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/descprin.pdf  
Dretske, F. (1970). Epistemic Operators. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 1007Ð1023.  
Dretske, F. (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical  
 Studies, 40, 363Ð378. 
 321 
Dummett, M. (1979). Common Sense and Philosophy. In G. Macdonald ed., Perception 
and Identity. London: Macmillian, 1Ð40. 
Egan, F. (2008). The content of color experience. Philosophy and phenomenological 
research, 76, 407-414. 
Egan, A. (2010). Comments on Jonathan CohenÕs The red and the real. Analytic 
Philosophy, 53, 306-312. 
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
En, B. (1983). In Defense of the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy, 80, 279-298. 
Evans, G. (1980). Things Without the Mind. Reprinted in Collected Papers. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985. 
Fain, H., and Kaelin, E.F. (1960). Student Philosophical Opinions: A Survey. Inquiry, 3, 
137-152. 
Fara, Michael (2005). Dispositions and habituals. Nos, 39, 43Ð82. 
French, R. M., Mareschal, D., Mermillod, M. and Quinn, P. C. (2004). The Role of 
Bottom-Up Processing in Perceptual Categorization by 3- to 4-Month Old Infants: 
Simulations and Data. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 382-
397.  
Fried, L. S., & Holyoak, K. J. (1984). Induction of category distributions: A framework 
for classification learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition, 10, 234-257. 
Galileo, G. (1960). The Assayer. (A. C. Danto, trans). In A. C. Danto and S. 
Morgenbesser, eds., Philosophy of Science. Cleveland and New York: Meridian 
books.   
 322 
Gert, J. (2013). Color constancy and dispositionalism. Philosophical Studies, 162, 183- 
200. 
Gibbard, A. (2006). Moral feelings and moral concepts. In R. Schafer-Landau ed., Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 195Ð215.  
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton  
Mifflin.  
Goethe, J. (1810). Theory of Colours, translated by C.L. Eastlake, Cambridge, Mass:  
MIT Press, 1970. (Original English publication, 1840.) 
Goldman, A. (1979). What is Justified Belief. In G. Pappas ed., Justification and  
Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1Ð23.  
Gonzalez, C., & Madhavan, P. (2010). Diversity During Training Enhances  
Detection of Novel Stimuli. Department of Social and Decision Sciences. Paper 
116. Retrieved from http://repository.cmu.edu/sds/116 
Griebel, U., & Peichl, L. (2003). Colour vision in aquatic mammalsÑfacts and open  
questions. Aquatic mammals, 29, 18-30. 
Gocke, B. P. (2009). What is physicalism? Ratio, 22, 291-307. 
Hacker, P. M. S. (1991). Appearance and Reality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hardin, C. L. (1988). Color for Philosophers. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
Hardin, C. L. (2003). A spectral reflectance doth not a color make. Journal of Philosophy, 
100, 192-202. 
Hardin, C. L. (2004). A green thought in a green shade. Harvard Review of Philosophy, 12, 29- 
38. 
 323 
Harman, G. (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 
31Ð52.  
Heit, E., & Feeney, A. (2005). Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 340Ð344. 
Heller, M. (1999). Relevant Alternatives and Closure. Australasian Journal of  
Philosophy, 77, 196Ð208.  
Hempel, C. (1969) Reduction: Ontological and linguistic facets. In S. Morgenbesser, et 
al. eds., Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. New York: St Martin's Press. 
Hering, E. (1920). Outlines of a Theory of the Light Sense, trans. L. Hurvich and D.  
Jameson, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. 
Hilbert, D. R. (1987). Color and color perception: A study in anthropocentric realism. 
CSLI, Stanford.  
Humberstone, I. L. (1996). Intrinsic/Extrinsic. Synthese, 108, 205-267. 
Jackson, F., (1993). Armchair Metaphysics. In J. Hawthorne and M. Michael eds., Philosophy in 
Mind, Amsterdam: Kluwer. 
Jackson, F. (1996). The primary quality view of color. Philosophical Perspectives, 10,  
199-219. 
Jackson, F. (2012). LeibnizÕs Law and The Philosophy of Mind. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 112. 
Jacobs, G. H. (1981). Comparative color vision. New York: Academic Press.  
Jacobs, G. H. & Deegan II, J. F. (1999). Uniformity of colour vision in old world monkeys. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society. Biological Sciences, 266, 2023-2028. 
Japanese Ophthalmological Society. (2003). Establishment of the society at the return of the 
 324 
century. Retrieved December 30, 2010, from 
http://www.nichigan.or.jp/english/ophthalmology.jsp 
Johnston, M. (1992). How to speak of the colours. Philosophical Studies, 68, 221-263. 
Johnston, M. (1997). Postscript: visual experience. In A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert. eds., 
Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.  
Johnston, M. (1998). Are manifest qualities response-dependent? The Monist, 81, 3-43. 
Jordan, G. & Mollon, J.D. (1995). Rayleigh matches and unique green. Vision Research,  
35, 613-620.  
Kalderon, M. E. (2007). Color pluralism. The Philosophical Review, 116, 563-601. 
Kay, P., & Weber, M. A. (2005). Variations in Color Naming Within and Across Populations, 
Behavioral and Brain Science, 28, 512-513. 
Khamara, E. J. (1988). Indiscernibles and the absolute theory of space and time. Studia  
Leibnitiana, 20, 140-159. 
Kim, J. (1993a). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and 
 Phenomenological Research, 52, 1-26 
Kim, J. (1993b). The non-reductivistÕs troubles with mental causation. In John Heil &  
Alfred  R. Mele, eds., Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 
Klein, P. (1981). Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism. Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press. 
Kneale, W. (1950). Sensation and the Physical World. Philosophical Quarterly, 109Ð126.  
Krauskopf, J. (1963). Effects of retinal stabilization on the appearance of heterochromatic  
targets. Journal of Optical Society of America, 53, 741-744. 
 325 
Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Kuehni, R. G. (2004). Variability in unique hue selection: a surprising phenomenon.  
Colour Research and Application, 24, 158-162. 
Land, E. H. (1977). The retinex theory of color vision. Scientific American, 231, 108-128. 
Levin, J. (2000). Dispositional Theories of Color and The Claims of Common Sense. 
Philosophical Studies, 100, 151Ð174 
Lewis, D. (1969). Review of Art, Mind, and Religion. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 23-35 
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Lewis, D. (1994). Reduction of mind. In S. Guttenplan ed., A Companion to the 
Philosophy of  Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 412Ð431. 
Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 549Ð567.  
Lewis, D. (1997a). Naming the Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75, 325- 
342. 
Lewis, D. (1997b). Finkish dispositions. Philosophical Quaterly, 47, 142-58 
Locke, J. (2004). An essay concerning human understanding. Retrieved from 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/lockess2.pdf 
Lutze, M., Cox, J., Smith, V., C., & Pokorny, J. (1990). Genetic Studies of Variation in  
Rayleigh and Photometric Matches in Normal Trichromats. Vision Research, 30, 
149- 162.  
Macpherson (2012). Cognitive penetration of colour experience: Rethinking the issue in 
light of an indirect mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84, 
24-62. 
 326 
Malkoc, G., P. Kay & M. Webster. (2005). Variations in normal color vision. IV. Binary 
hues and hue scaling. Journal of the Optical Society of America, A 22, 2154Ð68.  
Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 1-8 
Martin, C. B. (2008) The mind in nature. Oxford University Press. 
Maund, B. (1995). Colours: Their nature and representation. Cambridge University Press, New 
York.  
Mausfeld, R. & Niedere, R. (2003). Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight 
 into the nature of color perception? Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 26, 41-42. 
Matthen, M. (2005). Seeing, doing, and knowing: A philosophical theory of sense 
perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
McCann, J. J., McKee, S. P., & Taylor, T. H. (1976). Quantitative studies in retinex 
theory. Vision Research, 16, 445-458. 
McDowell, J. (1985). Values and secondary qualities. In Ted Honderich, ed., Morality 
and Objectivity. New York: Routledge. 
McGinn, C. (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
McGinn, C. (1996). Another look at colour. The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 537Ð53.  
McKitrick, J. (2003). A case for extrinsic dispositions. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 81, 155-174. 
Mclaughlin, B. P. (2003). The place of color in nature. In R Mausfeld & D. Heyer, eds., Colour 
Perception: Mind and nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Mellor, H. (1974). In defense of dispositions. Philosophical Review, 83, 157-81. 
Mellor, D. H. (1982). Counting corners correctly. Analysis, 42, 96-97. 
 327 
Miyahara, E. (2003). Focal colors and unique hues. Perceptual Motor Skills, 97, 1038Ð
 1042. 
Mizrahi, V. (2007). Color objectivism and pluralism. Dialectica, 60, 283-306. 
Molnar, G. (1999). Are dispositions reducible? Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 1-17 
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford University Press. 
Mumford, S. (2004). Laws in Nature. New York: Routledge.  
Nassu, K. (1983). The physics and chemistry of color. The fifteen causes of color. New 
York: Wiley. 
Nassau, K. (1997). The causes of color. In Alex Byrne and David Hilbert, eds., The  
Philosophy of  Color, Volume 1: Readings on Color. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
No, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  
Nida-Rmelin, M. (1996) Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion?  
Philosophical Studies, 82, 145Ð57.  
Palacios, A., Martinoya, C., Bloch, S., & Varela, F. J., (1990). Color mixing in the pigeon. A 
psychophysical determination in the longwave spectral range. Vision Research, 30, 587-
596. 
Palmer, S. (1999). Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain 
 Sciences, 22, 923-943 
Pautz, A. (2006). Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour 
experience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84, 535-564. 
Peacocke, C. (1984). Colour concepts and color experience. Synthese, 58, 365-85. 
 328 
Posner M. I., & Keele, S. W. (1968). On the genesis of abstract ideas. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 77, 353Ð363. 
Prichard, H. A. (1909). KantÕs Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Prindle, S. S., Carello, C., & Turvey, M. T. (1980). Animal-environment mutality and 
direct perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 395-397. 
Prior, E. (1981). Smith on dispositions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59, 206-210. 
Prior, E. (1982). The dispositional/categorical distinction. Analysis, 42, 93-96. 
Prior, E. (1985). Dispositions. Aberdeen University Press.  
Prior, E., Pargatter, R., and Jackson, F. (1982). Three theses about dispositions. American 
 Philosophical Quarterly, 19, 251-281. 
Putnam, H. (1956). Red, greens, and logical analysis. The Philosophical Review, 65, 206-
 217. 
Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of Òmeaning.Ó In K. Gunderson, ed., Minnesota Studies 
in the Philosophy of Science. 7. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.       
Raftopoulos, A. (2005). Cognitive Penetrability of perception: Attention, strategies, and bottom-
up constraints. New York: Nova Science.  
Reid, T. (2005). Inquiry into the human mind. Retrieved from 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/reidinqu.pdf 
Roberson, D., Davies, I., & Davidoff, J. (2000). Color categories are not universal:  
Replications & new evidence from a Stone-age culture. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 129, 369-398.  
Roberts P. (2013). Parsing the rainbow. Synthese, doi: 10.1007/s11229-013-0368-z  
Roberts, P., Andow, J., & Schmidtke, K. (2014) Colour relationalism and the real  
 329 
deliverances of introspection. Erkenntnis, doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9600-6 
Roberts, P. & Schmidtke, K. (2012). In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and 
veridicality about color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3. 547-558 
Runeson, S. (1988). The distorted room illusion, equivalent configurations, and the 
specificity of static optic arrays. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 14, 295-304. 
Russell, B. (1912). The problems of philosophy. London: OUP.  
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Schefrin, B. E., & Werner, J. S. (1990). Loci of spectral unique hues throughout the life 
span. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 7, 305-311.  
Schiffer, S. (1987). Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Schiffman, H. R. (2001). Sensation and perception, an integrated approach. New York, 
 NY: John Wiley & Sons, INC. 
Shoemaker, S. (1975). Functionalism and Qualia. Philosophical studies, 27, 291-315. 
Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357-381. 
Shoemaker, S. (1984). Causality and properties. In Identity, Cause, and Mind, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 206-233. 
Shoemaker, S. (1990). Qualities and Qualia: WhatÕs in the mind? Philosophy and 
 Phenomenological Research, 50, 109-131. 
Shoemaker, S. (1991). Qualia and consciousness. Mind, 100, 507-524. 
Shoemaker, S. (1994). Self-knowledge and Ôinner senseÕ (Lecture III: the phenomenal 
character of experience). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 219Ð
314. 
 330 
Shoemaker, S. (1998). Causal and Metaphysical Necessity. Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, 79,  59Ð77. 
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Philosophical and scientific realism. London: Routledge & Kegan  
Paul. 
Smart, J. J. C. (1975). On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colour. In Chung-yin-
Chen ed., Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Honolulu: University 
Press of Hawaii, 54-63. 
Smart, J.J.C. (1978) The content of physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly, 28, 239Ð41. 
Smith, A. D. (1977). Dispositional properties. Mind, 86, 439-445. 
Speaks, J. (2009). Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content.  
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79, 539-573. 
Starr, C. (2005). Biology: Concepts and Applications. Thomson Brooks/Cole.  
Strawson, G. (1989). ÔRedÕ and red. Synthese, 78, 224.  
The American Society for Nondestructive Testing. (2003). Back to basics: Fluorescent penetrant 
 testing and color vision deficiencies. Retrieved December 30, 2010, from 
 http://www.asnt.org/publications/materialseval/basics/jun03basics/jun03basics.htm 
Thompson, E. (1992). Novel colors. Philosophical Studies, 68, 321-249. 
Thompson, E. (1995). Colour Vision: A study in cognitive science and philosophy of perception. 
 New York: Routledge.  
Triplett, T. (2007). TyeÕs missing shade of blue. Analysis, 67, 166-170. 
Turvey, M. T., Shaw, R. E., Reed, E. S., & Mace, W. M. (1981). Ecological laws of 
perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. Cognition, 9, 237-304. 
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 331 
Tye, M. (2006). The puzzle of true blue. Analysis, 66, 173-178. 
Tye, M. (2012). Cohen on color relationalism. Analytic Philosophy, 53, 297-305. 
Vogel, J. (1990). Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation. Journal of  
Philosophy, 87, 658Ð666. 
Wade, T., Jongman, A., & Sereno, J. ( 2007). Effects of acoustic variability in the 
perceptual learning of non-native-accented speech sounds. Phonetica, 64, 122-
144. 
Watkins, M. (1999). Do Animals See Colors? An Anthropocentrist's Guide to Animals, the Color 
 Blind, and Far Away Places. Philosophical Studies, 94,189-209. 
Watkins, M. (2002). Rediscovering colors: A study in pollyana realism. Kluwer. 
Watkins, M. (2005) A posteriori primitivism. Philosophical Studies, 150, 123-137. 
Webster, M. A., & Kay, P. (2005). Variations in Color Naming Within and Across  
Populations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 512-513. 
Westphal, J. (1987). Colour: A philosophical introduction. Basil Blackwell. 
Westphal, J. (2005). Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions  
about Colours. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105, 219-235. 
Wiggins, D. (1987). A sensible subjectivism. In Needs, Values, Truth. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.   
Wright, A. A., & Cumming, W. W. (1971). Color Naming functions for the pigeon. Journal of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 15, 7-17. 
Wright, W. D., & Pitt, F. H. G. (1934). Hue discrimination on normal colour-vision.  
Proceedings of the Physical Society (London), 46, 459Ð454.  
Wuerger, S. M., Atkinson, P. & Cropper, S. (2005). The cone inputs to the unique-hue  
 332 
mechanisms. Vision Research, 45, 3210Ð 3223.  
Yablo, S. (1992). Mental causation. Philosophical Review, 101, 245-280. 
Yablo, S. (1995). Singling out properties. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 477Ð502. 
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure. Journal of Personality and  
Social Psychology, Monograph Supplement 9, 1-27. 
 
 
